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Abstract 
Chinese competition law was conceived in the 1980s, soon after the post-Mao state 
adopted an open-door policy. Based primarily on the EC competition law model, an 
Anti-Monopoly Law (AML), as a principal pillar of Chinese competition law, has been 
formally on the legislative agenda since 1994 and was eventually enacted on 30 
August 2007. Such delay was caused by a confluence of implicit and explicit social 
and legal-political factors. 
This thesis seeks to explore the interaction between competition law and its ecological 
environment in a context of the People's Republic of China (the PRC) in transition. It 
evaluates substantial and procedural rules of the AML and identifies the dynamic 
interface between Chinese competition law and industrial policy and sectoral 
regulations. The thesis seeks to demonstrate that since having a viable and sound 
institutional arrangement is crucial to any competition law and there are tensions 
between the transitional economy and political structure of the PRC, an optimal 
implementation of competition law and policy is difficult to achieve under the current 
climate. Nevertheless, the thesis demystifies an obscure relationship between the AML 
procedure on the one hand, and Chinese litigation rules and legal-political reality on 
the other. It thus questions an "all-or-nothing" perspective and explores how 
competition law and policy affects the marketplace and governance of the PRC. By so 
doing, the thesis aims to facilitate the understanding of a three-dimensioned Chinese 
competition law and policy, within which formal rules, informal constraints, and 
enforcement characteristics are perceptible through a prism of cultural-historical, 
comparative, and institutional analyses. The thesis includes nine chapters. The law is 
as stated at 30 August 2007. 
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1 
Introduction 
1.1 The Thesis and its Objectives 
This thesis presents a research on competition law and policy of the People's Republic 
of China (the PRC) in transition. It focuses on the Mainland China and does not 
provide in-depth research on competition law and policy of the de jure separate 
jurisdictions of Hong Kong and Macau and the de facto separate jurisdiction of Taiwan. 
However, comparative analyses on competition regimes of the four jurisdictions are 
conducted where necessary. For the purpose of this thesis only, the use of the 
abbreviation PRC denotes the Mainland China and does not include Hong Kong SAR, 
Macau SAR, and the Taiwan Region. 
The thesis assesses the Anti-Monopoly Law 2007 (AML 2007), the Anti-Unfair 
Competition Law 1993 (AUCL 1993) and other competition-related laws and sectoral 
regulations of the PRC. Through exploring the interaction between Chinese 
competition law and policy and the social, political, and economic environment in 
which the law and policy has developed, the thesis questions an all-or-nothing 
perspective towards Chinese competition law and policy, and illustrates how 
competition law and policy affects marketplace and governance of the PRC. 
One of the feature of this thesis is that it blends an analysis of competition law and 
policy with a broader investigation into the social and political context in which the 
law and policy has developed. A fUndarnental point to be borne in mind is that legal 
and executive orders are embedded in specific political systems. ' Thus, this writer 
1 In The Spirit of the Laws, Montesquieu relied Oil the nature of a government to determine the nature of law implemented by that government and concluded that culture and law are not readily transferable among nations with 
radically different endowments and governmental structures. See, Anne M Cohler and others (eds & trs): Montesquieu: the Spirit of the Laws (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1989) 231-336,477-78, and 494-518. Modem sociologists further argue that ideas and theories are not universal, but are embedded in a specific temporal, physical and social setting that permits therrr to flourish. See, Peter L Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology Orinowledge (Anchor Books, Garden City, NY 1966) 18-46. 
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places an emphasis on political-economic analysis, prominent amongst which are the 
crucial role of state structure and ideology in shaping patterns of competition 
authorities and effects of competition law and policy. 
1.2 Competition Law Transplantation 
A limit of this thesis is that it is impossible to be value-free. Nevertheless, the thesis 
aims to develop an objective understanding of the legal and non-legal reasons for the 
progressive development of Chinese competition law and policy. This writer attempts 
to answer a series of questions as follows. Why EC competition law as a model is most 
extensively used by Chinese legislators? How the legislators adopt the EC model in the 
way they are doing considering the intense legislative debates and unavoidable 
political dilemmas? How are the legislators about to design competition authorities in a 
still authoritarian and negotiated state? Furthermore, to what extent can one understand 
Chinese competition law and policy through a three dimensioned analysis which 
examines formal rules, informal constraints, and enforcement characteristics? 
2 By so 
doing, the thesis elaborates how competition law and policy is transplanted in a 
transitional PRC and how such law and policy affects the marketplace and governance 
of the receiving jurisdiction. 3 
1.2.1 Legal Transplant 
In 1974, Alan Watson used the term 'legal transplant' the first time and defined the 
concept as `the moving of a rule or a system of law from one country to another'. 
2 Such three dimensioned analytical framework is inspired by Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic 
Performance, a seminal book written by institutional economist Douglass C North (1993 Nobel Laureate in 
economics). In this book, North defines 'institutions' as 'the rules of the game in a society' or `the humanly devised 
constraints that shape human interaction'. North argues that institutions 'structure incentives in human exchange, 
whether political, social, or economic. Institutional change shapes the way societies evolve through time and hence 
is the key to understanding historical change'. In his analysis, North includes both formal constraints (e. g., rules) 
and informal constraints (such as conventions, customs, traditions, and codes of behaviour) and enforcement. See 
Douglass C North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge 1990) 1-60, esp. 3,36,46, and 54. 
3 The term `marketplace' is chosen in order to avoid confusion with the concept `relevant market'. A marketplace is 
understood as any arrangement that enables buyers and sellers to obtain information and to decide price and 
quantities of the transaction. In other words, the marketplace connects parties together and therefore allows them to 
close deals by helping to reduce transaction costs. Traditionally, marketplace can be physical locations such as local 
open markets. In the modern world, following the start of the e-commerce era, many marketplaces are now 
networks within which people trade through telephone, fax or the Internet. See, Michael Parkin and others, 
Economics (5's edn Addison-Wesley, Harlow 2003) 32-33. 
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Watson observed paradoxes of law from a comparative perspective. On the one hand, 
remarkable differences in important detail exist between even closely related systems 
because `a people's law can be regarded as being special to it, indeed a sign of that 
people's identity'. On the other hand, legal transplants `have been common since the 
earliest recorded history', 4 because legal systems have seldom developed in a clear 
separation from each other. 
Since the end of the 1980s, `free trade in legal ideas' S has considerably increased 
across borders and cultures. Such multi jurisdictional legal transplants have been a 
result of various factors and considerations such as the collapse of the communist 
system in Eastern Europe, and the demand for free trade and harmonised rules on 
IPRs. 6 A direct and main advantage of legal transplant is savings in resources because 
technically speaking, it is cost-efficient to copy existing rules than to reinvent the 
wheel, and practical experience from the donor's model may often be available at no 
extra or substantial expense. However, it is noted that original meanings can be lost or 
twisted while divergences may begin during the mere process of translation. 
Furthermore, once imported law find its place in a new environment, legal ideas 
borrowed from the donor's model is subject to further changes due to conceptual 
differences, linguistic barriers and different political, economic, socio-cultural 
parameters. It is also noted that legal transplantation is easier in areas of the law that 
are more technical in nature such as the data protection and traffic law. Yet, the result 
becomes far less predictable if policy considerations and fundamental values involve 
in the process of legal transplantation. 7 
It was observed that `[s]ocieties largely invent their constitutions, their political and 
4 Alan Watson, Legal Transplant: an Approach to Comparative Law (Edinburgh, Scottish Academic Press, 1974) 21. 
A detailed explanation of Watson's comparative law theory is provided by W Ewald, 'Comparative Jurisprudence 
(Il): The Logic of Legal Transplants' (1995) American Journal of International and Comparative Law 489. 
' Otto Kahn-Freund, `On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law', (1974) 37 Modern Law Review 1-27,10. 
6 Jorg Fedtke, 'Legal transplants', in JM Smits (eds), Elgar Encyclopedia of Comparative Law (Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham 2006). 
7 Fedtke (n 6) (435-36). 
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administrative systems, even in these days their economies; but their private law is 
nearly always taken from other'. 8 Since the end of the 1980s, however, the 
phenomenon of legal transplantation has gone much beyond the areas of private law. 
For example, post-communist constitutions of eastern European countries were drafted 
on the basis of extensive borrowing from Western models. 9 Considering that 
competition law reflects hybrid features of both public and private law, 
10 the ongoing 
transplantation of competition law all over the world further contributes to the 
complexity of legal transplantation, especially in those emerging democracies and 
economies. 
1.2.2 Transferability of Available Competition Law Models 
Legal transplantation is a dynamic process and many factors contribute to the success 
of a specific legal transplant example. Montesquieu, one of the earliest scholars who 
questioned the transferability of national law, stated that `[l]aws should be so 
appropriate to the people for whom they are made that it is very unlikely that the laws 
of one nation can suit another'. ) However, Watson was of the opinion that successful 
legal transplant `could be made from a very different legal system, even from one at a 
much higher level of development and of a different political complexion,. 
' 2 When 
speaking of competition law, scholars have discussed the transferability of available 
competition law models, especially by comparing the US antitrust law and the EC 
competition law. 13 
eSFC Milsom, Historical Foundations of the Common Law (Butterworths, London 1969) ix. 
9 Dupre provides a detailed investigation on Hungarian's experience on importing the various components of the 
rights to human dignity from German law. See, Catherine Dupre, Importing the Law in Post-Communist Transitions: 
the Hungarian Constitutional Court and the Right to Human Dignity (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2003) 
10 When analyzing the basic conceptions of competition law, Gerber notes that '[i]n one, competition law tends to 
be viewed as a device for framing and protecting private rights. In the other, it is understood primarily as part of 
public, administrative law - and associated with the regulatory goals of the state. These conceptions clash in fundamental ways, and they influence choices about what to do in specific situations'. See, David J Gerber, Law 
and Competition in Twentieth Century Europe: Protecting Prometheus (1" paperback edn Oxford University Press, 
Oxford 2001) x. 
11 Anne M Cohler and others (eds & trs): Montesquieu: the Spirit of the Laws (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge 1989) part I book 1 ch 3. 
12 Alan Watson, Legal Origins and Legal Change (Hambledon Press, London 1991) 293. 
13 For example, see Dabbah's discussion on `Model Systems on Antitrust', at, Maher M Dabbah, The Internationalisation of Antitrust Policy (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2003) 273- 276. 
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It is the fact that most competition law of the contemporary world derives more or less 
directly from either the US antitrust law or the European competition law. As will be 
discussed in detail in the following chapters, the PRC has chosen the EC model as a 
benchmark when drafting the AML. However, over the years, Chinese competition law 
and policy have also developed its local discourse and rhetoric. For example, 
`administrative monopoly' and `monopoly contract', as two peculiar concepts 
reflecting Chinese guoqing (national conditions), were created during the legislative 
process of the AML. 
1.3 The Conceptual Framework 
In this section, a number of concepts will be defined, insofar as they are relevant to the 
subject matter of this thesis. Defining these concepts aims to explain what the general 
views have been and how these concepts are perceived in the Chinese context and for 
the purpose of this thesis. 
1.3.1 Chinese Competition Law and Policy 
In order to define Chinese competition law and policy, one may start by reviewing the 
concepts of competition, competition law and competition policy. 
As observed by commentators, the literature on competition is made obscure by the 
fact that `some of its components deal with competition in one sense, some in 
another'. 14 For the commercial world, competition is the principal force in the 
marketplace. It can be viewed as a process of rivalry that enables market actors as 
customers have the choice between different suppliers and as suppliers the choice 
between different customers. Thus competition may be regarded as an instrument 
which creates freedom of choice and, at the same time, checks market power. 
'5 
14 Stephen Martin, `Globalization and the Natural Limits of Competition' in M Neumann and J Weigand (eds), The 
International Handbook of Competition (Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham 2004) 49. 
13 Christian Krichne , `Competition Policy versus Regulation: Administration versus Judiciary', in Neumann and 
Weigand (n 2) 307. 
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Therefore, competition in the marketplace promotes equal opportunity. 
Competition is evolutionary in substance, dynamic in form and is adaptable to suit 
time and circumstance. 16 In part because of this feature, competition has become a 
`political, legal and economic chameleon'. 17 In Western civilization, competition has 
been both God and devil because it has provided wealth and economic progress but it 
has also changed distribution of wealth and threatened communities and ethics. '8 As 
suggested by Hobbes in his Leviathan, unfettered competition of countless individuals 
is a struggle of everybody against everybody (homo lupus hominem est). `Organising 
the economy on the basis of competition is an ideological choice'. 19 In the PRC, 
traditionally there was no space for a competition culture to thrive. Since the 
establishment of the PRC in 1949, competition had been painted in a negative colour, 
perceived as a capitalist monster, and criticized relentlessly by the prevailing ideology 
until the late 1970s. 20 Now however, competition is universally accepted as an 
essential mechanism that delivers efficiency and innovation to and from the 
marketplace. Nevertheless, although market does not need to work perfectly to work 
better than government regulation, history taught us that both competition and market 
cannot be simply left to an autopilot. Primarily based on this consensus the 
proliferation of competition law and policy has become a global phenomenon. 
Nevertheless, competition law is a difficult concept to define thoroughly and 
undisputedly, as well as competition policy. Because of the evolving nature of 
competition and the changing balance of market and government, different definitions 
have been given to these two concepts over the years. This writer defines competition 
law as a system of economy-wide legal rules (subject to statutory exceptions) that 
16 Maher M Dabbah, EC and UK Competition Law (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2004) 2-3. 
17 Sonya Margaret Willimsky, `The Concept(s) of Competition' (1997)1 ECLR 54. 18 Gerber (n11)1. 
"Brenda Sufrin, `Competition Law in a Globalised Marketplace: Beyond Jurisdiction' in Patrick Copps and others 
(eds), Asserting Jurisdiction: International and European Legal Perspectives (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2003) 105. 
20 Xiaoye Wang, Qiye Hebing thong de Fanlongduan Wenti (Antimonopoly Issues of Concentrations of 
Undertakings) (The Law Press, Beijing 1996) 137-138. 
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addresses market imperfection in order to protect the process of competition from 
distortion and restriction. 
It is noteworthy that the scope and the titles of competition law can be different across 
jurisdictions. The substantial issues of competition law normally include rules on 
restrictive agreements, abuse of dominance and merger control. However, in some 
jurisdictions, for example, the PRC and the Taiwan Region, competition law also deals 
with unfair competition practice. 21 Furthermore, a variety of titles, such as antitrust law 
and fair trading law, have been given for competition law. 22 These different titles 
`generally reflect the hierarchy and objectives of the law, as well as the legal traditions 
of the jurisdictions concerned'. 23 However, one may ask whether these different titles 
actually refer to the same subject matter. Another important question is that these 
different titles may also imply the interface and tension between the term `competition 
law' and `fair trading' or `unfair competition law'. For example, when examining the 
German competition law history, Gerber writes: 
... it should be noted that the 
German legal system contains a highly 
developed and much used area of law called `unfair trade law' that has 
conditioned the development of the competition law system. This 
system preceded the GWB (the current law was enacted in 1909), and 
prior to enactment of the GWB, the term `competition law' 
(Wettbewerbsrecht) was used to refer to it. Today, that term is used 
generally to refer to both areas of law, with the term `Kartellrecht' 
(cartel law) designating the area of law that we treat in this book. 24 
21 See 3.1.2 and 3.2, below 
22 Antitrust law is the US name for competition law but the EC Commission also uses the term 'antitrust' referring 
to the areas of competition law including restrictive agreements and abuse of dominance but excluding merger 
control and state aid. See the European Commission's Website 
<http: //ec. europa. eu/comm/competition/index en. html>, and, Alison Jones and Brenda Sufrin, EC Competition Law: 
Text Cases, and Materials (2od end Oxford University Press, Oxford 2004) 2. 
23 More examples include the Act to Regulate Competition and Provide for Fair Trading (Malta), Federal Law on 
Economic Competition (Mexico), Law on Prohibiting Unfair Competition (Mongolia), Law to Promote and Protect 
the Exercise of Free Competition (Venezuela). See UNCTAD, Model Law on Competition (United Nations, New 
York and Geneva 2004) Document No TDB/RBP/CONF. 5/7/Rev. 2,11 and 90. 
24 Gerber (n 11) 277 
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Gerber also notes that unfair competition law is aimed at protecting competitors 
because it provides undertakings `with a right to sue their competitors for impairment 
of their capacity to compete'. Unfair competition law was and continues to be 
understood as private law. However, unfair competition law was connected with the 
idea of `purifying' the competitive process. Such idea facilitated `the perception that 
the process required protection, and this, in turn, supported the idea of a generalized 
legal regime to provide such protection'. Therefore, unfair competition law played a 
positive role in preparing the way for competition law. 25 
Competition policy is understood in the given context as a system of law and policy, 
both economy-wide and sector-specific, to protect competition and to be enforced by 
the competition authorities (including sectoral regulators under given conditions) and 
the law courts. 26 Therefore, the concept of competition policy is different with the 
concept of competition law in two aspects. Firstly, competition policy places more 
weight on administrative and juridical enforcement. Secondly, competition law is a 
principal component of competition policy. However, the substantial scope of 
competition policy is broader; under its name the interaction between competition law 
and other forms of regulation, particularly sectoral regulations, can be observed and 
assessed. 
As the subject matter of this thesis, the concept of Chinese competition law and policy 
refers to a system of legal and regulatory rules, both economy-wide and sector-specific, 
and the rules implementation. Such system aims to protect and/or regulate the 
competitive behaviour and competitive process within and, under certain criteria, 
outside the PRC. 27 
25 Gerber (n11) 37-39. 
26 Competition law can be enforced by private parties in some jurisdictions, such as the USA, under certain 
conditions. See 8.4.2, below, for discussion on private enforcement of competition law in China. 
27 See 3.4.1, below, for discussion on the effects doctrine in China. 
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1.3.2 Sectoral Regulations (Bumen Fagui) 
Whereas competition law constitutes a system of legal rules applicable to all sectors 
(subject to certain statutory exceptions), sectoral regulations concern specific 
industries, particularly those `regulated industries'. 28 In the Chinese context and for the 
purpose of this thesis, the term `sectoral regulations' refers to `basic laws' (jiben falu), 
`administrative regulations' (xingzheng fagui), and ministerial rules (bum en guizhang) 
which are enforced by regulatory agencies and the law courts on a sector-specific basis, 
for example, the Postal Law 1986, the Electric Power Law 1995, the Railway Law 
1990, and the Telecommunications Regulations 2000 29 Sectoral regulations normally 
include competition-related rules, a fact which has resulted in concurrent jurisdictions 
between competition authorities and sectoral regulators. It is therefore necessary to 
discuss sectoral regulations when examining Chinese competition law and policy. 
1.3.3 Regulation (Jianguan), Regulated Industries (Jianguan Chanye) and 
Regulatory Reform (Jianguan Gaige) 
The term `regulation' is used generically to refer to government intervention into the 
marketplace through a system of economy-wide and/or sector-specific policy tools. 
Some commentators regard competition law and policy as a form of regulation. For 
example, it is noted that `[c]ompetition policy must be integrated into the general 
policy framework for regulation. ' 30 
However, others believe competition policy is different from regulation. For example, 
economists believe that: 
Regulation applies to special sectors, whose structure is such that one 
28 See 1.3.3, below, for discussion on the concept of `regulated industries'. 
29 See 2.4, below, for discussions on the sources and hierarchy of Chinese law, the Chinese concepts of 'basic laws' 
jiben falu), `administrative regulations' (xing. heng fagui) and `ministerial rules' (bumen gui. hang), and the 
relationship between `sectoral regulations' (bumen fagui) and 'ministerial rules' (bwnen guirhang). 
'o See OECD, the Background Report on the Role of Competition Policy in Regulatory Reform (Korea), (OECD, 
Paris 1999) 3, available at 4httpJ/www. oecd. org/dataoecd/2/44/2497300. pdf>; also see E Thomas Sullivan and 
Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Lax; Policy and Procedure: Cases, Materials, Problems (5th edn LexisNexis, 2003) 
973. 
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would not expect competitive forces to operate without problems. 
Regulation would usually concern markets where fixed costs are so 
high that no more than one firm would profitably operate (a so-called 
natural monopoly); example might be electricity (transmission phase), 
telecommunications (local loops) and railways (the network) 31 
Parkin and others argue that `the government intervenes into markets to influence 
prices, quantities produced and the distribution of wealth. The government intervenes 
in three main ways, namely regulation, competition policy, and public ownership'. 
They define regulation as `rules enforced by government agencies to restrict or control 
economic activity in price setting, product standards, trading standards and the 
conditions under which firms can enter an industry. '32 
People who deem competition policy and regulation as different tools further observe a 
series of distinctive features between competition policy and regulation. First of all, 
while competition authorities generally limit themselves to checking the lawfulness of 
firms' activities, industry regulators have more extensive powers (they might impose 
or control firms' prices, investments, and product choices). Secondly, while 
competition authorities usually intervene ex post (for instance, checking the legality of 
a certain business practice after it has already been taken), regulators act ex ante (for 
instance, authorizing a certain business practice or not). Regulators' involvement 
within an industry is long-run and continuous, whereas competition authorities' 
interventions tend to be occasional. Such differences are also mirrored in the 
theoretical frameworks adopted to deal with these two issues. While competition 
policy issues can mostly be analyzed by using oligopoly theory, regulatory issues are 
more frequently addressed by the so-called `principal-agent models', where the 
principal is the regulatory authority and the agent is the regulated firms, with the 
former having to devise incentives in order for the latter to take the actions that would 
31 Massimo Motta, Competition Policy (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2004) xviii. 
32 Parkin and others (n 1) 363. 
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achieve the principal's objectives. 33 
The term `regulated industries' is less controversial which refers to sectors where entry 
conditions, pricing, operation, and/or distribution of the gains are administered 
substantially by governmental agencies. In a regulated industry, business activities are 
controlled to a more or less extent by legislative or governmental agency decisions 
rather than by free competition. 
The scope of regulated industry is varied across jurisdictions and time. For example, in 
Mao's China, virtually every industry was regulated, planned and output proportioned. 
The scope was extended to every aspect of daily life, including clothing, shelter, 
transportation and most foodstuffs. Today, regulated industries can be found in natural 
monopolies, sectors related to the existence of information asymmetries, and/or sectors 
which are in a transitional phase, for example the formerly state-owned and 
subsequently liberalized sectors. Examples of regulated industries include financial 
services, telecommunications, energy, public utilities and transport, etc. 
It may be noted that, in the contemporary world economy, almost no industry is 
completely free of government intervention. Meanwhile, there are few regulated 
industries in which competition plays no role. As a result, competition law and policy 
'has found a place in most of the regulated industries'. 34 More recently, there has been 
a growing skepticism about the rationales for regulated industries. The past thirty years 
have seen regulatory reform or deregulation becoming a worldwide trend which means 
`the process of removing restrictions on prices, product standards and types, and entry 
conditions. '35 
1.4 The Methodology 
33 Mona (n 15) xviii. 
34 Sullivan and Hovenkamp (n 14) 974. 
35 Parkin and others (n 1) 363 and 823. 
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Competition law is interdisciplinary in nature. 36 The thesis aims to present a broader 
picture within which formal rules, informal constraints, and enforcement 
characteristics of Chinese competition law and policy are perceptible through a prism 
of cultural-historical, political, comparative, and institutional analyses. Furthermore, 
empirical methods (through interviews and questionnaire survey applied during a field 
research in the PRC) are used whenever it is appropriate. 37 
For example, regarding political analysis of competition policy, based on literature on 
comparative public policy and competition policy, Doern and Wilks observe that four 
levels of political analysis may be applied to understand the political economy of 
competition policy in OECD countries. 38 Based on Doern and Wilks' model, this writer 
suggests three levels of political analysis (see Figure 1.1, below) which may facilitate 
the understanding of Chinese competition law and policy. 
Figure 1.1 Levels of Political Analysis in Chinese Competition Law and Policy39 
36 Maher M Dabbah, 'Measuring the success of a system of competition law' (2000) 21 ECLR 369. 
37 A series of literatures written in Chinese has been referred throughout this thesis. Translations of the titles, quotes, 
and sources were conducted by this writer. Throughout the footnotes, authors of Chinese literatures referred are 
given in the traditional Chinese name order, namely, the family name being first. However, in the bibliography, all 
family names are listed first, followed by initials of given names. 
38 The four levels analysis includes: `the macro-politics of competition policy, or the identification of aggregate 
factors which help explain why overall competition policies are the way they are in each country; the meso-level of 
institutional politics, including overall decision-making processes; the micro-politics of policy implementation and 
enforcement; and the emerging dynamics concerning the internationalization of competition policy, the politics of 
system frictions' See, G Bruce Doern, 'Comparative Competition Policy: Boundaries and Levels of Political 
Analysis' in Bruce Doern and Stephen Wilks (eds), Comparative Competition Policy: National Institutions in a 
Global Market (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1996) 20-21. 
39 Adapted from Doern and Wilks, (n 35) 20-21. 
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1. Macro-politics (Factors explaining Chinese competition law and policy) 
1.1 A transitional political regime under the control of the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) 
1.2 Ideologies and ideas: socialist market economy and socialist democracy 
1.3 Business interests and policy community influence 
1.4 Interests and strategies of core competition agencies 
2. Meso-politics (features of institutions and overall decision process) 
2.1 Jurisdiction and degree of autonomy 
2.2 Incorporation of economic and legal ideas and cultures 
Discretionary elements: 
2.3 Non-competition criteria 
2.4 Ministerial and quasi-ministerial discretion 
2.5 Hearings and direct interest representation 
2.6 Opportunities for private action 
2.7 Vehicles for study, inquiry, and media exposure 
3. Micro-politics (implementation, compliance, and enforcement) 
3.1 The nature of implementation activity embedded in a mix of policy instruments 
3.2 Fairness and transparency 
1.5 The Structure 
This thesis includes nine chapters. Chapter 1 contains an introduction to objectives, 
conceptual framework, methodology and structure of the thesis. Chapter 2, by 
examining the changing state institutions and legal thoughts, analyses the `ecological 
environment of Chinese competition law and policy', including the incentive ('seeds'), 
the socio-economic ideology ('soil'), the institutional conditions ('sun and water'), and 
the political economy conditions ('pesticides t). 40 The ecological environment sets a 
unique and intricate context for the investigation and assessment of the following 
chapters. Chapter 3 traces the historical developments, transplantation and localisation 
process of the Chinese Anti-Unfair Competition Law 1993 (AUCL) and the Chinese 
40 The term 'ecological environment of Chinese competition law and policy' is inspired by Michel Gal, 'The 
Ecology of Antitrust: Preconditions for Competition Law Enforcement in Developing Countries', in UNCTAD, 
Competition, Competitiveness and Development: Lessons from Developing Countries (United Nations, New York 
and Geneva, 2004) 29, Document No. UNCTAD/DITC/CLP/2004/1. Gal noted that '... the mere adoption of a 
competition law is a necessary but not sufficient condition for it to be part of market reform. Just as ecological 
conditions determine the ability of a flower to bloom, so do some preconditions affect the ability to apply a 
competition law effectively. ' 
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Anti-Monopoly Law 1997 (AML). The chapter is a foundation upon which in-depth 
investigations on Chinese competition law and policy and its interface with relevant 
laws and rules are provided. Chapter 4 begins by assessing of the concept, the 
underlying reasons, and the substantive rules on abuse of administrative power to 
restrict competition in the PRC. After discovering fundamental feature of Chinese 
domestic market -a cellular market with widespread sectoral monopolies and local 
protectionism or regional blockades, a step by step proposal is followed which argues 
that the concept 'administrative monopoly' should be replaced by available alternatives. 
Furthermore, by analysing EC jurisprudence on state monopolies and revealing 
similarities and differences of state monopolies between the EC and the PRC, this 
chapter assesses the potential value and relevance of the EC experience to the PRC. 
Through analyzing vertical and horizontal restrictive behaviour in the PRC, relevant 
rules of the AML and other legal and regulatory tools, and experience of other 
jurisdictions, Chapter 5 provides answers on how the AML is about to regulate 
restrictive agreements in the Chinese domestic market. Chapter 6 provides an analysis 
on abusive behaviour of enterprises in the PRC, especially those of the regulated 
industries, and offers proposals on a workable analytical framework for Chinese 
regulators. Case study of litigation between Intel, Sony and Chinese domestic 
enterprises is provided. This chapter also examines the interface between Chinese 
competition law and IP and contract law. By analysing basic concepts, notification 
thresholds, substantive appraisal test, and enforcement mechanism of Chinese merger 
control regime established by the 2003 and 2006 M&A Rules and the AML, Chapter 7 
examines the potential conflicts between merger control law and industry and trade 
policy of the PRC and a possible approach to minimize the confrontation. Chapter 8 
analyses an unclear relationship between the AML procedure on the one hand, and 
Chinese litigation rules and legal-political reality on the other. It answers whether a 
judicial check on AML agency's decisions is illusory and whether there is space for 
AML private enforcement. Finally, concluding remarks on Chinese competition law 
and policy, in general, and on the AML, in particular, are provided by Chapter 9. 
The law is as stated at 30 August 2007 
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2 
The Context: the Changing 
State Institutions and Legal Thoughts 
Here the question is `What kind of society do we want and how can 
competition law help to achieve it? ' The question and the discourse 
surrounding it are political and often symbolically charged. 
David Gerberas 
As a new field of social endeavour, competition law and policy represents a component 
in the relationship between government and society. It also represents a distinct 
combination of juridical, economic, and political matters 42 Faced with internal and 
external pressure to protect and regulate competition, the PRC has been transplanting 
and localizing competition law and policy since the early 1980's. This process 
demonstrates an intricate story of both convergence and divergence. One may ask what 
factors explain the status quo or predict future developments. As observed by 
Institutionalists, although formal rules may change quickly as the result of political or 
judicial decisions, informal constraints embodied in customs, traditions, and codes of 
conduct are much more impervious. Such informal constraints not only connect the 
past with the present and future, but also provide us with a key to explaining the path 
of historical change. 43 
This chapter does not intend to answer the normative question asked by Gerber. On the 
contrary, the chapter provides an overview of an important aspect of the Chinese 
guoqing (national conditions), namely, the evolution and status quo of state institutions 
41 David J Gerber, Law and Competition in Twentieth Century Europe: Protecting Prometheus (le paperback edn Oxford University Press, Oxford 2001) 418. 
42 Gerber (n 1) ix, xv, 417. 
43 Douglass C North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1990) 6. 
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and legal thoughts of the PRC. By so doing, the incentive ('seeds'), the socio- 
economic ideology ('soil'), the institutional conditions ('sun and water'), and the 
political economy conditions ('pesticides') of Chinese competition law and policy are 
The chapter is a foundation upon which the interaction between presented. 44 
competition and regulation of the PRC will be explored in the following chapters. 
2.1 Background 
As the world's most populous country, China has the most enduring history for 
millennia and has a written history dated from the Xia Dynasty (2100-1600 B. C. ). In 
221 B. C., the Qin Emperor (Qin Shi Huang) created an imperial bureaucracy that 
constituted the basic institutional framework of a centralized political system. The 
feudalist China established an authoritarian tradition through which the society was 
governed through a complex social stratum, supported by bureaucratic elite, and 
rationalized by the Confucian philosophy of harmony, loyalty, benevolence, and piety. 
The feudalist China was the longest-lasting major system of government in the world 
history, which lasted over more than two thousand years until the collapse of the last 
dynasty Qing, in 1911. Since then, China has been transformed from an imperial 
monarchy to a short-lived republic established by Kuomintang (the National People's 
Party), then to a revolutionary state socialism and finally to an era of economic 
transition. The country's economy has undergone repeated shifts from unparalleled 
crisis to rapid modernization. The society and culture were sundered by foreign 
invaders and profound class struggle, and have subjected to an everlasting feast of 
`Isms' where Confucianism, socialism, capitalism and liberalism have impacted the 
marketplace, the society and the governance. 45 
The past 100 years has also witnessed China going through an iconoclastic 
transformation since the nation once served as a laboratory for theories on the 
44 Michel Gal, 'The Ecology of Antitrust: Preconditions for Competition Law Enforcement in Developing 
Countries', in UNCTAD, Competition, Competitiveness and Development: Lessons from Developing Countries 
(United Nations, New York and Geneva, 2004) 29, Document No. UNCTAD/DITC/CLPR004/1. 
45 Ray Huang, China: a Macro History (M. E. Sharpe, New York 1990); Melanie Manion, 'Politics in China' in 
Gabriel Almond and others (eds), Comparative Politics Today: a World New (8m edn Pearson Longman, New York 
and London 2006) 422. 
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functioning of a command economy and a totalitarian society. Karl Marx predicted 
capitalism would inevitably lead to socialism. He wrote extensively about the faults 
and evils of capitalism, but left no blueprint for the promised socialist heaven. 
Socialist opponents argued that socialism simply could not work. The Chinese 
experience proved that the two schools were both problematic and their theories are 
open to further explanation. 
The socialist planned economy prevailed in the PRC from its establishment in 1949 
until 1978. Since the late 1970s, the PRC has been in a transition from a planned 
economy to a market economy. One of the major surprises in economic development 
during the last three decades is the rapid growth of the Chinese economy. By opening 
the market, accepting private wealth and allowing competition under its socialist 
political structure, the PRC has been becoming one of the most promising emerging 
economies in the world. Remarkable economic progress has been made against a 
backdrop of much more limited political reforms. The robust performance of the 
Chinese economy has surprised observers almost as much as did the collapse of the 
Soviet economy. Many are watching carefully to see if China can stay on its fast- 
growth track. The emerging economy also facilitates the development of a civil society, 
in which individuals are independent from the state step by step, and the nation and its 
people are increasingly becoming integrated into the international society. 
Having decided to take the road back to a market economy, the PRC has a challenging 
path to follow. For example, although the ruling elite has been working hard to 
reconcile its political ideology with the benefits of the thriving market economy, the 
continuing invocation of socialist values in an increasingly capitalist society has 
deepened cynicism, permitting neither socialist nor capitalist values to gain a strong 
foundation. 46 Furthermore, transition to the market required setting up a legal 
framework for the market, breaking up the pervasive state monopolies, privatisation, 
and opening up the economy to international competition. Therefore, the transition 
46 Xiaoying Wang, The Postcommunist Personality: The Spectre of China's Market Reforms' (2002) 47 The China Journal 1,3. 
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requires the state to change from a custodian of society and a dirigiste role to a much 
smaller and flexible one. The state is expected to determine, arbitrate, and enforce the 
rules of the game, as these functions cannot be done by market itself. In this regard, it 
is useful to consider the role of the state institutions and an overview of these bodies is 
set out below. 
2.2 The Chinese Communist Party 
Founded in July 1921, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is the single ruling party 
and the largest political power in the PRC, with a membership of approximately 72.4 
million by the end of 2006.47 From the government and the military forces to the 
judiciary and the legislature, virtually all important positions are held by the CCP 
members. Therefore, the CCP in fact controls, to a significant extent, most state 
powers of the PRC. The Central Committee of the CCP holds the final decision- 
making power of the Party. Although not a legislative organ under the Chinese 
Constitution, the Central Committee of the CCP has substantial influence over the 
legislative process due to the fact that the Chinese Constitution is based on the `Four 
48 Fundamental Principles', one of which is the CCP's leadership. 
It has been noted that all communist regimes suffer from the problem of party 
penetration into state affairs. 9 In China this problem has been particularly acute. Most 
of the `second generation' of Chinese political leaders, including Deng Xiaoping, Peng 
Zhen, and Chen Yun, were victims of the Cultural Revolution, an unprecedented 
disaster that was able to occur in part because of the highly centralized and inter- 
connected system of the CCP and the state. These leaders had a strong motivation to 
change this aspect of the political system, and the separation of government from the 
CCP has become a major reform goal. However, such a reform is hazardous for the 
Party since, by withdrawing the functions of government from the CCP's direct control, 
47 Xinhua News Agency, '2006 Nationwide Statistics of the Chinese Communist Party' (9 July 2007) 
<http: //news. xinhuanet. com/politics/2007-07/09/content_6351047. htm> last accessed 9 October 2007. 
49 The 'Four Foundational Principles' refer to `the socialist road, people's democratic dictatorship, the leadership of 
the CCP, and Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought'. 
`9 Tony Saich, Governance and Politics of China (2"4 edn Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke 2004) xv. 
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it constitutes a potential threat to the CCP's commanding status. Within the CCP, a 
great deal of energy has been invested into the search for a possible balance between 
preservation of the Party's dominant position, on the one hand, and promotion of an 
autonomous and efficient role for the government institutions, on the other. 
Prior to the 1980s, there was virtually no division of functions between the CCP, the 
legislature, the executive and the judicial system. Party organs were in charge and 
pushed aside the legislative and the judiciary in implementing policy. Some progress 
has been made since the 1980s in the position of legislature and of the judicial system. 
For instance, CCP organs at various levels have disbanded their units that overlapped 
with government institutions. Also, an administrative responsibility system has been 
established for heads of government at various levels, and for their departments. 
Another noteworthy change puts government firmly in charge of issues of ordinary 
daily administrative work, but leaves the CCP committees at various levels in control 
of matters deemed important and politically sensitive. The obvious contradiction 
between these changes lies in the difficulty in establishing formal procedures that may 
in practice conflict with the real distribution of power. 
However, the legal developments during the past three decades have shown signs of 
the development of an institutionalized legislature in which that the CCP's control over 
lawmaking is less centralized and unified than that has been supposed by Western 
analysts. 50 The transitional China has therefore become a unique regime in which the 
ruling party has demonstrated exceptional skills in loosening its control of economy 
and giving priority to development while reserving its political leadership of the 
society. Tensions between the present political structure and the society and 
governance have been observed over the years. In fact, as one can see from the 
following chapters, the PRC has faced a `long, arduous process' when transplanting 
and localising its competition law and policy under the current context. 51 
so Murray S Tanner, `The Erosion of Communist Party Control over Lawmaking in China' (1994) 138 The China Quarterly 381,402. 
31 Jared A Berry, 'Anti-Monopoly Law in China: A Socialist Market Economy Wrestles with its Antitrust Regime' (2005-2006) 2 International Law and Management Review 129. Also see, Maher Dabbah, 'the Development of 
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2.3 The Executive 
Contemporary China has a five-tiered executive structure which comprises, from the 
top to the bottom, the central, provincial, municipal, county, and village levels. 
2.3.1 The Central Government: the State Council 
The State Council (SC), also known as the central government, is the highest organ of 
the Chinese administration and is composed of a premier, vice-premiers, state 
Councillors, ministers in charge of ministries and commissions, and the auditor-general 
and the secretary-general. The work of the SC is presided over by an executive board 
(Changwu Huiyi) composed of the premier, vice-premiers, state councillors and the 
secretary general. 52 
As the executive organ of the NPC, the SC is responsible and accountable to the 
National People's Congress (NPC) and its Standing Committee (SCNPC). 53 It is able 
to submit bills to the NPC or the SCNPC as well as to formulate administrative 
regulations in accordance with the `basic laws', 54 to proposed and implement the 
national plans and state budget, and to oversee public order, etc. Beside the General 
Office, there are various ministries, commissions, offices, administrations and bureaus 
under the SC. 
Sound Competition Law and Policy in China: An (Im)possible Dream? ' (2007) 30(2), World Competition 341,343- 
344. In this article, Dabbah observes the contradiction of `a politically monopolised government is in the process of 
enacting a law aimed at prohibiting economic monopolistic behaviour and `abuse' of administrative powers to 
restrict competition', and asks if 'competition law could find a niche in contemporary China'. 
52 XIANFA (Constitution 1982) arts 85 - 89. 
53 See 2.4, below. 
54 For the concept of 'basic laws' see 2.2.2, below 
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Figure 2.1 The Composition of the State Council as at August 2007ss 
Ministries and Commissions (total no. 28) 
e. g. National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), Ministry of Commerce 
(MOFCOM), Ministry of Justice (MOJ), Ministry of Communications (MOC), Ministry of 
Information Industry (MII), People's Bank of China (PboC) 
Special Organisation directly under the SC (total no. 1) 
State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) 
Organisations directly under the SC (total no. 8) 
e. g. State Administration of Industry and Commerce (SAIC), General Administration of Civil 
Aviation (CAAC), State Intellectual Property Office (SIPO), State Administration of Radio, Film 
and Television (SARFT) 
Offices (total no. 4) 
e. g. the Legislative Affairs Office (LAO) 
Institutions (total no. 14) 
e. g. Xinhua News Agency, China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC), China Securities 
Regulatory Commission (CSRC), China Insurance Regulatory Commission (CIRC), China 
Electricity Regulatory Commission (CERC) 
Administrations and Bureaus under Ministries and Commissions (total no. 11) 
e. g. State Tobacco Monopoly Administration (STMA), State Post Bureau (SPB), State 
Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) 
2.3.2 The Local Government 
The local government is administered through 23 provinces (including the Taiwan 
Region), 5 autonomous regions, 4 municipalities directly under the central government, 
and 2 special administrative regions (SARs) including Hong Kong and Macau. 
53 Data source: <httpJ/english. gov. cn/links/statecouncil. htm> last accessed 9 October 2007. Such composition was the outcome of the reorganization after President Hu Jintao and Primer Wen Jiabao took the leadership in 2003. 
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Since the 1980s, the government has initiated four rounds of reform that aimed at 
transforming government functions and reducing the size of staff and number of 
departments. To spur economic growth, the Chinese leadership has taken dramatic 
steps such as setting up `special economic zones' (jingji tequ) and allowing alternative 
forms of ownership. It has allowed collective, private, and foreign direct investment 
(FDI) relevantly free from planning or control, to operate alongside and compete with 
SOEs. 
Due to the reform, the centre and localities relationship has significantly changed over 
the past three decades and this has significant implications for competition and 
regulation in China. 56 So far, the reform has mainly involved the decentralization of 
economy and the key has been the reduction of Beijing's control on local fiscal system. 
In part because of this changing political equilibrium, local officials have gained a 
strong role in economic development through licensing and other regulatory powers. 
Reformist propaganda slogans have included `to get rich is glorious' (zhffu guangrong) 
and `some get rich first' (rang yibufenren xian fugiliai). Officials were quick to 
recognize that their position and power may be turned to their advantages through 
legitimating rent-seeking activities. Such activities have been called as `creating 
income' (chuangshou). As one could expect, transition in China is a conflict-ridden 
rather than a consensual process. The signals are clear that the ever-greater importance 
of the market mechanism in resource allocation and the increasing autonomy of 
enterprises require a new approach of governance. The market economy has its own 
ideological and moral basis, which the Chinese economy in transition, to certain extent, 
is still lacking. 
2.4 The Legislature 
2.4.1 The National People's Congress and its Standing Committee 
56 See 4.1.2 and 4.5.2, below. 
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Since its creation in 1954, the National People's Congress (NPC) has been the highest 
legislative body and organ of state power. The NPC has authorities to appoint and 
remove leaders and members of state organs at the central level, to decide national 
development plans and state budgets, and to supervise the implementation of the 
constitutional law, etc 57 These powers seem extensive at first glance, but in practice it 
is not the NPC that really controls them. Important decisions and appointments are 
made by the Central Committee of the CCP and then passed on to the NPC for its 
`consideration'. The NPC was previously called a `rubber-stamp', which means it was 
only a useless decoration. As observed by western commentators, from its inception 
the NPC `has lacked the organizational muscle to tell the executive and the judiciary 
what to do'. 58 Furthermore, the NPC has a large number of delegates (2,985 at the 
2004, the beginning of the 10th NPC) and meets only once per year to really exercise 
its power. Therefore, it has been noted that the NPC is `not really a parliament in the 
usual sense', and is difficult to `initiate legislation on its own. '59 The NPC elects a 
Standing Committee (SCNPC) to act on its behalf when not in session. The SCNPC is 
the permanent body of and sits for the same term as the NPC. Because of its smaller 
size (approximately 150 members) it can hold regular meetings every two months. 
Since the late 1970s, the roles of the NPC in making laws, supervising law 
enforcement and the work of governmental organs, and making decisions about state 
affairs have all been strengthened to some extent. The number of laws and regulations 
enacted by the NPC and local people's congress (LPC) has increased steadily. It is not 
unusual for members of the LPC to reject candidates nominated by higher-level CCP 
committees for senior positions in local government. Even the number of negative 
votes on important matters has increased. For example, in 1997, over a thousand 
representatives (one-third of the total) voted against the annual work report of the 
57 XIANFA (Constitution 1982) art 62. 
38 K O'Brien, Reform without Liberalization: China's National People's Congress and the Politics of Institutional 
Change (Cambridge University Press, New York 1990) 79. 
59 William C Jones, `The Constitution of the People's Republic of China' (1985) 63 (4) Washington University Law 
Quarterly 708-709. 
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Supreme Procuratorate of the PRC to protest against unsatisfactory progress in the 
campaign against corruption. 
2.4.2 The Legislative Procedure 
According the Constitution 1982 and the Legislation Law 2000 (Lifa Fa), the 
legislative power of the PRC is primarily vested in the NPC and the SCNPC. The 
legislative procedure of basic laws involves four stages, namely, submission of bills, 
deliberation (reading), voting, and approval and publication. Legislative procedure for 
administrative regulations, ministerial rules and local regulations and rules are 
varied. 60 
Figure 2.2 the Legislative Structure of the PRC 
National People's Congress (NPC): the supreme legislative organ 
- Amending constitutional law 
- Enacting and amending basic laws 
- Meeting annually for two weeks to review and approve major policies, laws, the budget, 
and major personnel changes 
1 
Standing Committee of the National People's Congress (SCNPC) 
- Interpreting constitutional law 
- Enacting, amending and interpreting basic laws 
- Exercising state power when the NPC is not in session 
State Council (SC): the central government 
- Submitting bills to the NPC and the SCNPC 
- Enacting administrative regulations in accordance with the constitution and the basic laws 
1 
Ministries, Commissions, and Administrations and Bureaus 
- Enacting ministerial rules 
Local People's Congress (LPC) - provincial and autonomous regional level, and municipalities 
directly under the central government 
60 LIFAFA (Legislation Law 2000) arts 12-41. 
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- Enacting local 
I 
Local Government (LG) - provincial and autonomous regional level, municipalities directly 
under the central government and certain cities (e. g. provincial capitals and specially approved 
cities) 
- Enacting local rules 
The concept of `basic laws' is worth to be examined further. The Constitution 1982 
and the Legislation Law 2000 do not clearly define the legislative competence of the 
NPC and the SCNPC. It is provided that the NPC has the power to enact 'basic laws', 
the SCNPC has the power to enact `laws' other than those should be enacted by the 
NPC. Both `basic laws' and `laws' have not been clearly defined. According to the 
legislative practice over the years, certain laws are clearly regarded as basic laws, 
including the Criminal Law, the General Principles of Civil Law, the Criminal 
Procedural Law, the Civil Procedural Law, and a variety of organic laws for the 
legislature, the judiciary and the executive, etc. These laws have been enacted by the 
NPC. The status of some other laws, however, is less certain. For example, the 
Contract law was enacted by the NPC, whereas the Company Law was enacted by the 
SCNPC. The Inheritance Law was enacted by the NPC, whereas the Land 
Administration Law was enacted by the SCNPC. In order to avoid drawing an 
uncertain distinction, this writer chooses the concept `basic laws' to cover both `basic 
laws' and `laws' falling within the legislative competence of the NPC and the SCNPC. 
In fact, although the NPC has the highest legislative authority in the PRC, the SCNPC 
holds substantial legislative power because it holds meetings once every two months 
for a ten-day session but the full NPC convenes for only one short session each year. 
Therefore, although according to the Constitution, the NPC holds the exclusive power 
to amend the Constitution and to enact basic laws, most important laws of the PRC 
have been read and passed by the SCNPC. For example, the Company Law, the 
Securities Law, the Employment Contract Law, and the Insurance Law. The AML, 
regarded as the centre of the Chinese economic law system, had been on the legislative 
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agenda of the 8`', 9`h, and 10th SCNPC and was finally enacted at the 29th Session of 
the 10`h SCNPC 61 
2.4.3 The Hierarchy of Chinese Law 
The Constitution 1982 and the Legislation Law 2000 set out a hierarchy of legislative 
authorities and powers, which recognizes those central and local bodies with 
legislative competence. 
Figure 2.3 Sources and Hierarchy of Chinese Law 
Constitutional Law (NPC) 
1 
Basic Laws (NPC, SCNPC) 
1 
Administrative Regulations (SC) 
11 
Ministerial Rules (SC) Local Regulations (LPC) 
Local Rules (LG) 
It may be noted that the hierarchy between ministerial rules and local regulations is not 
62 clear. 
2.5 The Judiciary 
A Chinese jurist once commented that, "[t]here was no tradition of individual rights 
enforceable against the State and the Party. Legal institutions remain less specialized 
and law enforcers less professional than those in the established democracies. "63 This 
comment reflected certain features of the Chinese judiciary and the section below 
61 See 3.1.4, below. 
62 LIFAFA (Legislation Law 2000) arts 79,80, and 82; see also, Kevin X Li and Ming Du, 'Does China Need 
Competition Law? ' (2007) March Issue Journal of Business Law 190. 
6' Liang Zhiping, Xunqiu Ziran Zhixu thong de Hexie (Seeking Harmony from the Natural Order) (China University 
of Politics and Law Press, Beijing 2002). 
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provides an overview of such system. 
2.5.1 The People's Court System 
The People's Court System is divided into four levels, from the top to the bottom, 
including, (1) the Supreme People's Court (SPC), (2) the higher people's courts at the 
provincial level, (3) the intermediate people's courts at the municipal level, and (4) the 
basic people's courts at the county or district level. 
The judicial system of the PRC was paralysed during the Cultural Revolution. During 
the first two decades of reform, the CCP continued to exercise direct control over 
personnel appointments to the court system and over important decisions. Such 
practice compromised the objective of separating the party from the state and 
undermined the capacity of the judicial organs to carry out their functions 
independently. The CCP also followed a broad strategy in limiting judicial authority of 
retaining a framework of law while influencing the judges indirectly. The situation has 
changed slowly but steadily. The Chinese judicial system now plays an increasingly 
important role in law enforcement, has become more independent, and has been much 
more open to the public and the media. 
However, such independence is a relative matter. Political interference in legal 
procedure still exists and, at the local level, occurs frequently. The more important an 
issue is to the government, the more likely it is there will be an intervention. As 
Peerenboom noted, `in the past, many decisions were made prior to trial in accordance 
with the dictates of CCP personnel', and therefore, `one of the peculiarities of litigation 
in the PRC is that cases are often decided outside the courtroom. '64 In addition, local 
judicial systems are under a dual leadership system. On the one hand, they are subject 
to guidance from their professional superiors; on the other hand, however, they are also 
under supervision from the CCP committee and people's congress at their 
administrative level. It's noteworthy that China is a civil law country, and case law is 
64 Randall Peerenboom, 'Ruling the Country in Accordance with Law, Reflections on Rule and Role of Law in Contemporary China' (1999)11(3) Cultural Dynamics 339. 
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not binding as precedent. It is possible that different people's courts may issue 
different opinions on the same or similar legal issues. In recent years, the influence of 
the vertical leadership has become stronger, and this has led to increase in judicial 
independence. Nonetheless, the horizontal leadership has caused a problem of the 
judiciary's dependence on the government for financial support. Furthermore, it is 
noteworthy that judges have no independent status in the PRC. They must contribute to 
building socialism and protecting the party's leadership. Throughout the country, a 
great number of judges were selected from veteran officers who normally lack any 
previous legal education and training. Although this mechanism for appointing the 
judges has declined recently, the effect is lingering. 
The fact is law is seen to be an instrument in the service of `socialism'. It is simply `a 
generality of political expedience, a way to get things done most effectively. It may 
and will be violated whenever the considerations of administrative efficiency that led 
to its adoption point the other way. '65 Therefore, Saich commented that the Chinese 
legal system is `one specific cog in a bureaucratic machine that is built to achieve state 
objectives' 66 
2.5.2 The Role of Law 
From the slavery society to the present socialist system in transition, the Chinese legal 
systems have been developed, amended, transplanted, and localized in order to adapt 
to particular social and political order. 
The traditional Chinese concept of law was very different from what is familiar to the 
most in the modern world. Manifested mainly as criminal rules, Chinese law until the 
1890s was primarily a tool for dominance and its principal purpose was to deter the 
potential wrong-doing. Traditional Chinese Society recognized the different statuses of 
nobles, officials, commoners, and the `mean' people. Relationships based on family 
65 Roberto M Unger, Law in Modern Society: Toward a Criticism oJSocial Theory (The Free Press, New York 1976) 67. 
66 Saich (n 9) 137. 
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and social classes have historically been at the core of the civil society, corresponding 
with the doctrine of the Confucianism, which considered that family and social status 
were the essential themes of ethical codes and the backbone of the social order. 
Valuing social harmony, the rulers strongly believed comprehensive legislation or 
extensive litigation was not required by a harmonious society. As a result, social norms 
based on Chinese morality governed the society. The law was not perceived to protect 
individual rights but was deemed as an instrument of the last resort. 67 The essence of 
traditional Chinese law remains influential after the establishment of the PRC in 1949 
and Chinese legal developments, at present and in the future, are still shaped by its past 
to a significant extent. 
In the early decades of the People's Republic, the legal system established by the 
Kuomintang was abolished and legal thoughts were dismissed as `bourgeois rightist'. 
There were very few laws at all which reflected a national tradition of unchecked 
power and the judiciary was largely a branch of the police force. However, laws did 
become more precise and significant after the end of the Cultural Revolution in 1976. 
For example, in 1979, the PRC passed its first criminal law. The law's later revisions 
abolished the vague crime of `counter-revolution' and established the right of 
defendants to seek counsel. At present, law is more important as a mechanism to 
maintain social order than it was at any time in the Chinese history. The emphasis of 
traditional culture on harmony and informal approaches of dispute resolution is 
increasingly at odds with the reality of a market economy and a more pluralistic 
society. Unger once commented, `market rationality cannot be squared with a situation 
in which merchants are unable to predict how government power will be used to affect 
their transactions and their assets. '68 The following is a review of Chinese leaders' 
perceptions of the role of law because those understandings have produced substantial 
impacts to legal developments of the PRC. 
67 Ch'u T' ung-tsu (Qu Tongzu), Law and Society in Traditional China (Hyperion Press, Westport CT 1980); also see 
general discussion on traditional Chinese law in Kui Hua Wang, Chinese Commercial Law (Oxford University Press, 
South Melbourne 2000) 1-9. 
68 Unger (n 25) 73. 
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Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao are deemed as the cores of 
the first, second, third, and fourth generation of leaders to the CCP and the PRC. Mao 
Zedong defined law as an instrument of class struggle, which was to be implemented 
by political campaigns and mass movements rather than by formal judicial institutions. 
Mao continuously resisted a purely legal order in China by emphasizing communist 
ethics. In Mao's China, law was simply an instrument in the hand of the CCP and the 
bourgeois notion of `rule of law' was rejected. Such a fact eventually led the country 
into two decades of legal nihilism from the Anti-rightist Movement, starting in 1957, 
to the end of the Cultural Revolution in 1976. 
After resuming leadership in 1978, Deng Xiaoping chose a pragmatic approach 
towards law. Based on his painful political experiences during the Maoist era, he stated 
that `very often, what leaders said is taken to be the law and anyone who disagreed 
was called a law-breaker. Such law changed whenever the leaders' views change' 69 
Deng believed law was necessary for socialist modernization and social governance. 
Deng led the country to a `Chinese path' of searching for a socialist legal theory. Such 
a theory must adhere to the country's `Four Fundamental Principles', namely, the 
socialist road, the people's democratic dictatorship, the leadership of the CCP, and 
Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought. 7° Deng considered that `the law was the 
highest authority', although even today the relationship between the law's authority 
and the CCP's leadership is still ambiguous. Deng later introduced five practical legal 
principles, including `there must be laws for people to follow' (youfa keyi), `laws must 
be observed' (youfa biyi), `law enforcement must be strict' (zhifa biyan), `law 
offenders must be punished accordingly' (weifa bUiu), and, `all are equal before the 
law' (falu mianqian renren pingdeng). Under these action-driven principles, legal 
reform had started as part of Deng's mission to establish socialism with Chinese 
69 Deng Xiaoping, `Implement the Policy of Readjustment, Ensure Stability and Unity' (Speech) (25 December 1980) in Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping 1975-1982 (Foreign Languages Press, Beijing 1984) 157-58. In this 
speech, Deng opposed the rule of men and advocated the rule of law. 
70 Deng Xiaoping, 'Guanyu Sixiang Jiben Yuance' (On the Four Fundamental Principles) (Speech) (30 March 1979) 
in DengXiaoping Wenxuan (Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping) vol 2 (The People's Press, Beijing 1994) 158-184. 
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characteristics. Especially after 1982, the CCP adopted a very favourable attitude 
towards law and regarded it as an effective means to implement China's reform agenda. 
It was Deng who brought the idea of a `socialist market economy' into China71. An 
instrumentalist view still prevailing. However, the Chinese legal reform has advanced 
far beyond expectation of the narrow instrumentalists who deemed the socialist legal 
system as a safeguard and a justification to the rule of the CCP. As noted by a 
commentator, `once Party rule was constrained to rule through law, de-politicization 
grew apace'. 72 
In 1997, Jiang Zemin brought the idea of `rule the country by law' into China. 73 In 
2001, at the National Conference of Heads of Propaganda Departments of the CCP, 
Jiang put forward another idea of `governing the country by law and morality'. He 
emphasized that in the process of building socialism with Chinese characteristics and 
developing a socialist market economy, the CCP and the government should strengthen 
the socialist legal infrastructure, reinforce judicial independence, improve the quality 
of legal personnel, train lawyers and promote citizen's legal consciousness. At the 
same time, the socialist morality must also be strengthened and the government should 
integrate the law and the morality when governing the country. Since 1992, China has 
been busy with economic legislation and improving legal facilities for its socialist 
market economy. 74 
2.5.3 Chinese Constitutional Law 
71 Deng Xiaoping, DengXiaoping Wenxuan (Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping) vol 3 (The People's Press, Beijing 
1994) 149. Deng created the concept 'socialist market economy' and wrote the followings: 'There is no fundamental 
contradiction between socialism and a market economy. The problem is how to develop the productive forces more 
effectively. We used to have a planned economy, but our experience over the years has proved that having a totally 
planned economy hampers the development of the productive forces to a certain extent. If we combine a planned 
economy with a market economy, we shall be in a better position to liberate the productive forces and speed up 
economic growth. ' Deng further stated that '[p]lanning and market forces are not the essential difference between 
socialism and capitalism. A planned economy is not the definition of socialism, because there is planning under 
capitalism; the market economy happens under socialism, too. Planning and market forces are both ways of 
controlling economic activity'. 
72 Carlos Wing-Hung Lo, `Socialist Legal Theory in Deng Xiaoping's China' (1997) 11 (2) Columbia Journal of 
Asian Law 469,480. 
ß Jiang Zemin, Gaoju Deng Xiaoping Lilun de Weida QL-hi, Bao Jianshe You Thouguo Tese de Shehuirhuyi Shiye 
Fuanmian Tuixiang 21 Shiji - Report to the 15"' National Congress of the CCP (The People's Press, Beijing 1997). 
-'Legal Service for Economic Order', August 1993 Being Review 9-15. 
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A constitution is described as a `map of public power'. 75 China provides a 
contemporary example of the evolution of communist thinking about constitutions and 
law. Because the Marxist theory explicitly rejected the Western idea of constitutional 
rule with its emphasis on limited government, individual rights and private property, 
the CCP rejected the idea of a neutral constitution and therefore the concept of judicial 
independence. Yet as with many other aspects of Chinese politics, this situation has 
began to change since the 1980s as the party discovered the advantage of applying the 
rules consistently, through the rule of `socialist law' and a measure of `socialist 
legality'. 
The PRC has been governed by four Constitutions since 1949.76 In general the 
Constitution 1982 (the current constitution) reflects the country's ambitions to create a 
more predictable system based on a clearer separation of roles and functions of state 
organs as well as a system of relatively clearly defined citizens' rights and obligations. 
It also reflected the attempt to free the state organs from the control of the CCP. For 
example, compared with the Constitution 1975 and Constitution 1978, the power of the 
CCP has decreased although the leadership of the party is still affirmed in the preamble 
of the constitution through the `Four Fundamental Principles'. In that sense, both the 
constitution and law remains `a bird in a cage'77 and the public's freedom for political 
manoeuvre remains circumscribed and limited. Not surprisingly, it was commented 
that 'China does have a set of institutions for the preservation of social order and 
governmental authority, but these institutions operate on very different principles from 
institutions usually called "legal"'. 78 
2.6 Concluding Remarks 
China is in the process of transition from a central-planned economy to a market 
75 I Harden, 'The Constitution and its Discontents' (1991) 21 British Journal of Political Science 489,491. 
76 Enacted in 1954,1972,1978, and 1982 respectively. 
nSB Lubman, Bird in a Cage: Legal Reform in China after Mao (Stanford University Press, Palo Alto, CA 1999). 
78 DC Clarke, 'Justice and the Legal System in China' in R Benewick and P Wingrove (eds), China in the 1990s 
(Macmillan, Basingstoke 1995) 92. 
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economy. The transition, by definition, aims at gradually establishing the market as the 
central mechanism of resource allocation. The market is not a panacea, nor is it an end 
in itself, but it is rather a means to promote social and individual well-being. The 
review of the PRC in transition indicates that some characteristics of the pre- 
transitional power and social structure still exist today. The accelerating economic 
reform, the paradoxical `socialist market economy', the hesitant political 
transformation, and the fragile legal institutions have set a unique context for Chinese 
competition law and policy. 
Ray Huang, a distinguished Chinese historian, once predicted as follows: 
The decades ahead may promise to be the most challenging and creative era 
for persons engaged in China's legal profession. New laws have to be enacted 
to keep pace with the new dimensions of materialistic life. These things could 
not be adequately done in the past, just as it would have made little sense to 
impose modem traffic regulations and street signs before the automobile was 
invented. 79 
For example, China's WTO membership seems to presume not only a liberal trading 
order, but also an independent legal system that constrains government as necessary, 
transparent, accountable and a relatively pluralistic political order. As regards 
competition and competition law, howevEr, traditional Chinese culture is hostile to the 
operation of markets and rational competition among firms or profit-seeking behaviour 
may be contrary to the vested interests. No doubt in many cases, as indicated by the 
following chapters, the law and policy are used merely as a form of special pleading by 
interested parties. Nevertheless, competition law tends to be misused or is perceived to 
be misused elsewhere. For example, when discussing images of European competition 
law experience, Gerber write: 
Many believe that competition laws were created and have been maintained 
by bureaucrats seeking murky objectives in often suspect ways and that they 
79 Huang (n 5) 251. 
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have had little, if anything, to do with central issues of political and economic 
development. 80 
Accordingly, although active state engagement is indispensable for establishing 
competition law and policy in a transitional PRC, one might ask if the country is well- 
prepared for an optimum implementation of competition law and policy, which 
depends on checked and balanced administrative and judicial systems. 
81 Another 
logical question followed is how China has learnt from the advanced competition 
regimes considering the gap between the reality in China and the theory and practice in 
the West. As one may see from the following chapters, to some degree, the evolution of 
competition law and policy in the PRC has been the outcome of a collision and fusion 
between indigenous conditions and foreign experience, which occurs in connection 
with changes in the Chinese society and governance. 
8° Gerber (n1) 3 
81 A typical pessimistic comment has come from Mark Williams as he argues that `competition law can only be 
effective in a functioning democracy', and 'authoritarian or illiberal democracies are unlikely to have effective 
competition law systems. ' See, M Williams, Competition Policy and Law in China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2005) 423 and 431. Others, however, suggest that 'the question of how a 
competition law might be implemented may ... be separated from that of 
how, or whether, such a law should be 
formulated... ', see Mark Furse, `Competition Law Choice in China' 30(2) World Competition 323,338. 
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3 
The Developments of 
Chinese Competition Law and Policy 
Chinese competition law was conceived in the 1980s, soon after the post-Mao state 
adopted an open-door policy. As the foundation of Chinese competition law, the Anti- 
unfair Competition Law (AUCL) (Fan Buzhendang Jingzheng Fa) was enacted in 
September 1993. Based primarily on the EC competition law model, the Anti- 
Monopoly Law (AML) (Fanlongduan Fa), as another principal pillar of Chinese 
competition law, had been formally on the legislative agenda since 1994 and was 
finally enacted on 30 August 2007. The past thirteen years had witnessed intense 
public debates on the necessity and suitability of the AML, with fighting between 
agencies to gain enforcement powers, warnings about the potential damage the law 
could have on business and foreign investment, and complaints on foreign control and 
on real or perceived restrictive and abusive behaviour by multinational corporations 
(MNC) in the Chinese market. The AML's enactment was therefore caused by a range 
of implicit and explicit social and legal-political factors. 
This chapter provides a review of historical developments of the AUCL 1993 and the 
AML 2007. The chapter further identifies framework, objectives and key concepts of 
Chinese competition law and policy. 
3.1 A Three-Decade Search: 1980 - 2007 
The most pressing task for China is to establish a legal system that interlinks the 
superstructure with the bottom layers of the society. 
Ray Huang' 
So said a famous Chinese historian regarding the country's true challenge after 
1 Renyu Huang (Ray Huang), Zhongguo Da Lishi (China: a Macro History) (Sanlian Publish, Beijing 1997) 281. 
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traditional Chinese culture confronted the Western civilization in 1840 AD. The three- 
decade history of perceiving and transplanting competition law and policy has proved 
the difficulties involved when establishing such a legal system, especially certain key 
components that may shake the foundation of the society. 
3.1.1 The Early Endeavour: the 1980s 
China's first legislative effort to combat monopolies was the enactment of The Interim 
Provisions for Promoting and Protecting Socialist Competition (Guanyu Kaizhan he 
Baohu Shehuizhuyi Jingzheng de Zanxing Guiding), widely known as the Ten Articles 
on Competition (Jingzheng Shitiao), by the State Council in 1980.2 This document 
aimed to introduce certain degree of `healthy' competition into a planned economy. 
Nevertheless, one could easily recognise the conflicts between competition policy and 
socialist ideology. For example, although the regulation stated that necessary 
adaptations should be made to the pricing system in order to foster competition, at the 
same time, it stipulated that enterprises must apply for government approval to raise 
prices. The regulation also stated that prices of designated key products must remain 
stable. In addition, while it advocated technological development and commercial 
transfer, the regulation also urged enterprises to participate in technological exchange 
in line with `the spirit of socialist cooperation'. 3 
The most noteworthy aspect was that certain types of local protectionism and sectoral 
monopolies were prohibited 4 Commentators noted that it was the earliest attempt to 
deal with the so called `administrative monopoly' in the PRC. 5 As a signal of the 
country's economic transition, the historic significance of this document is 
undeniable. 6 However, the regulation was just a paper tiger since it provided no 
Z Issued by the SC on 17 October 1980, see Official Gazette of the State Council, no 487. 
3 Zheng Pengcheng, Xingrheng Longduan de Falu Kong. -hi Yanjiu (Legal Control of Administrative Monopoly) (Peking University Press, Beijing 2002) 10-11. 
4 See 4.1.2,4.2,4.5.1, and 4.5.2, below, for discussion on notions of `regional blockades (local protectionism)' and `sectoral monopolies'. 
s The Ten Articles on Competition, arts 3 and 6. See 4.2, below. 
6 From developing `a planned commodity economy' in 1978 to `a socialist market economy' in 1992, the PRC has 
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implementing mechanism, legal remedies or sanctions. Instead, it required involved 
regions and government departments to enact detailed measures accordingly. The 
regulation was soon forgotten without trace. 
3.1.2 Legislative Battles: the Early 1990s and the Anti-Unfair Competition Law 
1993 
The Drafting Panel of Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law was set up as early as August 1987 
under the Legislative Affairs Office of the State Council, 7 which produced a draft on 
anti-monopoly and a draft on unfair competition in 1988. Both drafts met with intense 
opposition. For example, one view was that although an anti-monopoly law may be 
necessary, there was no need to emphasis on administrative monopoly, as this may 
obstruct the process of top-down reform by the government, and put the government in 
an awkward position. As a result, only parts of the draft on unfair competition were 
enacted in 1993 8 
The Anti-Unfair Competition Law 1993 (AUCL) is a foundation stone of the Chinese 
competition regime. Rather than waiting for a separate anti-monopoly law, the AUCL 
1993 incorporates provisions that address certain forms of restrictive agreements, 
abuse of dominance, and administrative monopoly. 
9 The AUCL 1993 avoids using the 
term `anti-monopoly' but chooses the term `unfair competitive behaviour' instead. 
Among the eleven categories of 'unfair competitive conduct', five are anti-competitive 
behaviour, including, forced transactions by public utilities or other statutory 
monopolists, administrative monopoly, below-cost sales, tying, and bid rigging. The 
remaining six categories are unfair trading practices, including passing-off, 
commercial bribery, misleading advertising, commercial secret infringement, illegal 
accepted the mechanism of market economy step by step without relinquishing the supremacy of socialist ideology. 
See ch 2, above. 
Wang Xiaoye, `The Prospect of Antimonopoly Legislation in China', (2002) 1 Washington University Global 
Studies Law Review 201,216. 
' he AUCL was adopted at the 3`d Session of the 8th SCNPC on 2 September 1993 and entered into force on 1 
December 1993. See, Kong Xiangjun, Fanlunduanfa Yuanli (Principles of Anti-Monopoly Law) (China Legal 
System Publishing, Beijing 1999) 4849; Wang Xiaoye, Jing_hengja (Competition Law) (Social Sciences Academic 
Press, Beijing 2007) 16. 
9 See 4.2.1,5.2.1,6.2.1, below. 
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prize sales and defamation. 1° No detailed guidance has been given on defining and 
assessing the above-mentioned unlawful behaviour. Taking below-cost sales for 
example, although the AUCL 1993 prohibits business operators from selling goods at 
`a price that is below cost for the purpose of excluding competitors', " the AUCL 1993, 
the related subsidiary legislation and cases have offered no sufficient explanations on 
what cost level should be taken into account, how to assess the relationship between a 
firm's costs and prices, how to compute costs, and more difficultly, how to distinguish 
prices that are low for predatory purposes from prices which are low but as part of pro- 
competitive effects. Focusing on cost levels, predatory pricing theory of the EC and 
US competition law has been developed over the years through leading case laws and 
theoretic debates and has posed challenges to competition authorities in both 
jurisdictions. 12 Transplanting such a complex theory without thorough investigation 
into its rationale and cautious self-assessment on competence has rendered the rule on 
below-cost sales of the AUCL 1993 inoperative. 
Figure 3.1 Unfair Competitive Conduct under the Anti-Unfair Competition Law 
1993 
Unfair Trading Practices (6 types) 
" Passing-off (Articles 5 and 21) 
" Commercial bribery (Articles 8 and 22) 
" Misleading advertising (Articles 9 and 24) 
" Commercial secret infringement (Articles 10 and 25) 
" Illegal prize sales (Article 13 and 26) 
" Defamation (Articles 14 and 20) 
Anti-competitive Behaviour (5 types) 
" Forced transactions by public utilities (Articles 6 and 23) 
" Administrative monopoly (Articles 7 and 30) 
" Below-cost sales (predatory pricing) (Article 11) 
10 See Figure 3.1, below. 
11 AUCL 1993 art 11. 
12 See, for example, AKZO Chemie BVv Commission (Case C-62/86) [1991] ECR 1-3359; P Areeda and D Turner, `Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act', (1975) 88 Harvard Law Review 697; 
and, Economic Advisory Group for Competition Policy (EAGCP), An Economic Approach to Article 82, (Report) 
(July 2005) <http: //europa. eu. int/comm/competition/publications/studies/eagcpjuly_21_05. pdf> 50-53. 
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" Tying (Article 12) 
" Bid rigging (Articles 15 and 27) 
Regarding the enforcement mechanism, the AUCL 1993 authorizes the State 
Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC) and its local bureaux (AICs) above 
county level as enforcement authorities. However, the law further provides that `where 
laws or administrative regulations provide that other departments shall exercise the 
supervision and inspection, those provisions shall apply. ' 13 This in effect allows many 
other government departments exemptions from the AUCL application and a share of 
the enforcing power. In fact, many authorities have taken advantages of this 
opportunity. For example, the General Administration of Civil Aviation (CAAC), the 
Ministry of Information Industry (MII), the People's Bank of China (PBoC), the 
Ministry of Justice (MOJ) have adopted ministerial rules and taken over authorities to 
regulate anti-competitive activities fall within their remit. 14 Although according to the 
sources and hierarchy of Chinese law, ministerial rules are located at a lower level than 
basic laws and administrative regulations, these ministerial rules are often more active 
due to strong authorities and powers of the ministries and commissions involved. Such 
enforcement conflicts have severely compromised the effects of provisions on anti- 
competitive conduct under the AUCL 1993. Furthermore, the SAIC and the AICs, as 
primary enforcement agencies, have been proved to be vulnerable. The AICs at all 
levels are part of the government branch and lack sufficient independence and 
authority. Not only are they often challenged by conflict rules adopted by other 
authorities, but also their investigations are often interfered and enforcement blocked. 
In addition, under the AUCL 1993, legal sanctions and remedies are insufficient. For 
example, although below-cost sales and tying are prohibited, no corresponding 
sanctions are provided, which further deprives the law's enforceability. Also, for a 
13 AUCL 1993 art 3. 
14 For example, (1) the Provisions to Prohibit Unfair Competition in Civil Aviation Transportation Market (27 
February 1996), (2) the Telecommunications Regulations (25 September 2000), (3) the Provisions for Countering 
Unfair Competition Conduct by Lawyers (20 February 1995), and, (4) the Provisions on Prohibitions of Unfair 
Competition in Saving Service (14 February 1996). 
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public utilities enterprise or an operator in a monopoly position which forces users to 
purchase designated goods and services, the SAIC and AICs can impose a fine of 
RMB 50,000 - 200,000.15 Such a range is normally a very small part of the profits 
made by those enterprises and thus can hardly stop them from violating the law. For 
administrative monopoly, the AUCL 1993 requires administrative agency at a higher 
level to `make corrections'. Even `the circumstances are serious', the higher agency 
only needs to impose internal `administrative sanctions' on the officials directly 
responsible. 16 Neither the SAIC and the AICs nor the victims could challenge these 
decisions. l' As Dr Kong Xiangjun, a justice of the Supreme People's Court (SPC), 
commented, `there are no effective administrative measures under the AUCL 1993 to 
control restrictive competition activities, which, however, have to be mainly controlled 
by administrative measures. '18 
Since the AUCL 1993 is limited in scope and its implementing mechanism has low 
authority, anti-monopoly provisions have been appearing continually in other 
legislative documents beyond the reach of the AUCL. An example is the Price Law 
(Jiagefa) passed in 1997, which prohibits `unfair pricing activities' including collusion 
to control market price to impair the interests of other business operators or consumers, 
selling products below costs in order to eliminate competitors or monopolize the 
market, and offering the same products or service at a discriminative price. 19 Not only 
is there an obvious overlap between Price Law 1997 and the AUCL 1993 , the Price 
Law 1997 also grants enforcement power to `price administrative agencies above 
county level', referring to the former State Bureau of Commodity Prices (SBCP), now 
the Price Department of the National Development and reform Commission (NDRC) 
and its local bureaux. No further clarification has been provided on responsibility 
's AUCL 1993 art 23. 
16 AUCL 1993 arts 7 and 30. 
17 See the Yongchun case at 4.4, below, for an example. 
18 Kong (n 8) 23. 
19 Price Law 1997 art 14 (1) (2) and (5). 
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allocation between the SAIC system and the NDRC system in asserting jurisdiction. 20 
From what have been discussed above, one may logically understand that, alongside 
the competition regime establishing process, China has enacted more and more laws 
and regulations, and as a result, the number of conflicting provisions has increased 
significantly over the years. To complicate the legislative chaos and enforcement 
conflicts, different authorities have issued provisions, interpretations and circulars, etc. 
at all levels with diverging effects. For instance, regarding the AUCL 1993, there are 
11 judicial interpretations, 15 administrative regulations, 232 ministerial rules, 342 
local regulations and local rules, 21 a fact which has caused and will continue to cause 
uncertainties in implementation, and further increase costs and difficulties in 
compliance. Under these circumstances the introduction of a systematic competition 
law and policy has objectively become a pressing task for Chinese legislators. 
However, it is noteworthy that the PRC has chosen a two-pillar system of competition 
law, which primarily includes the AUCL 1993 and the AML 2007, and surrounded by 
related laws, regulations and rules. Such a legislative arrangement has both historic 
and epistemological reasons because the Chinese policymakers believe that the unfair 
competition law and anti-monopoly law regulate same objects, namely, the 
competition process and competition activities. 22 The AUCL 1993 is currently under 
revision for the purposes of separating the provisions on anti-competitive conduct from 
those on unfair trading practices. The AML 2007 is newly adopted, and other 
competition-related laws and regulations are expected to be revised according to the 
AML 2007 in the near future. A dynamic perspective is thus needed when assessing the 
20 The Former State Bureau of Commodity Price (SBCP) was incorporated in the NDRC in 2003. 
21 Data source: Beida Fabao Chinese Law & Regulation Date Retrieval System 
<http: //law. chinalawinfo. com/newlaw2002/SLC/slc. asp? db=chl&gid=6359> last accessed 9 October 2007. 
u See 3.2, below. Also see, Shang Ming, 'Fazhanzhongde Zhongguo Jingzhengzhengce yu Lifa' (Progressive 
Competition Policy and Legislation in China) (Speech at the China-EC Forum on Competition Policy) (27 April 2005) <http: /tfs. mofcom. gov. cn/aarticle/dzgg/f/ 200504/20050400081489. htn-d>; and, Wang Xiaoye, 'Recent 
Development in Chinese Antitrust Law' (Speech at the ABA) (5 October 2004) <httpi/www. abanet. org/antitrust/at- 
committees/at-is/pdf/programs/speech to aba_on oct. 5-l. pdfl 1-2. 
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Chinese competition law and policy. Furthermore, this author's opinion is that the 
future of Chinese competition law and policy, to a great extent, predictably depends on 
cautious institutional arrangement of the AUCL 1993 and the AML 2007.23 
3.1.3 Acceleration v Postponement: from the Middle 1990s 
Although the AML was proposed by the State Council (SC) as early as 1987, the 
formal drafting process was delayed until 1994. In this year, the Standing Committee 
of the 8th National People's Congress (the 8th SCNPC) proposed an anti-monopoly law 
in its legislative plan and authorized the State Economy & Trade Commission (SETC) 
and State Administration of Industry & Commerce (SAIC) to be responsible for 
drafting the proposed AML. 24 Five years later, the first complete draft, the 1999 Draft 
was submitted to the State Council (SC). As the constitution for free enterprises, the 
proposed AML envisaged a framework for business activities by protecting 
competition in the marketplace. However, because of many identifiable and 
unrecognised factors, enactment was postponed several times while the proposed AML 
had been on the legislative agenda of the 9th and the 10`b SCNPC successively. 25 
Many commentators have argued that the real difficulties were resulted from the status 
quo of economic development and the PRC still lacks mature market conditions to 
implement a comprehensive competition law. Some opponents of the AML believe that 
monopolies can only arise in advanced markets where intense competition renders it 
possible for large-scaled companies to become monopolies or oligopolies. Since China 
is still in the process of establishing a market economy, they argue, the legislative 
effort would be an anachronism. 26 Concerns also exist among hesitant Chinese 
23 See ch 8, below. 
24 See Legislative Plan of the 8m NPC, Central Committee of the CCP, (thong Fa 1994 no 2); Hu Shuli, 
'Fanlongduan yeshi xingbailizhe ban jiushi' (Long way to go for the anti-monopoly mission) (2002) 20 March Cai/ing Magazine <http: //www. caijing. com. cn/riewctVhome/CditoriaU2005-05-08/2554. shtm>; Mark Williams, Competition Policy and Law in China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2005) 172-177. 
u See chs 2 and 9, respectively. 
26 Zhou Qiren, 'Jingzheng, Longduan he Guanzhi: Fanlongduan Zhengce de Beijing Baogao' (Competition, 
Monopoly and Regulation: Background Report on Anti-monopoly Policy) (Internal Research Report, The Department of Industry of The State Office of Restructuring, PRC) (22 December 2001); and, Xue Zhaofeng, 
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legislators who believe that the law might be severely undermined by complex 
competitive analysis and weak enforcement clouded by widespread abuse of 
administrative power to restrict competition. These challenges have prompted some 
Chinese innovations in the proposed AML's successive drafts, which have caused the 
proposed AML among the most hotly-debated topics in the PRC. 
During the past ten years, however, monopoly related problems have aroused public 
uproar for market management and competition protection. Accompanying economic 
development, issues of market privatization and governance have become severe 
concerns of policymakers who deem these matters as particularly urgent challenges to 
the chaotic Chinese market. The issues are also perceived as potential risks to China's 
further successful transition. For example, widely known as `administrative monopoly', 
abuse of administrative power to restrict competition refers to improper governmental 
intervention into the market and manifests as sectoral monopolies (initiated or caused 
by sector regulators) and local protectionism or regional blockades (initiated or caused 
by local government), remaining a divisive problem as an aftermath of the centrally 
planned economic system. 
Figure 3.2 an Example -- Consumers' feedback on Regulated Industries in the 
PRC: Ridiculous Mobile Phone Bills27 
Total Respondents: 279 
`Buyao Xue Meiguo de Fanlongduanfa' (Do not follow the US Antitrust Law) Nanfang Zhoumo (Southern China 
Weekend) (Shenzhen 12 May 2000). 
27 See Appendix 2 for data explanation. 
56 
yes 
no 
no answer 
N 
According to a survey conducted in the summer of 2005 by this writer28, although the 
situation has been slowly improved over the years, 96% of respondents agreed that 
they had been charged two-way by their mobile phone service suppliers, which meant 
they have to pay for both making and answering calls when using their handsets. With 
43% of respondents further expressed their strong dissatisfaction regarding the status 
quo of Chinese telecommunications market and other regulated industries, which is 
mainly monopolised by sectoral regulators and regulated enterprises. 
In addition, private monopoly and industry concentration of `national champions' have 
emerged which threaten to compromise China's efforts to achieve a competitive 
market economy. Furthermore, some multinational corporations (MNC) have been 
observed to abuse their dominant positions to harm consumers and distort the already 
vulnerable competition landscape. 29 Therefore, despite the economic boom, concerns 
both within and outside the PRC have been accumulating over these competition 
threats that may jeopardize the country's further transition to a modern market 
economy. Thus, protecting competition by improving legal and regulatory framework 
28 The survey and series of interviews were conducted in May and June 2005 in the PRC as part of a field research 
which is funded by Central Research Fund, University of London (Ref: AR/CRF/C). This writer is honoured and 
grateful for the funding, without which the project would be unfeasible. 
29 SAIC, `Zaihua Kuanguo Gongsi Xianzhi Jingzheng Xingwei Biaoxian ji Duiche' (Report on the Restrictive 
Competition Behaviors of Multinational Enterprises in China and Counter Measures) (2004) May Issue Gongshang 
Xing_heng Guanli (Journal of the State Administration of Industry and Commerce), He Wenlong, `Fan Waizi 
Longduan de Zhengfu Linglei Zhengce Jianxi' (Reviewing Special Policies on Preventing Foreign Monopolizing) 
(2004) 4 Zhengfa Xuekan (Journal of Politics and Law) 16-19. 
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has become one of the key missions of Chinese government. The importance and 
urgency of enacting the proposed AML, which has been deemed to be the core of the 
two-pillar competition law regime, had thus gained renewed attention of China's 
policy makers. 
However, two other related episodes have unexpectedly contributed to the proposed 
law's destiny. First, because of the reconstruction of the State Council in 2003, drafting 
authorities of the proposed AML were handed over from the SETC and the SAIC to 
the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) and the National Development and Reform 
Commission (NDRC). 3° Secondly, many observers believed that the SAIC and the 
NDRC, as the premier enforcement agencies of the AUCL 1993 and the Price Law 
1997, have nevertheless competed with the MOFCOM for the status of the Chinese 
anti-monopoly law enforcement authority. Eventually, a situation of fighting for 
drafting and future enforcement authority arose among the MOFCOM, the SAIC, and 
the NDRC. 31 
From the time it was conceived, the AML has attracted a great deal of attention within 
and outside China. Several events have already produced great impacts. For instance, 
sponsored by the China Academy of Social Sciences, Japan Competition Research 
Institute, and Washington University in St. Louis, etc., the Beijing Conference of 
Competition Policy and Economic Development was held in September 2002. The 
conference was co-chaired by professors Hiroshi Iyori and Wang Xiaoye, a leading 
competition law scholar and an adviser to the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law Legislative 
Panel. More than seventy competition officials and experts from nine countries were 
presented. 32 Focusing on Chinese AML legislation, the globalisation of competition 
30 The Ministry of Commerce is formerly known as the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation 
(MOFTEC). 
31 See, for example, 'Pinglun: Lifa Fubai yi Chengwei Zhongguo Shehuixing de Qianwenti' (Comments: 
Legislative Corruption is becoming a potential problem for China) 
<http: //comment. hexun. com/article. aspx? id=1077776>. 
32 The Conference representatives included, among others, Professor Hoseung Kwon, who was appointed as the 13th 
Chairman of Korea Fair Trade Commission in March 2006; Professor David Gerber, author of Law and Competition 
in Twentieth Century Europe, (The book was translated and published in Chinese which has guided many Chinese 
scholars' investigations into EC competition law. ); Dr. Ulf Boege, President of German Federal Cartel Office, etc. Other representatives came from Thailand, Indonesia, Venezuela and other countries and regions. 
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law and WTO competition policy, working papers of the conference were published in 
Chinese that offered insights and a benchmark for the developments of the proposed 
33 AML. 
For example, in his article Constructing Competition Law in China: The Potential 
Value of European and U. S. Experience, Gerber writes that `China will develop its 
own competition law on its own terms and on the basis of its own institutions, 
traditions, and goals', and `[i]t is unlikely to accept any foreign model of competition 
law as its own'. Although admitted the advantages of legal transplant, Gerber warns 
that `effective borrowing of language and institutions is difficult, because it extracts 
them from the context in which they have been used', and emphasises the importance 
to `recontextualize' the borrowed legal tools `by examining how and why they were 
created, how they have developed, what their relationship is to other elements of the 
system, and what consequences they have produced'. 34 In another article, De Leon 
explores how institutions in developing countries shape competition policy-making 
and regulatory reform, the implications of this process on the adoption of a pro-market 
strategy, and the implications of its application to a transitional China. 35 
2005 was an eventful year in the legislative history of the AML because three drafts 
were submitted successively in April, July, and November and several far-reaching 
conferences regarding the proposed AML were held in China. In May 2005, the State 
Council held an `International Symposium on China's Anti-Monopoly Legislation' and 
invited around twenty experts worldwide to comment and advise on the April 2005 
Draft. 36 Other events included 2004 Shanghai Conference on Fair Competition and 
37 Wang Xiaoye and Hiroshi Iyori (eds), Competition Law and Economic Development (Social Sciences Documentation Publishing House, Beijing 2003). 
34 Nie Xiaohong (trs), 'David Gerber: Cong Oumei Jingyan Kan Zhongguo Jingzhengfa de Zhiding' (Constructing 
Competition Law in China: the Potential Value of European and US Experience), in Wang and Hiroshi (a 33) pp 205-213. 
35 Zhu Zhongliang (tra), 'Fazhanzhong Guojia he Zhuangui Guojia Jingzheng Zhengce de Zhidu Fenxi' (Ignacio De 
Leon: Institutional Analysis of Competition Policy in Transition and Developing Countries: The Lessons from Latin America), in Wang and Hiroshi (n. 33) pp 101-116. 
36 Department of Treaty and Law of MOFCOM, 'Guowuyuan Fazhiban Zhang Qiong Fuzhuren zai Fanlongduan Lifa Guoji Yantaohui Bimushi shang de Jianghua' (Speech by Zhang Qiong, Vice Director, the Legislative Affairs 
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Market Economy, 2005 Shanghai Conference on Market Entry and Fair Competition, 
and 2005 Beijing International Forum on Competition Policy and Legislation, etc. 
Outside China, the American Bar Association has delivered two joint comments based 
on the 2002 Draft and the April 2005 Draft AML respectively. 
37 The two ABA joint 
comments provided detailed analyses on most significant points of the proposed AML. 
However, the lack of transparency of the AML legislative process caused concerns. 
According to the survey conducted by this writer during the summer of 2005, among 
279 questionnaire respondents, 35% of respondents agreed that they knew China was 
having anti-monopoly legislation and were quite informed about the proposed law 
because of professional and/or other reasons. 45% of respondents agreed that they 
knew there was ongoing legislation on anti-monopoly. With 20% of people agreed that 
they had never heard about the proposed law. Please see Figure 3.3 below, which 
further indicates the public's familiarity to the substantive contents of the proposed 
AML and of the AUCL. 
Figure 3.3 How familiar was the two-pillar system of competition law to the 
public in 2005? 38 [Total respondents: 279] 
Very familiar Familiar Unfamiliar No answer 
Familiarity with the contents of the 10% 25% 64% 1% 
proposed Anti-Monopoly Law (AML) 
Familiarity with the contents of the 1993 32% 29% 39% 0 
Anti-Unfair Competition Law (AUCL) 
Office of the State Council to the Closing Ceremony of The International Symposium on China's Anti-Monopoly 
Legislation) (9 October 2005) <httpJ/tfs. mofcom. gov. cn/aarticle/dzgg/f/200510t20051000525406. html>. 
37 American Bar Association (ABA), 'Joint Comments on Proposed Anti-Monopoly Law of the People's Republic 
of China' (July 2003 and May 2005) <httpJ/www. abanet. org/antitrust/comments/2003/jointsubmissioapdf> and 
<http: //www. abanet. org/antitrust/comments/2005/05-05/commentsprc2005woapp. pdf>. 
38 See Appendix 2 for data explanation. 
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For legal order to be established in China, an imperative step is the public's active 
participation in the legislative process and their awareness of the existing laws. In the 
present context, if one of necessary components to a successful competition law is 
compliance, the law needs to be made transparent and understandable. However, as 
showed by figure 3.2, in 2005, eleven years after the AML was proposed by the 8`h 
SCNPC and twelve years after the promulgation of the AUCL 1993, only 35% of 
respondents were familiar with the contents of the proposed AML, among which 83% 
were law scholars and law students. In 2005, it was extremely difficult for the public to 
access the drafts of the proposed AML. The survey outcome revealed the AML 
legislative process was not sufficiently transparent and the proposed AML was far 
from being vigorously advocated among the general public. 
However, although there were concerns and criticism on the inaccessibility and 
transparency of the legislative process to the general public, 39 according to Professor 
Wang Xiaoye, the legislative process of the proposed AML was relatively the most 
democratic and transparent one the PRC had ever had, taking into account the socialist 
State's strict confidentiality in previous legislative affairs. Professors Wang has 
actively promoted competition law to government officials and the public by 
delivering lectures and speeches and by offering advice. One of the latest lectures was 
delivered to the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress (SCNPC) in 
Beijing on 27`x' October 2005, under the title `anti-monopoly law: a principal law to 
protect the socialist market economy order'. Mr Wu Bangguo, China's top legislator 
and Chairman of the SCNPC, chaired the lecture and other thirteen members of the 
SCNPC were presented. 40 
Professor Wang commented that the enactment of the AML will be a milestone in the 
Chinese legal history and the law's enforcement and evolution would act as a catalyst 
39 See, for example, Williams (n 24) 172 and fns 44 and 45 of 172; Duan Hongqing, `Boyi Lifa Gongkai' (Legislative process should open to the public) (2005) 138 CarjingZa. hi (Caijing Magazine). 
40 'Renda changweiui juxing di shiqici fazhi jiangzuo' (the 17' Legal Lecture held at the SCNPC) Renmin Ribao (People Daily) (Beijing 28 October 2005) 1 <httpl/www. people. com. cn/GB/paper464/16033/1417260. html> last 
accessed 9 October 2007. 
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for the country's future political reform. She also commented that although problems 
which may cause uncertainty and inconsistency still exist, it would be naive to wait 
until the law reaches its perfection. Chinese decision-makers would like to see the law 
is adopted with great caution, and is tested and improved by practice. 
4' 
During the Annual Plenary Session of the 10`h NPC in March 2006, the proposed law 
once again caused strong repercussion from the topic of administrative monopoly to 
concerns of M&A involving MNC, and from officials, the public, to the business 
community within and outside China. In spite of being at the centre of attention, both 
optimistic predictions of promulgation during 2006 or 2007 and gloomy views of the 
proposed law's uncertain fate in a `never-never land' were prevalent. 
42 
By August 2007, at least ten drafts (listed at Figure 3.4 below) were generated and 
unpublicly circulated among representatives of the NPC, the administrative and 
judicial systems, legal and business professionals, academia, and international experts 
and organisations for comments and discussion. 
Figure 3.4 Ten Drafts of the Proposed Anti-Monopoly Law 
" The 1999 Draft 
" the 2001 Draft 
" the 2002 Draft 
" the 2004 Draft 
" the April 2005 Draft 
" the July 2005 Draft 
" the November 2005 Draft 
" Interviews with Wang Xiaoye, Professor of Law, Law Institute of Chinese Academy of Social Science (CASS) 
and Advisor to the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law Legislative Panel; also see, Wang Xiaoling `Fanlongduanfa: ba lifa 
nanti liudao zhifa zhong jiejue' (Anti-Monopoly Law: leave the legislative problems to implementation) 
<http: //news. xinhuanet. com/newmedia/2005-09/05/content_3443874. htm>, last accessed 9 October 2007. 
42 Li Yuezheng, 'Fanlongduanfa shaguoli gai dun sha cai: duofang liyi boyi' (What should be in the pot of the anti- 
monopoly law: a multi-layers rivalry among multi-parties) Zhongguo Qingnianbao (China Youth Daily) (Beijing 27 
January 2006); Cai Songting, `Waizi longduanxing binggou xiang jinghao, Zhongguo yinjin waizi zhengce 
zhuanxiang' (alarms from monopolizing M&A: will China's foreign direct investment policy change direction? ) 
(Zhongguo Xinwen Wang (Chinenews. com)) (27 March 2006). 
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" the First Reading Draft (June 2006) 
" the Second Reading Draft (June 2007) 
" the Third Reading Draft (August 2007) 
3.1.4 The First and the Second Readings of the Proposed Anti-Monopoly Law 
The proposed AML was submitted to the 22°d Session of the 10`h SCNPC for a first 
reading in June 2006. In June 2007, the 28th Session of the 10th SCNPC considered the 
proposed AML for the second time. A consensus established between legislators, 
officials, and legal experts that the AML legislation should not be delayed any longer 
and the proposed AML should be enacted as soon as possible 43 
The First Reading Draft includes 56 Articles under eight chapters. 44 The Second 
Reading Draft includes 57 Articles under eight chapters. Three types of monopolistic 
conduct fall under scrutiny, namely, monopoly agreements (restrictive agreements), 
abuses of market dominant positions and concentrations between undertakings that 
may have the effect of eliminating or restricting competition. The proposed AML also 
prohibits the abuse of administrative power to eliminate or restrict competition, a type 
of conduct that has caused the most formidable monopolies in contemporary China. 
Compared with the First Reading Draft, six major changes can be observed from the 
Second Reading Draft, including, (1) requiring the State to promulgate and implement 
competition rules appropriate for the socialist market economy and to improve macro- 
economic measures for a united, open, competitive, and orderly market system; (2) 
declaring that the State shall encourage concentrations between undertakings through 
fair competition and voluntary association in order to expand economic scale and 
scope and to increase competitiveness; (3) confirming that undertakings with dominant 
market positions shall not abuse such positions to eliminate or restrict competition; (4) 
43 Official records of the proposed AML three readings are available at 
<http: //www. npc. gov. cn/zgrdw/flzt/index. jsp? lmid=15&dm=1520&pdmc=ch>, last accessed 9 October 2007. 
µ Several articles have provided detailed analysis on the First Reading Draft. See, for example, Moritz Lorenz, 
'Guarding the Pass - The Forthcoming Chinese Competition Legislation' (2007) 30 (1) Word Competition 137; Mark Furse, 'Competition Law Choice in China' (2007) 30 (2) World Competition 323; Maher Dabbah, 'The 
Development of Sound Competition Law and Policy in China: An (Im)possible Dream? ' (2007) 30 (2) World 
Competition 341. 
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requiring the State to protect state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in key and strategic 
sectors and to protect legally arranged exclusive dealing. Meanwhile, pricing and 
business operations of such undertakings and arrangements will be scrutinized and 
regulated according to law; (5) requiring that trade associations shall improve self- 
discipline in order to guide legal competition between undertakings and to protect the 
market competitive order; and, (6) stating that mergers and acquisitions of domestic 
undertakings by foreign companies should be examined according to relevant laws and 
regulations if the proposed transactions are related to national security. 
However, the Second Reading Draft includes no specific merger notification 
thresholds, leaving the task of clarification to the SC by promulgating AML 
implementing regulations before 1 August 2008. It is noteworthy that the First Reading 
Draft chose objective turnover notification thresholds in place of previously proposed 
multiple thresholds that combined criteria of turnover, transaction value and market 
shares. Under the First Reading Draft, the thresholds were met where the combined 
aggregate worldwide turnover of all the undertakings concerned exceeded RMB 12 
billion and the aggregate turnover in the Chinese domestic market of any one 
undertaking concerned exceeded RMB 800 million. 
During the AML's second reading, many top legislators appraised the Second Reading 
Draft as being `more suitable to national conditions (guoqing)'. In contrast, leading 
Chinese competition law scholars commented that the latest developments indicated 
conflicting industry policy and competition law, growing protectionism and 
nationalism, and an ongoing battle to establish and defend national champions. 
Encouragingly, the Second Reading Draft converges to the international best practice 
and clarifies that the AML will not prohibit dominant market position per se but will 
scrutinize abusive conduct of market winners. Hopefully, this will further enhance the 
development of economically sound competition law in China. This writer suggests 
that a patient and dynamic approach is needed when observing the interface between 
competition law and industry policy and the rivalry between reformists, protectionists 
and techno-nationalists under the Chinese context. 
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3.1.5 The Third Reading and the Enactment of the Anti-Monopoly Law 2007 
From 24 to 29 August 2007, the 29`h Session of the 10th SCNPC was held in Beijing, 
which read the proposed AML for the third time. The Third Reading Draft made 
several revisions based on the Second Reading Draft, including superior powers 
granted to the AMEA to enforce the AML (against sectoral regulators), decreased 
powers to the AMC, clearer indication of a rebuttable market share presumption for 
establishing a dominant position, increased fines for restrictive agreements and abuse 
of dominance, and more serious punishment for abuse of administrative power to 
restrict competition, etc. The final version of the AML was almost identical with the 
Third Reading Draft, apart from a minor revision of an article on industry associations. 
Winning 150 out of the 153 votes, the AML was formally adopted on 30 August 2007 
and will enter into force on 1 August 2008.45 The AML's enactment is a landmark step 
in the establishment of a Chinese competition law system. 
3.2 The Framework: Monism v Dualism 
Chinese competition law and policy have two pillars, including the Anti-Unfair 
Competition Law 1993 (AUCL) and the Anti-Monopoly Law 2007 (AML). The 
system also includes a series of basic laws and numerous administrative regulations 
and ministerial rules. 46 In stead of a dual legislative framework of competition law 
composed of unfair competition law and anti-monopoly law, some Chinese scholars 
have advocated a unified legislative structure that combines the two pillars and has a 
centralized enforcement authority. Some believe that a dual legislative model implies 
significant conflicts in administrative institutions and may potentially caused 
inconsistency and uncertainty in implementation. In contrast, a unified competition law 
framework can integrate the AUCL with the AML, and establish a quasi-independent 
enforcement authority directly under the State Council. Such an arrangement, like 
those operating in Taiwan, Russia, Indonesia, and Hungary, etc. would be more 
45 Xinhua News Agency, 'China adopts Anti-Monopoly Law, ' (Beijing 30 August 2007) 
<http: //www. chinadafly. com. cn/china/2007-08/30/content_6069209. htm>, last accessed 9 October 2007. 
46 See discussions in 4.2,5.2,6.2,72, and 8.2, below. 
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accountable and transparent and less unpredictable, more efficient and less cost. It 
would also prevent the potential conflicts both in interpretation and in enforcement, 
and would further reduce rent-seeking behaviour. 47 However, until now, there is no 
sign that such a proposal would be accepted by Chinese legislators. 
3.3 The Objectives 
As observed by leading commentators, the topic of competition policy objective is an 
evergreen old one but with very new components. 48 `The objectives of competition can 
shift'. 49 The variation in competition law objectives is seen both across time and across 
jurisdictions. They also vary depending on the stage of economic development and the 
size of the economy. 50 The issue of legislative objectives is relevant for recognizing the 
legislators' motivation to adopt a competition law and thus is imperative. 51 In addition, 
competition law and policy does not stand in detachment or live in a vacuum. 
Imbedded in a specific order, the law is functioning as an indication of contemporary 
values and goals of a society in particular, and is inclined to transform as political ideas 
in general. Different jurisdictions' competition law considers various concerns. 
Because views and insights shift over time and place, competition law therefore exists 
in tensions, conflicts, and inconsistency. 52 
Furthermore, the issue of competition law objectives is significant because the 
47 Wang Yanlin, 'Zailun Zhongguo Jingzhengfa Lifali zhi Xuanze' (Revisit the Option of Legislative Model on the 
Competition Law of PRC) (2005) 1 Jing_hengja Pinglun (Competition Law Review) 29-40; Wang Xuezheng, 
'Jingzhengfa lila moshi bijiao yanjiu' (Comparative Research into Competition Legislative Models) (1997) 5 
Zhongguo Faxue (Chinese Legal Science) 59-66; Kou Xiangjun, The Principles of Anti-Monopoly Law (China 
Legal System Press, Beijing 2001) 29-5 1. 
u CD Ehlermann & LL Laudati (eds), European Competition Law Annual 1997: Objectives of Competition Policy 
(Hart Publishing, Oxford 1998); Dabbah, The Internationaleation of Antitrust Policy (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge 2003) 49-57. 
49 Sufrfn (n 106) 105. 
50 ABA, Report on Antitrust Policy Objectives, 
<http: //www. abanet. org/antitrustJcomments/2003/jointsubmission. pdfl (at appendices) fn 28 of p 12; World Bank 
and OECD, A Framework for the Design and Implementation of Competition Law and Policy (World Bank and 
OECD, Washington DC 1999) 1-7. 
51ABA(n47)10. 
52 Dabbah (n 46) 51; Richard Whish, Competition Law (5th edn Butterworths, London 2003) 17. 
66 
approaches by which objectives are expressed affect the way in which they are 
conceived and understood. 3 Clear objectives inform the implementation of the law by 
helping to identify and explain differences in legal standards and outcomes in specific 
cases and such implementation makes the rationales explicit for decision-making and 
thus increases transparency and certainty. 54 Moreover, although economic theory and 
empirical techniques provide a set of tools with which to assess the relative merits of 
competing economic hypotheses, what hypotheses the decision-makers and 
practitioners should seek to test are implicitly related with the objectives of a particular 
ss system of competition law. 
3.3.1 The Classification of Competition Law Objectives: Lessons from Other 
Jurisdictions 
A classification of competition law objectives across jurisdictions may help to further 
recognize that the AML has been molded to serve both economic and non-economic 
objectives, as well as direct and ultimate goals. It is a multi-purpose new endeavor, 
which has been adapted both to 'guoqing' (national conditions) and to international 
accepted competition law principles. 56 
The US Sherman Act was enacted in 1890 to constrain the growth of industrial 
combinations and to protect the `little man'. The statutory language was loose and 
vague and the interpretation was left to the judiciary. 57 With the passage of time, The 
US adopted more specific statutes to prevent dominant firms from foreclosing market 
opportunities to their less powerful competitors, to address unfair competition in order 
to benefit consumers, to protect small businesses from being disadvantaged by larger 
53 David J Gerber, 'Constructing Competition Law in China: The Potential Value of European and U. S. Experience' 
(2004) 3 Washington University Global Studies Law Review 325-329. 
54 ABA (n 47) 1-2 and Dabbah (n 46) 49-57. 
55 S Bishop and M Walker, Economics of E. C. Competition Law: Concepts, Application and Measurement (2"d edn 
Sweet and Maxwell, London 2003) 3-6. 
56 Shang Ming (n22). 
57 ABA (n 47) 6-7; Jones and Sufrin, EC Competition Law (2nd edn Oxford University Press, Oxford 2004) 18-21. 
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competitors' buying power, and to forestall industrial concentration. " In Europe, the 
1957 Treaty of Rome established the European Economic Community which was 
aimed to enhance peace in Europe by promoting free movement of goods, persons, 
services and capital within a common market. The Treaty of Rome included 
competition provisions addressing both restrictive agreements and abuse of dominance 
to promote market integration. 59 
Most recently, developing and transitional countries have had mixed motives in 
adopting competition laws. 60 For example, the purpose of the Armenia competition law 
is to `protect and promote economic competition, to ensure an appropriate environment 
for fair competition, the development of businesses and protection of consumer 
rights. '61 In the Russian Federation, the law is enacted in order to `prevent, limit and 
suppress monopolistic activity and unfair competition, and ensure conditions for the 
creation and efficient operation of commodity markets'. 62 In Mongolia, the law's 
legislative intent is `to regulate relations connected with prohibiting and restricting 
state control over competition of economic entities in the market, monopoly and other 
activities impeding fair competition. ' 63 The legislative purpose of the Fair Trade Law 
of Taiwan is to maintain trading orders, to protect consumers' interests, to ensure fair 
competition, and to promote economic stability and prosperity. 64 The Indonesian 
competition legislature adopted in 1999, recites that it is intended to ensure economic 
democracy, equal opportunities for market actors, economic efficiency, and the welfare 
of the people. 65 As one could see, various objectives have been asserted by competition 
SB Clayton Act 1914; Federal Trade Commission Act 1914 which was extended to address unfair or deceptive acts or 
practices in 1936; Robinson-Patman Act 1936; Celler-Kefauver Amendment to Clayton Act. 
59 Jones and Sufrin (n 54) 33-35. 
60 UNCTAD, Model Law on Competition (United Nations, New York and Geneva 2004) 13-15. 
61 Law of the Republic of Armenia on Protection of Economic Competition, art 1. 
6' Law of 30 May 1995 on Competition and the Limitation of Monopolistic Activity in Commodity Markets, 
Russian Federation, art 1. 
63 Law of Mongolia on Prohibiting Unfair Competition, art 1. 
64 Taiwanese Fair Trade Law 1992. 
65 Law of Indonesia No. 5 of 1999 Concerning the Ban on Monopolistic Practices and Unfair Business Competition. 
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laws of different jurisdictions since modern competition law was conceived in the USA 
and Europe. Many commentators have discussed this issue and have classified the 
objectives into different categories. 66 However, there is still no thorough and 
conclusive list available for counties that are currently adopting competition law. 
Whereas there is no final consensus of which specific objectives are inappropriate, the 
general agreement is that the `promotion of competition' expressed within efficiency 
terms is a fundamental objective. It is recommended that economic analysis, in terms 
of efficiencies, should play a central role in the application and enforcement of 
competition law. As recognized, the trend toward greater reliance on economic analysis 
provides a common language which furthers accountability and facilitates 
understanding and critical appraisal. Furthermore, such a trend provides recognized 
and objective criteria and modes of analysis, which can limit discretion of decision- 
makers and thus increase transparency. Increasing reliance on an economic analysis by 
different jurisdictions also helps to achieve greater convergence among competition 
enforcers, which may thus increase business certainty globally. 
Instead of claiming that the sociopolitical objectives should be ignored, it has been 
further recommended that rather than functioning as operational criteria in individual 
competition cases, such objectives are best employed in the formulation of stand alone 
legislation or a priori rule. Furthermore, the examination of social and political 
Objectives should be transparently separated from the economic analysis engendered 
by the promotion of economic objective. 67 
The following sub-sections provide an analysis of rationales and debates on economic 
'd sociopolitical objectives, sole objective and multiple objectives, and ultimate and 
direct objectives of competition law and policy. 
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61 
See, for example, Dabbah (n 46) 49-53, ABA (n47) 11-29, World Bank and OECD (n 47)1-5. 
4BA (n 47) 1-2 and 37-41; Ehlerma anLaudati (n 46)10-26. 
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3.3.1.1 Economic v Sociopolitical Objectives 
The two categories that attract most debates can be defined as economic and 
sociopolitical objectives. Some commentators stated, regarding the two ends of the 
spectrum of the `objective issue', there exist economic (efficiency and consumer 
welfare) and non-economic (sociopolitical and public interest) approaches to 
competition law. 68 
At one end of the spectrum is the view that the only goal of competition law is 
maximizing economic efficiency in order to achieve lower price, improved quality, 
increased choices, and accelerated innovation. There is no legitimate place for 
sociopolitical objectives such as fairness and equity because they are not able to be 
enforced in a consistent and transparent way as such criteria are ill-defined and subject 
to value judgements and political influences. 
The contrary opinion is that competition policy is established on multiple values that 
reflect a society's wishes and such society's perception of itself. In fact, each country's 
competition law is modified to its needs, follows its historical and cultural framework 
and thus imbedded in its institutional arrangement. The law therefore unavoidably has 
both economic and non-economic objectives such as facilitating market integration, 
protecting small businesses, preserving the free enterprise system, maintaining fairness, 
honesty and social cohesion, upholding democratic process and pluralism, etc. 
However, unanimity breaks down within and across countries regarding how the 
respective weights and priorities should be attached to these objectives, and the 
potential tensions between some sociopolitical objectives intensify the argument. 
Nevertheless, some questioned whether there is a clear distinction between economic 
and sociopolitical objectives because most of the suggested sociopolitical objectives, 
such as democratic process, pluralism, market integration, etc., can also be described 
as economic goals. 69 
68 World Bank and OECD (n 47) 1; ABA (n 47) 1-3; Dabbah (n 46) 53. 
69 Ehlermann and Laudas (n 46) 6-8. 
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For example, the Japanese anti-monopoly law states that its ultimate objective is `the 
democratic development of the national economy' which laid the foundation for 
thwarting the reoccurrence of `Zaibatsu' (gigantic diversified family enterprises that 
once controlled the Japanese economy during the prewar ear, such as Mistsui and 
Yasuda). It obviously has a political component. However it was conceived as an 
economic objective. In addition, Japanese anti-monopoly law also specifies one of its 
objectives as `fair competition', a concept generally understood by Japanese as 
competition by means of innate aspects of business, such as price and quality (but not 
hidden agendas and secret elements such as rent-seeking behaviour and quid pro quos). 
Therefore, `fair competition' is another concept with both eminent economic and 
prudent political concerns. 70 
Therefore, it might be wise not to view economic and non-economic objectives as 
reciprocally incompatible. Political objectives have many economic elements and vice 
versa. However, the unfortunate situation exists that despite plausible economic 
arguments, people will suspect that the incentive for a decision is some other hidden 
reason. 71 
3.3.1.2 Sole Objective v Multiple Objectives 
The endless drama of economic and non-economic objectives has also been expressed 
as a fight between sole objective and multiple objectives. Some commentators have 
claimed that the US antitrust laws have been serving economic efficiency, the 
exclusive or sole goal of competition law and policy during the past three to four 
decades. 72 Critics have argued that, by incorporating multiple objectives, the EC 
70 Ehlermann and Laudati (n 46) 6-7; See also, Xu Shiying, `Fanlongduanfa de Ribenhua jiqi Jiejian Yiyi' (The 
`Japanese-Localization' of Anti-Monopoly Law and its Implications), and, Wang Weinong, 'Riben Jinzhilongduanfa 
de Jiben Fali: Mudi, Jiegou yu Jiben Gainian' (The Core Jurisprudential Dimensions of the Japanese Act 
Concerning Prohibition of Private Monopolization and Maintenance of Fair Trade: Objectives, Structure and Basic 
Concepts) (2005) 1 Jing_heng Fa Pinglun (Competition Law Review) 190-192 and 140-149. 
71 Ehlermann and Laudati (n 46) 16. 
n Gerber (n 50) 325, and, Law and Competition in Twentieth Century Europe (1" Paperback edn Oxford University 
Press, Oxford 2001) 520-521; Bishop and Walker (n 52) 3-6. 
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competition policy promotes integration and economic freedom but not competition; 
the regime also tends to prohibit normal business practice while providing exemptions 
to anti-competitive agreements. 73 Others declined this sole objective argument. They 
believed that the significance of efficiency does not necessarily indicate the omission 
of other objectives. Although they admitted that the relative weight and balance 
between economic and various other non-economic objectives that competition law 
can and might facilitate remain open to question, they claimed that every competition 
law has multiple objectives, more or less, explicit or implicit, and there is no exception. 
A leading competition law scholar once commented that, `[a] multiplicity of goals 
pursued by informed officials has been considered an essential feature of European 
competition law systems' and that `[o]ur story (of EC competition law) suggests that 
the tapestry of competition law experience has been far denser and richer than some 
who focus entirely on US experience might believe'. 74 
3.3.1.3 Ultimate v Direct Objectives 
The direct (intermediate or operational) objectives of competition law basically 
addresses economic objectives, such as maintenance of effective competition, 
maximizing economic efficiency and consumer welfare by encouraging firms to 
behave competitively. They inform the authorities when and where to step in and what 
yardstick to use for decision-making. More specifically, direct objectives of 
competition law include the protection of price competition to facilitate the associated 
productive and allocative efficiency, and the protection of innovation competition to 
promote dynamic efficiency through the development of new products and processes. 75 
Ultimate objectives are those related to sociopolitical commitment such as preserving 
the democratic process, pluralism, free enterprise, fairness, and market integration, etc. 
Although sociopolitical objectives have economic consequences and vice versa, as 
n Rein Wesseling, The Modernisation of EC Antitrust Law (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2000) 80-85. 
74 Gerber (n 68) 420 and 433. 
76 Ehlemann and Laudati (n 46) ix & 33. In this report, the commentators agreed that the direct goals of competition policy should be `limited to economic efficiency and consumer benefit'. 
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discussed above, some commentators suggest that one should not mix them up because, 
by so doing, competition law would be burdened with innumerable objectives for 
direct application, and the criteria for the assessment of individual cases would be 
unclear and less transparent. 76 
Furthermore, it is noteworthy that the direct objectives of competition law are much 
broader in developing and transitional countries than in developed countries. 
Competition law in developing countries often takes a more regulatory approach. The 
reason for such divergence is understandable: There are fewer consensuses among 
officials or politicians about the desirability of competition policy; also, the economic, 
legal, social or political frameworks are less developed for the proper functioning of a 
free market economy. 77 
It has been suggested that the direct objective of competition law of developed 
countries is to promote economic efficiency and to maximize consumer welfare. 
Therefore, the administration and enforcement of such competition law focuses on 
market behaviour and merger control. In contrast, the direct competition law objective 
in developing countries contributes more to the development of economic 
opportunities and entrepreneurship because in such countries, more efforts have to be 
made to set up the political acceptance of a market economy. One can thus predict the 
balance between economic and non-economic objectives in these countries is more 
fragile and vulnerable. 
3.3.1.4 Potential Conflicts between Multiple Objectives 
It is widely accepted that the application of economic analysis contributes a greater 
degree of precision and predictability in the enforcement of competition law. Therefore, 
economic philosophy of competition has become the law's dominant intellectual 
discourse and economic efficiency is a major objective of competition law and 
76 Ehfemann and Laudatr (n 46) 9. 
77 Dabbah (n 46) 52-53. 
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policy. 79 On the contrary, other sociopolitical objectives can complement, be neutral 
toward, or conflict with economic objectives. Attempts to take into account multiple 
objectives in the administration and implementation of competition law and policy 
may cause inconsistent outcomes because such an approach increases analytical 
complexity, reduces predictability and legal certainty, negatively affects the assessment 
of objectivity and fairness, and thus impacts the ability of competition law to achieve 
economic objective. 
Furthermore, tensions between the objectives of equity and efficiency, and of 
protecting consumers and small business are often ignored. 79 For example, many 
jurisdictions use competition rules to protect small and medium-sized businesses. With 
the small business objective, however, competitors rather than competition may be 
protected 80 In Japan, for instance, `elimination of excessive concentration of power' 
and `promotion of the democratic and wholesome development of the national 
economy' are fundamental competition law objectives. Japanese abuse of dominance 
provisions, together with the regulation of unfair trade rules, are often employed to 
approach such concerns. Nevertheless, the enforcement is `often synonymous with a 
political struggle of the small against the large'. 81 A number of competition provisions 
of Germany, France, and Canada also provide protections for smaller undertakings. 82 
In developing countries, a recent decision on substantive merits by the Indonesian 
Business Competition Supervisory Commission found Indomaret, a large, discount 
supermarket chain, responsible for `not paying appropriate attention to the existence of 
the neighboring small shops' and for failing to 'observe the balance' between large- 
scale and small-scale retailers, and ordered Indomaret to cease its expansion in 
78 Maher Dabbah, EC and UK Competition Law (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2004) 4. 
7' ABA (n 47) 15-16,33-37; World Bank and OECD (n 47) 4-5. 
so Wish (n 49)17-21; ABA (n 47) 10,18-21. 
81 Hiroko Yamane, `Deregulation and Competition Law Enforcement in Japan: Administratively Guided 
Competition? ' (2000) 23 (3) World Competition 141,181-182; See also Act Concerning Prohibition of Private Monopolization and maintenance of Fair Trade (Act No. 54 of 14 April 1947) at s 1. 
sZ For example, ss 20(3) (4) and 22(2) of the GWB; arts 420-2 of Code de Commerce and the New Economic Regulation (NER); Canadian Competition Act, R. S. C. 1985, C-34, Part I, 1.1. 
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traditional markets where it is directly facing small-scale retailers. 83 
In the PRC, Article 22 of the April 2005 Draft of the proposed AML once introduced 
the `essential facilities doctrine'. The provision may raise significant concerns 
especially when applied together with `refusal to deal' and interacts with Chinese IP 
law. The provision was vague and will potentially discourage investment and 
innovation from the stronger and thus protect the weak instead of retaining the process 
of competition. It has been advised that the provision should be either deleted or 
require evidence that the competitor seeking access cannot practically or reasonably 
duplicate the facility; the competitors seeking access should also demonstrate that 
access would further the legitimate interests of consumers. 84 The July 2005 Draft chose 
the first option and the provision was removed. 
Some commentators have further observed that the issue of what objectives 
competition law should embrace in addition to economic efficiency, for instance, the 
protection of the less powerful, is ultimately a matter of political choice. 85 Using a law 
to protect the competition process causes tensions fundamental to any society, because, 
`located at the confluence of economic and political power, these issues often act as a 
prism to reveal forces that otherwise might remain imperceptible. '86 This observation 
may explain the underlying reason of the conflicts between multiple objectives of 
competition law and policy. 
Furthermore, competition policy may be politically unpopular, as it disturbs vested 
interests and affects the distribution of wealth. A tradeoff may have to be made 
between the economic and non-economic objectives. However, competition policy has 
a sound efficiency justification but it is not a panacea. Other laws and policies, such as 
83 PT Indomarco Prismatama, Decision No. 03/KPPU-L-1t2000, Decision of Business Competition Supervisory 
Commission of the Republic of Indonesia. Quoted in ABA (n 47) 20-2 1. 
84 ABA (n 35) (2005) 3-4 and 20-21. 
85 Jones and Sufrin (n 54)18; Whish (n 49) 22; Dabbah (n 46) 59-60. 
86 Gerber (n 68) 1. 
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taxation and subsidies, address other aspects of the economic and political system and 
thus may provide more appropriate and directed solutions to competing interests. 
3.3.2 Objectives of Chinese Competition Law 
3.3.2.1 Objectives of the Anti-Unfair Competition Law 1993 
The AUCL states that `the law is enacted in order to safeguard the healthy 
development of the socialist market economy, encourage and protect fair competition, 
prohibit unfair competition act, and defend the legitimate rights and interests of 
operators and consumers'. 7 `To defend the legitimate rights and interests of operators' 
reflects a fundamental difference between the AUCL and the AML, as the latter is 
expected to protect the competitive process, not competitors. 88 
3.3.2.2 Objectives of the Anti-Monopoly Law 2007 
The wording of the AML objectives has evolved over the years. Similar to its 
predecessors, the 2002 Draft once stated its objectives as `to stop monopolies, 
safeguard fair competition, protect the legitimate rights and interests of consumers and 
operators, and to promote the healthy development of the socialist market economy', 
which was almost identical with the legislative objectives of the AUCL. The 
conflicting objectives of `protecting legitimate interests of consumers and operators' 
were recognised and the AML objectives have finally been narrowed down to 
`preventing and prohibiting monopolist conduct, safeguarding fair market competition, 
improving economic efficiency, protecting the interests of consumers and public 
interests, and promoting the healthy development of the socialist market economy. '89 
3.3.2.2.1 Economic Objectives 
The manifest economic objectives of the AML are prohibiting monopolistic conducts, 
87 AUCL 1993 art 1. 
" Gerber (n 68) 37-38. 
89 AML art 1. 
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preserving the process of competition, and protecting consumers' interests. 90 
The first progress is the transformation of `prohibiting monopoly' (adopted by the 
1999 and 2002 Drafts) to `prohibiting monopolistic activities' (adopted since 2004). 
This change reflected the Chinese legislators' recognition that monopoly could be a 
prize from competition by merits, such as innovation, low price, or dedicated service. 
By focusing on `monopolistic activities', the AML could enable the authorities to 
distinguish between desirable status and undesirable behaviour, thus prohibits the latter 
but without unduly intervening in the former. 91 
The second significant difference is the draft omitted `fair' and adjusted `safeguarding 
fair competition' to `safeguarding market competition order. ' Some argue that the term 
`fair' might cause unexpected counterproductive consequences. Inserting `fair 
competition' in a competition law is likely to distort the market competitive process 
and society as a whole, because `fair competition' is ill-defined and involves a value 
judgement. Furthermore, describing the specific approaches of `fair competition' has 
also proven elusive. For example, inefficient undertakings might argue that 
competition is `unfair' because it is hard for them to compete with their more efficient 
competitors. 2 This writer's opinion is, however, `protecting fair competition' might 
have very special value for its psychological and educational effects in the context of a 
transition China. By declaring its attempt to protect fair competition, the AML will 
also obtain more support from the public. `It is just unfair' - such feelings are 
accumulated among ordinary Chinese. The public began to suspect competition in 
contemporary China, which seems as a game process with a plenty of unwritten rules 
and hidden agendas. From this point, the Chinese national conditions, ideological 
dilemma, and governance crisis have made the transplantable conditions of 
competition law much more difficult than the law's original ecological environment in 
90 AML art 1. 
91 ABA (n 35) (2005) 5 and (2003)'7 and 9. 
92 ABA (n 35) (2005) 6 and (n 48) 15. 
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Europe and USA. It proves again that it is extremely difficult to separate competition 
law from the political and historical framework in which it is set up. 3 
However, one might ask whether the objective of protecting `the interests of 
consumers' is identical with `maximizing consumer welfare'. Because rather than 
directly protecting consumers, the AML preserves competition mechanism, a dynamic 
process that encourages undertakings to reduce costs, improve quality, use resources 
efficiently, and thus to promote economic efficiency. By so doing, the AML will help 
increase consumer choices and promote consumer welfare. 94 Similar wording of 
`protecting legitimate rights of consumers' has already been incorporated by the AUCL. 
Therefore, the different mechanism, principles, and ideas between the AUCL and the 
AML are blurred at this point. Having said that, it is arguable that one can not define 
`consumer welfare' and `consumer interests' as two completely different terms and it 
seems the confusion between the two terms is also a problem in other jurisdictions. For 
example, when researching the history of the US antitrust policy during the later New 
Deal (1935-1948), Peritz observes that the consumerist rhetoric suffusing the Public 
Utilities Holding Company Act of 1935 exemplifies 'a new vision of constituents 
whose problems and solutions, and whose interests, were largely economic'. And `the 
later New Deal ... acted upon a body economic disaggregated into markets, classes, 
and interests, all of which appealed to a unified public interest of "consumer welfare"'. 
Peritz is right to point that `such notion of "consumer welfare" is in sharp contrast to 
its revisionist use by recent Chicago Scholars' 95 
3.3.2.2.2 Sociopolitical Objectives 
The sociopolitical objectives of the AML are `protecting the public interests' and 
`promoting the healthy development of the socialist market economy', and therefore 
93 Dabbah (n 46) 35. 
94 Lawrence S Liu, `Jiangou Jingzheng Fazhi: cong Zhongguo Dalu Jingyan Tanqi' (Creating a Competition Law 
Regime: from the Perspective of Mainland China's Experience) (2004) 3 Yuedan Minshangfa Yanjtu (Yuedan Civil 
and Commercial Law Review) 7-9. 
95 Rudolph JR Peritz, Competition Policy in America: History, Rhetoric, Law (Oxford University Press, New York 
1996) 134-135, and 358 n 63. 
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pave the way for `a unified, open, competitive, orderly market system' . 
96 
The public interest approach to competition law and policy may allow a better balance 
of different economic, social, and political objectives. However, the independence of 
competition law administration may easily become curbed, since what composes 
`public interest' is questionable and the concept itself is an intangible and indefinable 
abstraction. In many situations, the perception of the so-called `public interest' can be 
widely divided, and what might be claimed clearly by one party may be seen as less 
important or even immaterial by another. Therefore, the `public interest' objective may 
cause significant tensions between interest groups and the implementation of the AML 
tends to become captive to the political process if it is actually employed to serve 
different stakeholders. Therefore, many of the political challenges made to competition 
law and policy are not, in reality, based on genuine public interest concern. Rather, 
they are challenges advanced by sectional groups with political clout, advancing their 
own narrow sectional interests, rather than in the true public interest. 97 
As regards the `healthy development of the socialist market economy', what conduct 
could be categorized as `healthy' or `unhealthy' is questionable because such 
classification is unavoidably subject to the decision-makers' preference and thus is 
subjective and elusive. Because of its generality, adopting this objective could cause 
uncertainty in interpretation and application of the law, and may further produce 
conflicts with other objectives if regarded as an operational objective used to 
determine the lawfulness of specific conduct in particular cases. 98 
Although such an objective is criticized, this writer's view is that unless the socialist 
China changes its political colour, there is not much possibility to alter or omit this 
`politically right legal declaration'. Competition legislation was unpopular everywhere 
%AML, arts I and 4; see, also, Shang Ming (n 22); Chen Lijie, `Zhongguo Fanlongduan Lifa de Xianzhuang yu 
Wenti' (Present Situation and Problems of Anti-Monopoly Legislation of the PRC), in Wang Xiaoye and Hiroshi 
Iyori (eds) (n 33) 128-134. 
97 World Bank and OECD (n 47) 5; Ehlermann and Laudati (n 46) 58. 
98 ABA (n 35) (2005) 6 and (2003) 8-9. 
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before the end of the World War II and was particularly unacceptable in China until 
recently. For example, Before the World War I, the issue of cartel legislation became a 
major focus of political activity in Germany. The endeavours to enact a cartel law were 
significant in the development of political consciousness among population groups. 
This political `awakening' was similar to the populist pressures that paved the way for 
the enactment of the Sherman Act in the USA. However, the political impetus for 
cartel legislation was opposed by `the Bismarckian alliance between heavy industry, 
big agrarian interests and the bureaucracy'. After the `long tug-of-war', Germany 
eventually enacted its Competition Statute (GWB) in 1957.99 It is therefore inevitable 
to attach a political gloss to assure political acceptance and to get the legislation passed 
even though it is difficult to predict the extent of the potential political repercussions of 
the AML. One must accept the fact that the adoption of a competition law is a political 
act, ' and thus to make certain compromise. 100 However, as once suggested, `the 
political gloss in order to make the law saleable should not be confused with the 
objectives'. '0' In fact, a large amount of contemporary Chinese economic and even 
civil legislation have similar wording - it might simply be routine. 
102 
3.3.2.2.3 Market Integration Objective: Will China Learn from Europe? 
The market integration objective was indicated by The Resolution of The Third Plenary 
Session of The 16th Central Committee of the CCP in 2003. The Resolution states that 
one of the major tasks of establishing a modern market system in China is to 
strengthen the degree of the market integration. Rules that impede fair competition, set 
up administrative barriers, prohibit non-locally generated goods and services shall be 
revoked. '03 Reflecting such policy consideration, the third sociopolitical objective of 
99 Gerber (n 68) 102-108,275. 
'oo Ehlermann and Laudaii (n 46) 53-65. 
101 Ehlermann and Laudari (n 46) 17. 
102 For example, Contract Law 1999 art 1, Company Law 2005 art 1, Securities Law 2005 art 1, Trademark Law 1982 art 1, Foreign Trade Law 1994 art 1, Environmental Protection Law 1989 art 1, and Law of Certified Public 
Accountant 1993 art 1. 
103 'Guanyu Wanshan Shehuizhuyi Shichang Jingjitizhi Ruogan Wenti de Jueding' (Resolution on Several Issues 
Relating to Perfecting the Socialist Market System) People§ Daily (Beijing, 14 October 2003)1. 
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China's Anti-Monopoly Law - facilitating the establishment of `a national united, open, 
competitive, orderly modern market economy', 104 to some extent, is similar with the 
market integration objective of EC competition law both in theory and in practice. The 
EC experience therefore has potential value to the Chinese policymakers. 
The market integration objective has been a first priority to the development of 
competition law in the EC. The Chinese economic reforms have also placed great 
emphasis on this goal during the past three decades. Although China is a unified polity, 
considering the status quo of the Chinese market, the elimination of sectoral monopoly 
and regional blockade in order to reduce artificial borders is generally considered as a 
priority among the country's development strategies. Developed by leaps and bounds, 
the Chinese market has however become fragmented. For example, apparently because 
of the economic rivalry and unbalanced development between provinces and regions, 
many provincial governments impose taxes and other fees on goods that are not 
produced in their administrative regions, and set checking-points at provincial borders 
to collect fees or even block free movement of goods. 105 However, the essential reason 
is that former monopolies are not willing to lose and thus make efforts to retain their 
privileges, which in turn increases entry barriers. 106 Such monopolistic actions severely 
constrain the ability of Chinese enterprises to grow organically and compete globally 
and thus damage the country's competitiveness and further development. Therefore, 
market integration and the fundamental economic objectives of the AML may 
complement each other in the Chinese context. 107 
Market integration involved many factors. One important issue of a market 
104 AML, art 4. 
los Qi Yudong, Zhongguo Jingji Yunxing zhongde Longduan yu Jing=hen (Monopoly and Competition in China's 
Economic Operation) (The People's Press, Beijing 2004) 135-147; Rick Yan, `To Reach China's Consumers, Adapt 
to Guoqing' in Harvard Business Review on Doing Business in China (Harvard Business School Press, Boston 2004) 
138-139. 
106 Anna Fornalczyk, `Competition Policy During Transformation of a Centrally Planned Economy', in Barry Hawk 
(ed) International Antitrust Law and Policy (1993) Annual Proceedings of the Fordham Corporate Law Institute 385. 
107 Mark Williams, 'Competition Law Development in China', (2001) May Issue Journal of Business Law 285; 
Wang Xiaoye, 'Entering into the WTO accelerates the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Legislation', in Wang and Hiroshi 
(eds) (n 33)172.175. 
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construction process is the reduction of government intervention in economic activities 
and the elimination of artificial borders that distort competition and block the exchange 
of goods and services. This desire has acted as an incentive for the development of EC 
competition law since the 1950s. EC competition law has frequently used it to help 
reduce governmental controls of economic production, which had been a normal 
phenomenon at certain period during the 20`h century either as a result of wartime 
controls or as part of general economic policy. The law has also been used to 
discourage the distortion of markets by private firms, especially those that have 
enjoyed government support or protection. 108 This objective is consistent with China's 
economic reform and the legislative objectives of the AML, which focuses on 
establishing a modem economy operating on genuine market principles rather than on 
government control. 109 
In fact, China is not the only country that should aim its competition law at 
government actions along with private restrictive competition behaviour that could 
result in market segmentation. Competition law of other transitional economies 
focuses on the same issues. For example, articles 7 and 8 of Russian Competition Law 
prohibit local government from action that may result in restraints of competition. The 
same prohibition can also be found in the competition laws in Ukraine and Czech 
Republic. 1 10 
Nevertheless, such unique competition law objective must be construed and 
implemented with great caution in order to avoid unintended counterproductive 
outcome as we could learn from the EC competition law experience. The integration 
impetus of EC competition law has an important impact on the Commission's 
108 Gerber (n 50) 327 and (n 68) 334-391. 
109 Wang (n 7) 201; Chenglin Liu, 'Competition laws in a Different Context: Managing Vertical Restraints in the 
Chinese Transitional Economy' (paper presented at the 5th Annual Conference of the Society of New Institutional 
Economics at University of California, Berkeley, 15-17 September 2001) 25-26. 
10 Ignacio De Leon, `Fazhanzhong Guojia he Zhuangui Guojia Jingzheng Zhengce de Zhidu Fenxi' (Institutional 
Analysis of Competition Policy in Transition and Developing Countries), in Wang and Hiroshi (eds) (n 33) 112; 
John Clark, 'Restraints by Regional and Local Governments on Competition Lessons from Transition Countries', 
(1999) 25 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 366. 
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decisions. Some commentators, however, claim that the EC pursues the objective of 
market integration sometimes at the expense of economic efficiency. For example, the 
consideration of market integration in competition analysis may discourage territorial 
restraints, which can sometimes be efficiency enhancing. A competition law that 
completely prohibits territorial restraints may thus reduce market efficiency. "' 
Perverse outcomes will arise if decision makers focus exclusively on market 
integration objectives and ignore the analysis on economic welfare. A good example is 
provided by the EC Commission's Distillers decision. 112 Although it has the potential 
to conflict with economic efficiency, efforts to integrate markets can and do facilitate 
entry and promote efficiency and thus may be compatible with the direct economic 
objective of competition law and policy. Nevertheless, the decision makers have to be 
aware that no matter which objective, economic or non-economic takes precedence, 
this does not imply close attention should not be given to other objectives. Instead, 
assessment against the competition law objectives could be made more transparent and 
coherent by considering each objective separately. 
3.4 The Scope 
3.4.1 Extraterritoriality: the Effects Doctrine in China 
Similar to the situations of other major competition regimes"" Chinese competition 
law and policy is also facing increasing challenges caused by `globalisation'. Since 
2001, the proposed AML has adopted the `doctrine of extraterritoriality' and appeared 
to choose the `effects doctrine' as a basis to assert jurisdiction on monopolistic conduct 
111 Ehlermann and Laudati (n 46) 8; Bishop and Walker (n 52) 3-6; ABA (n 47) 37. 
112 Distillers [1978] OJ L50/16, [1978] 3 CMLR 173... 630,635; Also see Jones and Sufrin (n 54) 678-679. In this 
case, the Commission condemned a dual pricing scheme and did not accept the argument that this was needed to 
protect Distillers' exclusive distributors on the Continent who spent considerable efforts on promotion and thus to 
prevent them from the `free riders'. The result of this decision was an increase in the price of some brands in the UK 
and the withdrawal from sale of Johnny Walker Red Label in the UK -a clear reduction in consumer welfare (at least British consumers) with no offsetting benefits. Furthermore, other Distillers' brands ceased to be promoted on 
the Continent. The net result was therefore one in which the brands sold by Distillers in the UK now differ from 
those sold on the Continent. Therefore, such decision may actually have impeded the single market integration 
instead of promoting it. 
113 Brenda Sufrin, `Competition Law in a Globalised Marketplace: Beyond Jurisdiction' in Patrick Copps and others 
(eds), Asserting Jurisdiction: International and European Legal Perspectives (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2003) 106. 
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occurring outside the territory of the PRC that `has eliminative or restrictive effects on 
competition in the domestic market' of the PRC. 114 The wording of this provision 
seems unaltered over the years. 
The doctrine of extraterritoriality in competition law and policy is an extremely 
difficult one and is highly questionable since it `lies in the crossroads between law and 
politics and that the conflicts it has triggered involve important political questions'. 
115 
Therefore, as noted by Muchlinski, `[u]nilateral national regulation tends to create a 
global market divided by different policy regimes', and `[t]he extraterritorial 
application of law can have serious political effects'. 116 In spite of the doctrine's , case 
laws and academic theories developed in the USA and the EC make it clear that the 
`effects doctrine' must be applied with great caution and extraterritorial jurisdiction in 
competition cases cannot be asserted without the presence of `direct, substantial and 
foreseeable anti-competitive effects'. 117 
The uncontrolled expansive extraterritoriality established by the proposed law will, at 
best, render the provision unworkable, at worst, trigger future frictions between China 
and other jurisdictions because of the doctrine's potentiality to invade other countries' 
sovereignty. The wording of the effects doctrine implied by the AML is therefore 
suggested to be revised to `monopolistic conduct occurring outside the territory ... that 
has direct, substantial and foreseeable eliminative or restrictive effects on competition 
in the domestic market of the P. R. China, ' 118 and by so doing, establishing the 
minimum requirement of national nexus under public international law. 
114 For example, the 2001,2002,2004, and April, July, and November 2005 Draft Anti-Monopoly Law art 2 para (2). 
115 Dabbah (n 46) 167. 
116 Peter Muchlinski, Multinational Enterprises and the Law (2"d edn Oxford University Press, Oxford 2007) 114 
and 116. 
117 Dabbah (n 46) 163, and 167-186. 
lls ABA Joint Comments suggested that art 2 should be revised to include a standard of `substantiality'. See ABA (n 
35) (2005) 2 and 6-7. 
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3.4.2 Competition Law v Sectoral Regulations 
One of the major differences between the April 2005 Draft and the previous drafts is 
the addition of a new article that renders the proposed law inapplicable to `any conduct 
which is taken as legitimate according to other laws and regulations'. ' 19 Since the July 
2005 Draft, this principle has been developed so that the proposed law `does not apply 
where other laws or administrative regulations of relevant industries or sectors provide 
provisions'. The status of this principle has been also promoted from the 
supplementary articles to a general provision setting out the scope of the proposed 
AML. 120 Encouragingly, this provision was completed deleted by the Third Reading 
Draft and final wording of the AML. The potential conflicts between the AML and 
sectoral regulations and industry policy is discussed in related chapters. 121 However, 
one can easily recognise the compromise between the AML and industry policy, and 
common phenomena of conflicts in the hierarchy of Chinese laws. 
3.5 The Key Concepts 
3.5.1 Unfair Competitive Conduct (Buzhengdang Jingzheng Xingwet) 
The subject matter of the AUCL is `unfair competitive conduct', referring to conduct 
which impairs `legitimate interests of other business operators and thus disturbs the 
social economic order. '122 As discussed in 3.1.2 above, under the umbrella of `unfair 
competitive conduct', the AUCL 1993 regulates eleven categories conduct that covers 
both anti-competitive behaviour and unfair trading practices. 
3.5.2 Monopolistic Conduct (Longduan Xingwei) 
The subject matter of the AML is `Monopolistic Conduct', which refers to monopoly 
agreements, abuse of market dominant position and concentrations between 
undertakings which `may have the effect of eliminating or restricting competition'. 123 
1 19 The April 2005 Draft art 55. 
120 The July and November 2005 Drafts, art 2 para 3. 
121 For discussion on the interface between industrial and competition policy, see, 8.5 below. 
122 AUCL 1993 art 2. Also see 3.1.2, above. 
123 AML art 3. See detailed analysis of the concepts of `restrictive agreements', `abuse of dominant market position' 
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3.5.3 Undertakings (Jingyingzhe) 
The concept of `undertaking' has been chosen to substitute the former notion of 
`business operator' in previous AML drafts. Such a change was regarded as a welcome 
improvement by commentators. Under the AML, an `undertaking' refers to `natural 
persons, legal persons or other organizations that engage in manufacturing or operating 
commodities, or providing services. '124 It has been suggested that such a definition 
might be too narrow and uncertain. It should be clarified to encompass all forms of 
economic actors, including individuals, partnerships, cooperatives, corporations, 
professional or trade associations, no matter it is private, public or private-public 
mixed ownership. 125 
3.5.4 Relevant Market (Xiangguan Shichang) 
The concept `relevant market' has replaced the former notion `given market' and 
`specific market'. 126 Instead of defining a market in purely geographic terms as in the 
previous drafts, since the July 2005 Draft, the concept has been given both product and 
geographic dimension. It is also the first time the lawmakers have accepted concepts of 
`substitutability' and `elasticity of demand'. A `relevant market' is finally defined by 
the AML as `the scope of product or territory within which undertakings compete 
against each other as regards specific products or services during a certain period of 
time' 127 
3.6 Concluding Remarks 
The review on the historical developments of the Chinese competition law once again 
and 'concentrations' at relevant chapters. 
124 AML art 12 para 1. 
125 Civil and Commercial Law Research Section of Shanghai Social Science Institute, `Guanyu 
Zhonghuarenmingongheguo Fanlongduanfa (Songshengao) de Xiugai Yijian (Revising Suggestions on Anti- Monopoly Law of PRC (2004 Submission Draft)) (2005) 4 Shangwu yu Falu (Commerce and Law) 45-46. 
126 For example, the July 2004 Draft art 4. 
127 AML art 12 para 2. 
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proves that 'it is difficult to separate competition law from a political perception. ' 128 
The AML is expected to improve the regulatory environment, protecting the 
competitive process and improving economic efficiency in a transitional China. 
However, transplantation and localization of competition rules are heavily constrained 
by the Chinese guoqing (national conditions). The case of establishing competition law 
and policy in the PRC reflects dilemmas and challenges transitional countries facing 
today. As a special mixture of legal, economic, and political issues, competition law 
requires time to understand and to implement effectively. There are certainly no 
exceptions available to the PRC. 
128 Dabbah (n 46) 69. 
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4 
Abuse of Administrative Power to 
Eliminate or Restrict Competition 
4.1 Introduction 
Because of `path dependence' of the previous central-planned economy, the connection 
between the government and enterprises has not been completely separated in the 
PRC. 1 Rapid economic growth has been accompanied by increased scepticism about 
government's role. Critics of the government say that the state is overly intrusive, 
governments create monopoly, and government failures are just as pervasive as market 
failures. For some, government is the problem rather than the solution. Using or 
abusing public power to restrict competition is typical phenomena in the PRC. The 
Chinese policymakers have attempted to use administrative power to check 
administrative power over the past three decades. Rules on prohibiting abuse of 
administrative power to restrict competition under the AML are a case in point. How 
these rules have developed under the current legal and regulatory framework and how 
they have been designed under the AML are questions to be answer by this chapter. 
Case studies are provided, which shed further light on the difficulties to prohibit abuse 
of administrative power under the current political equilibrium. The chapter is ended 
by a proposal that calls for reform on a number of aspects, including substituting the 
concept `administrative monopoly' with available alternatives, transplanting the 
1 'Path dependence' is a term that has come into common use both in economics and other intellectual disciplines 
(including history, politics, sociology and law). See, KJ Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values (2°d edn Yale University Press, New Haven 1963) 119-120, and, SE Margolis and SJ Liebowitz, 'Path Dependence' < 
http: //ftp. utdallas. edu/-liebowit/palgrave/palpd. htnil>. The path dependence theory has been offered as an 
alternative analytical perspective for social sciences. For example, North argues that `[p]ath dependence means that 
history matters. We cannot understand today's choices (and define them in the modeling of economic performance) 
without tracing the incremental evolution of institutions'. North illustrating path dependence by asking what happens when a common set of rules is imposed on two different societies. He noted that in the nineteenth century, 
many Latin American countries adopted constitutions modified based on the U. S. Constitution. Also, Third World 
countries have adopted property rights laws of successful Western countries. However, because the way 
enforcement occurs, the norms of behaviour, and the subjective models of the actors are different, the results are not 
similar to those in the USA or other Western countries. North concludes that 'the common imposition of a set of 
rules will lead to widely divergent outcomes in societies with different institutional arrangements', and '[o]nce a development path is set on a particular course, the network externalities, the learning process of organizations ... reinforce the course'. See, DC North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1990) 99-101. 
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principle of proportionality, etc. 
4.1.1 Definitional Issues 
4.1.1.1 What is Meant by `Administrative Monopoly' 
`Administrative monopoly' (xingzheng longduan), a term first used by a Chinese 
economist in 1988,2 widely referred to and examined by scholars and seemed to be 
accepted by Chinese legislators. 3 Evidently the composition of administrative 
monopoly mainly depends on the scope of the concept itself, which is, however, by no 
means a simple and immediately recognizable discourse. As observed by scholars, a 
major problem to fight against administrative monopoly is the definition itself. If it is 
monopoly initiated by the government, which organisation should be entrusted with 
competent power to scrutinize it? The available definitions are ambiguous, confusing, 
either too broad or too narrow and have caused numerous theoretical and practical 
difficulties over the years. 
For Dr. Hu, administrative monopoly referred to an absolute monopoly situation 
caused by a centralized governmental system which totally controls production and 
distribution for the whole society. Such monopoly is, by nature, distinct from economic 
monopoly. 4 
In 1989, the concept was first referred by a legal scholar without further definition. 5 In 
1990, Professor Wang Baoshu defined the concept from a legal prospective as `in 
contrast with economic monopoly, administrative monopoly refers to a situation that 
2 Hu Ruyin, Jingrheng yu Longduan: Shehuf-huyi Weiguan Jingji Fenxi (Competition and Monopoly: Socialist 
Microeconomic Analysis) (Sanlian Publishing, Shanghai 1988) 48. 
3 Although Chinese legislators regarded `the prohibition of administrative monopoly' as the most unique creation of 
China's competition law, provisions on administrative monopoly were deleted from the draft Anti-Monopoly Law in 
late 2005. The main reason for omitting administrative monopoly, according to commentators, was the 
unenforceability of the related provisions and the inability of the competition authority to challenge state bodies. 
The AML's uncertain future and unavoidable dilemmas caused by the so-called `administrative monopoly' had 
become one of the fiercest fighting points during the Annual Plenary Session of the NPC in March 2006. See, for 
example, Huang Yikun, 'Fanlongduan de Ganga Guoqing' (The Awkward National Conditions for the Anti- 
Monopoly Law) Jingfi Guancha (Economic Observation) (Beijing 16 January 2006). 
4Hu(n1)48. 
5Wei Jian, 'On Chinese Anti-Monopoly Legislation' (1989) 3 Zhongwai Faxue (Journal of Chinese and Foreign 
Law). 
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national economic regulators and local government eliminate, restrict, or hinder 
competition between economic operators by abusing administrative power. '6 In the 
same year, another legal scholar defined the concept as `certain administrative 
organisations and their officials, by using administrative power to perform 
governmental functions, monopolize resources and market, and further seek ends 
which are inconsistent with the aims and functions of the government. '7 Since then, 
officials and scholars have defined and commented on the concept of administrative 
monopoly. The indeterminacy and perplexity of the concept began to arise. 
For example, Wang Yang gave a definition of `behaviour of the state, by using public 
authority, which eliminate or restrict competition. ' s Zheng Pengcheng defined the 
concept as `behaviour of administrative organs, by using administrative power, which 
restrict competition and impede order of the socialist market economy. '9 For Jung and 
Hao, administrative monopoly is `monopolistic activities initiated by government 
agencies at various levels by abusing regulatory or administrative power. 'lo 
Outside China, legal experts also observed this phenomenon and offered comments 
over the years. Owen and others defined the concept as `government-created 
monopolies' by `abusing regulatory power. 'l' Mason and Hou described the concept as 
`improper governmental intervention in the market. ' 12 Nathan Bush's definition is `the 
abuse of power for anticompetitive ends'. 13 
'Wang Boshu, `Corporate Concentration and Prohibition on Monopoly' (1990) 1 Faxue Yanjiu (Law Research). 
' Li Zhongshen, `Several Questions of Administrative Monopoly' (1990) 2 Zhengfa Luncong (Politics and Law 
Review). 
a Wang Yang, `General Theory and Basic Mechanism of Anti-Monopoly Law' (1997) 2 Chinese Law. 
' Zheng Pengcheng, Xing--peng Longduan de Falu Kong--hi Fenxi (Research on Legal Control of Administrative 
Monopoly) (Peking University Press, Beijing 2002) 7 and 30. 
10 Youngjin Jung and Qian Hao, `The New Economic Constitution in China: A Third Way for Competition 
Regime? ' (2003) 24 Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business 9. 
11 Bruce M Owen and others, `Antitrust in China: The Problem of Incentive Compatibility' AEI-Brookings Joint 
Center for Regulatory Studies (2004, revised 2006) < http: //aei-brookings. org/admin/authorpdfs/redirect- 
safely. php? frame=.. /pdffiles/php7d. pdf> 8-9. 
12 Daniel Mason and Athena Hou Jiangxiao, `China's Proposed Anti-monopoly Law: the US and European 
Perspective' (2004) November Asia Law 7. 
13 Nathan Bush, `Chinese Competition Policy: It takes more than a law' (2005) May-June China Business Review 
<http: //www. chinabusinessreview. com/public/0505/bush. htmb. 
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Williams defined administrative monopoly as `the use by government, at all levels, of 
administrative power, both legal and extra legal, to promote, manipulate, impede or 
prevent economic activities that are deemed to be inimical to the interests of a sector of 
the economy that requires some form of promotion or protection'. 14 Years later, in his 
monograph on competition law and policy in Greater China, Williams adjusted the 
wording of his definition from `use' to `misuse' and omitted `(economic activities) that 
are deemed to be inimical to the interests of a sector of the economy that requires some 
form of promotion or protection. '" But Williams provided no further explanation as 
regard what is meant by `misuse'. 
The series drafts of the proposed AML once offered a definition as `abuse of 
administrative power by government agencies and their subordinate departments that 
eliminate or restrict competition'. 16 The AML final wording avoids using the concept 
`administrative monopoly'. `Administrative agencies and organisations with 
responsibilities for public affairs administration' are prohibited from abusing their 
`administrative power to eliminate or restrict competition'. Therefore, the scope of the 
concept has been enlarged. " However, the notion `abuse' has been left open without 
further guidance. Instead, the AML sets out an illustrative but not exhaustive list of 
behaviour such as `forced transaction', `sectoral monopolies', `regional blockades', 
`forcing undertakings to conduct monopolistic behaviour', and `promulgating rules to 
eliminate or restrict competition'. 18 Furthermore, it is not clear that whether the scope 
14 Mark Williams, 'Competition Law Developments in China' (2001) May Issue Journal ofBusiness Law 275. 
15 Mark Williams, Competition Law and Policy in China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge 2005) 138-139. The full definition given by Williams is: `the misuse by government, at all levels, of 
administrative powers, both legal and extra-legal, to promote, manipulate, impede or prevent economic activities'. 
16 See, for example, the July 2004 Draft art 3(4). 
17 The full definition of `administrative monopoly' provided by in the AML is: 'Administrative agencies and 
organisations empowered by laws and regulations with responsibilities for public affairs' ... 'abuse their 
administrative power to eliminate or restrict competition'. See Article 8 AML. 
18 See 4.3. below. 
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of `regulations' covers both `administrative regulations' and `local regulations'. 
19 
In fact, the notion `abuse of administrative power to eliminate or restrict competition' 
has been chosen to substitute the concept `administrative monopoly' since the July 
2005 Draft. However, the concept `administrative monopoly' continues to appear at 
literature, media, and official news release even after the enactment of the AML. 
2° 
Therefore, it appears the concept has already been accepted although it was not chosen 
by the AML. 
4.1.1.2 Criticism 
From this brief literature review on the concept of administrative monopoly, the 
common understanding is that `administrative monopoly' is behaviour of authorities, 
by exercising public power, which restrict or impede competition. However, 
divergences and confusions are more prevalent: 
(1) The first problem is `to whom is the concept addressed'? There is uncertainty 
regarding the subject matters of administrative monopoly. 
(2) Another major problem is the dilemma of `use' and `abuse'. 
(3) Furthermore, some definitions are unduly narrow. For example, according to 
Owen's definition, what happens if an administrative organisation directly carries 
out of economic activities? It might not `organise' the market by using its 
`regulatory power' but participate in the market by using its general administrative 
power to restrict or eliminate competition. 21A good example is the Yongchun 
case. 22 Another danger is defining the concept in a way which makes it 
unmanageably large, taking Mason's definition for instance. 
19 See 2.4.3, above. 
20 See for example, Zheng Manning, `Ziran longduan xingzheng longduan zenme fan? ' (How to regulate natural 
monopolies and administrative monopoly? ) Renmin Ribao (People Daily) (Beijing 3 September 2007). 
21 JLB Sierra explains that the State may play two different roles: (1) carrying out regulatory activities to organize 
the market by acting as a public authority; (2) participating in the market to offer services or goods like any other 
operator by acting as a public undertaking. State measures of the first role subject to Article 31 and 86 of the EC 
Treaty. By contrary, behaviour of public undertakings subject to Article 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty. See JLB Sierra, 
Exclusive Rights and State Monopolies under EC Law: Article 86 (Formerly Article 90) of the EC Treaty (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford 1999) [1.44] and [4.09]. 
22 See 4.4, below. 
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Further analyses are as below. 
4.1.1.3 Subject Matters of the Concept 'Administrative Monopoly' 
4.1.1.3.1 The Levels of Administrative Authorities 
Some commentators claim that `administrative authorities' only refer to local 
authorities but not the central government and its departments. It is submitted here that 
the concept should include not only local authorities but also the administrative 
authorities at the central level. Otherwise, the AML would be unable to deal with 
numerous restrictive behaviours initiated by the ministries and department of the 
central government. The question of how should the AML regulate administrative 
power at the central level is however another question which will not be discussed at 
the present section. 
4.1.1.3.2 The Scope of Administrative Authorities 
Another question is how widely the scope of `administrative authorities' is. Will it also 
include certain types of legislative or judiciary power? It is not an uncommon 
phenomenon in China that local legislatures include provisions that distort competition 
and local judiciary delivered judgments that discriminate against non-local 
undertakings or even reserved market of local legal service to designated law firms. 23 
Therefore, if the answer to the above question is no, the law would be incomplete 
without competency to deal with such `legislative and judicial power'. However, if the 
answer is yes, there are logical reasons to both modify the name and enlarge the scope 
of the concept. For example, there are obvious gaps between Wang Yang's definition 
and the concept in question24. 
23 Zheng Pengcheng provided another notion `guanshang longduan' (monopolies caused by `red-collar' merchants 
(merchants who are also officials)). Zheng stated that, such a concept is overlapping with administrative monopoly 
but also includes other monopolies caused by the judiciary, the military, other political or autonomous organisations 
such as the Communist Youth League and the Women's Association, and even by CCP committees and other organs, 
which, all are not 'administrative organs'. However, one might be puzzled by such an idea and might further ask 
how a civil organisation as the Women's Association could be categorized as `official'? What is the nature of 'the 
CCP organs'? Are they special organs parallel, below, or above the legislature, the judiciary, and the executive? 
Zheng offered no explanations to any of these questions. See, Zheng (n 8) 42-43. 
24 Wang (n 7). 
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4.1.1.4 Administrative Power, Public Authority and State Measures 
If the scope of the concept extends to all public authorities, the `administrative power' 
in the definition should be substituted by `public authority' or the EC concept of `state 
measures', the latter has potential value to China's competition legislation and 
implementation. For example, Article 86(1) of the EC Treaty is aimed at combating the 
introduction or maintenance of certain state measures by Member States. The EC 
Commission has taken the view that the concept of `state measures' covered `laws, 
regulations, administrative provisions, administrative practices, and all instruments 
issuing from a public authority, including recommendations'. 25 
4.1.1.5 Use, Misuse and Abuse 
Not only `misuse' or `abuse' is an unclear concept, it also causes analytical difficulties 
and daunting obligations in the burden of proof. Distinguishing `abuse of 
administrative power' from `legitimate use of administrative power' may be a highly 
complicated issue, and the wording of the law will require the AML authority to define 
and apply the ambiguous concept of `abuse', and further prove the existence of 
'abuse'. 26 
In 2005, the ABA submitted that the related provisions could be adjusted as follows: 
No government, government department, or government employees may, 
through formal or informal use of administrative power, (1) require 
undertakings or individuals to purchase commodities form an undertaking 
designated by a government, government department, or government 
25 See: Recital 1 of Commission Directive (EEC) 70/50 on the abolition of measures which have an effect equivalent 
to quantitative restrictions on imports and are not covered by other provisions [1970] OJ Spec. Ed. 17. 
26 It is noteworthy that currently the AML entrust administrative agencies at higher levels to order the administrative 
agencies or other public organisations that abuse their administrative power to restrict competition to make 
correction. The AMEA can make proposals to the relevant superior agencies to handle the cases in accordance with 
the law. See, AML art 51. 
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employee; (2) restrict access by undertakings to markets for commodities or 
restrict the free flow of commodities between regions; or (3) compel 
undertakings to engage in conduct otherwise prohibited under this law. This 
article does not apply to government action taken in accordance with the 
specific authorization of other laws and regulations ... 
27 
The ABA experts noted that this formulation may address the same concerns as the 
prohibition on abuse of administrative powers without defining the unclear concept of 
`abuse'. Through this approach, the authority would (1) determine whether the 
challenged administrative conduct results in any of the three listed anticompetitive 
effects, and (2) determine whether the challenged conduct was `in accordance with the 
specific authorization of other laws and regulations. ' The second step thus focuses 
directly on the legal basis and purpose of the government department's administrative 
authority. 
However, one might ask, what happens if the challenged conduct is the result of a 
specific authorization of other laws and regulations? Would that mean the conduct 
implies no competition concerns and is lawful because of its `legal base'? 
4.1.1.6 The Overlap between Related Concepts 
A detailed examination of the concepts of `monopoly', `natural monopoly', `state 
monopolies', and `legal monopoly', etc. is beyond the limits of the present thesis; 
accordingly what followed are a brief but necessary outline and a comparison between 
several related concepts. 
Monopoly, an opposite extreme to perfect competition, is an ambiguous word, which 
often has different implications for legal professionals and for economists. It usually 
refers both to a given situation, where there is only one seller but many buyers in a 
27 ABA: Joint Submission of American Bar Association's Sections of Antitrust Lax Intellectual Property Law, and International Law on the Proposed Anti-Monopoly Law of the People's Republic of China, at: 
<http: //www. abanet. org/antitrust/comments/2005/05-05/Commentsprc2005wapp. pdf> 26-27. 
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relevant market and to behaviour that attempt to monopolize relevant market. 28 
`Monopoly leads to allocative inefficiency because there is a difference between the 
marginal cost of production and the valuation of the marginal consumer. ' 29 The 
undertaking that exclusively controls the supply of goods and/or services is a 
`monopolist'. Monopoly covers both exclusivities by laws and regulations, or by 
authorities using discretionary power (for example, legal monopoly, exclusive rights 
under Article 86 of the EC Treaty, and administrative monopoly under Chinese 
competition law, etc. ), and those that are purely or basically factual (for example, a 
`dominant position' in the context of EC competition law). 
4.1.1.6.1 Natural Monopolies 
Economists speak of natural monopolies in situations where the market is more 
efficiently served by a sole undertaking. The classic example has traditionally been 
those undertakings that supply a service through a network, in sectors like 
telecommunications, the supply of electricity and so on. For these undertakings, the 
fixed costs are considerable compared to the variable costs, which leads to a situation 
where the survival of more than one undertaking in the market is impossible. On this 
basis, it is possible to speak of an objectively justified exclusivity that arise from 
factual situations, but not generated, in principle, from the exercise of discretionary 
state powers 30 However, as noted by Sierra, although natural monopoly may be a fact, 
its existence and maintenance by a specific undertaking derives from State intervention. 
It is difficult to find, in the real world, clear examples of natural monopolies whose 
status does not depend to a certain extent on the will of the regulators. 1 
The concept of natural monopoly further has dynamic and evolving characteristics that 
can cause significant challenges and difficulties to regulation and regulators. The 
28 Alison Jones and Brenda Sufrin, EC Competition Law: Text, Cases, and Materials (2"d edn Oxford University 
Press, Oxford 2004) 8. 
29 Simon Bishop and Mike Walker, The Economics of E. C. Competition Law: Concept, Measurement and 
Application (2d edn Sweet and Maxwell, London 2003) 23,2.20. 
30 Jones and Sufrin (n 27) 8-9. 
31 Sierra (n 20) 10 and 25. 
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nature of natural monopoly is determined largely by economic and technological 
factors that may change over the time. As a result, what is defined as a natural 
monopoly at a given time and in a given place will not necessarily be so under 
different circumstances. 
Taking the EC approach on natural monopoly for example, `the legal environment (of 
natural monopoly) keeps changing to take into account technical, economic and social 
developments. '32 The courts also favoured such a dynamic approach, for example, in 
the Judgment of RIT, the ECJ used a wording of `at the present stage of development 
of the Community', 33 which left the possibility to take into account of future 
technological development and re-evaluate the existing monopolies traditionally 
considered to be `natural'. 
Natural monopoly manifests itself mainly as `sectoral monopoly', which is one of 
basic categories of administrative monopoly in China. Therefore, the concept of 
`administrative monopoly' and `natural monopoly' can be overlapping to a certain 
degree. Nonetheless, sectoral monopoly is not necessarily related to `natural 
monopoly', taking tobacco and alcohol monopolies for example. 
4.1.1.6.2 State Monopolies 
Some Chinese scholars claimed that state monopolies and administrative monopoly, by 
their very nature, are different. For example, Liang Huixing defines the former as 
`monopolies initiated by the central government through lawful measures, which 
represented the country's whole interests. '34 Zheng observes the differences between 
administrative monopoly and state monopolies. 35 He argues that the subject of state 
monopolies is the state, while the subject of administrative monopoly is administrative 
32 Francoise Blum and Anne Logue, State Monopolies under EC Law (John Wiley & Sons, Chichester 1998) 1. 
33 Case C-18/88 RTT [ 1991] ECR at 1-5797, para. 16. 
34 Liang Huixing, `Opinions on China's Anti-Monopoly Legislation', (1991) 6 Faluyu Shiyian (Law and Practice). 
35 Zheng (n 8)35-36. 
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organs. Morover, the state uses state power to initiate State monopolies, while 
administrative organs use administrative power to initiate administrative monopoly. In 
addition, the origin of state monopolies is public interests and the state interests, while 
the origin of administrative monopoly is regional and personal interests. Zheng further 
offers exclusive distribution of alcohol and tobacco as examples of state monopolies. 
Finally, state monopolies are lawful but administrative monopoly is illegal. The 
legality of state monopolies rests on explicit authorization of laws, for example, 
monopoly rights granted by the Postal Law and Tobacco Monopoly Law. Zheng, 
however, went on to explain that lawful state monopolies could become irrational 
because of the development of economy and technology. For example, former state 
monopolies in telecommunications began to open for competition. 
Nevertheless, Liang and Zheng's approaches have inevitably led to the relationship of 
the two concepts more blurred. First of all, `the State acts only through its organs. '36 
The state organs include the legislative, the executive (administration), and the 
judiciary. Secondly, power is one element of the State. The state power is distinguished 
between three different components: the legislative, the executive, and the judicial 
power. " Therefore, `the state uses state power to initiate state monopolies' can be 
rewrite as `the state, through its legislative, executive (administrative), and judicial 
organs, uses corresponding legislative, executive (administrative), and judicial powers, 
to initiate state monopolies'. Logically, administrative monopoly should be a type of 
state monopolies. 
Thirdly, the legality of state monopolies, as already admitted by Zheng, is relative 
rather than absolute. 8 If administrative monopoly is one form of state monopoly, its 
36 Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and Slate (Russell & Russell, New York 1973) 195. 
37 Kelsen noted that, `The State is thought of as an aggregate of individuals, a people, living within a certain limited 
part of the earth's surface and subject to a certain power: One State, one territory, One people, and one power... 
Though the unity of the power is held to be essential... it is ... possible to 
distinguish between three different 
component powers, the legislative, the executive, and the judicial power of the State. ' See Kelsen (n 35) 255. 
38 In the EC, the theoretical debate concerning the law relating to exclusive rights granted by state measures is 
focused on the question of the legality of such rights. See, Sierra (n 20) 363. There are undeniable similarities between 'exclusive rights and State monopolies' under EC Law and 'administrative monopoly' under Chinese Law. 
The relevance of EC experience to the Chinese competition law deserves an in-depth research. 
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legality should be also relative. There should be no reason to explain why 
administrative monopoly should be regarded as illegal per se. One reason might be 
`the abuse of administrative power' as a precondition of constituting an `administrative 
monopoly'. However, would that mean monopolies caused by `proper use' of 
administrative power are not `administrative monopoly'? Then what are they? A 
further question is that if `the legality of State monopolies rests on explicit authority of 
laws', as observed by Zheng, whether every explicit authority of laws is legal? 
Furthermore, whether monopolies explicitly authorized by regulations, therefore, can 
be regarded as necessarily illegal without the need for any further analysis? 
Fourthly, one could hardly find objective criteria available to define the concepts of 
`state interests', `social interests', `public interests', `regional interests', and `personal 
interests'. Which test(s) could be employed to justify some but repudiate others? One 
may further ask whose or what kind of interests should competition law serves. These 
questions once again are related to unsettled discussion and debate on competition law 
objectives. Much needs to be done in the PRC, like what has learnt from the EC 
competition law experience, to clarify `factors such as why and how competition law 
systems were created, which ideas, objectives and value have influenced decision- 
making within them, and the extent to which they have achieved the objectives set for 
them'. Otherwise, Chinese competition law and policy's `identity' remains and will 
continue to remain veiled. 39 
In addition, when explaining the relative nature of state monopolies, Zheng referred to 
the telecommunications sector, a typical representative of traditional natural monopoly. 
A logical reasoning could be that if `administrative monopoly' is a form of `state 
monopoly', and `administrative monopoly' is overlapping with `natural monopoly', it 
could therefore be claimed that these three concepts unavoidably overlap. 40 The 
39 David J Gerber, Law and Competition in Twentieth Century Europe: Protecting Prometheus (1" paperback edn Oxford University Press, Oxford 2001) 2. 
40 European law practitioners Blum and Logue, also referred `State monopolies' to `undertakings which have a 
close relationship with the State and have been granted certain privileges by it. These undertakings generally include the utility companies but may extend to companies in other sectors. ' See, Blum and Logue (n 31) 1. 
99 
uncertain relationships between `state monopoly', `natural monopoly', and 
`administrative monopoly', therefore, have to be further explored in future 
interpretation and implementation of the AML. Furthermore, Liang and Zheng's 
approach also equals `state monopolies' and `statutory monopoly' as being 
synonymous. 
4.1.2 The Cause and Consequence of Abuse Administrative Powers to Eliminate 
or Restrict Competition 
Although detailed analysis is beyond the scope of this thesis and should be reasonably 
left to scholars of economics and politics, a brief introduction is necessary for 
justifying the imperative of scrutiny. 
This author's literature review and documentary analysis indicated that the immediate 
cause of administrative monopoly is that, in a highly concentrated government system 
without sufficient check and balance, officials at various levels fight for profits against 
the `economic man'. 41 
The intermediate origin of administrative monopoly, however, is an irrational wealth 
distribution system implemented since the late 1970s. In such a system, a centralised 
vertical political power coexists with decentralised powers in financial revenues 
between the central and local government through public ownership such as State- 
owned enterprises (SOE). Profits of SOE, to a great extent, were distributed among 
related bureaux as sources of administrative revenue 42 
41 See 2.3, above. 'Economic man' or homo economicus, the economist's model of human behaviour, is at the heart 
of economic theory. In classical economics and neo-classcial economics, man (a human) was assumed as a rational, 
perfectly informed and self-interested actor who desires wealth, avoids unnecessary labour, and has the ability to 
make judgements towards those ends. It was John Stuart Mill who used the term `economic man' for the first time. 
See, Joseph Persky, `Retrospectives: The Ethology of Homo Economicus' (Spring, 1995) The Journal of Economic 
Perspecitves 221-23; and John S Mill, Essays on Some Unsettled Questions of Political Economy (2"d edn 
Longmans, Green, Reader & Dyer, London 1874) essay 5, paras. 38 and 48. Although the term did not come into 
use until the 19ie century, the idea is often associated with earlier thinkers such as Adam Smith and David Ricardo. 
For example, in The Wealth of Nations (Vol. IV), Adam Smith explained how rational self-interest and competition 
through the working of the 'invisible hand' can lead to economic well-being and prosperity. 
42 See, for example, The Economic Research Institute of the State Planning Commission, 'Dapo difa shichang fenge 
de celue yanjiu' (Research on strategies to break local market blockades) 2001 (27) Jingji Yanjiu Cankao (Economic 
Research Reference); Zhao Ying, Zhongguo Gongye Zhengce Shirheng Yanjiu (Empirical Analysis on China's 
Industry Policy) (Social Science Documentary Publishing, Beijing 2000) 147; Zheng (n 8) 63-75; Qi Yudong, 
Monopoly and Competition in Chinak Economy Operation (The People's Publishing, Beijing 2004) 135-147. 
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The Chinese socialist planning system was so designed that SOE were under dual 
leadership. Vertically, each SOE belonged to one sector led by a ministerial-level 
regulator under the State Council and thus subject to the regulator's policies. At the 
same time, except those that were directly operated by the sectoral regulators, the 
enterprises were also horizontally subject to the directions of or owned by local 
government at different levels, depending on their size, importance and formation. 
Despite reform efforts to separate administration of government from enterprises 
management, institutional design and vested interests have strengthened the so-called 
`strip' (sectoral monopoly initiated by vertical sectoral authorities) and `block' 
(regional blockade initiated by horizontal authorities) fragmentation, through which 
the growing power of `rent-seekers' reserve incentive and power to engage in 
restrictive activities. 
Regional blockade is also driven by economic (increasing local revenue) and political 
(promotion of local government officials' depends partially on local economic 
performance) considerations. Local governments take various measures to prevent or 
discriminate against non-local products and services and effectively set up regional 
protectionism. Those measures include forbidding local business from engaging in 
wholesaling or retailing non-local products; applying discriminative standards in 
quality inspection, technical requirements and licensing; fixing price or setting price 
standards for non-local commodities; and setting up checking points on the local 
border to obstruct, intercept or even confiscate products originating in other regions. 
Nevertheless, the deeper economic reason of regional blockade has to be searched in 
an industry structure with similarities, duplications and insufficient comparable 
advantages. Such a structure, formulated according to Chairman Mao's war time 
economic strategies, has led to Chinese undertakings small in scale and scope, less 
developed in technology, but exist in a `small but all' regional industry system. Local 
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officials, prompted by the above mentioned economic and political reasons, have 
competed for projects and investment, and worsen such similarities. Statistics show 
that, among China's 32 provincial regions, there are 27 regions producing motor 
vehicles, 29 regions producing TVs, 23 regions producing refrigerators and washing 
machines, etc 43 From this point of view, one can reasonably expect that, to combat the 
so-called `administrative monopoly', legal instrument on its own is not sufficient. 
Widespread `administrative monopoly' has become the most formidable malignancy in 
Chinese economy. It facilitates misusing resources, causes inefficiency, delivers goods 
and services to be inferior in quality and higher in price, creates income gaps, induces 
corruptions, and frustrates the formation of `an integrated, open, competitive, well- 
organised modern market system' in Chinaaa 
There is common understanding on the necessity and urgency to deal with 
`administrative monopoly'. However, the real problem is determining how it could be 
dealt with. China's present economic reform began in 1978. After almost three decades, 
the economic transition has not been completed and a substantive political transition 
has not begun. The present economy features as a semi-market mechanism. The so- 
called `administrative monopoly', as a coexisting phenomenon of the unaccomplished 
transition, creates incredible huge rent-seeking opportunities during the process of 
market liberalization. To become rich or to stay poor, to a great extent, depends on 
whether one could grasp the opportunities and seek the 'rent'- quids pro quos 45 
In recent years, the media have been full of reports on corruption, bribery, money 
laundering and degeneration of officials and merchants, on the immense gap between 
the rich and the poor, and on the widespread social inequality. People once believed 
43 Qi (n 40) 425-426. 
a The Third Plenary Session of the Sixteenth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party declared that 
`establishing an integrated, open, competitive, and well-organized modern economy system' is one of the CCP's 
seven major tasks of improving the socialist market economy system. See Speech by Hu Jintao, General Secretary 
of the Central Committee of the CCP, during the Session on 14 October 2003. See China Daily (Beijing 15 October 
2003) 1. 
°S Hu Angang, a leading Chinese Economist, argued that administrative monopolies simply are corrupt. See, Beijing 
Qingnian Bao (Beijing Youth Daily) (Beijing 24 September 2001). 
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that market privatization in China will result in social reform. Unlocking China's 
economic potential will also spur its political reform. And after China's entering the 
WTO, officials and merchants would have to follow international business practice and 
thus reduce corruption. But now, people began to ask how could `economic reform' 
become, to a great extent, a pronoun for `wealth plunder'? 
On the one hand, the government and many scholars place great hopes on the AML 
and on the establishment of `socialist rule of law'. People all believe that not only 
should the law learn from developed counties, it also should be based on China's 
conditions. 46 The prohibitions on administrative monopoly by the AML are beneficial 
for officials not only to distinguish between right and wrong, legal and illegal, but also 
to improving their awareness of competition policy. Others claimed that without 
changing the functions of the Chinese government from an all-powerful to a limited 
government, using law to deal with administrative monopoly would be insufficient 47 
For example, according to Article 30 AUCL 1993, any person or entity that abuses 
government or administrative power to restrict competition will be ordered by 
administrative organs at higher levels to make corrections. The AUCL further does not 
allow for the victims of such actions to resort to legal process according to the 
Administrative Litigation Law 1989. This provision has been proved vulnerable in 
practice because the government is not only the rule-maker, the umpire, but also the 
game player. 48 Hence, there will be no better chance for the AML. 49 But the 
commentators keep silent on how to change the government or they presume that the 
establishment of the `socialist rule of law' could resolve the problem. 
46 Hu Jian, `Fanlongduan Fa Shouxian Yao Fan Xingzheng Longduan' (The First Task of the Antimonopoly Law is 
to Combat Administrative Monopoly) Zhongguo Zheng_hi Xue (Chinese Politics) 3 November 2004. 
47 Du Liang, `YiZhi Kongwen - Fanlongduan Fa Fandeliao Xingzheng Longduan ma? ' (A Mere Scrap of Paper - 
Can the Antimonopoly Law Combat Administrative Monopoly? ) 2hongGuo Qiyejia (Chinese Entrepreneurs) 18 
September 2004. 
48 See Judgement of the Yongchun Case at 4.4, below. 
49 Wang Hongyu, 'Xingzheng Longduan Buyi You Fanlongduan Fa Guiding' (The Antimonopoly Law should not 
Include Administrative Monopoly) ZhongGuo Zheng: hi Xue (Chinese Politics) 2 November 2004. 
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On the other hand, Chinese economists argue that without privatizing and confirming 
property rights of SOE, establishing private ownership fundamentally, and further 
rationalizing the present industry structure, the AML would be a mere scrap of paper, 
which cannot prevent administrative power from unduly invading the market. Thus, 
China should not just copy competition law from developed counties, and further 
confuse economic monopoly with administrative monopoly. 50 Outside China, Williams 
commented that `the oddity of a monolithic, single party, non-democratic government 
having to issue a legal prohibition to prevent other parts of the same government from 
breaking or abusing its own administrative powers is an unusual phenomenon. '5' 
In addition, it has been subjected that competitive concerns over other government 
departments should be addressed by deregulation programs or regulatory reform 
initiated by the central government. For example, in recent years, the OECD has tried 
to bring attention to the importance of regulatory reform because driving out anti- 
competitive practice from the market through competition law is not made possible 
until sufficient regulatory reform is achieved. For example, the Korea Fair Trade Act 
has several provisions that promote cooperation between Korea's Fair Trade 
Commission and relevant Ministries that have authorities to regulate certain 
industries. "Z 
Figure 4.1 Should the Anti-Monopoly law deal with administrative monopoly? 53 
(Total Respondents: 279) 
S° Zhou Qiren, Jing-heng, Longduan he Guanrhi - Fanlongduan Zhengce de Being Baogao (Competition, 
Monopoly and Regulation - Background Report on Antimonopoly Policy), Internal Research Report, The Department of Industry of The State Office of Restructuring, China, 22 December 2001. 
51 Williams (n 13) 289. 
52 For example, Article 3.2 of Korean Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act states: The Fair Trade Commission 
may give opinions to the chief officers of the appropriate administrative authorities as to the introduction of 
competition or other measures necessary to improve market structures, where it appears to be necessary for the 
Commission to carry out action plans... ' Also, Article 63 states: '... The chief-officer of the competent 
administrative authority shall seek, in advance, consultation to the Fair Trade Commission, where he intends to 
propose legislation or amend enactments containing anti-competitive regulations... '. 
53 See the Appendix 2 for data explanation. 
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According to the survey conducted for this research in the summer of 2005,46% of 
respondents researched said that they agreed with using an anti-monopoly law to deal 
with administrative monopoly. 16% of respondents disagreed with such an approach. 
3% of respondents chose neither agree nor disagree, with further 35% of respondents 
chose not to answer the question. During this author's field research in 2005, a law 
research student in Shanghai commented that using a law to regulate the so-called 
`administrative monopoly' in present Chinese context would be unfeasible and the 
legislators might deceive themselves as well as others. However, employees were 
basically more confident toward the proposed law on the issue of administrative 
monopoly. For example, a lay-off manager of an SOE in Zhengzhou expressed his 
opinions that. 'it is a good sign our leaders begin to realize the problems caused by the 
government itself. I look forward to seeing the new law because I think a more 
competitive economy may help me back to employment again. ' 
4.2 The Current Legal and Regulatory Framework 
As di. cu, sed in 3.1.1. above, The Interim Provisions for Promoting and Protecting 
Competition in the Socialist Economy (the Ten Articles on Competition), issued by the 
State Council on 17 October 1980, were the first legislative document to protect 
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competition and regulate administrative monopoly in China. 54 The Ten Articles on 
Competition stipulated that `in economic activities, with the exception of products 
exclusively managed by state-designated departments and organisations, 
monopolization or exclusive dealing is not allowed'. 55 Furthermore, 
[c]ompetition must be introduced by breaking down regional blockades and 
sectoral monopolies. No locality or department is allowed to block the market. 
No locality or department should impose any ban on entry of non-locally made 
goods. Localities shall ensure that raw materials be transferred out according to 
state plans and should not crate any blockade. In order to promote competition, 
departments in charge of industry, transport, fmance and trade must revise any 
part(s) of their existing regulations and rules which impede competition. 56 
As the first legislative effort to combat monopolies and a signal of the PRC's economic 
transition, The Ten Articles' historical significance should not be underestimated. 
However, as analysed in 3.1.1, the manifested conflicts between competition policy 
and socialist ideology, the non-existed enforcement mechanism rendered the Ten 
Articles a mere paper tiger. 
4.2.1 The Anti-Unfair Competition Law 1993 
Article 7 of the AUCL stipulates that, 
Governments and their affiliated departments shall not abuse administrative 
powers to force consumers to buy commodities only from designated sellers 
or to impose restrictions on the business of their competitors. Governments 
and their affiliated departments shall not abuse administrative powers to 
prevent commodities originating in other regions from entering local markets 
or prevent local commodities from flowing into the markets of other regions. 
Therefore, Article 6 of the AUCL is a rule that regulates both undertakings and 
administrative monopoly because it can be infringed in conjunction with Article 7 by 
54 See 3.1.1, above. 
ss The Ten Articles on Competition, art 3. 
56 lbid, art 6. 
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the administrative authorities `hiding' behind the public utility enterprises. It states that 
`Public utilities or other operators having monopolistic status according to law shall 
not force others to buy goods of the specific operators designated by them so as to 
exclude other operators form fair competition. ' 
4.2.2 The Provisions on Prohibiting Regional Blockades in Market Economy 
The Provisions on Prohibiting Regional Blockades in Market Economy (Regional 
Blockades Provisions) were adopted by the State Council in April 2001. This 
legislative document prohibits all forms of geographic market partitioning activities. 
Any type of conduct by any individual or unit with the purpose of preventing the 
products or services of one region from entering the local markets of another or vice 
versa is prohibited. 57 
4.2.3 Sectoral Regulations: Some Examples 
4.2.3.1 The Postal Law 1986 
The Postal Law was adopted in December 1986 and entered into force in January 1987. 
It provides that postal enterprises affiliated to the competent department of postal 
services under the State Council are public enterprises, owned by the whole people. 
Postal enterprises shall establish branches to operate postal service. 58 It also provided 
that mail delivery and other service with characteristics of mail delivery shall be 
exclusively operated by postal enterprises, except otherwise stipulated by the State 
Council. Postal enterprises may entrust other units or individuals as agencies to run 
businesses exclusively operated by postal enterprises. 59 The State Post Bureau (SPB) 
and the SAIC are agencies to supervise and administer the postal law and postal 
service in the PRC. 
4.2.3.2 The Electric Power Law 1995 
57 The Regional Blockades Provisions, arts 6-9. 
58 Postal Law, art 3. 
59 Ibid, an S. 
107 
The Electric Power Law was adopted in December 1995 and entered into force in April 
1996. It states that the state encourages domestic and foreign investment in the electric 
industry. 60 It further provides that electric power supplying enterprises are required to 
operate in their approved supplying area. 61 Furthermore, the principle of `unified 
pricing policy managed by relevant regulators at different levels' must be followed. 
No unit may set the electricity price beyond its authority over electricity price control. 
No power-supplying enterprise may change the electricity price without 
authorization. 62 The State Electricity Regulatory Commission (SERC) and electricity 
departments above county level are agencies to supervise and administer the electric 
power industry in the PRC. 
4.2.3.3 The Railway Law 1990 
The Railway Law was adopted in September 1990 and entered into force in May 1991. 
It provides that the Ministry of Railways (MOR) shall be responsible for railway 
industry throughout the country and implement a highly centralized transport control 
system over the national railway network. The MOR shall be responsible for setting 
railway fares and tariffs. 63 
4.2.3.4 The Telecommunications Regulations 2000 
The Telecommunications Regulations were adopted and effective as of September 
2000. The Telecommunications Regulations provide that `supervision and 
administration of the telecommunications industry shall be in accordance with the 
principles of separating governmental functions from enterprise management, 
prohibiting monopoly, encouraging competition, and facilitating development, 
openness, equality and fairness. ' 64 Licensing system is established based on the 
recognition of differences between basic telecommunications service and value-added 
60 Electric Power Law, art 3. 
61 Ibid, art 25. 
62 Ibid, arts 35 and 43. 
63 Railway Law, arts 6 and 72. 
64 Telecommunications Regulations, art 4. 
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service. 65 Major telecommunications enterprises are prohibited from refusing requests 
for connecting to the telecommunication network. 66 Customers have rights to choose 
service suppliers. 67 Forced transactions are therefore prohibited. Furthermore, 
restrictive practices such as predatory pricing and irrational cross-subsidies are also 
prohibited. 68 The Ministry of Information Industry (MII) and departments of 
information industry at provincial levels are agencies to supervise and administer the 
telecommunications industry. 
4.3 Abuse of Administrative Powers to Eliminate or Restrict Competition under 
the Anti-Monopoly Law 2007 
The AML incorporates an entire chapter to regulate abuse of administrative power to 
eliminate or restrict competition. It prohibits administrative agencies and 
`organisations empowered by laws or regulations with responsibilities for public affairs 
administration' (other public organizations) from abusing their administrative powers 
to participate in forced transactions, regional blockades, or to promulgate anti- 
competition rules 69 
(1) Sectoral monopoly: Administrative agencies and other public organisations are 
prohibited from abusing their administrative power to compel undertakings to 
engage in the monopolistic conduct prohibited by the AML. 70 
(2) Regional blockade: Government agencies and other public organisations are 
prohibited from abusing administrative power to take a series of actions that 
impede the free flow of products between different regions. Specifically outlawed 
actions include, for example, setting up discriminatory standards for fees, 
6$ lbid, arts 7,8, and 12. 
66 Ibid, acts 17-22. 
67 Ibid, arts 31. 
69 Ibid, arts 42. 
69 AML, ch 5, arts 32 - 37. 
70 AML, art 36. 
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technical requirements, and licensing, and setting up checkpoints, restricting non- 
local undertakings from bidding activities, etc. 71 
(3) Forced transactions: Administrative agencies and other public organisations are 
prohibited from abusing administrative power to mandate (or mandate in disguise) 
any entities or persons to operate, purchase or use only the products supplied by 
designated undertakings. 72 
(4) Administrative conduct with general application: Administrative agencies are 
prohibited from abusing administrative power to promulgating rules containing 
provisions which eliminate or restrict competition. 
73 
Remedies provided by the AML on abuse of administrative power to eliminate or 
restrict competition include: the superior agency of the administrative agency or of the 
public organisation shall order it to make correction; the persons directly in charge and 
others directly responsible shall be subject to disciplinary sanctions in accordance with 
law. Furthermore, the AMEA may make proposals to the relevant superior agency to 
handle the case in accordance with law. 74 
Previous drafts however provided more efficient remedies, including, revoking specific 
administrative acts, administrative sanctions to the directly responsible officials, 
referring to criminal procedure if the administrative act in question constitutes a 
criminal offence, and confiscating the illegal income and imposing a fine of up to 
RMB 1,000,000 to the designated undertaking according to the seriousness of 
circumstances, and, the AMEA to suggest or advise the administrative agencies 
71 Ibid. arts 33 and 34. 
72 Ibid. art 32 
73 Ibid, art 37. 'Administrative conduct with general application' and related remedy `suggesting or advising .... to 
change or revoke such conduct' were once deleted by the July 2005 Draft. This writer's opinion is that it was 
understandable to omit such provisions without carefully designed remedies and workable enforcement mechanism. 
However, the problems caused by 'administrative conduct with general application' cannot be evaded by simply 
leave them free from scrutiny. 
74 AML, art 51. 
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promulgating rules with provisions eliminating or restricting competition to change or 
revoke the rules. 75 
It is not certain whether there will be remedies available to compensate victims of 
abuse of administrative power to eliminate or restrict competition at the time of writing. 
One could expect that although complainants could bring actions after 1 August 2008 
when the AML will come into force, for example, based on similar disputes to the 
Yongchun case, they would still be in an unfavourable position because of the law's 
inadequate design on remedies. 
The wide scope and apparent strict rules but insufficient enforcement mechanism 
prohibiting abuse of administrative powers to eliminate or restrict competition have 
revealed China's governance crisis as a transitional economy. Although the 
government is urged to regulate the economy by enforcing and complying with the law, 
there are no functioning mechanisms to offer necessary constraints or incentives. 
Without a genuine reform to decentralise political power, old institutions and 
mentalities will continue to encourage rent-seeking behaviour by turning 
administrative powers into a profitable resource. Government agencies are only subject 
to self-discipline with little accountability under the Administrative Litigation Law 
1989, and there are no rigorous external constraints, such as effective judicial review, 
have been developed. 76 As a result, effective competition has been smothered by 
suppressive and irregular government practices. In this sense, the incorporation of 
rules on abäse of administrative power is primarily to create and preserve the basic 
conditions for a competitive market order. Similar conditions and problems in other 
transitional economies have produced the same type of competition law provisions to 
prevent state bodies from taking actions harmful to competition in marketplace. " 
For instance, the recently adopted Vietnam's Competition Law has provisions specially 
75 See, for example, the July 2004 Draft, arts 59 and 60. 
76 The topic of the relationship between judicial review and competition law is dealt with in ch 8 below. 
77 RogerAlan Boner, 'Antitrust and State Action in Transition Economies', Antitrust Bulletin, Spring 1998. 
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designed for state monopoly sectors. 78 In Russia, the Law on Competition and 
Limitation of Monopolistic Activity on Commodity Markets was adopted in 1991 and 
amended in 1995. The main feature of Russian competition law is that it is applied not 
only to undertakings but also to State executive authorities. According to Article 7&8 
of the Law, actions and agreements of the bodies of executive authority that limit the 
economic independence of undertakings, create favourable or discriminatory 
conditions for certain undertakings shall be prohibited. The 1995 amendment to Article 
7 of the Law further gives the anti-monopoly authority power of preliminary control 
over adoption of decisions of executive authorities. In addition, decisions on questions 
of establishing, reorganization and liquidation of undertakings as well as on granting 
any privileges to a certain undertakings or group of undertakings shall be approved by 
the anti-monopoly authority. 79 
A further example is Bulgaria, where, in addition to regulating undertakings, Article 2 
of 1998 Bulgarian Law on Competition Protection stipulates the Law shall also apply 
to `the authorities of the executive branch and of local government, if they expressly or 
tacitly prevent, restrict, distort or might prevent, restrict or distort the competition in 
the country'. The 2003 amendment, followed the EC model of Article 86, further the 
Law's scope to `undertakings to whom the state or the local authorities has assigned 
services of public interest in so far as the application of the law does not impede de 
facto or de jure the fulfillment of the tasks assigned to these enterprises and the 
competition in the country is not affected to a considerable extent'. 80 
Not only the transitional countries, advanced economies, such as the EC, also have a 
sophisticated system to deal with exclusive rights and state monopolies through a 
series of legislative, judicial, and administrative instruments. However, as far as the 
78 See, for example, Vietnam - new competition law, Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer Updates, January 2005; and, 
Le Phu Cuong, 'Monopoly Situation in Vietnam', at: 
<http: //www2. jftc. go. jp/eacpf/05/APECTrainingProgram2003/LePCuong. pdfl. 
79 B. Kashevarov and Andrei. Q Tsyganov, Summary of the most Important Recent Developments in Russian 
Competition Legislation, <http: //europa. eu. int/comm/competition/speeches/text/spl996_040 en. html>. 
80 See the Bulgarian Law on Competition Protection, at <http: //www. cpc. bg/system/storage/zak_en 1_119. doc>. 
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present writer knows, only China chose to use the concept of `administrative 
monopoly'. Such concept as well as related provisions has become a major dilemma of 
the AML and had caused its enactment blocked several times. The prohibition of 
`administrative monopoly' might be a special endeavour which is planed to assure the 
transition to a market economy. The provisions, however, deliver serious enforcement 
challenges for Chinese authorities and courts. One might ask how could the provisions 
to be applied to government agencies of various sectors and levels. Although it still 
remains to be seen whether the remedies could be further improved and effectively 
implemented by the AMEA against other government agencies in the future, one can 
reasonably predict the outcome maybe passive considering the unbalanced social and 
political context for these provisions to be functioning in China. 
4.4 Case Study 1: the Yongchun Case81 
In 4.4 and 4.5, case study on the Yonchun Case, in particular, and in sectoral monopoly 
and regional blockades, in general, shed further light on the difficulties of prohibiting 
abuse of administrative power to restrict competition under the current political 
equilibrium. 
4.4.1 The Facts 
On 27 May 1994, Jiangdu Education Department82 (JED) issued the Circular on 
Standard Registration Photos for Middle School Students (hereinafter referred to as 
`the Circular'). The Circular demanded that, from 1994 onwards, all newly registered 
1st year middle school students of Jiangdu were required to take standard registration 
photos, which meant same size, same colour, and taken against same background 
(indicating `yy JIANG JIAO' 83). In the Circular, the JED authorized Jiangdu Education 
81 Yongchun and others v Jiangdu Education Department (JED) and Jiangdu Education Industrial Company (JEIC) 
Adapted and translated by this writer from: China Senior Judges Training Center and The People's University Law 
School, Review of Cases of Chinese Courts (The People's University Press, Beijing 1997) 450-453. 
(1) All footnotes were added by this author. 
(2) No case citation is available at the time of writing. 
82 Jiangdu is a county of Yangzhou city in Jiangsu province of the PRC. 9' 'yy' referred to the year of first registration. 'JIANG JAO' was the abbreviation of 'Jiangdu Jaoyuju' (Jiangdu 
Education Department). For example, all registration photos for 1994-1995 academic year thus had '94 JIANG 
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Industrial Company (JEIC) working on the JED's behalf to offer door-to-door photo 
taking services for each school. The JEIC then arranged a photo-taking timetable and 
handed it out to local schools. Before complaints have arisen, the JEIC charged RMB 
4.95 per set, and took photos for approximately 10,000 students of 40 schools. The net 
profit was RMB 20,000. When answering complaints from students and local photo 
studios, the staff of the JED and the JEIC emphasized that without photos meeting the 
standard set by the Circular, registration cards could not be issued. Local photo studios 
then referred the matter to Jiangdu Administration of Industry and Commerce and 
Jiangdu People's Congress and asked the JED revoke the Circular. However, the 
complaints and claims were left unresolved. 
In November 1994, Yongchun Photo Studio and other 37 local photo studios brought 
an action against the JED and the JEIC at the County People's Court of Jiangdu (CCJ). 
Yongchun and others argued that the Circular infringed Article 7 of the AUCL84 and 
claimed that the JED and JEIC should cease the infringement, express an apology, and 
compensate for the damages. 
The CCJ found that the JEIC was incorporated by the JED as a subsidiary unit. 
According to an agreement between the JED and the JEIC, the former should give 
`convenience' to the latter and should help it to acquire business as more as possible 
within `the JED's system' (meaning the JED, its subsidiaries, and local schools). The 
JEIC was required to share its profits with the JED according to a fixed percentage. In 
addition, the JED granted an exclusive right to the JEIC for using `yy JIANG JAO' as 
`background' for registration photos. The JED never expressed that local photo studios 
could use such `background' to offer services on school registration photos. 
4.4.2 The Judgement 
JAO' on the background. 
s' Article 7 (1) of the AUCL provides `Governments and their affiliated departments shall not abuse administrative 
power; to force consumers to buy commodities only from designated sellers or to impose restrictions on the 
business of their competitors'. For detailed review of the AUCL 1993, see 3.11 above. 
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The CCJ found, by using administrative power, the JED reserved the services of school 
registration photos exclusively to its subsidiary, the JEIC, and by so doing, eliminated 
all local photo studios from the market of `school registration photos' 85 The JED's 
practice infringed Article 7(1) of the AUCL, and therefore constituted unfair 
competition behaviour. 
However, the CCJ went on to decide, according to Article 30 of the AUCL86, the unfair 
competition behaviour of the JED should be terminated or corrected by the People's 
government of the same level or educational authority of the higher level, in this case, 
the People's Government of Jiangdu, or the Education Department of Yangzhou. The 
CCJ has therefore no jurisdiction on this dispute. The action was dismissed. 
Yongchun and others appealed to the Intermediate People's Court of Yangzhou (ICY). 
The ICY held, according to Article 30 of the AUCL, whether the disputed circular 
issuing practice of the JED was unfair competition behaviour should be decided by the 
competent administrative organ(s), and therefore outside the jurisdiction of the 
People's Courts. Furthermore, the exclusive practice of the JEIC is based on the 
Circular. Also according to Article 30 of the AUCL, whether there is compensation 
should be settled after the competent administrative organ(s)' decision towards the 
dispute. 87 The ICY therefore upheld the CCJ's finding and dismissed the appeal. The 
judgment was final. 88 
4.4.3 A Comment 
The facts of the Yongchun case, which involved a restrictive practice of forced 
85 The concept of 'relevant market', 'given market', or 'specific market' could not been found among Chinese 
legislation, case law, and literatures in 1994. 
86 Article 30 of AUCL 1993 states that '[w]here a local government and it subordinate departments, in contravention 
to the provisions of Article 7 of this law, ... the administrative authorities at higher level shall order them to rectify the situation; where the circumstances are serious, the competent authorities at the same level or the next higher 
level shall take disciplinary sanctions against the persons directly responsible. ' 
87 The ICY left unanswered who should decide the question of compensation. 
88 According to the principle of 'four Levels, two Instances', the PRC court system has four levels and the judgment 
of the court of first instance may be appealed to the court of next higher level, but the judgments of the second 
instance are final. 
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transactions, were among typical categories of `administrative monopoly' in China. 
The judgement revealed serious flaws in enforcement mechanism and institutional 
arrangement of the AUCL, the first Chinese law incorporating provisions dealing with 
administrative monopoly. 89 The case also reflected the status quo of the power 
relationships between the administrative and judiciary systems in the PRC 90 
4.5 Case Study 2: More Examples of Using (Abusing) Administrative Power to 
Restrict Competition 
4.5.1 Sectoral Monopoly: Excessive Pricing, Tying, Entry Deterrence, and other 
Restrictive Practices 
After four rounds of government restructuring, sectoral monopoly now is found in a 
limited number of industries, which includes, among other things, natural monopolies 
and certain key technology enterprises such as space and nuclear technology. 91 Also 
referred to as industry or department monopoly, sectoral monopoly, is mainly 
manifested as restrictive and/or monopolistic behaviour of public utilities and other 
network industry. The logical link between sectoral monopoly and network industry is 
that, in contemporary China, the later are historically established by or controlled by 
sector regulators. For example, in electricity industry, there is an established principle 
of `One County, One Electricity Administration, and One Company'. 92 
The ministries and their subsidiaries operating or regulating those industries, however, 
have been widely criticized for using regulatory power to unduly restrict competition. 
For instance, in early 1999, when its affiliated airlines started to decrease airfare, the 
China General Administration of Civil Aviation (CAAC) imposed a ban on thicket 
89 Before the AUCL, there were several administrative regulations with provisions dealing with administrative 
monopoly. See 5.1 of the present chapter for an example. 
90 See ch 2, above. 
91 See discussion in 2.3, above. 
92 The 'one company' is in principle, established as a subsidiary undertaking of the 'one administration'. But the 
administration of some county, without establishing such a company, directly carries out economic activities of 
electricity distribution See, Qi (n 40) 255-260. 
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discounts. 93 The most criticized sectoral monopoly phenomena are monopolistic 
behaviour in the educational sector, and restrictive practices prevailing in natural 
monopolies such as railway industry, postal services, and other utilities industry. 94 
4.5.1.1 The Educational Sector 
Higher education institutions in the PRC began to charge tuition fees in 1989. By 2004, 
the average revenue of residents in cities and towns has increased four times, but the 
average college tuition fees have increased twenty five times. 95 Meanwhile, the 
relevant regulators have set different kinds of barriers to entry and discrimination 
against private colleges and universities, which have left private schools to 
unprivileged position and thus can only compete with government-funded institutions 
marginally. In fact, as criticised by some commentators, there is no `education 
industrialisation' in the sense of market economy as advocate by the government, but 
only sectoral monopoly under the flag of `education industrialisation', which has been 
believed as a major reason for excessive fees. 96 
From the survey conducted for this research, more than 80% of people expressed their 
concern and dissatisfaction toward the excessive fees, low quality, rigid system, and 
out-of-date curricula of Chinese educational system both in higher and foundational 
education. 
Figure 4.2 Respondents who agree they cannot afford their education97 
93 Official Notice from State Planning Commission and China Civil Aviation Bureau on Strengthening the 
Administration of Domestic Airfare to Ban Low Price Competition (25 January 1999). 
94 However, not all monopolistic behaviour of network enterprises and other undertakings can be categorized as 
administrative monopoly. They are simply behaviour of undertakings and ought to be dealt by referring to 
provisions of restrictive agreements and of abuse of dominance. Detailed analysis see chs 5 and 6. 
95 Zhongguo Xinwen Zhoukan, (China Weekly News) (Beijing 11 April 2004) 10. 
% See for example, Wang Xianqing, Chinese Education - the Biggest VIctim of Monopoly, at: 
<http: //www. blogms. com/blog/CommList. aspx? BloglogCode=1000004532>; Zhou Liang, Where are the roots of 
corruption in education? <http: //www. chinaeweekly. com/viewarticle gb. aspx? vid=1065>. 97 See the Appendix 2 for data explanation. 
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4.5.1.2 The Railway Industry 
Railway transport in the PRC is mostly controlled by the Ministry of Railways (MOR). 
Every year, there are special fares (15%-20% increase in two weeks) during the 
traditional Chinese's New Year - the Spring Festival, which is seen as an occasion for 
family reunion in China, and some other public holidays. There was only one `Public 
Hearing' held in 2001 regarding the special fares, which functioned like a political 
show. In 2005, the official explanation was that `the increasing extent of the railway 
fares during the 2005 Chinese New Year would be the same as the previous New Year 
seasons' (so there is no need to have a hearing). Altogether 137 million people were 
estimated to take trains during the 2005 Spring Festival. " The Spring Festival now is 
called `Spring Plunder' by Chinese. 99 Ironical comments, such as `the Ministry's only 
one public hearing would be valid for one hundred years', have prevailed on the 
Internet and other media100 
'x Xinhua News Agency (Beijing 13 November 2005). 
99 'Festival' and 'plunder' have same pronunciation as bie] in Mandarin. 
'00 See, for example, The Ministry of Railways: Nostalgia for the past; The Committee of the Development and 
Reform: Afisrepresentation of the Present, by Wang Xudong, at, <http: //news. xinhuanet. com/comments/2005- 
01/16/content 2459666. htm>; for more comments see, 
<http: //comments. xinhuanet. com/comment9nc%%, sid=2448265>. 
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Results form the survey conducted for this research indicate that, of the 279 
respondents, 92% agreed they and/or their family have been influenced by the train 
fare increases during public holidays such as the Spring Festival, National Day, and 
May Day holidays. 46% of respondents further expressed their discontentment to the 
high price and insufficient service offered by the rail industry. Dr. Li Jing expressed 
her concerns towards the sector at issue, `the artificially imposed entry barriers to the 
transport industry are too high, which caused the country's weak transportation and 
distribution infrastructures and therefore constrained Chinese economy to grow 
organically. The industry has to be deregulated and more competition should be 
brought in both for the consumer welfare and for the country's future strategic 
development. I hope the Anti-Monopoly Law could contribute to this deregulation 
process in the near future. "" 
4.5.1.3 The Postal Service 
89% of respondents agreed that when they post letters and packages, the post office 
only accepted those with envelopes and packing materials meeting the standards set by 
the China Post, which actually refer to envelopes produced by affiliated undertakings 
of `China Post' and packing materials sold by `China Post'. Here is a little anecdote by 
Professor Tao Zhenhua, `[t]his letter was returned by the post office recently because I 
used an envelope which didn't match the new standard. But this envelope was 
produced by a subsidiary of the post office according to its old standard. I doubt there 
is any objective reason to set a standard for envelope and then change it irregular. In 
any case, the post office should recall all old envelopes and give us refund. Of course it 
never does so. ' 102 In many areas, consumers are required to accept other services by 
101 Statement made at an interview during this author's field research on China's competition law legislation in 
Beijing, May and June 2005. The project was funded by University of London Central Research Fund (CRF) 
(Reference No. AR/CRF/C). Dr. Li Jing, lecturer in economics at the Capital University of Economy and Trade, 
Beijing. 
102 Comment made by oral communication during this writer's field research in Beijing in 2005. Tao ZhengHua, 
Professor of international law at the Institute of Law of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), Beijing. 
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certain providers. 103 For example, in Hubei province, the postal office required 
customers to open saving account with them. In Jiangsu province, the postal office 
required customers to use debit card service from a specific bank. 
104 
4.5.1.4 Other Typical Monopolistic Conduct in the Public Utilities 
78% of respondents agreed that they and/or their household had been charged with 
excessive fees under the name of `first time installing fees', `connecting fees', etc. 
when they began to use telephone, gas, tap water, electricity, and heating, etcl05 
`Excessive fees' in the Chinese context means the fee is over charged compared with 
the average income of ordinary citizens. For example, during the author's field 
research in China, an accountant of a private-owned enterprise in Zhengzhou 
complained that, `in 2004, the gas company charged every household in this new 
residential area RMB 3,000 for connecting to the gas pipe, which was equally to one 
eighth of my family's annual income. We are in the middle income level of this city. In 
2005, the electricity company charged every household RMB 1,000 of the city for 
electricity meter upgrading... Most citizens struggle to pay a variety of exorbitant fees. ' 
Public Utilities normally use official documents, such as circulars, to justify their 
restrictive behaviour. For example, in 1999, a power department in Jiangsu province 
required users to buy electric product it provided, based on an official circular issued 
by the Ministry of Electricity. '06 
4.5.2 Regional Blockades: Market Foreclosure and Partitioning 
A study conducted by Sandra Poncet, an economist at the Centre for International 
Research and Development in Paris, has showed that regional trade barriers within the 
103 SAIC Gazette (1999) 278; also see Beijing Evening Post 05 June 2005. 
104 SAIC Gazette (1999) 132. 
103 Public utilities were tightly control by Chinese government, mainly by specific ministries. The government 
began to reform public utilities slowly and hesitatingly, for example, to accept competition in telecommunication 
industry. At the time of writing, however, there are still no sign when the government will begin to reform the 
retailing of gas and electricity. 
106 SAIC Gazette (1999) 275. 
120 
PRC are as high as those between countries of the European Union in the late 1990s, 
and is also roughly the same as the trade barriers between Canada and the USA. Inter- 
provincial trade barriers have risen steadily since the 1980s as Poncet found goods 
crossing provincial borders in China faced the equivalent of a 46% tariff in 1997, up 
from 35% a decade earlier. 107 
Examples of regional blockades, also referred as local protectionism, are familiar to 
most Chinese. In Jilin and Hebei provinces, regional governments once required non- 
local beer manufacturers to contribute to a `beer adjustments fund' and in effect 
imposed an additional fee on each bottle of beer sold in the local market. 
108 A local 
government in the Northeast was reported to have issued an official circular requiring 
all local retailers to sell only locally manufactured fertilizers. Any violation would 
result in confiscation of the `illegal goods', punitive fines and even revocation of the 
business licences. At local levels, the administrative departments often condition 
issuance of approvals or licenses on acceptance of designated services. For example, 
department of motor vehicles may require vehicle owners to use designated garages 
from maintenance services in order to obtain or renew licenses. 
4.5.3 Forced Transactions 
Forced transaction can be a reflection of both sectoral monopoly and regional 
blockades. However certain forced transaction cannot be defined in the two categories. 
For example, during the present writer's field research in Beijing, more than two third 
(69%) of the respondents agreed that when issued with ID cards, passports, marriage 
certificates, even academic credentials, etc. they have been required to have their 
photos to be taken at designated place and pay higher price. Photos taken at other place 
would be rejected by the issuing authorities. Stories similar to the Yongchun case still 
happen everyday and related authorities have taken such `power' for granted. A 
107 See Bruce Gilley, `Provincial disintegration: reaching your market is more than just a matter of distance' Far 
Eastern Economic Review (22 November 2001) 44. 
108 Wu Chengguang, 'Difficulties in Combating Monopolies' May 2001, <http: //finance. sina. com. cn/o/59830. html>. 
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lecturer in Sociology aired his grievance as a citizen, `People don't understand why 
they have to pay more if they could get something cheaper and better elsewhere? Some 
of the powerful is trying to extort every cent from the general public. ' 109 
4.6 Concluding Remarks: Reform Requirements 
After detailed examination, one can expect that the logical outcome of adopting the 
concept of `administrative monopoly', or `abuse of administrative powers to eliminate 
or restrict competition', which overlaps with several related concepts, has caused and 
will continually cause difficulties in interpretation and application. 
`Administrative monopoly' also unnecessarily narrows the law's scope to deal with 
restrictive behaviour caused by public authorities, for example, legislative and/or 
quasi-legislative measures which restrict or distort competition. The former is the 
exercise of legislative power and is therefore out of the scope of `administrative 
monopoly'. The latter, quasi-legislative measures, although is undeniably a form of the 
exercise of executive (administrative power) power, is potentially out of the scope of 
`administrative monopoly' because of the unavoidable conflicts of the teeming 
regulations and the AML and the inability of the competition authority to deal with 
such conflicts under the present institutional framework. This is one reason why quasi- 
legislative measures, expressed as `administrative conduct with general application' 
was deleted from the previous draft. 
It is hereby submitted that: 
(1) The concept of `administrative monopoly' should be abolished because of the 
innate obscurity, uncertainty, and limitation of the concept. One solution is to substitute 
`state monopolies' or `restricting competition by using state measures/public authority' 
for 'administrative monopoly'. 
109 Comment given by an anonymous lecturer in sociology during the author's same field research in Xi'an, China. 
See n 99, above, for details. 
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The title of Chapter V of the AML may thus be revised from `Abuse of Administrative 
Power to Eliminate or Restrict Competition' to `Provisions Addressed to State 
Monopolies', or `Provisions Addressed to Restricting Competition by Using State 
Measures/Public Authority', or to a more concise title of `Provisions Addressed to 
Public Authorities'. ' 10 
(2) Constitutional prohibitions on restrictive behaviour by public authorities without 
objective justification and respect to the principle of proportionality, Adding 
provisions concerning competition in future constitution amendment as `basic norms' 
in the hierarchy of Chinese laws. 
(3) Further transplanting the EC `principle of proportionality' and the jurisprudence 
behind such principle in future Constitution amendment and administrative legislation 
in general, and in competition legislation in particular. 
The EC principle of proportionality was originated from German law and has three 
subsidiary principles: suitability, necessity and proportionality `strictly speaking'. In 
Case C-331/88 Fedesa (1990), the ECJ defined proportionality as: `The principle of 
proportionality ... requires that measures adopted 
by Community institutions do not 
exceed the limits of what is appropriate and necessary in order to attain the objectives 
legitimately pursued by the legislation in question; when there is a choice between 
several appropriate measures recourse must be had to the least onerous, and the 
disadvantages caused are not to be disproportionate to the aims pursued. ' Although 
originally addressed to Community institutions in relation to the Community principle 
of subsidiarity, the principle has been used to challenge both Community action and 
member state actions. "' The present author predicts that the philosophy behind the 
principle and case law and decisions developed by the ECJ, CFI, and the EC 
110 Before the July 2005 draft, the previous drafts all chose the title of `Prohibition of Administrative Monopoly'. 
The July 2005 draft adapted the title to `Prohibition on Abuse of Administrative Power to Restrict Competition'. 
111 See for example, Commission Decision (EEC) 90/16 concerning the provision in the Netherlands of express 
delivery services (Courier Postal Service - The Netherlands) [1990] OJ L10/5 1, paras 16-18. 
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Commission are highly relevant and could be carefully transplanted to Chinese context. 
At the time of writing, no provisions of the current Chinese laws and regulations 
explicitly incorporate the principle of proportionality. However, many Chinese 
academic works argue that the principle of proportionality was adopted implicitly in 
the Chinese administrative law. 112 For example, according to the Administrative 
Litigation Law 1989 (ALL 1989), a specific administrative action may be revoked, 
partially revoked, or modified by the people's courts if a specific administrative action 
is through an incorrect application of laws or rules, the defendant administrative organ 
abuses its power, or, the imposed administrative penalties are clearly unjust. 113 
However, this writer's research indicate that the principle of proportionality is seldom 
to be interpreted, articulated, or applied in China due to the early stage of development 
of Chinese administrative law, which is also the major obstacle of transplanting the 
principle of proportionality in China. 
The system research of administrative law only started in China in the early 1980s. 
Legal scholars in this field have been heavily influenced both by the orthodox Marxist 
approach of law and by Western legal theories. There is so far no definitively or 
unanimously accepted definition of administrative law in China. Until quite recently, 
the debate on administrative law in China has been mainly focused on whether the law 
should be used to protect or restrain administrative organs to exercise administrative 
power. One set of scholars argues that the origin of modem administrative law is from 
Western countries and is based on the constitutional principles of rule of law and 
separation of powers. The second school argues that Chinese administrative law is 
based on a socialist political structure, which is therefore fundamentally different with 
`Western bourgeois administrative law' in essence. The third school represents a more 
commonly accepted approach, which argues that Chinese administrative law should 
112 Mingan Jiang, Administrative Law and Administrative Litigation Law (2d edn, Peking University Press and 
Higher Education Press, Beijing 2005) 71. 
113 ALL 1989, art 54. 
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protect and control the exercise of administrative power. 114 Like any intellectual 
construct, the principle of proportionality is particularized rather than being a universal 
norm that can be readily transplanted to other social systems. Due to the unclear 
definition, objectives and rationales, and development status quo of Chinese 
administrative law, the process of transplanting the principle of proportionality in 
China will certainly take long time to complete. 
(4) Reinforcing the judicial power in China by establishing the mechanism of effective 
judicial review, and by so doing, to guarantee the constitutionality of laws and 
delegated legislations, ' 15 furthermore, improving judiciary control of administration in 
order to examine effectively the legality of administrative acts, both substantively and 
procedurally. 
(5) Transplanting the EC concepts of 'state monopolies of a commercial character', 
`service of general economic interest', and the principle of `conflicts of interests' in 
competition legislation. 
(6) Distinguishing between monopolies de facto and potentially competitive economic 
activities. Taking electricity industry for example, the supply of electricity contains 
four successive production states: generation, high-voltage transmission, low-voltage 
distribution and retailing. Transmission and distribution are network industry that are 
monopolies de facto and can still be justified under the theory of natural monopoly 
considering the status quo of technical development. By contrary, Electricity 
generation and retailing are potentially competitive and should be open to 
competition. 116 Another example is basic postal services and value-added cruise 
"' Songnian Ying, Xing. hengfaxue Xinlun (New Ibeory of Administrative Law) (China Fazheng Press, Beijing 
1997) 7. 
"' Although detailed analysis of present concentrated state and the possibility of a 'separation of powers' in China 
are beyond the scope and objectives of this thesis and might only permit an historical explanation, a review of 
political conditions for Chinese competition law and policy is provided inch 2, above. 
116 Gert Brunekreeft and Katja Keller, `Competition in European Electricity Supply: Issues and Obstacles' in Johann 
Eekhoff (eds) Competition Policy in Europe (Springer, Verlag 2004) 193. Chinese economists also have common 
understanding on this issue. See, for example, Qi (n 40) 280-282. 
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services. 117 
(7) Establishing connection between other substantive competition provisions and state 
monopolies/ restricting competition by using state measures (public authority): Neither 
the AML nor the available literature has clarified the question of whether the 
provisions on administrative monopoly has any connection with other substantive 
provisions and if yes, how the connection should be established and to be dealt with in 
practice. For reasons of legal certainty, this author suggests that it is necessary to adopt 
a reasonable interpretation in the near future. 
To prohibit the abuse of administrative power to restrict competition, a system of legal, 
economic and political instruments is required. Neither legal nor non-legal approaches 
alone are sufficient. Without being sustained by an independent judiciary and a 
competent quasi judiciary competition authority, using administrative power to check 
administrative power may be unfeasible. Although it is an imperative pillar of the 
system, the AML is far from adequate and is not a panacea. The AML is especially 
vulnerable on scrutinizing public authorities when taking into account its remedy 
design, institutional arrangement, and its context. That is one reason why 
`administrative monopoly' has become the most formidable dilemma and battlefield of 
competition legislation in China. 
This writer's cautious conclusion is as below. First of all, as observed by James 
Madison in 1788, `in framing a government to be administered by men over men, the 
great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the 
governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself. ' Without being sustained by 
an independent judiciary and a competent quasi judiciary competition authority, using 
administrative power to check administrative power will be too unrealistic and too 
uncertain to be achieved. Secondly, bearing the above observation in mind, further in- 
depth multi jurisdictional comparative research, especially investigation into state 
117 Case C-320/91 Corbeau [1993] ECR 1-2533. 
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monopolies under the EC law, could nevertheless provide potentially adaptable 
solutions for a transitional China. 
This chapter is closed by a little story. Ming Tai Zu (1368 - 1399 A. D. ), the first 
Emperor of the Ming Dynasty, once asked, `I am determined to eliminate corruption. 
But why people offended the law at the end of the day after I just executed many 
corrupted officials in the morning? ' Liang Zhiping, a contemporary Chinese jurist, 
submitted an explanation to the king. Liang commented that criminal penalty may 
punish the outcome of the crime, yet it cannot eliminate the incentives of the crime. 
What Ming Tai Zu had tried to eliminate was exactly the side product of a system he 
had tried to protect. 118 The challenges, dilemmas and implications of the rules on use 
and/or abuse of administrative power to eliminate or restrict competition are worth to 
be closely observed and therefore open to further explanation. 
11s Liang Zhiping, 'Shuo Zhi' (On Governance), in Liang Zhiping, Fa Bian (The Law's Evolution) (China 
University of Politics and Law Publishing, Beijing 2002) 117-18. 
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5 
Restrictive Agreements 
This chapter examines the current legal and regulatory framework on restrictive 
agreements including basic concepts and mechanism established by the AML. The 
chapter further observes that the rationales of Chinese legislators to adopt an EC model 
of `prohibition and exemption' instead of a US model of 'per se rule and rule of reason' 
are based on legal and institutional conditions, as well as administrability of the AML. 
Furthermore, the chapter argues that because mandatory notifications for obtaining 
exemptions (chosen by early drafts) was not finally adopted by the AML, principles of 
self assessment and directly applicability are implicitly introduced into the PRC. 
However, since the current rules on restrictive agreements are insufficiently precise 
and its enforceability is subject to doubt, the statutory language calls for revisions on 
several aspects. It is therefore proposed that a clearer and more predictable analytical 
framework is needed by adopting block exemption regulations as well as necessary 
guidelines and notices to `define and structure discretion' and to effectively implement 
the prohibition and exemptions on restrictive agreements under the AML. 1 
5.1 Background 
Restrictive agreements, especially cartel activities, have been widely reported in the 
media over the years and have been growing in frequency and influence. Vertical 
restraints in China are also widespread, especially in consumer products market. For 
example, in July 2002, Changhong, the biggest consumer electronics producer in 
China, announced its termination of supplying TV sets to Beijing outlets of Guomei 
(now GOME), a big electronics retailer because of Guomei's pursuit of an aggressive 
1 Maher M Dabbah, the Internationalisation of Antitrust Policy (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2003) 70- 
85. Dabbah analyses and proposes three approaches to deal with the use of discretion by competition law authorities, 
namely 'confining, structuring, and checking discretion'. Among them 'confining and structuring discretion' has 
particular significance to the process of transplanting competition rules in the PRC. 
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pricing policy below certain level without consents from Changhong. 2 Whether there 
was a minimum RPM agreement behind such a dealership termination was uncertain 
since the case was left unattended with no prescriptive rules existing at all in 2002. The 
case however implied the needs for the PRC to adopt economic-based rules on vertical 
restraints. 
5.2 The Current Legal and Regulatory Framework 
The current legal and regulatory framework on restrictive agreements is not as 
stretching as those on abuse of dominant market position and on merger control. A 
general review is offered below. 
5.2.1 The Anti-Unfair Competition Law 1993 on Bid Rigging 
As discussed at 3.1 and 3.2 above, the AUCL is not solely an unfair competition law 
but includes substantial provisions tackling restrictive and abusive behaviour. 
Regarding restrictive agreements, the AUCL 1993 explicitly prohibits bid rigging. 
Collusive bids are void and parties are subject to a fine between RMB 10,000 and 
RMB 200,000.3 Other typical restrictive agreements are however beyond the scope of 
the AUCL 1993. 
5.2.2 The Price Law 1997 on Abusive Pricing Behaviour 
The Price Law was adopted at the 29th Session of the 8th SCNPC on 29 December 
1997 and entered into force on I May 1998. It provides that pricing system of the PRC 
includes market price, government-guided price and government-set price. The Price 
Law declares that the state promotes fair, open and lawful market competition and 
prohibits business operators from collusion to control market price. It also prohibits 
certain abusive pricing behaviour. 4 Offenders are subject to seizure of illegal gains, a 
fine up to five times of the illegal gains, warning, order to stop business for 
_ -, 'Changbong tingzhi gongying Guomei' (Changhong to stop supply GOME) Renmin Ribao (People's Daily) 
(Beijing, 31 July 2000). 
3 AUCL 1993, arts 15 and 27. 
4 See 6.2.2, below. 
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rectification, and/or cancelling business licences. 5 
5.2.3 The Bidding Law 1999 
The Bidding Law was adopted at the 11th Session of the 9`h SCNPC on 30 August 1999 
and entered into force on 1 January 2000. The bidding law prohibits bid rigging but 
provides more serious penalties than the AUCL. Offenders are subject to seizure of 
illegal gains, a fine equal to 5%o to 1096o of the total value of the bid project, 
disqualification to attend future bidding, cancelling business licences, criminal 
liabilities, and/or compensations to other parties. As one could see, uncertainty and 
overlap exist between rules on bid rigging provided by the Bidding Law and the AUCL. 
5.2.4 The Contract Law 1999 on Collusive Contracts and Contracts 
Monopolizing Technology 
The Contract Law was adopted at the 2°d Session of the 9th NPC on 15 March 1999 
and entered into force on 1 October 1999. The relationship between competition law 
and contract law in the PRC is a topic worth to be explored further. Several provisions 
of the Chinese Contract law have already been referred by litigants to sue their 
competitors, for example, the dispute between Dongjin and Intel Corp. 
According to the Contract Law, a contract shall be voidable if (1) it is reached through 
fraud or coercion by one party and the contract damages the state interest; (2) 
malicious collusion is conducted to damage the interest of the State, of a collective 
entity or of a third party; (3) an illegitimate purpose is concealed by legitimate 
behaviour; (4) it damages the public interest; (5) it violates the compulsory provisions 
of laws and administrative regulations. 8 The Contract Law also provides that a 
technology contract which monopolizes technology or impedes technological progress, 
3 Price Law 1997, arts 14 and 40. 
6 Bidding Law 1999, arts 32 and 53. 
7 See 6.4.1, below. 
S Contract Law 1999, art 52. 
130 
or infringes technological achievement of others shall be null and void .9 Furthermore, 
parties of a technology transfer contract may agree the scope of the use of a patent or 
know-how, provided that no restriction is imposed on technological competition and 
development. 10 Although the interface between contract law, competition law and IP 
law is by no means an easy subject and will not be further analyzed here, the 
ambiguous relationships and wider implications should not be ignored and therefore 
deserve a further enquiry. 
5.2.5 The Criminal Law 1997 
The Criminal Law prohibits bidder rigging. Collusive bidders and bidders and bid- 
inviters are subject to a fixed-term imprisonment up to three years, or criminal 
detention and/or a fine. " 
5.2.6 The Interim Provisions on Prohibiting Monopolistic Pricing Behaviour 
2003 
In June 2003, the NDRC adopted the Interim Provisions on Prohibiting Monopolistic 
Pricing Behaviour (the Monopolistic Pricing Provisions), which entered into effect on 
1 November 2003. The Monopolistic Pricing Provisions function as one of 
implementing regulations to the Price Law, and are aimed at prohibiting monopolistic 
pricing behaviour, promoting fair competition, and protecting legitimate interests of 
business operators and consumers. 12 
A new concept `monopolistic pricing behaviour' is introduced into the Chinese law, 
which was defined as `controlling market price through collusion between business 
operators or through abusing of market dominant position and therefore disturbing 
9 Ibid, art 329. 
10 Ibid, art 343. 
" Criminal Law 1997, art 223. The Criminal Law was adopted at the Zed Session of the 5'b NPC on 1 July 1979; it 
was amended at 5th Session of the 8's NPC on 14 March 1997, and was revised in 1999,2001 (twice), 2002, and 2005 respectively. 
12 The Monopolistic Pricing Provisions 2003, art 1. 
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normal production and operation order, impeding legitimate interests of other business 
operators or consumers, or harming the social public interests. '13 Business operators 
are prohibited from entering agreements, decisions or concerted practices which fix or 
change price, limit output to control price, control price in bidding or auctioning 
activities, and other price-controlling behaviour. Therefore, the Monopolistic Pricing 
Provisions, as regards restrictive agreements, provide a detailed explanation to Article 
14 (1) of the Price Law which only generally prohibits controlling market price 
through collusion. 14 
5.2.7 The Measures for Administration of Fair Trading between Retailers and 
Suppliers 2006 
A newly adopted ministerial rule, the 2006 Measures for Administration of Fair 
Trading between Retailers and Suppliers (the Retailers and Suppliers Measures), is 
however a noteworthy newcomer. The Retailers and Suppliers Measures were jointly 
issued by five agencies at ministerial level in October and entered into force in 
November 2006.15 Several provisions of this legislative document regulate restrictive 
agreements. For example, retailers and suppliers are prohibited from impeding market 
transaction order and fair competition as well as from damaging legitimate interests of 
their trading partners. 16 Furthermore, retailers are generally prohibited from (1) 
restraints of suppliers' pricing ability when suppliers directly supply consumers and 
other undertakings; and (2) restraints of suppliers' ability to supply or to provide 
distribution services to other retailers. 17 Suppliers are prohibited from (1) tying; and (2) 
restraints of retailers' ability to sell commodities of other suppliers. ' 8 
13 Ibid, art 2. See 6.2.4, below, for discussion of the Monopolistic Pricing Provisions on abuse of dominance. 
14 Ibid, art 4 and Price Law 1997, art 14. 
15 The five agencies are the MOFCOM, NDRC, MPS, SAT, and SAIC. No English edition of the Measures for 
Retailers and Suppliers is available. The Chinese official text is available at: 
<http: //www. gov. cn/ziliao/flfg/2006-10/18/content_416305. htm>. An English version of a speech by Mr Huang Hai, 
the Deputy Minister of the MOFCOM regarding this legislative document is available at: 
<http: //huanghai2. mofcom. gov. cnWaarticletspeech/200611/20061103664989. htm1>. 
16 The Measures for Retailers and Suppliers 2006, art 4. 
Ibid, art 7. 
Ibid, art 18. 
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According to the Retailers and Suppliers Measures, departments of commerce, price, 
taxation, and industry and commerce at local levels are responsible to implement this 
legislative document and to supervise the prohibited behaviour. If a conduct is 
suspected as a criminal offense, it will be investigated by the public security 
departments (the police). 19 As regards the possible overlapping between the legislative 
document and other laws and regulations, if other laws or regulations provide similar 
rules on prohibited behaviour, other laws or regulations shall prevail. Otherwise, the 
Retailers and Suppliers Measures are applicable. The liabilities of infringement include 
order to rectify the conduct and a fine up to RMB 30,000.20 
The Retailers and Suppliers Measures shed some light on features of distribution 
agreements in the PRC, among which countervailing buying power is significant and 
vertical restraints are often connected with abuse of market dominant positions by 
supermarket chain stores. 21 However, as one of ministerial rules and set at a lower 
level of the hierarchy of Chinese law, the Retailers and Suppliers Measures have some 
typical weaknesses, including vague definition of regulated subject matters, 
decentralized and/or overlapping enforcement power, and ill-designed procedure, 
liabilities and remedies. For example, the deterrent effect of a fine up to RMB 30,000 
is subject to doubt. Secondly, there is no assurance to a due process of investigation 
and decisional practice by the five agencies' local departments. Thirdly, the 
implementation might be counter-efficiency because a simple per se rule appears to be 
chosen to prohibit certain distribution practices which, however, can be both pro- 
competitive and anti-competitive. Furthermore, one may ask, if all legislative 
documents have similar articles as the proposed AML and the Retailers and Suppliers 
Measures to delegate applicable rules to `other laws and regulations which provide 
19 Ibid, art 20. 
20 Ibid, art 23. 
21 See speech by Huang Hai (n 15) above. 
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provisions', which document and authority could be the end of this circle of conflicts 
on legislative hierarchy? 
5.3 Restrictive Agreements under the Anti-Monopoly Law 2007 
5.3.1 Monopoly Agreement (Longduan Xieyi): A Concept that Results Ambiguity 
Since 1999, the proposed AML has chosen the term `monopoly agreements' to refer to 
restrictive agreements. The final wording of the AML defines the term as `agreements, 
decisions or other concerted practices that eliminate or restrict competition'. 22 The 
AML provides an illustrative list of prohibited monopoly agreements. Competing 
undertakings are prohibited from price fixing, output restriction, market sharing, 
restriction on products or technology developments, joint boycott, and other horizontal 
practices determined by the AMEA. Non-competing undertakings are prohibited from 
fixing the resale price, restriction of minimum resale price, and other vertical practices 
determined by the AMEA. Industry associations are specifically prohibited from 
organizing undertakings to engage in monopoly agreements. 23 Monopoly agreements 
are categorized together with abuse of dominant market position and certain 
concentration of undertakings as three types of `monopolistic conduct', which is the 
principal subject matter of the AML. 24 
However, although the definition given by the AML is in line with the EC model in 
relation to restrictive agreements, the notion of `monopoly agreements' is problematic 
and tends to cause confusion because monopoly, market dominant position, or 
sufficient market power is not a threshold requirement for triggering prohibition of the 
AML on monopoly agreement. Furthermore, the definition given by the AML does not 
explicitly limit `who' could be parties of alleged `monopoly agreements' but 
emphasizes on `agreements... ' that `eliminate or restrict competition'. There is no de 
minimis doctrine explicitly adopted by the AML. 'Eliminating or restricting 
22 AML, art 13. 
23 AML, art 16. 
24 AML, art 3. 
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competition' should therefore be seen as the primary gravity of the definition of 
monopoly agreement. 
In addition, an obvious mismatch can be seen from the AML's prohibition and 
exemption mechanism on restrictive agreements. The AML exempts agreements aimed 
at `improve efficiency and enhance competitiveness of small and medium-sized 
undertakings', subject to some conditions. 25 There appears a linguistic or logical 
difficulty to categorize agreements between small and medium-sized undertakings to 
`monopoly agreements' and then to exempt the agreements. 
From the terms `contract', `combination', or `conspiracy in restraint of trade' of 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act to `agreement, decision and concerted practice' of Article 
81 EC, the concepts of `collusion', `restrictive agreements' or `anticompetitive 
agreements' have been developed and many jurisdictions have chosen similar terms 
based on either US or EC model referring to horizontal and vertical restraints. 
For example, Section 3 of the Japanese Anti-Monopoly Act prohibits entrepreneurs 
from `unreasonable restraint of trade', which means `business activities, by which any 
entrepreneur, by contract, agreement or any other concerted actions, irrespective of its 
names, with other entrepreneurs, mutually restrict or conduct their business 
activities' ... `thereby causing, contrary to the public interest, a substantial restraint of 
competition in any particular field of trade. ' 
Section 34 Prohibition of Singapore's Competition Act 2004 chooses a general notion 
of `agreements' exactly based on the model of Article 81 EC. In Taiwan, Article 7 of 
Fair Trade Act of 2002 chooses the notion `concerted action' which refers to `the 
conduct of any enterprise, by means of contract, agreement or any other form of 
mutual understanding' and limits its applicability to `competing enterprises' and 
therefore does not apply to vertical agreements26 However, the Taiwanese law does 
25 AML, art 15 (3). 
26 Mark Williams, Competition Policy and Law of China, Hong, Kong and Taiwan (Cambridge University Press, 
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regulate some forms of vertical restraints in Article 18 and Article 19 under Chapter III 
Unfair Competition. For example, Article 18 provides that `the trading counterpart and 
the third party shall be allowed to decide their resale prices freely; any agreement 
contrary to this provision shall be void'. In Article 19(6), enterprise is prohibited from 
`limiting its trading counterparts' business activity improperly by means of the 
requirements of business engagement. In this aspect, it can be seen clearly that the 
Taiwanese competition law is based on the Japanese model in which `vertical restraints 
are covered under the section on unfair business practices. '27 
However, apart from the PRC, it seems no other jurisdiction chooses the term 
`monopoly agreements'. In the July 2003 Joint Comments on the proposed AML, ABA 
experts observed problems that might be caused by this term. Without further 
comments and explanations, the ABA working group suggested using the term of 
`prohibited agreements' in order to avoid confusion because the illegality of these 
types of restraints does not depend on the market position of the actors. 28 However, in 
Chinese language, 'bei jinzhi de xieyi', the translation of `prohibited agreements', 
seems clumsy with remote meanings that might be more difficult to be characterized in 
the AML's future interpretation and implementation. This could be a reason for why 
Chinese legislators apparently paid attention to the two Joint Comments submitted by 
ABA in 2003 and 2005, revised the proposed AML in several aspects accordingly, 
however ignored this particular suggestion on a fundamental concept. 29 Owen and 
others also recognize this flaw and comment that `[u]se of the word "monopoly" in the 
section concerned with "agreements" may create unnecessary confusion' but they also 
Cambridge 2005) 385. 
27 Dabbah (n 1) 276. 
28 American Bar Association (ABA), Joint Comments on the Proposed Anti-Monopoly Law of the People s Republic 
of Chino at: <httpilwww. abanet. org/antitrust/comments/2003/jointsubmission. pdf> July 2003, and, 
<http: /Avww. abanet. org/antitrust/comments/2005/05-05/commentsprc2005woapp. pdt> May 2005. 
29 For example, following the ABA 2003 Joint Comments (n 28) (at pp 4 and 6), the proposed AML has abolished 
the original individual notification and exemption mechanism since the April 2005 Draft, although a more direct 
reason for this changing approach might be the impacts of the modernization of EC competition law. Since the July 
2005 Draft, the proposed AML has a separate article to regulate resale price maintenance instead of arranging the 
prohibition of RPM in the middle of six types of horizontal restraints, which was also criticized by the ABA 2005 
Joint Comments (n 28) (at pp 2 and 9-11). 
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offer not further analysis and suggestions. 30 
A possible explanation for choosing the term `monopoly agreement' is that the PRC 
has chosen `anti-monopoly law' as the title for this major competition legislation. The 
term `monopoly agreement', compared with `restrictive agreement', would be easier to 
comprehend by the public. 31 However, this explanation is difficult to reconcile with the 
fact that China has also implanted an EC `abuse of dominance' concept instead of a US 
notion of `monopoly or attempt to monopolization' in the following section of the 
AML. Although the Chinese were unfamiliar with the notion of abuse, after many 
years legislative debate, the notion is no longer a stranger to the public. 2 This fact has 
proven that completely new legal concepts could be transplanted in the PRC after 
sufficient advocacy despite the fact that it is too early to predict the effectiveness of the 
transplantation. 33 Furthermore, in several major works on EC and US competition laws 
by Chinese scholars, the concept of `restrictive agreements' has been thoroughly 
examined. These academic endeavours have laid sufficient foundation for transplanting 
the concept into the Chinese context. 34 
For the reason given above, this author proposes that the notion of restrictive 
agreements would better serve the functioning of the AML than the term of monopoly 
agreements. It is hoped that future developments of the AML could choose `xianzhi 
jingzheng xieyi' (restrictive agreements) instead of the current `longduan xieyi' 
(monopoly agreements) to conform to the accepted international practice and to avoid 
unnecessary interpreting and implementing confusion. In the following sections, this 
30 Bruce M. Owen el al. 'Antitrust in China: The Problem of Incentive Compatibility' (AEI-Brookings Joint Center 
for Regulatory Studies, September 2004, revised July 2006), <httpJ/aei-brookings. orgladmin/authorpdfs/redirect- 
safely. php? frame=.. /pdfles/php7d. pdf>, at 32. 
31 To the writer's best knowledge, no Chinese legislative documents or literature have ever discussed the reason to 
choose the term of 'monopoly agreement' and the problem might be caused by the term. The explanation offered 
here is based purely on this writer's analysis from Chinese-English linguistic perspective. 
32 Discussions on 'abuse of market dominant position' are frequently conducted by Chinese public and the media 
recently. 
33 See discussion in ch 6, below. 
34 See Wang Xiaoye, Ougongti Jingrhengfa (EC Competition Law) (Beijing, China Legal Publishing House, 2001) 
88-184; Kong Xiangjun Kong, Fanlongduanfa Yuanli (The Principles of Anti-Monopoly Law) (Beijing, China 
Legal Publishing House, 2001) 297-488. 
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author uses the term `restrictive agreements' when analyzing horizontal and vertical 
practices prohibited by the AML. 
5.3.1.1 Horizontal Agreements 
The AML prohibits competing undertakings to reach monopoly agreements including 
price fixing, output restriction, markets sharing, restriction on products or technology 
developments, joint boycott, and other horizontal practices determined and prohibited 
by the AMEA 35 
Horizontal agreements such as price fixing cartels are not uncommon in the Chinese 
market. From as significant as airlines tariff cartels at national level to as small as rice 
noodle producers cartel at local level. 36 Considering the current legal and regulatory 
instruments only offer rules on price fixing and bid rigging with weak enforcement 
such as Article 14 of the Price Law and Article 15 if the AUCL, the relevant rules of 
the AML should be an important step to fight against hardcore cartels in China. 
A noteworthy point is that Chinese legislators' attitude towards horizontal agreements 
is ambiguous. This fact might compromise the AML horizontal rules' future 
enforcement to certain degree. 
During the first reading of the proposed AML in June 2006, several commissioners of 
the 10`h SCNPC questioned the rules on prohibiting horizontal restrictive agreements. 
For example, after explained why Chinese toy products were boycotted in Sweden, Mr. 
Zheng Gongcheng commented that the proposed AML to prohibit price fixing `should 
not go too far'. Mr. Zheng further stated that price cartels are sometimes necessary to 
avoid vicious competition between Chinese manufacturers, to improve safety and 
health conditions and general welfare of Chinese labour, and to avoid being taken 
35 AML, art 13. 
36 Zhongxin She (Chinanews), 'Jipiao jiage lianmeng shi jiage longduan' (Price cartel between airlines is 
monopolistic behaviour) (Beijing, 16 May 2001), at <http: //www. china. org. cn/chinese/MATERIAU33972. htm>, 
and case analysis of a rice noodle cartel in Yingshan County in 1996, in Kong (n 34) 852-854. 
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advantage by developed countries. 37 These comments were typical and representative 
and indicated a tendency of using competition law as a cure-all. 
5.3.1.2 Vertical Agreements 
The AML further provides a separate article to prohibit non-competing undertakings 
from fixing the resale price, restriction of the minimum resale price, and other vertical 
38 practices determined by the AMEA. 
Two concerns have arisen over the statutory language of the AML on vertical restraints. 
First of all, as regards resale price maintenance (RPM), it is not clear that whether the 
AMEA and courts will distinguish maximum and recommended RPM from fixed and 
minimum RPM. Until recently, the EC and US competition doctrines often deal with 
fixed and minimum RPM as hardcore restraints or per se illegal practice but assess 
maximum and recommended RPM more favourably. For example, The US Supreme 
Court established rule of per se illegality for minimum RPM in Dr. Miles in 1911, 
applied the per se rule to maximum RPM in Albrecht in 1968, but eventually 
overturned the Albrecht principle and applied rule of reason to maximum RPM in State 
Oil Co. v Khan in 1997.39 In the EC, Regulation 2790/1999 blacklists fixed or 
minimum RPM, whether directly or indirectly enforced, as hardcore restraints. Such 
provisions are non-severable and including them will result in entire agreements 
falling outside the Regulation. 40 Settled EC case law on distribution agreements such 
as Pronuptia de Paris and Metro I basically condemn fixed or minimum RPM as 
`restriction by object' and such agreement terms will usually be void 41 However, on 
37 Commissioners discussion on the proposed AML's First Reading Draft is available at: 
<httpihvww. npc. gov. cn/zgrdw/common/zw. jsp? label=WXZLK&id=350218&pdmc=1125> (in Chinese). 
38 AML, art 14. 
39 Dr. Miles Medical Co. v John D. Park & Sons Co. 220 U. S. 373 (1911); Albrecht v. Herald Co. 390 U. S. 145 
(1968); State Oil Co. v Khan 188 S. Ct. 275 (1997); See, also, Gustavo E. Bamberger, `Revisiting Maximum Resale 
Price Maintenance: State Oil v. Khan (1997)', in John E. Kwoka, Jr. & Lawrence J. White (eds) The Antitrust 
Revolution: Economics, Competition, and Policy (4th edn Oxford University Press, New York 2004) 334-336. 
40 Reg 2790/99, art 4(a) OJ L336/21 on the application of Article 81(3) to vertical agreements and Commission 
Guidelines on vertical restraints paras 47 and 66. 41 Pronuptia de Paris GmbH v Prontguia de Paris Irmgard Schillgalis: 16 1/84, [ 1986]ECR 353, [1986] 1 CMLR 
414; Metro SB-Gofmarkte GmbH& Co. KG v Commission (Metro I): 26/76, [1977] ECR 1875. 
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28 June 2007, in a landmark decision Leegin involving a leather goods manufacturer's 
decision to cut off sales to a retailer that had been cutting prices in violation of an 
alleged RPM agreement, the US Supreme Court has overruled the per se illegal ban on 
RPM 42 The Court held that the legality of RRM practice will be decided on a case by 
case basis. RPM will be assessed under the rule of reason standard and will be deemed 
as lawful if the pro-competitive effects of an RPM agreement outweigh its 
anticompetitive effects. RPM would remain unlawful if it is used to facilitate a 
horizontal agreement among competitors to restrict competition. 
Chinese literature on EC and US practice on price vertical restraints may however 
cause confusion and the status quo of Chinese decision-makers' and practitioners' 
understanding towards this area seemed insufficient. For example, Kong, a former 
enforcer at the SAIC and currently a Justice at the PRC Supreme People's Court (SPC), 
introduce US, EC and Australian rules on RPM without clearly distinguished fixed or 
minimum RPM from maximum or recommended RPM and without follow the recent 
three decades trends in RPM worldwide. Kong states that `RPM is subject to per se 
rule in most countries'; 'US antitrust laws always condemned RPM'; and, `[i]n 
principle, RPM, no matter minimum or maximum fixed, is condemned under the per 
se illegality,. 43 
Secondly, apart from prohibiting RPM, the First Read Draft provided a `catch-all' 
approach to prohibit imposing `other' trading conditions that `eliminate or restrict 
competition', without giving further explanations on the meaning and scope of the 
word `other' 44 Although the final wording of the AML does not follow this approach, 
it does provide that other (vertical) monopoly agreements determined by the AMEA 
may be prohibited. 45 It is uncertain how broadly the AML's future development will 
incorporate rules and norms on franchising, single branding, exclusive distribution and 
42 Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc. 127 S. Ct. 2705 (2007). 
13 Kong (n 34) 466-472. 
44 The First Reading Draft, art 8. 
45 AML, art 14 (3). 
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supply, selective distribution, and other distribution arrangements. Furthermore, how 
vertical restraints prohibition and exemption will be implemented in China is in doubt 
considering the complicacy and flexibility of this area if one takes a close look at EC 
and US competition law history. 
As observed by a commentator, `[f]rom an economic point of view, all types of vertical 
restraints are capable of being either pro-competitive or anti-competitive, depending 
on the surrounding circumstances'. 46 However, a case-by-case evaluation approach 
would be too demanding for agencies and the courts, and too uncertain for 
undertakings concerned. 47 Reflected by the European experience, the EC block 
exemption regulations and relevant guidelines have been developed over the years in 
searching for administrable and workable rules on vertical restraints (and on some 
beneficial horizontal restraints). There has been a fundamental change in the EC 
Commission's approach from a strict and formalistic approach to a more economic- 
based approach since 2000.48 From Brown Shoe (1966) to Sylvania (1977), the US 
antitrust law scrutinizes vertical restraints, especially non-price restraints, far more 
favourably than it did several decades ago 49 The strand in US antitrust practice has 
suggested that `courts generally presume that non-price vertical restraints are designed 
to increase efficiency and should be permitted except in extraordinary 
circumstances. '50 One can thus reasonably expect that China also needs a sufficient 
period of time to learn and to adapt. Although such a period could be much shorter 
with capacity building in Beijing and effective technical assistance from advanced 
46 Joanna Goyder, EUDistribution Law (4th edn Hart Publishing, Oxford 2005) 67. 
47 Ibid, 67. 
'B Reg 2790199 OJ L336/21 on the application of Article 81(3) to vertical agreements; Reg. 2658/00 on the 
application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to categories of specialization agreements; Reg. 2659/00 on the application 
of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to categories of research and development agreements. 
4' In FTC v Brown Shoe Co. 86 S. Ct 1501 (1966), 'the Court upheld the FTC's condemnation of a franchise plan 
where a shoe supplier's promised not to carry shoes competing with the franchisor's lines even though the record 
contained no evidence of the market share affected or the extent to which competing shoe suppliers were foreclosed, 
and the dealers could terminate the agreements at any time', see, Gellhorn and others, Antitrust Law and Economics 
in a Nutshell (5`h edn West Publishing Co., St. Paul, Minn 2004) 397-401; In Continental T. V., Inc. v GTE Sylvania 
Inc., 97 S. Ct 2549 (1977), the Supreme Court held that the rule of reason governed vertical restraints other than 
RPM. 
so Gellhorn and others (n 48) 370. 
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jurisdictions, clarification and interpretation of rules on vertical restraints will be a 
challenging task to the Chinese competition authority and the courts with far-reaching 
implication to the business in the future. 
In addition, neither the EC nor the US original statutory language has sufficiently clear 
rules on specific vertical restraints. The vertical restraint jurisprudence has been 
developed by agencies' decisional practice and courts' case law in the EC and the USA, 
with the former has developed concurrent block exemption mechanism. Requesting 
China to absorb all these developments and to adopt them according to its own needs 
at this still early stage of competition law development is unrealistic. The effectiveness 
of Chinese rules on restrictive agreements is nevertheless depending on how widely 
the relevant AML rules are interpreted and how quickly future block exemption 
regulations are adopted. 'Confining and structuring discretion' in the process of 
regulating restrictive agreements also request developing rules through adjudication by 
the AMEA to use its rule-making power and through future legislative and non- 
legislative instruments to clarify rules and norms. sl 
5.3.1.3 Bid Rigging 
5.3.1.3.1 Why Bid Rigging was Treated Separately? 
From July 2004 Draft to the First Reading Draft, the proposed AML had provided a 
separate article to deal with bid rigging and thus had distinguished this type of 
behaviour from horizontal and vertical restraints. 52 Although the AML finally gives up 
this approach, treating bid rigging separately has historical reasons and may still have 
implications to the AML's future interpretation. 
Dissimilar to commonly accepted classification which deals with bid rigging as one 
typical form of horizontal practices, bid rigging in Chinese context has or has been 
perceived to have both horizontal and vertical features since the enactment of the 1993 
31 Dabbah (n 1) 76-79. 
52 The First Reading Draft, art 9, which reads: 'Undertakings shall be prohibited from colluding on bids in [the] 
course of inviting bid and bidding to eliminate or restrict competition. ' 
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AUCL. 
It is commonly accepted that bidding rigging is one form of hardcore cartel. For 
example, European scholars and practitioners have reached consensus that hardcore or 
classic forms of cartels include price fixing, output restriction, market sharing and bid 
rigging. Jones and Sufrin describe bid rigging as `where undertakings collaborate on 
responses to invitations to tender for the supply of goods and services', and observe 
that bid rigging `limits price competition between the parties and amounts to an 
attempt ... to share markets'. 
53 The cartel offence introduced by Sections 188-201 of 
the UK Enterprise Act 2002 explicitly prohibits four types of hardcore cartels and 
defines bidding rigging in Section 188(5) as `... arrangements under which, in 
response to a request for bids for the supply of a product or service... or for the 
production of a product... (a) A but not B may make a bid, or (b) A and B may each 
make a bid but, in one case of both, only a bid arrived at in accordance with the 
arrangements'. In the USA, when analyzing a bid rigging in Ohio's school milk market, 
Porter and Zona also define collusion in biding as an agreement among a group of 
firms that is designed to limit competition between the participants during bidding 
procedures. 54 
On the contrary, bid rigging in Chinese context implies collusions not only between 
bidders (competitors including goods sellers or service providers), but also between 
bidders and bid-inviters (competitors and buyers). In other words, big rigging in China 
has both horizontal and vertical characteristics. The First Reading Draft prohibited 
undertakings from `colluding on bids in the course of inviting bids and bidding to 
eliminate or restrict competition', without providing clear signals on who could be bid 
rigging collusioners. 55 However, previous Chinese legislation, judicial interpretations 
33 Jones and Sufrin, EC Competition Law: Text, Cases, and Materials (2nd edn Oxford University Press, Oxford 2004) 790; Christopher Harding and Julian Joshua, Regulating Cartels in Europe: A Study of Legal Control of 
Corporate Delinquency (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2003) 272-73. 
54 Robert H. Porter and J. Douglas Zona, Bidding, 'Bid Rigging, and School Milk Prices: Ohio v. Trauth (1994)', in 
John E. Kwoka, Jr. and Lawrence J. White (eds), The Antitrust Revolution: Economics, Competition, and Policy 4th 
edn (Oxford University Press, New York 2004) 212. 
55 The First Reading Dram art 9. 
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and literatures have provided an answer. The explanations are as below. 
Chinese laws on bidding rigging prior to the AML are represented by the AUCL 1993, 
the Criminal Law 1997, the Bidding Law 1999 and related judiciary and administrative 
interpretations. 56 The first law prohibits bid rigging is the AUCL which provides that: 
`Bidders shall not act in collusion for bidding in order to raise or reduce the bid price. 
Bidders shall not collude with bid-inviters in order to eliminate other competitors from 
fair competition'. Bid rigging is subject to a fine from 10,000 to 200,000 RMB and the 
collusive bid is void. No criminal liability is stipulated by the AUCL. 57 
`Bid rigging offence' was introduced by Article 223 of the Criminal Law 1997. Under 
the first paragraph of Article 223, when bidders collusively submit tenders that harm 
the interests of bid-inviters and other bidders and when the circumstances are serious, 
collusive bidders shall be sentenced to up to three years fixed term imprisonment, 
criminal detention, and may in addition or exclusively be sentenced to a fine. This is in 
line with the commonly accepted feature of bid rigging as collusions between bidders. 
However, the second paragraph of Article 223 further provides that when bidders and 
bid-inviters have collusive behaviour that harm legitimate interests of the State, 
organisations and the public, they shall be punished in accordance with the stipulations 
stated in the paragraph I of Article 223. Article 32 of the 1999 Bidding Law has 
similar statutory language as the 1997 Criminal Law that defines bid rigging including 
collusions between bidders and between bidders and bid-inviters. The Bidding Law 
imposes fine, civil and criminal liabilities to offenders. Chinese scholars, when 
commenting on the previous drafts of the proposed AML, particularly mentioned that 
`undertakings', under the relevant provision on `bid rigging', should be interpreted to 
include both bidders and bid-inviters. 58 
56 For example, the 2004 Supreme Court Interpretation on Applicable Laws in Construction Contract Dispute Cases, 
the 1998 Provisional Rules on Prohibiting Bid Rigging by SAIC, the proposed Implementing Regulation of the 
1999 Bidding Law by the State Council, etc. 
67 AUCL 1993, art 27. 
38 For example, Civil and Commercial Law Research Centre of Shanghai Social Science Academy, `Revision 
Suggestions on the Submission Draft (July 2004) of Anti-Monopoly Law of the PRC' (2005) April Issue Shangwu 
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Bid rigging cases in China that involved collusions between bidders and bid-inviters 
are not uncommon, especially in government procurement and infrastructure 
construction projects. However, because such cases are normally give rise to bribery 
and business secret infringement, in practice, collusive bid-inviters are normally 
punished according to maximum statutory penalty among these offenses and are 
convicted accordingly. For example, in 2004, two officials of Yuncheng City were 
found guilty of bribery and were sentenced to thirteen years imprisonment. The case 
involved collusion between the officials and two undertakings in bid rigging schemes 
during restructuring process of SOE in the Yuncheng region. 59 
The previous discussion on bid rigging in China attempts to explain why the proposed 
AML once provided a separate article to regulate big riggings. As already explained, 
the practice in China or perceived by Chinese includes two forms, horizontal bid 
riggings between bidders and vertical bid riggings between bidders and bid-inviters. In 
most cases, vertical bid riggings involve officials acting as collusive bid-inviters. 
Further detailed examination on relationship between bid riggings and other involved 
offenses such as bribery is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, for the sake of 
convergence and harmonization of competition laws worldwide, whether China should 
follow the commonly accept approach on regulating bid riggings may need to be 
addressed in the future. Encouragingly, the AML finally chooses not to treat bid 
rigging separately but use one single provision to regulate all horizontal agreements. 60 
5.3.1.3.2 Bid Rigging Offence under the Criminal Law 
The First Reading Draft once provided that `undertakings implementing monopolistic 
conduct ... 
(which) constitutes crime shall be imposed criminal penalties in 
yu Falu (Commerce & Law) 46. 
59 Zhongxinshe (Chinanews), `Shanxi Yuncheng Jiang zhengfu guanyuan shou heqian beipan 13nian' (Two Officials 
are sentenced to 13 years imprisonment separately for briberies involving a bid rigging) (Beijing, 20 June 2004), at: 
<http: //www. chinacourt. org/public/detail. php? id=120292&k title=*i&*VF&k content=*it# #%T&k_author->. 
60 AML, art 13. 
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accordance with the laws'. 61 ABA working group suggested that more clarity was 
needed with regard to which types of behaviour will be subject to criminal liability 
implied by the proposed AML. 2 The comment is highly relevant for the sake of legal 
certainty and indicate a possible `cartel offence' under the Chinese law. However, this 
writer's observation is, at present, cartel offence in China is only limited to bid rigging. 
`The laws' used by the First Reading Draft implicitly refers to the 1997 Criminal Law 
and related legislative and judicial interpretations, among which no criminal liabilities 
has been provided to restrictive agreements, abusive behaviour and undertakings' 
concentrations apart from bid riggings. Thus, the answer for this question must be that 
only bid riggings could be prosecuted criminally under the current Chinese legal 
framework. However, one may predict that since the consequences of bidding riggings 
are comparable to other hardcore cartels, cartel offence may be introduced into 
Chinese law through future revisions to the Criminal Law and to the AML. 
5.3.2 The Prohibition and Exemptions 
5.3.2.1 The Prohibition 
Since July 2005, the proposed AML has given up its previous approach of using one 
provision to prohibit both horizontal and vertical restrictive agreements. Such a 
change is in part because of strong influence from German and Japanese competition 
laws on restrictive agreements and from comments on previous AML drafts. 63 A 
noteworthy point is that, also in July 2005, with the 7th Amendment to the German Act 
Against Restraints of Competition (GWB) coming into force, the GWB provisions 
have been adapted to EC competition law. Among several changes is the termination of 
`the differentiation between the legality of vertical and illegality of horizontal restraints 
on competition and provides for the equal treatment for both'. 64 
61 The First Reading Draft, art 49. 
62 ABA (n 28) Joint Comments 2005,5. 
63 Chinese legislators seemed struggling between a separate and an integrated legislative approach towards 
restrictive agreements because the July 2004 Submission Draft chose a separate approach but the April 2005 Draft 
was back to an integrated approach. The AML's final wording followed the separate approach however. See 
comments on AMt. rules on restrictive agreements, Wang Xiaoye, Comments on Latest Draft of Chinese Antitrust 
Law (the May 2005 Draft), speech delivered at the 2005 Legislative Affairs Office of the State Council Symposium 
on Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law, 2; ABA (n 28) Joint Comments 2005, at 3 and 10-11. 
64 See Ashurst, 'Modernisation of Getman competition law - The 71e Amendment of the GWB', Ashurst: 
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5.3.2.2 The Exemptions: a Codified Rule of Reason? 
The AML establishes an exemption mechanism stipulating that the prohibition on 
horizontal and vertical restrictive agreements shall not apply if the undertakings 
involved can prove that the agreements in question could meet three criteria. These 
criteria are: (1) aiming for the realization of recognized objectives by the AML; (2) not 
substantially eliminating competition in the relevant market; and, (3) enabling 
consumers to share the interests derived from the agreements. 65 
There seems no exemption available for bid rigging which is prohibited implicitly as a 
hardcore restraint by the AML. However, the recognition and proof of bid rigging is by 
no means a straightforward task. For example, although bid rigging as a hardcore 
cartel activity is unlikely to meet the Article 81(3) EC criteria, in FIEC/CEETB, the EC 
Commission stated that `it would take a favourable view of an agreement designed to 
standardize and reduce the cost of the tendering process between building contractors 
and sub-contractors but which would not in any way limit either the firms who could 
tender or the prices at which they could tender'. 66 
Chosen by the April, July and November 2005 Drafts, a criterion which requires that 
agreements `are necessary for realization of the (claimed) objectives' has been deleted 
since the First Reading Draft. Otherwise, the AML exemption criteria for restrictive 
agreements would be very similar to the Article 81(3) EC model at the first glance. 67 
Competition Law Update August 2005 at, <http: //www. ashurst. com/doc. aspx? id_Content=1926>; also see 
introduction by the German Federal Cartel Office, at 
<http: //www. bundeskartellamt. de/wEnglisch/CompetitionAct/CompAct. shtml>. 
65 AML, art 15. 
66 FIEC/CEEFB [1998] OJ C52/2, quoted in Jones and Sufrin (n 52)808. 
67 See Article 81(3) EC and the Commission's Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) [2004] OJ C101/97. 
Article 81(3) sets out two positive and two negative criteria that are cumulative and exhaustive, as the agreement, 
decision, or concerted practice which is caught by Article 81(1) but seeks exemption by Article 81(3) must, (1) 
contribute to improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic progress; (2) 
allow consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit; (3) not impose non-indispensable restrictions; (4) not afford 
the parties the possibility to substantially eliminating competition 
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From the EC experience, this omitted necessity criterion is however significant and 
needs to be incorporated in the AML either by future AML revision, secondary 
legislation, or by the law's interpretation and implementation. Article 81 (3) EC 
demands that no dispensable restrictions have been imposed and the Commission's 
Guidelines further require that the indispensability of the agreement be considered 
both with respect to the whole contract and its individual clauses. 68 
Substantial concerns have also arisen as regards the three existing criteria for the AML 
restrictive agreement exemptions. Especially the first substantial criterion, `aiming for 
the realization of objectives recognized by the AML', is further developed by the 
second paragraph of Article 14 AML, which may imply more space for discretionary 
power than its counterpart in Article 81(3) EC 69 The AML recognizes six objectives 
plus a sweeper clause that exempts `other circumstances as stipulated by law and the 
State Council'. 70 Specified circumstances under exemptions include, (1) to improve 
technology, research and to develop new product; (2) to upgrade product quality, 
reduce cost, enhance efficiency, and unify specifications and standards of products; (3) 
to improve operational efficiency and enhance competitiveness of small and medium- 
sized undertakings; (5) to realize social public interests such as energy saving, 
environment protection, and disaster relief; (6) during the period of economic 
depression, to moderate serious sales decreases or production surpluses; and (7) to 
ensure legitimate interests in foreign trade and economic cooperation. As one could see 
from the statutory text, the exemption mechanism envisaged by the AML has chosen 
multi-layer and non-exhaustive standards which mix considerations of efficiencies, 
trade and industry policy, and social public interests, etc. 
Having said all that, expecting the AML to extinguish non-competition considerations 
might be unrealistic. Although advanced competition policy systems have developed 
68 Goyder (n 45) 28 and 31; Maher M Dabbah, EC and UK Competition Law (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2004) 121. 
69 AML, art 15. 
'° Ibid. 
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more certainty and less discretion through case law and legislative instruments, the 
USA, for example, has also granted antitrust exemption to export cartels by enacting 
the Webb-Pomerene Act. 7' What China could learn from the US experience is to 
clarify the criteria for export cartels anti-monopoly exemption. The reason for this 
suggestion is that even the AML text may be revised and export cartel exemption be 
removed, China can still grant similar exemption through other policy instruments. 
This thesis will not deal with the policy considerations of export cartel anti-monopoly 
exemption any further which are related to Chinese trade and industry policy. However, 
the concern, for the purposed of competition law, is that what is meant by `legitimate 
interests in foreign trade and economic cooperation' need to be clarified. If this implies 
an export cartel exemption, the relationship between the exemption and the prohibition 
and the criteria applicable to the exemption must also be clarified. 
Furthermore, as noted by several commentators, regarding the AML exemption 
mechanism, there is no distinction between hardcore restraints or `per se prohibitions' 
and less problematic practices or a `rule of reason analysis'. 72 When commenting on 
the May 2005 Draft, Professor Xiaoye Wang states that the exemption scheme 
applicable to hardcore restraints such as price cartels and quantity cartels will render 
Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law inconsistent with well-established fundamental antitrust 
principles. 73 
Nevertheless, the dichotomy of treatment between hardcore and non-hardcore 
restraints always blurs even in the advanced systems of competition laws, and `there is 
often no bright line separating per se form rule of reason analysis' 74 For example, 
although the EC and US competition laws have been much more suspicious towards 
horizontal restraints than vertical restraints and have categorized many horizontal 
71 Massimo Motta, Competition Policy: Theory and Practice (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2004) 29. 
72 Youngjin Jung and Qian Hao, 'The New Economic Constitution in China: A Third Way for Competition 
Regime? ' (2003) Vol. 24 Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business 46; ABA, Joint Comments 2003, 3. 
73 Wang(n61)2. 
74 National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v Board of Regents of University of Oklahoma 468 US 85 (1984). 
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practices as `hardcore restriction' or condemned under a per se illegality, it has been 
commented that major aspects of doctrine governing horizontal relationships `are 
among the most complex and unsettled areas of antitrust law today'. 75 
In the noteworthy 1979 Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. 
(BMI)76, a case involved a blanket licensing mechanism for musical compositions 
which CBS sued for violation of the Section 1 Sherman Act. CBS complained for a 
per se illegal behaviour since the blanket license worked out as a horizontal price- 
fixing agreement. The US Supreme Court recognized that the blanket licensing 
arrangement transferring the prices of different compositions into a single fee, but it 
emphasized that `[t]he Sherman Act has always been discriminatingly applied in the 
light of economic realities. ' The Court examined features of copyrighted compositions 
market in details, including `the impracticability of negotiating individual licenses for 
each composition' and the `extraordinary number of users spread across the land'. The 
Court thus observed that 'not all forms of conduct that literally fix prices are plainly 
anticompetitive or likely to lack any redeeming virtue', and then chose a `modified 
rule of reason approach'. " 
The BMI case has particular implications to the AML prohibition and exemption on 
restrictive agreements and to the interface between restrictive agreements and IPRs in 
the PRC. The AML has incorporated a provision to deal with the possible clash by 
stating the AML is not applicable where undertakings exercise IPRs according to 
relevant laws and regulations. The proposed AML however is applicable to conduct 
eliminating or restricting competition through abuse of IPRs 78 This rule appears to 
exclude a `per se illegal' approach to restrictive agreements involving IPRs. However, 
how use and abuse of IPRs will be interpreted under the AML is by no means certain at 
present. 
75 Ernest Gelihorn and others (n 48) 200. 
76 Broadcast Music, Inc. v Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. 441 U. S. 1,99 S. Ct. 1551,60 (1979). 
77 Gellhorn and others (n 48) 101 and 226-231. 
78 AML, art 55. 
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As noted by commentators as regards the Chicago Board of Trade v United States 
(1918), one difficulty with the case was that 
... it indirectly fostered a 
harmful distortion in the evolution of Section 1 
doctrine. Judges and plaintiffs came to perceive that Section 1 offered only 
two analytical tools: an administratively simple rule of per se illegality and an 
administratively hopeless rule of reason. 79 
In Europe, Wils comments that there is `some confusion as to the nature of Article 81(3) 
EC' since `it may have been considered that the application of Article 81(3) EC 
depended or should depend on discretionary political decisions'. Wils further argues 
that 
Article 81 EC is the European equivalent of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. 
Whereas the latter reads as a single rule prohibiting all agreements in restraint 
of trade (similar to Article 81(1) EC), it has been interpreted by the courts as 
condemning only unreasonable restraints. Article 81(3) EC simply codifies 
this case law. 
Although Wils' argument of `there is no scope for discretionary political decisions in 
the application of Article 81(3) EC' is subject to doubt, his observation of `Article 81(3) 
is nothing but a codified form of the American rule of reason' is meaningful for the 
AML. 80 The debate on whether the AML should be designed on a US style rule of 
reason and per se illegality or on an EC style of prohibition and exemption has never 
stopped during the AML legislative process. 81 For example, Zheng argues that China, 
as a civil law jurisdiction, should not adopt a US style rule of reason and per se 
illegality. However, Chinese competition law should learn from the relevant US 
experience, especially the balance of legal certainty and flexibility implied by the per 
A Gellhorn and others (n 48) 213. 
80 Wils, Principles of European Antitrust Enforcement (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2005) 6-7. 
81 Zhongbin Li, 'Heli Yuanze yu Woguo Fanlongduan Lifa Taolun' (The Rule of Reason and the Anti-Monopoly 
Legislation in China) (2002) 10 Zhongguo Gongshang Guanli Yanjiu (Administration of Industry and Commerce 
Review), and, Ciyun Zhu, `Fansi Fanlongduan: Woguo yingdang Jianli Wenhexing de Fanlongduan Zhidu' 
(Rethinking of anti-monopoly: China should establish a soft anti-monopoly regime) (2003) 2 Journal of Tsinghua 
University (Philosophy and Social Sciences). 
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se illegality and the rule of reason82 
However, what kind of codified rule of reason the AML is about to establish is 
uncertain at the time of writing. The relevant provisions are open to further 
interpretation and block exemption regulations may be urgently needed to enable the 
AML monopoly agreement exemption rules workable in practice. 
5.3.3 Consequences of Infringement 
Infringement of the AML prohibition on restrictive agreements that do not meet the 
three criteria for exemption may lead to investigation and penalties by the AMEA. 
Furthermore, bid rigging is explicitly subject to criminal liabilities. Remedies for the 
infringement include orders to cease the conduct, the confiscation of illegal gains, and 
fines (between 1-10 % of previous annual turnover). For non-implemented monopoly 
agreements, a fine of up to RMB 500,000 can be imposed. Furthermore, the AMEA 
may reduce or exempt sanctions for undertakings that voluntarily report important 
information and evidence concerning monopoly agreements. In addition, offenders are 
also liable to damages to injured undertakings. Unsatisfied parties may apply for 
administrative reconsideration to decisions made by the AMEA, and then bring 
administrative litigation towards the result of the administrative reconsideration. 
Parties are also allowed to bring administrative litigation without seeking 
administrative reconsideration. 83 
5.3.3.1 Nullity and Severability 
The proposed AML once provided that the prohibited restrictive agreements shall have 
no effect ab initio. 84 Although following the Article 81(2) EC model, a noteworthy 
point is that the ECJ has held that the nullity affects only the clauses in the agreement 
82 Pengcheng Zheng, 'Lun Benshen Weifa yu Heli Faze' (On the per se Illegality and the Rule of Reason), (2005) 1 
Jingzhengfa Pinglun (Competition Law Review) pp 59-78. 
83 AML, arts 46 and 53. Also see ch 8, below. 
" The First Reading Draft, art 11. 
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prohibited by the relevant competition provision. 
85 The whole agreement is void only 
when the prohibited clauses cannot be severed from the remaining terms of the 
agreement. The Commission's Guidelines on Vertical Restraints further clarify the rule 
and state that there is no severability for hardcore restrictions in vertical restraints, 
including fixed or minimum RPM and market partitioning by territory or by customer 
with four exceptions. 86 It is to be hoped that the rule of severability will be 
transplanted by the AML future development. 
In fact, the Foreign Economic Contract Law of the PRC incorporated the rule of 
severability as early as 1985.87 According to this law, a voidable economic contract 
was ineffective from the beginning. However, if part of an economic contract became 
invalid, the other parts should remain effective. Later in 1999, the Contract Law also 
provides that if part of a contract is null and void without affecting the validity of other 
parts of the contract, the other parts shall still be valid. 
88 Therefore, one can predict 
that the future AML practice will follow this rule even the wording of the relevant 
articles may keep silent. 
5.3.3.2 A Leniency Programme? 
The AML provides that if undertakings involved in monopoly agreements on their own 
initiative report information concerning the conclusion of monopoly agreements and 
provide important evidence to the AMEA, they may be given a mitigated punishment 
or be exempted from punishment. 89 This rule provides signals on a leniency 
mechanism as a supplemental instrument to detect and fight against hardcore cartels. 
Nevertheless, the effectiveness of a leniency programme depends on a series of factors 
"Case 56/65 Societe La Technique Miniere v Maschinebau Ulm GmbH [1996] EC 234, [1966] CMLR 357. 
86 Reg 2790/1999 [1999] OJ L336/21 art 4 and the Commissions' Guidelines of Vertical Restraints [2000] OJ 
C291/1, paras 46-51,66. 
87 The Foreign Economic Contract Law was adopted by the 106 Session of the 6th SCNPC on 21 March 1985. This 
law, as well as the Economic Contract Law (1981) and the Technology Contract Law (1987), were superseded by a 
unified Contract Law in 1999. 
88 Contract Law, art 56. 
89 AML, pare 2 of art 46, similar wording was firstly adopted by the November 2005 Draft AML. 
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such as potential penalty being serious enough for providing incentives to cartels 
members acting as `whistle-blowers', legal certainty of reduced penalty to applying 
firms, and simple and straightforward admission guidelines for the programme. 
90 
Therefore, establishing an effective AML leniency programme is still a long way to go. 
In addition, as cartels are increasingly globalized, the adoption and enforcement of a 
leniency mechanism is calling for cooperation with other jurisdictions on cartel 
enforcement know-how, in general, and more research and assessment on hardcore 
cartels in the PRC, in particular. 
5.3.4 Comments 
Taking into account of the flexible and evolutionary features of competition law, 
developing stage of administrative and judiciary systems of the PRC and other 
conditions for the AML, an EC model of block exemption mechanism should, at least 
in theory, be easier to establish and to implement than the US per se rule and rule of 
reason approach. The analyses of this Chapter further explain why Chinese legislators 
have basically chosen an EC model. 91 
An initial declaration of hardcore and non-hardcore restraints and different treatment to 
them is necessary and reasonable for the sake of legal certainty, but necessary space 
has to be left for future developments and for scenarios that on their face might be in 
the hardcore category but nonetheless are worth a full market analysis. The tougher 
problem is how to balance legal certainty and flexibility in the Chinese context. 
Furthermore, as regards the restrictive agreement exemptions envisaged by the AML, 
several concerns are worth to be addressed carefully. 
5.3.4.1 The Anti-Monopoly Exclusion 
Competition law exclusion is a common legislative or enforcement practice in many 
jurisdictions. For example, the EC Treaty provides special rules for highly sensitive 
90 Jiro Tamura and others, 'Japan Cartels', in Global Competition Review: the Asia-Pacific Antitrust Review 2004 
(London, Law Business Research, 2004). 
91 See ch 3, above. 
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sectors including agriculture, nuclear energy and military equipment, which are wholly 
or in part excluded from the scope of EC competition rules. 92 It has been recognized 
that in the USA there are two basic ways for antitrust exclusions. The first is statutory 
exclusion by `[c]ongress expressly declares that the antitrust laws do not apply, or 
apply only in a modified form, ' to some specific sectors `including agriculture, 
communications, energy, financial services, and insurance'. The second is antitrust 
exclusion by implication, `where Congress establishes a pervasive regulatory scheme 
that the application of the antitrust laws would disrupt, courts sometimes hold that the 
activity of regulated firms in impliedly immune'. However, `the US Supreme Court 
has warned that "[r]epeals of the antitrust laws by implication from a regulatory statute 
are strongly disfavored, and have only been found in cases of plain repugnancy 
between the antitrust and regulatory provisions. " 93 
In the UK, the Schedules 1-3 of the CA 1998 has excluded a wide range of agreements 
and situations from the Chapter I prohibition, such as agreements relating to land, 
agreements subject to competition scrutiny under the Broadcasting Act 1990, the 
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 or the Communications Act 2003, 
agreements necessary for compelling reasons of public policy and which are subject to 
an order by the Secretary of State, and agreements relating to farmer's association, or 
to production of or trade in `agricultural products' as defined in the EC Treaty and in 
EC Regulation 26/62 94 
The proposed AML, on the contrary, when dealing with the anti-monopoly law 
exclusion, once provided a problematic declaration that it `does not apply where other 
laws or administrative regulations provide provisions. ' 95 Furthermore, the proposed 
92 Dabbah (n 66) 128. 
93 Gellhorn and others (n 48) 568-569. The case law involved is United States v Philadelphia National Bank 83 
S. Ct. 1715 (1963). A noteworthy point is that, in this book, Gellhorn using the term of 'exemptions' refers to 
`antitrust immunity created by statutes and government regulations'. However, as can be seen, the scope and 
meaning of this term is the same as 'exclusions' used in the EC. In order to avoid confusion with the 'prohibition 
and exemption mechanism', this writer chooses the term 'exclusions'. 
94 Dabbah (n 66)131. 
's The First Reading Draft, para 3 of art 2, which reads 'As for monopolistic conduct prohibited by this Law, this 
Law does not apply where other laws or administrative regulations provide provisions. ' 
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AML authorizes anti-monopoly investigation powers to `relevant departments and 
supervisory organs' by declaring that `if there are relevant laws and administrative 
regulations stipulating that monopolistic conduct prohibited by this Law shall be 
investigated and handled by relevant departments or supervisory organs, the laws and 
regulations are to be applied'. 6 
Although both provisions were deleted finally, and the AML seems to grant higher 
authorities to the AMEA, another new provision may however function as a powerful 
anti-monopoly exclusion. Since the Second Reading Drafft, the AML has incorporated 
a provision which provides that 
Undertakings in industries controlled by the state-owned economy and relied 
upon by national economy and national security, as well as industries that 
conduct exclusive and monopolistic sales in accordance with law shall be 
protected by the state to conduct their legitimate business activities. The state 
shall implement supervision, adjustment and control of business operations 
and pricing activities of these undertakings in accordance with law, and 
safeguard legitimate interests of consumers and promote technological 
progress 97 
Although Article 7 may be a compromise which enables the AML politically 
acceptable, it is however badly designed and may be impossible to be enforced. 
Leaving whether or not the large number of current laws or administrative regulations 
playing roles in regulating competition will be revised and harmonized according to 
the AML, the all-power exclusion implied by Article 7 is also overlapping with the 
restrictive agreement exemptions to a great extent. 
It is hereby submitted that: (1) A substantial task on convergence and harmonization 
between sectoral regulations and the AML is urgently needed in order to avoid the 
% The First Reading Draft, art 44. 
97 AML, para 1 of art 7. 
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latter being rendered powerless by `law'. (2) Which `law' will prevail must be clarified 
by a separate legislative document or by guidelines by the AMC or the AMEA in order 
to avoid future clash in statutory hierarchy and to provide necessary legal certainty. 
Unless these two proposals being implemented, the multi-layer standard restrictive 
agreement exemptions and the over-inclusive anti-monopoly exclusion may deprive 
the effectiveness of the AML to an uncertain but potentially great extent. 
5.3.4.2 The Exemption for the Agriculture Sector 
The First Reading Draft once granted a sectoral exemption to restrictive agreements in 
the agriculture sector. 98 The agricultural exemption is common arrangement in many 
jurisdictions. However, the wording of the agriculture exemption stipulated by the First 
Reading Draft was confusing because it stipulated that the law `is not applicable to 
cooperation, association or other concerted conducts which do not substantially restrict 
competition by agricultural producers and the farmers' professional organizations ... '. 
One may ask whether there was an exemption at all because the problem was what was 
meant by `non-substantial restriction on competition'. In other words, was such a 
criterion sufficiently clear in order to make this sectoral exemption workable? If the 
`non-substantial restriction on competition' was `the' criterion for applying the 
agriculture sector exemption, would that also imply that `non-substantial restriction' in 
other sectors will be caught by the AML? If the answer to this question was negative, 
then what was the rational to have such an exemption? If the answer was positive, then 
what was the relationship between this `non-substantial restriction on competition' 
criterion and the `non-substantial elimination on competition' criterion of the AML 
monopoly agreement exemptions? There was hardly any reason to differentiate these 
two criteria, but once again, what is the rationale for having such a separate exemption 
for agriculture sector? 
The true intent of the Chinese lawmakers as regards the agriculture sector was 
"The First Reading Draft, art 56, which reads `This Law is not applicable to cooperation, association or other 
concerted conducts which do not substantially restrict competition by agricultural producers and the farmers' 
professional economic organizations during the course of production, processing, sales, transportation, storage and 
other operating activities of agricultural products. ' 
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uncertain but it seemed a future block exemption regulation for the sector was what the 
proposed AML intended to set up. However, the EC and UK experience shows that a 
specified sectoral exclusion might be more appropriate than a sectoral exemption 
regulation. 
5.3.4.3 The Necessity for Adopting Block Exemption Regulations 
When commenting on the July 2002 and April 2005 Drafts, the ABA working groups 
define the series of objectives recognized by the first criterion of the AML monopoly 
agreement exemptions as `block exemptions'. 99 The working groups went on to 
comment that the `block exemptions' established by the proposed AML were 
`extremely broad in scope, with parameters that are not clear and that may be difficult 
to apply in practice' and suggested that `the block exemptions should be narrower, 
more precisely defined and definite in duration'. 100 
The contents of these comments are relevant to possible regulatory risks implied by the 
broad values and objectives imbedded in the AML monopoly agreement exemptions. 
However, whether the comments address to a correctly categorized subject matter is a 
question worth to be answered. 
In EC competition law, block exemptions are granted `by way of a market or 
transaction-specific regulation, which applies to categories of agreements that satisfy 
specified criteria'. 101 Block exemption regulations are `general legislative acts' by EC 
Commission following authorization from the Council or directly by the Council 
`which circumscribe a portion of the field where Article 81 EC is not applicable'. 102 
"ABA (n28)Joint Comments 2005,3 and, Joint Comments 2003,21. 
100 mid. 
101 Dabbah (n 66) 128. 
102 EC Commission's power to adopt exemption regulations was based on Council Regulations No. 19/65 and No. 
2821/71. See discussion in G Marenco, `Does a Legal Exception System Require an Amendment of the Treaty? ' in CD Ehlermann and I Atanasiu (eds), European Competition Law Annual 2000: The Modernisation of EC Antitrust 
Policy (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2001) 173; see also, Wils (n 78) 22. 
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Furthermore, as analyzed already103, these recognized objectives are just part of the 
first criterion to qualify a general exemption for restrictive agreements, both the 
legislative language and expected functions of these objectives indicate that they will 
function as a Chinese counterpart of agreement which `contributes to improving the 
production or distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic progress', 
the first positive criterion of Article 81(3) EC. These recognized objectives are 
significant different with EC block exemption regulations and thus cannot be defined 
as Chinese block exemptions. 
Therefore, what the AML has established is a principal framework of prohibition and 
exemption on restrictive agreements, block exemption mechanism could not be 
recognized from the current legislative language. Nevertheless, in order to activate the 
AML rules on restrictive agreements, there are urgent needs (1) to revise the legislative 
language of the AML exemption in the future; and (2) to establish a block exemption 
mechanism for reasons discussed as below. 
The historical justification of the EC block exemption mechanism was `as an 
instrument to reduce the huge number of notifications to which the Commission could 
not handle administratively', the current value of the block exemption mechanism is 
said to enhance legal certainty and to save on enforcement cost. 104 Because the AML 
has abandoned its previous individual or voluntary notification mechanism since the 
November 2005 Draft, the historical justification of establishing a block exemption 
mechanism is no longer relevant to Chinalos However, the `enhancing legal certainty' 
and `saving on enforcement cost' argument is particular meaningful to the PRC. 
When examining the cost of the block exemption regulations, Wils offers three 
insightful criteria which can be referred when assessing whether there should be a 
103 See 5.3.2, above. 
1°4 Dabbah (n 66) 128; WiIs, (n 78) 22. 
105 Until the July 2005 Draft, the proposed AML had chosen either a mandatory or voluntary notification 
mechanism for obtaining exemptions for restrictive agreements. 
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particular block exemption regulation: 
... for any category of agreements (i) which are very 
frequently concluded in 
business practice, (ii) for which a full individual assessment would in the 
overwhelming majority of cases lead to the conclusion that the conditions of 
Article 81(3) are fulfilled, and (iii) which can be sufficiently clearly defined, the 
cost saving, including the reduction of risk, at the level of self-assessment by the 
undertakings when concluding these agreements as well as at the level of ex post 
litigation is likely to outweigh the cost of adopting the block exemption 
regulation. 106 
Furthermore, since the text of the AML prohibition on restrictive agreements has been 
based on the Article 81 EC model from the day it was conceived, there is an urgent 
need to study the EC block exemption system, to draw lessons from the evolutionary 
history of the system, and to transplant the mechanism according to national conditions 
of the PRC. 
In addition, the formidable task to strike a delicate balance between the per se rule and 
rule of reason and when to refer to which approach might be avoided to a great extent. 
Wils argues that the nature of Article 81(3) EC should not depend on `discretionary 
political decisions' but is a `codified form of the American rule of reason' and Article 
81 EC is `the European equivalent of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. ' 107 The EC 
Commission also states that Article 81(3) `in fact contains all the elements of a "rule of 
reason"' and presents an ideal forum for the analysis of the pro- and anti-competitive 
aspects of an agreement. 108 If this observation is correct, the AML exemptions on 
restrictive agreements and the future block exemption regulations can also function as 
a codified form of the American rule of reason since, at least from analysis on 
legislative language, the AML prohibition and exemption on restrictive agreements is 
106 Wils (n 78) 22; Wils, The Optimal Enforcement of EC Antitrust Law (Kluwer Law International, The Hague 2002) 
Section 6.2.3.2. 
101 Wils (n 78) 6-7. 
10B European Commission, White Paper on the Moderni_ation of the Rules Implementing Article 81 and 82 of the 
EC Treaty [1999] OJ C132/1, [1999]5 CMLR 208, pares 57 and 184 if. 
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the Chinese equivalent of Article 81 EC. 
However, it is noteworthy that, the CFI, in Metropole Televisions v. Commission and 
Van de Bergh Foods v. Commission, 109 rejected the argument that previous judgements' 
acceptance of economic justifications and explanations for restraints contained in an 
agreement is amounted to an acceptance of the rule of reason. In Metrople, the CFI 
held that the EC case law did not confirm the existence of a rule of reason. 
110 
A noteworthy point is that, Wils' argument of `no scope of discretionary political 
decisions' in the application of neither Article 81 EC nor Section 1 of the Sherman Act 
is problematic. Historical documents, decisional practices and case law, and literatures 
have all reflected `the political content' and `the use of discretion' in competition law 
and policy across jurisdictions"'. 
For example, when discussing discretionary powers and exemptions, Dabbah observes 
that the implementation of exemptions may `on grounds of industrial policy' and may 
for example `impede the access of foreign firms to the domestic market'. 
112 This 
observation appears to be a prediction of the AML exemptions on restrictive 
agreements. For example, among six recognized objectives of the first criterion of 
Article 15 of the AML, enhancing competitiveness of small and medium-sized 
undertakings, ensuring legitimate interests in foreign trade and economic cooperation, 
and moderating decreases in sales and production surpluses are particularly subject to 
political and judicial discretionary powers. Even in the future, after adaptation and 
narrowed interpretations, there might still scope which leaves Chinese exemption 
mechanism on restrictive agreements to discretionary manoeuvres. The challenging 
109 Case T-528/93, Metropole Television SA v. Commission [1996] ECR II-649, [1996] 5 CMLR 386, and Case I- 
65/98, Van den Bergh Food v. Commission [2004] 4 CMLR 1. 
110 See, Case 56/65 Societe La Technique Miniere v Maschinebau Ulm GmbH [1966] ECR 234, [1966] 1 CMLR 
357. For more in-depth discussion on a rejection of the rule of reason in the EC and per se illegality and the rule of 
reason in the USA, see Jones and Sufrin (n52) pp 201-204,613-18. 
111 Robert Pitofsky, 'The Political Content of Antitrust' 1979 (127) University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1051- 
1081. 
112 Dabbah (n 1) at ch 4 The Use of discretion, 70-85. 
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problem is not to avoid facing discretion but as commented by Dabbah, how well a 
particular system of competition law and the law's environment could deal with and 
check the use of discretion. 113 
5.4 Concluding Remarks 
Ehrlich and Posner observed that 
The inherent ambiguity of language and the limitations of human foresight 
and knowledge limit the practical ability of the rulemaker to catalog 
accurately and exhaustively the circumstances that should activate the general 
standard. Hence the reduction of a standard to a set of rules must in practice 
create both overinclusion and underinclusion. 114 
This remark is particularly relevant to competition law in part because the law `tends 
normally to be vague in terminology'. "5 As we can see from analyses of this chapter, 
although a framework on regulating restrictive agreements is established by the AML, 
since the framework is based on vague models of advanced competition laws and is 
tailored in order to transplant into a transitional China, much remains to be done. The 
especially complex analytical framework for restrictive agreements will require a 
fundamental rethink of the institutional arrangements and enforcement mechanism of 
the AML. 
113 Dabbah (n 1) 76-85. See also chs 2,3 and 8 of this thesis for detailed discussions on discretionary power which 
influences Chinese competition law and policy. 
"' Isaac Ehrlich and Richard A Posner, 'An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking', (1974) Vol 3 No 1 Journal 
of Legal Studies 268. 
115 Dabbah (n 1) 70. 
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6 
Abuse of Market Dominant Position 
6.1 Background 
Abuse of Dominance in China is reflected largely in use and abuse of administrative 
powers to restrict competition inherited from the pre-transitional system, as well as in 
economic monopolies created by the new conditions of the socialist market economy. 
Besides MNC, currently almost all market big-players are those large SOE, most of 
which are in the process of privatisation, and mostly in traditional natural monopolies 
such as public utilities, transport, telecommunications, etc. Therefore, one can 
reasonable understand that abuse of dominance in China goes hand in hand with public 
undertakings and the so-called `administrative monopoly' as discussed in chapter 4 
above. However, because of Article 7 of the AML and supported by their sectoral 
regulators, many public undertakings may easily find their leeway by claiming non- 
application of the AML. 
Ironically, taking into consideration of the current economic situation in China, the 
provisions of abuse of dominant position are originally and essentially expected to 
mainly regulate anticompetitive acts of those which are or will be transformed from 
regulated state undertakings. Three examples can indicate why abuse of dominance is 
highly relevant to Chinese public undertakings. 
The first example is the telecommunication sector. Although the creation of China 
Unicorn in 1994 and the splitting of China Telecom, the monopolist of the industry for 
45 years, have resulted in seven operators in the telecom sector, a pattern of real 
competition has yet to come. ' Taking mobile phone market for example, by 2006, 
Hong Kong SAR, a city with a population of 6.9m and an area of 1103.72 sq Ian, has 
Qi Yudong, Zhongguo Jingji Yunxing: hong de Longduan yu Jingheng (Monopolies and Competition in China's 
Economic Operation) (The People's Press, Beijing 2004) 291-292. 
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six mobile telephony companies. In the PRC, an economy with a population of 1.3b 
and a geographic area of 9,600,000 sq km, there are only two mobile telephony 
companies, China Mobile and China Unicorn, which are both State-owned companies 
and are controlled substantially by the Ministry of Information Industry and its local 
agencies. The less competitive Chinese telecommunication market is full of 
exploitative and exclusionary practices, such as excessive pricing, tying and bundling, 
exclusive dealing, etc. which has led to loss of consumer welfare. 2 
The second example is the health care pharmaceutical market. On the one hand, the 
market share of retailing pharmacies is only 15% and mainly in non-prescriptions. On 
the other hand, the remaining 85% market shares are held by state-owned hospitals by 
selling prescriptions. In order to eliminate competition from retailing pharmacies, 
many hospitals engage in restrictive practice such as exclusive dealing, bid rigging, 
tying, etc. To exploit excessive profit, hospitals are using e-prescriptions, which force 
patients not only pay for consulting doctors but also purchase prescriptions through the 
hospital. Similar behaviour by state-owned hospitals has significantly distorted 
competition of pharmaceutical market and has caused the price of health care 
unaffordable for majority Chinese. It is very easy for a hospital to find sectoral laws 
and regulations as an excuse to avoid competition and, in the near future, to avoid the 
anti-monopoly sword. 3 Although resolving the problem depends on reforms in the 
health care sector and the social security system, the AML is expected to scrutinize 
undertakings behaviour during the ongoing reform process. 
The third example is the petrochemical industry. In the year of 2005, by using their 
strong positions and `the golden opportunity of energy crisis', China's top two 
petroleum companies, the state-owned China Petroleum & Chemical Corp (SinoPec) 
2 Wang Junhao, The Reform Mechanism for Chinese Monopolist Sectors -A Case of Chinese Telecommunication Regulating System (2005) 1 2hongguo Gonge Jingji (China Industry Economy); Shi Jianzhong, 
Telecommunicating Sectoral Legislations and Regulatory Policies, (2006) August 21 Shyi Jingji Baodao (the 21" 
Century Economic Report). 
3 Ma Hongman, Why low price pharmacies are making big loss? Meiri Jing/i Xinwen (Economic News Daily), 12 
August 2005; - `Yigai shinian, weihe jinban baixing kanbuqi bing? ' (Health care reform 10 years on: Why nearly half citizens cannot afford seeing doctors? ) at, <http: //news. xinhuanet. com/comments/2004- 
12/16/content 2340572. htm>, 16 December 2004. 
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and China National Petroleum Corp (CNPC), increased their market share to 55% and 
32% respectively. Their expansion strategies included hostile takeover, margin 
squeezing, obtaining state aids and subsidiaries, refusal to deal, production restriction 
and quota, and price distortion, etc. It will be very difficult to subject the Chinese 
petrochemical sector to the AML considering the prevailing plausible excuses such as 
`national and resource security', `strategic industry', `national champions' and alike. 
Not to mention all high-profile state-owned enterprises are regulated by the newly 
formed but powerful State Assets Supervision and Administration Commission 
(SASAC) and its local bureaus focusing on industry policy and the National Plan. 
4 
These three examples are representative but far from exhaustive. 
6.2 The Current Legal and Regulatory Framework 
6.2.1 The Anti-Unfair Competition Law 1993 
Regarding abuse of market dominant position, the AUCL explicitly prohibits forced 
transactions by public utilities and other statutory monopolists. Public utilities 
companies are subject to a fine between RMB 50,000 and RMB 200,000 or a fine 
between one to three times of the illegal gains, and order to stop the illegal behaviour. 5 
The AUCL also prohibits below-cost sales (predatory pricing) and tying but does not 
require that a dominant market position needs to be established before assessing these 
two types of conduct. 6 
6.2.2 The Price Law 1997 
The Price Law prohibits business operators from below-cost sales with an intention to 
eliminate competitors and monopolize the market. It also prohibits discriminatory 
pricing and excessive pricing but does not require an `intention factor' to present. 
Similar to the AUCL, it is also not clear whether a dominant position need to be 
established prior to any substantial assessment. Offenders are subject to seizure of 
4 See Sheng Dalin, Monopolized State-owned undertakings' takeovers of private undertakings are against the reform, 21 ShYiXinwen (the 21° Century News), 10 April 2006. 
s AUCL 1993, arts 6 and 23. 
6 AUCL 1993, arts 11 and 12. 
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illegal gains, a fine up to five times of the illegal gains, warning, order to stop business 
for rectification, and/or cancelling business licenses. 7 
6.2.3 The Contract Law 1999 
Relevant articles of the Contract Law on monopoly are discussed at 5.2.4 above. 
6.2.4 The Provisions on Prohibiting Public Utilities to Restrict Competition 1993 
Based on the AUCL, the Provisions of Prohibiting Public Utilities to Restrict 
Competition (the Public Utilities Provisions) were adopted by the SAIC in December 
1993. The notion `public utilities' refers to `business operators in the sectors of water, 
electric power, gas, postal service, telecommunications, and transport, etc'. 
8 They are 
requested to 'abide by the laws of the PRC' and are prohibited from 'using dominant 
position to impede fair competition of other business operators and to harm legitimate 
rights of consumers'. 9 A non-exhaustive list was given which illustrated prohibited 
restrictive behaviour, including forced transaction, tying, refusal to deal and excessive 
pricing. '0 
According to this writer's literature and governmental archive review, the Public 
Utilities Provisions were the first legislative document which introduced the concept 
`dominant position' (youshi diwei) into the Chinese law, although a definition was not 
given. The concept was later developed to `dominant market position' (shichang zhipei 
diwei) by the Monopolistic Pricing Provisions in 2003. Except these two legislative 
documents, the concept `monopoly' (duzhan or longduan) has been used, for example, 
by the AUCL, the Price Law, and the Contract Law. The concept `dominant market 
position' was formally adopted by the AML in August 2007. 
Another interesting aspect of the Public Utilities Provisions is that service-users and 
7 Price Law 1997, arts 14 (2), (51 (7) and 40. 
S The Public Utilities Provisions 1993, art 2. 
9 Ibid, art 3. It's noteworthy that the Public Utilities Provisions 1993 do not use the concept 'abuse'. 
10 Ibid, art 4. 
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consumers are allowed to bring actions against public utilities and to claim 
compensations in accordance with rules set out by Article 20 of the AUCL. In contrast, 
Article 20 of the AUCL itself only allows injured business operators to sue. 
6.2.5 The Interim Provisions on Prohibiting Monopolistic Pricing Behaviour 
2003 
As previously discussed, the Interim Provisions on Prohibiting Monopolistic Pricing 
Behaviour (the Monopolistic Pricing Provisions) prohibit controlling price through 
collusion or abuse of dominant market position. 11 Although `dominant market position' 
is not defined, the Monopolistic Pricing Provisions provide that a dominant market 
position shall be determined according to `market shares (of the business operator 
concerned) on the relevant market, degree of substitutability (of the product or service 
in question) and the difficulty of market entry to new entrants'. 12 
Business operators holding dominant market position are prohibited from four types of 
abusive behaviour, including, fixing resale price, excessive pricing, below-cost sales 
(predatory pricing), and discriminatory pricing. 13 Therefore, regarding abuse of 
dominance, the scope of the Monopolistic Pricing Provisions is much clearer than that 
of the AUCL and the Price Law. As already analyzed, the AUCL and the Price Law are 
silent on whether a dominant position is a prerequisite to scrutinize prohibited abusive 
behaviour. 
6.2.6 Sectoral Regulations 
Sectoral regulations discussed at 4.2.3 above, such as the postal law, the electric power 
law, the railway law and the telecommunication regulations, are highly relevant to 
rules on abuse of dominance and are therefore important components of the current 
legal and regulatory framework. 
11 Monopolistic Pricing Provisions 2003, art 2; also see discussion at 5.2.6, above. 
12 lbid, art 3. 
13 Ibid, arts 5,6,7, and 8. 
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6.3 Abuse of Market Dominant Position under the Anti-Monopoly Law 2007 
6.3.1 Market Dominant Position (Shichang Zhipei Diwe: ) 
The concept of dominant market position was first adopted in China by the 
Monopolistic Pricing Provisions in 2003, prior to which the concept of monopoly was 
adopted by the AUCL, the Price Law and the Contract Law in 1993,1997 and 1999 
respectively. 14 Over the years, the concept of `dominant market position' has been 
developed in many aspects by the series drafts of the proposed AML. The focus of the 
concept has also been changed from competitors to competitive process. For example, 
previous drafts of the proposed AML once defined a dominant market position as `one 
or more operators controlling a `specific market' and prohibited `abuse of a market 
dominant position to obstruct the activities of other operators' 15 Under the AML, 
dominant market position is understood as a position that enables undertaking(s) to 
control the price, product quantity or other trading conditions in the relevant market, or 
to restrict or affect market entries. Dominant undertakings are prohibited from abusing 
its dominant positions to eliminate or restrict competition. 16 
The AML have one chapter with three substantial articles to deal with abuse of 
dominance. 17 Based on the Article 82 EC model, the elements of a dominant position 
include (1) Is there a dominant market position in a relevant market? (2) Is this 
dominance market position held in the PRC or a substantial (any) part of it? (3) Is there 
an abuse of that dominant position? (4) Does this abuse eliminate or restrict 
competition? (5) Is there any possible objective justification for the alleged abusive 
behaviour? 
6.3.1.1 The Market Share Presumption 
14 See the Monopolistic Pricing Provisions, arts 2,3,5-8; AUCL 1993, art 6; Price Law 1997, art 14 (2); Contract 
Law 1999, art 329. 
15 For example, the July 2002 Draft, art 14. 
16 AML, arts 6 and 17. 
17 Inch III, arts 16-18, the AML establishes a framework to scrutinize abuse of dominance in the PRC. 
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In essence, the AML has chosen the EC model on defining dominance by looking at 
firstly market share, and secondly, other factors indicating dominance to alleviate 
administrative and legal difficulties. 
As a starting point to assess dominance, a statutory presumptions triggered by certain 
market shares has been established since the 1999 Draft. Under the AML, the 
presumption of a dominant position arises if, in the relevant market, the market share 
of one undertaking reaches 50 percent or more; if the combined market share of two 
undertakings reaches 66 percent or more; or, if the combined market share of three 
undertakings reaches 75 percent or more. The AML does provide scope for rebutting 
market share presumptions. Moreover, no undertaking with a market share of under 10 
per cent will be considered to hold a dominant position. 18 
For a possible finding of a `joint market dominant position', the First Reading Draft 
deleted the inapplicable condition incorporated by the November 2005 Draft which 
required undertakings to prove that 'there is material competition between them'. 19 
However, such a 'joint dominant market position' has caused strong criticism within 
and outside China. For example, the ABA Joint Comments pointed that the concept of 
joint dominant market position is `contrary to prevailing norms' because `collective 
dominance' concept in EC and German Competition laws further require addition 
evidence of coordinated conduct to be identified 2° The concept is a controversial and 
problematic one if one takes a close look of the EC competition law decisional and 
judiciary practice. 21 The recently established Competition Commission of Singapore 
also provides guidance on this concept which requires that undertakings can be 
considered collectively dominant if they adopt a common policy (tacit coordination) in 
'a AML, art 18. 
19 The First Reading Draft, art 14. 
20 American Bar Association (ABA), Joint Comments on the Proposed Anti-Monopoly Law of the People k Republic 
of China, <http: //www. abanet. org/antitrust/at-comments/2005/07-05/abaprcat2005-2final. pdfl, May 2005,3. 
21 See for example, Compagnie Martime Belge Transports SA, Compagnie MaritimeBelge SA ande Dafra-lines A/S, 
v Commission [2000] ECR 1-1356, and, Gencor v Commission [1999] [ECR] 11-753. See also discussion in Maher 
M Dabbah, EC and UK Competition Law (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2004) 587- 590. 
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the relevant market 22 
It is noteworthy that, compared with its counterpart in Chinese authentic text, the 
`market share presumption' seemed as mandatory and irrefutable in the proposed law's 
English version. For example, Article 14 of English version of both the November 
2005 and the June 2006 Draft provides that undertakings that have meet any of the 
thresholds will be directly considered holding a dominant market position. Critics 
toward the Article 14 and similar arrangement in previous drafts have come from 
within and outside China. 3 There were concerns as the existence of a dominant market 
position or high market concentration may be necessary for the exercise of market 
power, but is not sufficient to lead to a conclusion that dominant position exists, 
especially under conditions of the `new economy'. Market shares and concentration 
measures are only starting points for the analysis of the competitive implication of a 
situation and a course of conduct. A detailed analysis is thus needed to determine what 
the actual state of competition in the market is. 
However, this writer has found that, from 2002 to 2007, a series of drafts (Chinese 
authentic) including the First and the Second Reading Drafts have chosen the wording 
of `undertakings ... 
MAY be presumed to hold a dominant market position. ' The 
implication of the Chinese text was that the market share presumption should be a 
rebuttable one. Although it was uncertain why such a problematic meaning-twisted 
translation had existed for many years, a possible explanation was that the substantial 
differences between `may' and `can' were ignored by translators who did not 
understand the significance on a rebuttable and a non-rebuttable presumption in abuse 
of dominance context. Encouragingly, this misunderstanding which may result in 
future interpretative inconsistency has been avoided since the Third Reading Draft. 
The AML eventually makes it clear that `an undertaking which is presumed to hold a 
22 Competition Commission of Singapore, Competition Commission of Singapore Guidelines 2005 on Section 47 
Prohibition - Abuse of Dominant Position, <http: //www. ccs. gov. sg/CCS/Templates/PrintFriendly. aspx>, December 2005,14. 
23 Nathan Bush, 'Refining China's Draft Anti-monopoly Law', Global Competition Review: the Asia-Pacific 
Antitrust & Trade Review 2006, (London, Law Business Research, 2006) 26; ABA (n 22) Joint Comments May 
2005,15-16. 
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dominant market position shall not be deemed as a dominant undertaking, if it can 
provide evidence which indicates it does not hold a dominant market position. '24 
However, whether the market share presumption will preclude a finding of `non- 
dominance' below the 50% market share is uncertain at the time of writing. 
6.3.1.2 Other Indicators of Dominance 
In addition to the market share presumption, the AML further specifies a non- 
exhaustive list of illustrative factors to determine dominant market position, which 
includes: (1) market share of the undertaking(s) involved and competition conditions 
in the relevant market; (2) ability of the undertaking involved to control sales market 
or raw materials purchasing market; (3) financial and technical conditions of the 
undertaking involved; (4) the extent of dependence of other undertakings on the 
undertaking involved; (5) the difficulty of entering the relevant market by other 
undertakings. The AML also provides a sweeper clause which recognises `other factors 
relating to the dominant market position of the undertaking' involved. 25 Previous 
chosen but now deleted `relevant factors' include the undertaking's association 
condition with other undertakings and import and export conditions of the relevant 
market 26 Although this list of factors is non-exhaustive, as pointed by the ABA Joint 
Submission 2005, a `time element' has been missing by the AML because factors 
indicating dominance should be considered over a sufficient period of time in order to 
evaluate their competitive effect and to thus avoid unjustified regulatory interference 
into the marketplace. 27 This observation is of particular importance considering China 
as an emerging and unstable market in the process of privatization and transition. 
6.3.2 Abuse (Lanyong) 
The AML does not explicitly prohibit attempts to acquire dominant market position, 
but only actual abuse of a dominant position. Therefore, in essence, the AML 
24 AML, an 18. 
25 Ibid, art 18. 
26 See, for example, the July 2004 Draft, art 19 (5). 
27 ABA (n 21) Joint Comments, May 2005,15. 
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provisions on abuse of dominant market position are clearly based on the EC as 
opposed to the US model. 
Following the previous drafts' format, the AML provides a list of categorised abusive 
behaviour plus a catch-all provision without given a legal definition of `abuse'. The 
specifically prohibited behaviour is illustrative and includes both exploitative and 
exclusionary conduct. Dominant undertakings are prohibited, without valid 
justifications, from carrying out excessive pricing, below-cost sales, refusals to deal, 
exclusive or forced dealing, tying or imposing other unreasonable transactional terms, 
and discriminatory dealing. 28 Under the AML, `other abuses of dominant market 
position determined by the AMEA' will also be prohibited . 
29 This `catch-all' provision 
has been incorporated since the July 2005 Draft which has distinguished the recent 
drafts from the previous ones. An important question of the earlier drafts was whether 
those activities mentioned were meant to be all the practices that will be forbidden and 
it was not clear whether other types of abusive behaviour not specifically listed in the 
drafts will also be caught. 
The absence of a definition of abuse implies that close attention must be given to 
future decisional practice of the AMEA and case law of the courts to ascertain how 
abuse of dominance will be defined and assessed under the AML. It is however too 
early to predicate whether the concept of abuse is an objective one relating to a 
dominant undertaking and to impacts on the market structure, or is a `chameleon' 
adaptable for a variety of objectives. Furthermore, refusal of access to network as an 
application of the `essential facilities doctrine' in the Chinese context has been deleted 
since the July 2005 Draft. Further limit finding an abuse to conduct `without valid 
justifications' is also a recent development. 30 
28AML, art 17(1)-(6). 
29 AML, art 17(7). 
30 The April 2005 Draft, art 22. 
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Based on the EC model, however, the Chinese abuse of dominance regime may imply 
more uncertainties and discretionary powers. For example, the legal definition of 
`market dominant position' of the AML implies a future interpretation difficulty of 
`degree of dominance'. Future non-legislative guidance and notice are therefore 
needed for the sake of legal certainty. Moreover, the AML offers no any clear criteria 
to determine abuse with only generic descriptions such as `unfair' and `without valid 
justifications'. As recognized by EC and US competition law practice, most types of 
conduct covered by Article 82 EC and Section 2 Sherman Act could have both anti- 
competitive and pro-competitive effects and so cannot always be categorized as legal 
or illegal. In the PRC, apart from some cases settled under the AUCL towards abusive 
behaviour of public utilities and administrative monopoly, there are almost no cases as 
regards abuse of dominance. Future subsidiary legislation and interpretations are 
expected to continue following EC and other available models. In any case, the current 
formalistic approach of the AML is difficult to implement optimally without much 
more intensive legislative and non-legislative initiatives and human resources 
investment. Three pending cases analyzed below have reflected how far China is from 
an administrable approach in regulating abuse of dominance. 
6.3.3 Consequences of Infringement31 
Remedies for the infringement of rules on abuse of dominant market positions include 
orders to cease the conduct, confiscations of illegal gains, and fines (between 1-10 % 
of previous annual turnover). 32 
6.3.4 Comments 
As recognized by legal scholars and practitioners, what constitutes a dominant position 
and an abuse of the position for competition law purposes is a complex and important 
threshold question. It remains to be seen how the future AMEA is about to interpret 
these two troublesome concepts. 
31 See 8.4.2, below. 
32 AML, art 47. 
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Although improved over the years, there are still many uncertain points existing in the 
AML provisions on abuse of dominance. For example, the AML prohibits a business 
undertaking in a dominant market position from refusing to deal `without valid 
justifications'. The term 'valid justifications' is not defined. In many cases involving 
refusals to deal, the EC and the US authorities and courts cite the presence and absence 
of a legitimate business interest as a controlling consideration. In the US, typically, the 
term `legitimate business purpose' either means that the defendant had no 
anticompetitive intent, or that the challenged practice is efficient. Similarly in the EC, 
a refusal to deal by a dominant firm is permitted in some circumstances, namely, when 
there are legitimate commercial interests and any steps taken must be fair and 
proportionate to the threat the company faces from a competitor. 33 
In addition, regarding below-cost sales, the AML has offered no explanation on what 
cost level should be taken into account, how to assess the relationship between a firm's 
costs and prices, how to compute costs, and more formidably, how to distinguish prices 
that are low for predatory purposes from prices which are low but as part of pro- 
competitive effects. Focusing on cost levels, predatory pricing theory of the EC and 
US competition laws has been developed over the years via leading case laws and 
theoretic debates and has posed intrinsic challenges to competition authorities in both 
jurisdictions. 34 Transplanting such a complicated concept and theory without thorough 
investigation into its rationale and self-assessment on enforcement competence might 
render the provision inoperative in the future. 
6.4 Case Study 
The case study provided at this section manifests how Chinese undertakings refer to 
existing laws and rules to challenge alleged abusive behaviour of MNCs before the 
33 Commercial Solvents v Commission, Joined Cases 6/73 and 7/73, [1974] ECR 223; Case 27/76, United Brands v 
Commission [ 1978] ECR 207, [197811 CMLR 429. 
34 Case AKZO Chemie BVv Commission [1991] ECR 1-3359, [1993] 5 CMLR 215; Case C-333/94 P, Tetra Pak 
International SA v Commission [1996] ECR 1-5951, [1997] 4 CMLR 662; Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v US, 
221 US 1 [1911]. 
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promulgation of the AML. The case study also shows the gaps between the current 
system and an effective set of rules on abuse of dominant position. 
6.4.1 The Dispute between Dongjin and Intel: Competition Law v IPR 
6.4.1.1 Beijing Dongjin Xinda Technology Co. Ltd (Beijing Dongjin) v Intel 
Corp.: Abuse of Dominance or Infringement of IP Rights3s 
Beijing Dongjin v Intel Corp. was heard before the Beijing First Intermediate People's 
Court on 28 July 2006. The dispute involved a standard clause of a software license. 
Beijing Dongjin claimed the clause was void under Article 329 of the Contract Law of 
P. R. China because it illegally monopolized technology and limited technology 
development. Although the proposed AML has not yet been enacted at the time, the 
case has been referred to as China's first anti-monopoly case and as a war between 
`elephant and aunt' 36, which invited widespread media comments within China. 37 
Beijing Dongjin purchased hardware product `Intel Dialogic Board' and was supplied 
with driver SR5.1.1, which functioned also as application software development 
package from Intel in March 2005. SR5.1.1 was subject to a standard licensing 
agreement set by Intel, a clause of which specified that purchasers could only use the 
Intel software in combination with the purchased Intel hardware. 
Beijing Dongjin argued that the clause created an illegal monopoly in respect of 
technology and, as a result, was void under Article 329 of the Contract Law, which 
deems contracts to be void when illegally monopolizing technology and impairing 
technology development. In addition, Paragraph 10 of the Interpretation of the 
's The case analyzed here is based on the Bill of Complaint submitted by Beijing Dongjin to the Beijing First 
Intermediate People's Court in April 2006 and two articles, (1) Wang Xiaoyan, `Dongjin vs Intel: bcntu qiye yu 
guoji longduan liliang de kangheng' (Dongjin v Intel: the contention among domestic enterprises and international 
monopolist powers), Farhi Mao (Legal Daily) (Beijing 25 July 2006) and, (2) Jiao Trying, `Dongjin fansu Intel 
wuguo, Intel banlai meiguo zhengren'(Dongjin v Intel: no outcome during the first hearing, Intel brought expert 
witness from the USA), Xin Jing Bao (The Beijing News) (Beijing 29 July 2006). No case citation is available at the 
time of writing. 
36 Intel and Beijing Dongjin were referred to as an 'elephant' and an 'aunt' due to the fact that the former is a 
successful multinational corporation with an annual turnover above USD 30 bn, the latter is a small Chinese private 
company with an annual turnover lower than USD IOm 
37 - Sh. 1i ian huigu. Donglin . 
ransu Intel longduan de qianyinhouguo (Review: Causes and Consequences of 
Dongjin's counterclaim against Intel), <http: //it. people. com. cn/GB/8219/68399/68409/4621379. html> 24 July 2006. 
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Supreme People's Court of P. R. China Concerning Issues on the Application of Laws 
in Disputes over Technology Contracts identifies technology licenses which create 
monopolies are consequently void. 8 Beijing Dongjin further argued that the standard 
clause limited its rights of freedom to choose between different hardware suppliers 
since the implication of the standard clause was that subsequent application 
programme developed by purchasers will be also required to use with Intel hardware 
products and thus will continue to be bundled with Intel Dialogic Board. Purchasers, 
like Beijing Dongjin, will have to be regular costumers of Intel and cannot switch. 
Intel argued that the complaint was fabricated and groundless since the principal sale 
was the hardware. The disputed software, as an `extra product', was a driver 
programme which can be developed and used according to purchasers' specific 
demands. What Intel required in the standard clause was using the supplied software 
with Intel hardware. The lawsuit was simple a response to a dispute in 2005 in which 
Intel sued Shenzhen Dongjin Technology, the parent company of Beijing Dongjin, for 
IP rights infringement39. It seemed that Intel tried to avoid the word `bundling' and did 
not objectively justify the clause instead by arguing that such standard clauses and 
contracts are `common practice' of IT sector. 
The case is pending at the time of writing. 
6.4.1.2 Intel Corp. v Shenzhen Dongjin Technology (Shenzhen Dongjin): The 
First Case on Interoperability in the PRC40 
It was believed that a high-profile IP rights dispute between Intel and Shenzhen 
Dongjin starting from the end of 2004 was a tipping point of the lawsuit brought by 
38 According to The Resolution of the SCNPC on Strengthening the Work of Law Interpretation adopted in June 
1981 and judiciary practice since then, judicial interpretations issued by the Supreme People's Court (SPC) of the 
PRC clarify laws and legal rules and have binding force to all subsidiary courts. A judicial interpretation becomes 
part of Chinese law upon issued. 
39 See, 6.4.1.2, below. 
40 The case analyzed here is based on three articles, (1) Wang Weiwei, '2005nian zhongwai zhishichanquan diyizhan 
daxiang' (The Sino-Foreign First War on IP Rights in 2005), Zhongguo Zhishichanquan Bao (China Intellectual 
Rights), 27 January 2005, (2) Ye Chengyue, 'Intel v Dongjin: A lawsuit triggered by Intel's decreased market share 
in China? ' Guo: hong Bao (Guozhong Daily) (Beijing 26 January 2005) and, (3) Shi Qiushi, 'Intel claimed a 
$7,960,000 compensation, Chinese hi-tech companies need anti-monopoly law' China Hi-Tech Newsletter (Beijing 
25 January 2005). No case citation is available at the time of writing. 
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Beijing Dongjin towards Intel in 2006.41 On 22°d December 2004, Intel brought a 
lawsuit against Shenzhen Dongjin to Shenzhen Intermediate People's Court for the 
infringement of its IP rights. Intel claimed for damages amounting to USD 7,960,000, 
which was equal to the whole assets value of Shenzhen Dongjin. The hearing 
commenced on 23`d March 2005 and since then attracted a high level of publicity and 
interest in the PRC, and was thus referred to as `the top IP rights news and disputes of 
2005'42 
In this case, Intel claimed that a series of `NADK' software developed by Dongjin for 
its DN series products since 2002 infringed Intel's copyrights of SR5.1.1 software - 
the driver and application programme development package for Intel Dialogic Board 
products. 
Dongjin claimed it owned IP rights towards its independently developed DN series 
products (a series of analog voice processing boards, which compete directly with Intel 
Dialogic Board products), and the bundled NADK software. Dongjin did not illegal 
`copy' Intel's SR5.1.1 software but used some interface information since the 
information was vital for developing DN series products. Similar to Intel's SR5.1.1, 
NADK was the driver and application programme development package for DN series. 
Since the interface information enabled NADK compatible with SR5.1.1 and thus 
allowed customers of Intel Dialogics Board to choose Dongj in DN series products and 
could still use application programme developed via SR5.1.1 without any alteration 
and upgrading. 
Dongjin's lawyers further commented that Intel's accusation abused its IP right, took 
advantages of China's lack of competition law system, restricted competition, limited 
technology development, and attempted to eliminate competitors in the market of 
41 Shenzhen Dongjin Technology (Shenzhen Dongjin) is the parent company of Beijing Dongjin Xinda Technology 
Co. Ltd (Beijing Dongjin). See, 6.4.1.1, above. 
42 -, '2005nian Zhongguo zhishichanquan shida xinwen' (Top 10 IP Rights News of China in 2005), Zhongguo 
Zhishichanquan Bao (China Intellectual Rights), 9 January 2006, available at: 
<http: //www. sipo. gov. ca/sipo/xwdt/mtjj/2006/200601/t20060109 72841. htm>. 
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computer telephony integration (CTI) technology, where Intel's dominant position was 
challenged by rapidly increased market share of DN series products since 2002. 
Shenzhen Dongjin also disclosed that although the sales value of DN series was less 
than Intel Dialogic Board, since the price of DN series was only one third of the price 
of Intel Dialogic Board, the sales volume of DN series already exceeded Intel Dialogic 
Board. In June 2005, the second hearing was held in Shenzhen. The focus of the 
dispute was firstly on technology assessment and identification, and secondly, on 
whether interface information should be protected by IP laws. No outcome was 
reached. 
In February 2006, an expert testimony was held in Beijing. The main findings were: 
NADK software incorporated some contents from the head file of SR5.1.1; The head 
file of SR5.1.1 included interface information; The nature of the incorporated 
information of SR5.1.1 in NADK further depends on the original programme; If 
Dongjin seeks interoperability (compatibility) between NADK and SR5.1.1, and 
following application programme developed by customers of Intel Dialogic Board via 
SR5.1.1, without other options, Dongjin has to use the identified interface information 
without alteration. 
The case is pending at the time of writing. 
6.4.2 Sichuan Dexian v Sony: Leverage Effect and Bundling of Consumables in 
Aftermarket43 
In November 2004, Sichuan Dexian brought unfair competition proceedings against 
Sony. On 29 June 2006, the first hearing was held in Shanghai First Intermediate 
People's Court. 
43 Shchuan Dexian Technologies Co. Ltd. (Sichuan Dexian) v Shanghai Sony Guangdian Electronics & Sony Corp. 
(Sony). Shanghai Sony Guangdai Electronics is a Joint Venture between Song Corp. and Shanghai Guangdai Group. 
The case facts are based on articles: (1) Zhihong Hou, 'Sichuan Dexian sued Sony in Shanghai for monopolizing 
behaviour' Zhongguo Zhengquan Bao (China Securities Daily) (Beijing, 30 June 2006) (2) Dengfeng Yan and 
others, 'Sony answered the accusation by explaining the necessity to protect its customers' Meiri Jengji Xiwen 
(Daily Economic News) (Beijing, 18 January 2005). 
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Sichuan Dexian is a lithium batteries manufacturer. It claimed that Sony applied 
intelligent recognizing technique to Sony digital cameras and camcorders and the 
bundled batteries. Since batteries of other brands cannot be used in Sony digital 
products without decoding, consumers of Sony digital products are thus locked with 
Sony batteries. Sichuan Dexian also claimed that the monopolizing behaviour of Sony 
was illegal since Sony abused its market dominant position, sought monopolist 
interests, set up technological barrier, and thus eliminated competition from batteries 
products of Sichuan Dexian. 
Sichuan Dexian further claimed that the price differences between Sony lithium 
batteries and other branded lithium batteries are as significant as two to three times. 
For example, the current retailing market price for a Sony NP-FP90 lithium battery is 
RMB 890, but the price for a similar product of Sichuan Dexian is only RMB 283, 
which can be used in Sony digital products after decoding the products' built-in 
intelligent recognizing techniques. Since the average life circle for a lithium battery is 
one to two years, the market is a huge one. Considering the current price/quality ratio, 
Chinese domestic lithium battery products is better than Sony's. The technological 
barriers set by Sony therefore impeded consumers and Chinese lithium battery market. 
Except Sony's digital products, Sichuan Dexian's batteries can be used in Panasonic 
and JVC products. In addition, Sony set up these technical barriers only in China 
without similar arrangement in other countries. Sichuan Dexian further claimed that in 
order to decode Sony's intelligent recognizing system, it spent more than RMB 2m 
already, which has increased per battery cost RMB 40-50. 
Sony's main point of pleading was that the arrangement was for safety reasons and 
thus was necessary in order to protect its customers since Sony had received several 
reports from it costumers that their digital products were damaged by non-Sony 
batteries. Sony thus chose the arrangement in order to protect its costumers form more 
product damages and potential physical injuries by non-Sony batteries. 
The case is pending at the time of writing. 
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6.4.3 Comments 
When commenting competition and competition law in the new economy, Peritz 
observes that regulators and scholars both recognize that innovation in many sectors of 
the new economy has a tendency to result in a new sort of monopoly, one that could 
lock consumers in even if better substitutes are available. Such recognition that 
innovation can both `unseat monopoly and enthrone it led to closer scrutiny of 
competition in high technology markets'. The remaining challenging question is, 
submitted by Peritz, that how agencies and courts would apply old statutes and `adapt 
twentieth-century economics to the new economy of the twenty-first century'. 44 
A series of significant legal and economic questions implied by the above-discussed 
three cases have given rise to analytical, administrative and judiciary difficulties in 
Chinese competition law and policy at the present and in the near future: What must 
the authorities identify as regards competitive effects before a dominant undertaking's 
behaviour could be defined as anti-competitive and thus illegal under the AML? 
Questions generated by the deputes between Intel and Dongjin are as below. First of 
all, what is the appropriate market definition in the disputes? Is analog voice 
processing board and the bundled driver and application programme development 
package on product or two? Secondly, if it is integrated one product, do consumers and 
competitors have rights to disintegrate the product without infringing the producers' 
IPRs? Thirdly, did Intel hold a dominant position in the market of CTI (computer- 
telephony integration) technology, and in these two cases, in the market of analog 
voice processing boards (and the driver and application programme development 
software) in Mainland China, or any part of it, or elsewhere? Fourthly, whether 
interface software should be protected by IP laws? If the answer is negative, under 
44 Rudolph JR Peritz, Competition Policy in America, History, Rhetoric, Law (revised edn Oxford University Press, 
Oxford 2000) 311. 
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what conditions dominant undertakings will have obligations to supply the information 
to competitors? In the EC, the manner of exercise of IP rights must be `legitimate' and 
not a manifest attempt to frustrate competition. Meanwhile, the settled EC case law has 
established strict criteria for mandatory licensing under Article 82.45 For example, in 
Magill, the ECJ stressed that because the exclusive right of reproduction formed part 
of an author's copyright, a refusal to grant a licence by an undertaking holding a 
dominant position would not in itself constitute an abuse. It could, however, do so in 
`exceptional circumstances'. The ECJ held that a refusal to grant a licence to reproduce 
materials will infringe the competition rules only where the owner of the copyright 
holds a `dominant position'. The ECJ further stressed that the exercise of IPRs would 
be reviewed under Article 82 EC only in `exceptional circumstance'. This is to say, the 
norm under the EC competition is that a refusal to license does not constitute an abuse 
of a dominant position. The `exceptional circumstances' in Magill were that the refusal 
prevented the appearance of a new product and there were demand for such new 
product. Although the EC case-law provides narrowed analytical steps, one question 
raised from the Magill case is that it might be difficult to establish if an undertaking 
seeking a licence from another is aiming to offer an identical or different product or 
service from that offered by the IP right holder. 46 Therefore, where could China strike 
a fine balance between IPRs protection and competition policy? Is there any possibility 
to establish criteria as legal basis on which mandatory licensing of IPRs can be 
required under the AML? The Fifth question is did Intel abuse its dominant position by 
refusing to supply interface information to its competitors? Similar to some substantial 
aspects of Microsoft Corp. v Commission in the EC, whether the interface information 
held by Intel was truly indispensable for Dongjin? If yes, whether the legitimate 
interest of Intel in protecting its valuable intellectual property rights might objectively 
justify the refusal? Is there any need to take into consideration of the value of the 
investment involved in developing Intel Dialogic Board and SRS. 1.1, and the value 
" See Case No COMP/37.792 Microsoft of 24 March 2004; Joined Cases C-241/91 P and C-242/P Magill; Case C- 
418/01 IMSHealth. 
'Alison Jones and Brenda Sufrin, EC Competition Law: Text, Cases, and Materials (2"1 end Oxford University 
Press, Oxford 2004) 763-769; and, David Aitman and Alison Jones, `Competition Law and Copyright: Has the 
Copyright Owner Lost the Ability to Control his Copyright? (2004) European Intellectual Property Review 137-147. 
181 
that would be transferred to rivals by disclosure? 47 Finally, did Intel abuse its dominant 
position by setting compulsory obligations to prohibit disintegration of the driver and 
application programme development package (SRS. 1.1) with the main product (Intel 
Dialogic Board) but allow users to modify or develop SR5.1.1 for its own needs? 
Questions raised by Sichuan Dexian v Sony are also difficult to answer. Did Sony hold 
a dominant market position in the market(s) for digital cameras and/or camcorders in 
Mainland China, or substantial (any) part of it, or elsewhere? Whether the primary 
market, the market(s) for digital cameras and/or camcorders is competitive? Is there a 
separate market of lithium batteries for Sony digital products? If yes, did Sony hold a 
dominant market position in that `aftermarket'? Whether competition in the market of 
batteries for digital products increasingly takes place at the time of the original digital 
products sale? What are the possibility and the exact cost for consumers of Sony 
digital cameras and/or camcorders to switch to batteries of other producers? Is it 
possible for consumers to switch to another digital cameras and/or camcorders and 
thus avoid the higher price of consumables, namely, Sony lithium batteries? How 
much is life cycle cost for a digital camera or camcorder and the requested batteries? 
Furthermore, whether there is sufficient information available to consumers in order to 
carry out such a `life cycle cost' calculation? Did Sony abuse its dominant position in 
the market of digital cameras and/or camcorders, and/or the market of requested 
lithium batteries (if there is a defined separate market) by its behaviour of setting 
technological barriers in order to reserve the market and to exclude competitors? Did 
Sony's technological barriers setting behaviour likely to have a market distorting 
foreclosure effect? Did the pricing of Sony's lithium batteries excessive and thus has 
an exploitative effect? Is there any objectively justified reason for Sony's behaviour? 
Who should conduct the assessment towards Sony's counterclaim based on the reason 
of safety? In the EC, decisional practice of the Commission and settled case law of the 
Courts have clarified that it is not the task of a dominant undertaking to take its own 
47 Case T-210/04 R, Microsoft Corporation v Commission. 
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initiative to `eliminate products which it regards, rightly or wrongly, as dangerous or 
inferior to its own products. '48 
6.5 Concluding Remarks 
First of all, lack of a systematic competition law as a legal basis for China to regulate 
anti-competitive behaviour and structures has caused more concerns in areas of abuse 
of dominance and restrictive agreements than in merger control regime. The latter, 
although far from optimal, is currently regulated by numerous sectoral and specific 
laws, regulations and rules. Comments by two officials of the Anti-monopoly 
Investigation Office (AMIO) of the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) demonstrated 
how difficult it is for anti-monopoly investigation and litigation to be conducted in 
China without the AML. In an interview regarding the case Sichuan Dexian v Sony, 
two officials of the MOFCOM disclosed that since the proposed AML has not yet been 
enacted, there was no formal procedure for the AMIO to follow. What situation can 
trigger an anti-monopoly investigation is uncertain such as whether an investigation 
can start after a complaint or the AMID can take its own initiative are all uncertain at 
the moment. Also there are obvious difficulties to define monopolist behaviour or 
abuse of dominance as the substantial law is also lacking detailed guidance. Legal 
scholars and practitioners further expressed their concerns on the undesirable position 
of Dongjin and Sichuan Dexian of challenging multinationals' possible anti- 
competitive behaviour without a clear legal basis to rely on. Both the officials and the 
scholars supported the necessity and timeliness for enacting the proposed AML 49 
Secondly, any abuse of dominant market position under the AML could be defined and 
assessed only after a very close and careful scrutiny of the factual, economic, and legal 
context, and based on a case-by-case analysis. There is no exception for the PRC. 
48 See Case 1-30/89, Hilt! v Commission [1991] EC 11-1439, [1992] 4 CMLR 16, and, DG Competition discussion 
paper on the application of Article 82 of EC, 60. 
49 The facts of this paragraph is based on an article by Xiouzhong Li, `Sony's technological barrier suspected for 
monopolizing' Diyi CaiyingRibo (The First Financial & Economy Daily) (Beijing, 17 January 2005). 
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However, the task is a particularly demanding one. Technical assistance from 
advanced competition law jurisdictions and thorough comparative research and precise 
translation are urgently required for China to establish an administrable approach on 
area of abuse of dominance. Furthermore, future published guidance and notices are a 
must in order to clarify uncertainties under the framework of the AML. 
Thirdly, the above-discussed three pending cases demonstrated that behaviour of 
undertakings of (possible) dominant position is the best incentive which attracts new 
entries. The long term market tends to be competitive, at least in theory, and there is no 
exception in Mainland China. When and how should competition law to be referred to 
is a tough question, which is even tougher for Mainland China. Sound competition 
policy is a moving target, as former Deputy US Attorney General William Baxter 
suggested that competition policy should be `based on whatever it is we know at any 
particular moment about the economics of industrial organization'. So the laws have to 
be adapted through reinterpretation and revision according to economic theory, market 
fact, and technology development. 
Finally, would the current EC modernization of Article 82 offer any relevant 
experience to the PRC? Any lessons could learn from comparative research into East 
Asian competition laws? How to identify the implications of the current form based 
and the possible effect based approaches to the business, the officials, and customers 
both in the EC and in the PRC. Would an effect-based approach be more desirable than 
a form based approach but also realistic? For example, a cost-based assessment with a 
premise that only conduct which would exclude an 'as efficient competition' may be 
more administrable in Chinese context. Could there be any possible defences based on 
objective justifications such as the efficiency defence available to parties? Finally, 
what obstacles China needs to overcome in order to establish a transparent and 
workable approach in abuse of dominance cases in particular, and in all areas of 
competition law in general are waiting to be addressed. 
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7 
Merger Control 
This chapter focuses on the Chinese merger control law developments and presents it 
in the broader context of the PRC regulatory reform in the post-1990s. It reviews the 
current legal and regulatory framework based on the M&A Rules and assesses 
procedural and substantial rules under the AML. The primary purpose of this chapter is 
to observe tensions in modern merger analysis in the Chinese context. This writer 
proposes a patient but dynamic approach when observing the interface between merger 
control law and industry policy and the ongoing rivalry between reformists, 
protectionists and techno-nationalists in China. 
7.1 Background 
7.1.1 The Accelerating Industry Consolidations: Political Signals and Market 
Climate 
As a strategy to acquire managerial and technical talents, to acquire economies of scale 
and scope, and to increase market share, cross-border and purely domestic M&A have 
become widespread in China over the years. The years 2006 and 2007 have particular 
significance in the Chinese M&A regulatory history. Five-year plans and annual 
government work reports are among the most important official documents that set 
forth guiding principles and main tasks for the PRC, and thus dictate its economical, 
political and social developments. ' Messages from the 2006 Government Work Report 
(the Government Report) and the 11th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and 
Social Development (2006-2010) (the 11th Five-Year Plan) provided indicators of 
accelerating industry consolidations and therefore have substantial impacts on M&A 
' China's economic system was modeled on the Soviet Russian centrally planned economy. Under such a system, 
the Central Government released the State Plan, namely, the Five-Year Plan, as the goals and directions of the 
country's economic development. After adopting a socialist market economy, the Five-Year Plan only provides 
macroscopic development goals and policies for national economic and social developments. 
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regulations and landscapes? 
The Government Report emphasized that reforming and restructuring state-owned 
enterprises (SOE) and upgrading industry are pressing tasks for China. In order to 
complete these tasks, the government will apply economic, legal and administrative 
measures and take full advantage of the market mechanism. 3 The Government Report 
declared that the tasks have wide implications and involve policy considerations. This 
document further indicated that, to encourage concentrations and to facilitate domestic 
enterprises growing stronger, the government will close down enterprises in capacity 
surplus sectors, control further expansion of production capacity, and support M&A, 
joint ventures and other cooperative agreements between enterprises. Furthermore, the 
government will continue to promote the open-up policy and to support domestic 
enterprises competing globally and using foreign capitals effectively. 
To supplement the Government Report, the State Council published an `Interpretation' 
and went further by declaring that the government will encourage cross-region and 
cross-sector concentrations by flagship corporations. The Interpretation illustrated the 
fragmented domestic market by referring to the steel, cement, chemicals, coal, 
electricity, motor vehicle, and textile sectors since these sectors have been troubled by 
inferior technology, out-of-date management system and capacity surplus. The 
Interpretation declared that the PRC will have several large combinations in the steel 
sector, each with an annual capacity of over 30m tons during the peoriod of the 11th 
Five-Year Plan. The document further indicated that the government will balance 
absorbing FDI with improved competitiveness of domestic enterprises. It particularly 
emphasized that M&A should be an important approach and should become a new 
2 The two documents were approved by the 4d' Session of the 10'" NPC in March 2006. English version of the 2006 
Government Work Report is available at: <httpJ/english. gov. cWofficiaV2006-03/14/content-227248. htm>. No 
official English version of the I1'" Five-Year Plan is available but its outlines (in English) can be viewed at 
<http: //english. gov. cn/2006-03/23/content_234832. htm>. 
3 Sections 2 and 3 of Part I and Sections 3 and 6 of Part II of the Government Report. 
4 See The Interpretation of the 2006 Government Work Report issued by the Research Office of the State Council 
(the Interpretation) in March 2006. No official English version of the interpretation is available. 
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focus of absorbing FDI. The government will actively promote cross-border M&A to 
reorganize SOE and SOA. Banking, insurance, securities, and distribution sectors will 
gradually open to WFOE or those with controlling interests by foreign investors. 
Parties will be permitted to evaluate assets and to decide transaction values conforming 
to the accepted international practice and market principles. Furthermore, to improve 
the current regulatory framework, the government will simplify and formulize 
administrative approval procedure and increase transparency. The PRC will continue to 
establish systematic competition policy and to improve regulatory framework on 
reviewing M&A and other competitive activities in order to prohibit monopolizing 
behaviour and unfair competition. The 11ý' Five-Year Plan emphasized and explained 
the above-mentioned missions in great detail. 5 Therefore, one can reasonably predict 
that the sustained M&A waves after 1990s, often supported by Chinese government, 
will continue in the next decade or so. 
Ambitious Chinese officials and entrepreneurs have acted swiftly according to the 
spirit of the 2006 Government Work Report and the 11th Five-Year Plan. Several high- 
profile M&A deals have gained widespread media coverage since then. The powerful 
consolidation trend in the Chinese market started from major initiatives of the central 
and local governments. Just before the 4th Session of the 10th NPC, the State Council 
issued Several Opinions on Accelerating Developments in the Equipment 
Manufacturing Sector. 6 In March 2006, the State Council issued the Circular on 
Accelerating Restructure of Capacity Surplus Sectors.? Both documents specifically 
emphasized M&A and stated that the government will support successful enterprises 
and close down loss-makers. 
Since April 2006, the NDRC and other seven ministerial-level agencies have led a 
structural reform in the cement sector. The NDRC stated that the central government 
See chs 1,3,4,8 and 9 of the 116 Five Year Plan `Guiding Principles and Development Objectives', 'Optimizing 
and Upgrading Industrial Structure', `Accelerating Developments in Service Sectors', 'Furthering Institutional 
Reform' and 'Implementing a Mutually Beneficial Open-up Strategy'. 
6 Guo Fa [2006] No. 8. 
Guo Fa [2006] No. 11. 
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aimed, by 2010, the capacity of the cement sector will reach 1.25 billion tons per year 
and the numbers of cement producers will be reduced from the current 5,100 to 3,500. 
To achieve this objective, the government will close down many small cement 
producers or merge them with larger ones. Furthermore, the central government will 
choose ten cement producers and will support these `national champions' to compete 
globally through measures such as M&A, project approving, planning permission and 
acquiring finance. The central government will further allocate other 30 cement 
producers to be support by relevant local governments. 8 
In July 2006, the Shangdong SASAC announced its plan to merge China's seventh 
largest steel company, Laiwu, with the sixth-placed Jinan. The two SOEs are both 
located in Shandong province. The transaction was expected to create the second- 
largest domestic steelmaker with a post-merger annual capacity of 20.76m tons just 
behind Baosteel in Shanghai, which has an annual capacity of 22.73m tons. Shangdong 
SASAC officials stated the post-merger Laiwu and Jinan will eventually meet the 
central government's 30m tons target set up for each national champion in the steel 
sector. 9 
In August 2006, the M&A Rules, which replaced the Interim M&A Rules, were issued. 
The latter had been in force since 2003.10 In June 2006, June and August 2007, the 
long-awaited proposed AML was read the three times at the 10`h SCNPC 
Considering the above-mentioned pro concentration signals from Beijing and from the 
Chinese market, it seems M&A is and will continue to be a major propeller of China's 
economic restructuring process. Statistics was also encouraging. According to 
PricewaterhouseCoopers and M&A Asia, there were USD 46 billion of inbound and 
a Ji Fagai Yunxing [2006] No. 609, 'Several Opinions on Accelerating Structural Reform of Cement Sector', issued 
by the SDRC, MOF, MOC (Ministry of Construction), MOFCOM, etc. in April 2006. 
9 Shanghai Zhengquan Bao (Shanghai Securities), `Shangdong yu zhenghe jigang laigang, mouhua guonei zuida 
gantie hebing jlua' (Shangdong is planning the biggest merger in the steel sector), 28 July 2006, available at: 
<http: //gdtb. mofcom. gov. cn/aarticle/shangwxw/zonghsw/200607/20060702744467. html>. 
10 See discussion in 7.2.2, below. 
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domestic M&A transactions in 2005, up 34% from 2004, outbound deals accounted for 
another $7 billion. Furthermore, an estimated 4,000 to 5,000 SOE are privatized each 
year out of a total remaining stock of roughly 135,000.11 One could reasonably 
conclude that the major task of Chinese merger control law is to set up a fundamental 
pillar of a comprehensive competition code and should not function as an undue 
instrument to deter M&A. However, non-economic factors also impact the Chinese 
merger control law and M&A in China can be intensively political. 
7.1.2 National (Economic) Security v Foreign Control 
7.1.2.1 The Growing Sentiments of Protectionism 
A May 2004 report entitled `The Competition-restrictive Behaviour of Multinational 
Companies in China and the Counter Measures' has fueled nationwide opposition 
towards MNC. The report, issued by the Fair Trading Bureau of the State 
Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC), was based on a one-year research 
project. In this report, markets of camera films, cameras, aseptic packaging, software, 
soft drinks, tyres, mobile phones, retailing, etc. were mentioned as examples of MNC 
monopolies in the Chinese market. 
The report stated, for example, in the camera film market, Eastman Kodak, Fuji, and 
Konica collectively have a market share above 80%, among which Eastman Kodak has 
a share of more than 50%. The only domestic brand is Lucky Film, which has a share 
of only 15%. In October 2003, Eastman Kodak further strengthened its dominant 
position by acquiring 20% share of Lucky Film at a price of USD 450 million, a 
product line and certain know-how. This transaction also increased suspicion of the 
possibility of a price cartel or other collusions between Kodak and Lucky Film. In 
markets of aseptic packaging and operating system software, Tetra Pak and Microsoft 
are two quasi-monopolists, each with a market share above 95%. The market for 
supporting software is also dominated by MNC. 12 Replying these criticisms, the 
These data were quoted in Tyrrell Levine and Kim Woodard, `The New Face of Chinese M&A' (2006) April Issue 
Far Eastern Economic Review. 
12 The Fair Trading Office of the SAIC, 'Zaihua kuaguo gongsi xianzhi jingzheng xingwei biaoxian ji duice' 
(Restrictive Behaviour of Multinational Corporations in China and Counter Measures) (2005) May Issue Journal of 
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involved MNC defended themselves and claimed they were innocent, were not 
monopolizing market but doing business by good practice and normal competitive 
conduct. 13 Trenchant comments also came from outside China. For example, Williams 
criticized that, `the SAIC does not really understand the nature of market 
competition. ' 14 
However, the influence of this report appears lingering with support from many slanted 
articles on MNC that helped to embellish the story. Headlines such as `M&A waves 
leading by international crocodiles', `malicious M&A by foreign private equities and 
investment banks', `monopolizing M&A threatening national security' have since then 
appeared in leading newspapers and websites. One could almost hear the collective 
gnashing of teeth in China. ls 
During the 4`h Session of the 10th NPC in March 2006, criticism towards M&A by 
foreign investors rose to its zenith and produced the strongest reaction in recent years. 
A motion moved by All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce (ACFIC) 
suggested that the central government should establish a national economic security 
system. The ACFIC report stated that cross-border M&A was a significant 
phenomenon of a globalized era, and was a necessary path for enterprises and 
countries to integrate into the global markets. However, when MNC increased their 
market shares and dominated domestic markets, national economy was always 
encroached and economic security threatened. The ACFIC motion suggested the 
proposed AML should be enacted as soon as possible and meanwhile the PRC should 
establish a national economic security system. 
Administration of Industry and Commerce; Xinwen Chengbao (Morning News), `Guojia gongshangzongju baogao: 
Kuaguo jutou zaihua jianxian longduan taishi'(Report by the SAIC: Multinational giants to show signs of monopoly 
in the Chinese market step by step) 15 November 2004, <http: //news. xinhuanet. com/fortune/2004- 
11/15/content 2221465. htm>; Lin Hua, `Kuaguo gongsi zhengde zai gao longduan ma? '(Are multinationals really 
monopolizing the market? ) (2005) 1 MOFCOM: Zongguo Waizi (Foreign Investment in China). 
13 See ch 6, above for more detailed analysis on this report. 
14 Mark Williams, Competition Policy and Law in China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge 2005) 213-214. 
"The term `crocodiles' refer to certain hedge funds that were perceived to damage Asian currencies and cause 
regional financial crisis in 1997. 
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Similar comments were also made by other top officials. Premier Wen Jiabao stated 
that, in the process of further integrating China into the world market, the country must 
pay particular attention to economic security. In his report, Ma Kai, Chairman of the 
NDRC, stated that in order to protect Chinese industries, the government should guide 
foreign investment to certain industries and regions, and improve and standardize 
policies related to takeovers. Li Deshui, Chief Commissioner of the National Bureau of 
Statistics (NBS), claimed that there should be stringent measures to regulate and 
punish hostile takeovers by foreign investors that target promising domestic companies 
and aim to monopolize the Chinese market. When explaining the proposed AML 
during the session, Cao Kangtai, director of the Legislative Affairs Office of the State 
Council (LAOSC), stated that, `With frequent M&A and restructuring activities by 
foreign investors, monopolies are emerging in some areas and in certain industries. 
This is why an anti-monopoly law is essential. '16 
The warfare towards M&A by foreign investors is by no means unique to China. Even 
Chinese officials' mixed attitudes with a certain degree of self-contradiction are 
understandable. Officials have been reluctant to risk themselves to negative political 
repercussions from selling national industries to foreigners. 17 
7.1.2.2 Triggering Factors 
7.1.2.2.1 Failed Outbound Acquisitions by Chinese Enterprises 
A chain of events has contributed to the current situation. One of the major tipping 
points was resentment over a failed USD 18 billion bid by China National Offshore Oil 
Co. (CNOOC), a giant SOE, for a California-based petroleum producer Unocal in 
2005. The deal would have been the biggest Chinese outbound acquisition but it 
collapsed mainly because of the rejection by the US Congress based on concerns of 
16 Information of this paragraph is based on a series of archives and documents of the 4O'Session of the 10th NPC. 
Some of them are available at dhttpJhvww. npc. gov. cn/dbdh/home/index. jsp? hyid=011004 >, (in Chinese). 
17 David J Gerber, Law and Competition in Twentieth Century Europe: Protecting Prometheus (1" paperback edn 
Oxford University Press, Oxford 2001), 179-80. 
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`energy security'. CNOOC's rival US bidder Chevron eventually won. In a statement 
made by CNOOC in August 2005, the company expressed its regret to withdraw the 
bid due to `unreasonable political obstacles' from the USA. 18 This episode has caused 
strong backlash in China since then. In early 2007, Mr Fu Chengyu, chairman of 
CNOOC, claimed that protectionism in US-led developed countries has spread 
worldwide. 19 
Information asymmetry in the process of China International Marine Containers 
(CIMC) attempt to acquire BURG Group 20 has generated suspicion about the 
impartiality of the EC merger control regime among Chinese. 
21 Furthermore, a 
protectionist backlash in response to the US and EU anti-dumping and other trade 
remedied against low-cost Chinese exports have damaged the trade relations. 
22 
7.1.2.2.2 Disappearing Chinese Brands and State-owned Assets 
A series of M&A (closed or proposed) by foreign investors have further contributed to 
concerns in China relating to the impact of M&A on Chinese brands. These 
transactions include Morgan Stanley and others to acquire Nanfu Battery, Kodak to 
acquire Lucky Film, Carlyle to acquire Xugong, Caterpillar Group to acquire Xiagong, 
Schaeffler Group to acquire whole control of Luoyang Bearing Group, and Johnson 
and Johnson to acquire DaBao, etc. 
'" China Enterprise Confederation & China Enterprises Directors Association (CEC-CEDA), `Zhonghaiyou chexiao 
shougou Unocal' (CNOOC to withdrew takeover bid for Unocal), 2 August 2005, <httpYAvww. cec- 
ceda. org. cn/channel/qydg/conterits/1064. html>. 
19 Tom Mitchell and Robin Kwong, `CNOOC chief decries spread of protectionism' Financial Times (London 30 
March 2007). 
20 Case COMP/M. 4009, CIMC/BURG. The proposed transaction was notified to the EC Commission in February 
2006 and entered the Phase I and then the Phase II investigation. The inquiry was closed in July 2006 after CIMC 
abandoned its plan to acquire BURG See European Commission (2006), 'Mergers: Commission closes inquiry after 
China International Marine Containers abandons acquisition of control over the Burg Group', 
<http: //europa. eulrapid/pressReleasesAction. do? reference=IP/0611062>. 
21 Negative comments on the outcome of CIMCBURG appeared in domestic media, such as, Huang Hai and others, 
'Zhongji jituan shougou Helan BURG shouzu, mianlin Oumeng fanlunduan diaocha' (CIMC to acquire BURG is 
under antitrust attack from the EC Commission) Diyi Caking Ribao (China CBN) (Beijing, 15 March 2006), and, 
Zou Yu and others, 'Zhongji shougou zao Oumeng fanlongduan diaochao, buduideng shangye bilei xianxian' 
(CIMC to acquire BURG: unequal business barrier is emerging) 21 Shyi Jingji Baodao (21°` Century Business 
Herald) (Beijing, 16 March 2006). 
u Raphael Minder & Andrew Yeh, 'Beijing warns EU over duty on shoes' Financial Times (London, 10 March 
2006). 
192 
An abandoned transaction has also been the focus of media and the public attention. In 
July 2006, a USD 600m deal which would have granted CVC Asia Pacific, a 
Citigroup-backed private equity fund, a 30 per cent stake in Shangdong Chenming 
Paper (Chenming), was withdrawn. Chenming is a listed top paper maker in China. 
Although CVC stated that the collapse was not because of government opposition or 
regulatory obstacle, 23 Chinese analysts claimed that, the more probably reason was that 
if successful, the transaction would enable CVC to become Chenming's controlling 
shareholder by increasing its share to 45 per cent in a short time. The implication was 
that foreigners would control this `top one'. The current controlling shareholder of 
Chenming is Shouguang SASAC, the local bureau of the SASAC in Shangdong 
province. 4 In fact, since late 2005, almost every sector can be linked with `national 
security' or `national economic security' in the hands of anti-foreign 'red guards'. 
7.1.2.3 The ACFIC Motion to Establish a National Economic Security System 
Suppose a national (economic) security system is imperative for China, the tougher job 
followed is how to design such a system, how to clarify its relationship with 
competition law, and how to manage the interface subsequently. 
The ACFIC submitted four key points in its Motion to Establish National Economic 
Security System, which included: (1) The NPC should set up a research institution on 
economic security legislation and a panel to responsible for drafting laws on economic 
security. The proposed AML should be enacted as soon as possible. Meanwhile, the 
SC should implement interim provisions on economic security prior to the enactment 
of the economic security law and the AML in order to regulate the current situation. (2) 
The SC should set up a National Economic Security Review Commission, which 
should be authorized to review investment and operational actions involving economic 
23 More Dickie, `CVC says "China did not scupper deaf" Financial Times (London, 1 August 2006). 
24 Kang Shuwei, `Tanpan wuguo, CVC wuyuan G Chenming kongzhiquan' (Negotiation without outcome, CVC has 
no chance to control G Chenming) Zhongguo Zhengquan Bao (China Securities Journal) (Beijing, 30 July 2006), 
<http: /Avww. cs. com. calssgs/021200607/t2OO6O730-970195. htm>. 
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security concerns. Furthermore, relevant ministries, commissions and other regulators, 
such as the NDRC and the People's Bank, should also establish economic security 
review organisations respectively. These organisations should review related issues fall 
within their remit and should coordinate with the National Economic Security Review 
Commission. (3) Establishing a China oversea investment security system. (4) 
Imposing mandatory provisions to regulate M&A activities of investment banks and 
other financial institutions. When M&A involves Chinese enterprises, the parties must 
also employ Chinese professional service agencies to take part in the transaction. 25 
7.1.2.4 Criticism 
This writer's opinion is that the ACFIC suggested key points are problematic because 
a potentially powerful, discretionary, overlapping, and decentralized national 
economic security system may do more harm than good. Furthermore, the current 
regulatory environment may become tougher accordingly. 
First, the ACFIC avoided defining the term of 'national economic security' or was 
unable to define it, which, however, has triggered controversies and will continue to 
cause disputes in the future. Furthermore, a logical presumption from the first key 
point is that the law on national economic security and the proposed AML are 
categorized as basic laws (at the same hierarchal level) and will both deal with 
economic security issue. This writer is not arguing that `national (economic) security' 
is of no significance and competition law is controlled exclusively by economic 
efficiencies. As discussed in Chapter 3, above, this writer agrees with the view that the 
direct objectives of competition include protecting competitive process, promoting 
economic efficiency, and maximizing consumer welfare. On the other hand, depending 
on each jurisdiction's stage of development and ideologist choices, the ultimate 
objectives of competition law are more diversified that may include commitments to 
fairness, market integration, democratic process and free enterprise, etc, 26 However, as 
u China Enterprise Confederation & China Enterprises Directors Association (CEC-CEDA) (n 18). 
26 See discussion at 3.3 above. 
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observed by Robert Pitofsky in 1979, a non-economic dimension to competition law 
`should be as specific as possible about those concerns' that would be included in `an 
enforcement equation. '27 
Is the recent Chinese campaign on national (economic) security issues of M&A by 
foreigners substantially different with issues that have arisen over the years in other 
jurisdictions? The answer should be no. From what have discussed above, the national 
(economic) security concern in China is a mixture of legitimate interest of national 
security and of divergent interests of populism and protectionism in disguise. This 
writer's observation is that competition review of M&A based on such diverging 
interests could mean that the AML may provide a basis for discrimination and 
protectionism rather than a tool to protect competition. In certain case, such a 
mechanism may violate China's WTO accession commitment, result in backlash in 
other countries, and by no means be rewarding to the competitiveness of Chinese 
business and industry. Furthermore, these diverged interests have indicated a strong 
tendency for Chinese competition law and policy to become another heavy hand of 
government intervention into marketplace. Such a tendency returns the current analysis 
to a generic question of objectives of competition law and policy, which will not be 
further discussed here. 8 Regarding the `legitimate interest of national security', this 
writer argues that competition law is not a suitable vehicle to deal with these concerns. 
The national security issue should be tackled by mechanisms focusing on political 
concerns and different rationales and techniques. 
7.1.2.5 The CFIUS and the Exon-Florio Provision: a Model for China? 
7.1.2.5.1 Lessons from the CFIUS and the Exon-Florio Provision 
27 Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust' (1979) 127 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1051, at 
pp 1052 and 1058. 
28 See discussion in ch 3, above. 
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Bearing in mind that the PRC and the USA are under significantly different socio- 
political context, the Committee of Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) 
and the Exon-Florio provision may provide the PRC with a possible model. The PRC 
could use the rationales behind such model to deal with national security concerns 
more appropriately. 29 First, from a technical perspective, the commissionership, 
procedure, duties and powers of the US system are relevant and could be borrowed by 
the PRC. Second, as discussed at 7.1.2.3 and 7.1.2.4, above, the ACFIC motion to 
establish a national economic security system does not define what it is meant by 
`national economic security' and it seems that the only manifest consideration is that 
the take-over party is `foreign'. On the contrary, the CFIUS mechanism and the Exon- 
Florio provision provide much clearly defined factors that may be taken into account 
to determine the possible effects of a foreign acquisition on `national security'. 
Moreover, the US model is worth to be closely observed for broader policy 
considerations, including the interface between competition policy and general FDI 
policy, and between competition, employment and competitiveness, etc. The effects of 
FDI on the US economy, the legislative history, implementing experience, amendment 
efforts on the increasingly politicized Exon-Florio provision, and the USA's reaction 
towards national security implications of FDI from China from 2005 onwards could 
30 offer valuable lessons to the PRC 
7.1.2.5.2 The Exon-Florio Provision and its Implementing Mechanism 
The Exon-Florio provision is implemented within the context of open investment 
policy of the USA that grants nondiscriminatory treatment with limited exception to 
foreign investors. The rationale of the provision is not to discourage FDI generally, but 
to provide a mechanism to review and, if the President finds necessary, to restrict FDI 
29 Analysis of this section is based on information of the CFIUS, available at: 
<http: //www. ustreas. gov/of ices/inteniational-affairs/exon-florioh. 
70 For detailed examination on the CFIUS and the Exon-Florio provision, see, EM Graham and DM Marchick, US 
National Security and Foreign Direct Investment (Institute for International Economics, Washington DC, 2006). 
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that threatens the national security. 31 The Exon-Florio provision is implemented by the 
CFIUS, an inter-agency committee chaired by the Secretary of Treasury. 
32 The CFIUS 
was originally established in 1975 mainly to monitor and evaluate the impact of 
foreign investment in the USA. In 1988, the President delegated to CFIUS his 
responsibilities to receive notices of foreign acquisitions of US companies, to 
determine whether a particular acquisition has national security issues sufficient to 
warrant an investigation and to undertake an investigation, if necessary, under the 
Exon-Florio provision. This order also provides for CFIUS to submit a report and 
recommendation to the President at the conclusion of an investigation. CFIUS seeks to 
serve U. S. investment policy through detailed reviews that protect national security 
while maintaining the credibility of open investment policy and preserving the 
confidence of foreign investors in the USA and of US investors abroad that they will 
not be subject to retaliatory discrimination. 
7.1.2.5.3 How the Egon-Florio Provision Identifies National Security Issues 
Raised from FDI: Factors to be Considered 
The Exon-Florio regulations do not define national security. The preamble to the 
regulations provides guidance that products, services and technologies important to US 
defence requirements would be significant to national security. Exon-Florio provision 
provides authority to the President to suspend or prohibit any foreign acquisition, 
merger or takeover of a US enterprise that is determined to threaten the national 
security of the United States. The President can exercise this authority to block a 
foreign acquisition of a US enterprise only if he finds: (1) there is credible evidence 
that the foreign entity exercising control might take action that threatens national 
31 Section 5021 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 amended Section 721 of the Defense 
Production Act of 1950 (also known as the `Exon-Florio provision'). 
32 Currently, the CFIUS has twelve members under the chairmanship of the Secretary of Treasury. The other eleven 
members of the CFIUS include the Secretaries of States, Defense, Commerce, and Department of Homeland 
Security, the Attorney General, the Director of the Office of management and Budget and of Science and 
Technology Policy, the U. S. Trade Representative, the Chairman of Council of Economic Advisers, the Assistant to 
the President for National Security Affairs and the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy. 
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security, and, (2) the provisions of law, other than the International Emergency 
Economic Powers Act do not provide adequate and appropriate authority to protect the 
national security. To assist in making this determination, Exon-Florio provision 
provides for the President or his designee to receive written notice of an acquisition, 
merger or takeover of a US corporation by a foreign entity. Once the CFIUS has 
received a complete notification, it begins a thorough review of the notified transaction. 
In some cases, it is necessary to undertake an extended review or investigation. An 
investigation, if necessary, must begin no later than 30 days after receipt of a notice. 
Any investigation is required to end within 45 days. 
The Exon-Florio provision lists the following factors that the President or the 
President's designee may consider in determining the effects of a foreign acquisition 
on national security. These factors are: (1) domestic production needed for projected 
national defence requirements; (2) the capability and capacity of domestic industries to 
meet national defence requirements, including the availability of human resources, 
products, technology, materials, and other supplies and services; (3) the control of 
domestic industries and commercial activity by foreign citizens as it affects the 
capability and capacity of the US to meet the requirements of national security; (4) the 
potential effects of the transaction on the sales of military goods, equipment, or 
technology to a country that supports terrorism or proliferates missile technology or 
chemical and biological weapons; and (5) the potential effects of the transaction on 
U. S. technological leadership in areas affecting US national security. The Exon-Florio 
provision also provided that the President should introduce implementing regulations. 
These regulations were issued in 1991. They set up a voluntary system of notification 
with the possibility of CFIUS member-agency notice for non-notified transactions. The 
President retains full authority to protect the national security with respect to any 
acquisition covered by this statute, regardless of whether the parties file a notification. 
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7.1.2.6 Comments 
This writer's observation is that legal standards for reviewing M&A within the realm 
of competition law, including notification thresholds and substantive appraisal tests, 
should be non-discriminationary for both purely domestic transactions and transactions 
involving foreign parties. Competition law is not a suitble vechicle to deal with 
concerns of national security or the so-called national economic security, which can 
possibly be resolved by establishing a carefully designed reviewing mechenism 
according to the reality of China and by studying experience of other jurisdictions. 
However, the long-term political pressures and the old, bankrupt ideology of 
revolution and cold war behind the slogan of national (economic) security is too 
obvious to be ignored which might, to a great extent, compromise the efficiency of any 
mechanism on this issue. Finally, a fundamental point which is always be ignored by 
policymakers and the public is that, competition and competition-related legal and 
regulatory instruments are not ends in themselves. Furthermore, competitiveness 
cannot be secured by economic nationalism and protectionism. Status quo of M&A and 
merger control in China have narrated a story of how easily for interest-diverged 
groups to abuse these instruments, no matter consciously, subconsciously, or 
unconsciously. 33 
7.2 The Current Legal and Regulatory Framework: Implications and 
Interactions 
The Chinese regulatory framework on M&A transactions was established in the 1990s. 
The concept of merger first appeared in 1986 in an experimental local regulation for 
foreign-invested enterprises. Following this document, some basic stipulations 
regarding approval procedure and transfer of equity interest were provided by local 
foreign investment regulations. The concept of merger was introduced nationally by 34 
33 It has been observed that various economic, political, and legal constraints peculiar to emerging economies then 
to impose the risk that competition policy will be abused. See Williams H. Page, 'Antitrust Review of Mergers in 
Transition Economics: A Comment, with Some Lessons from Brazil', (1998) 66 University of Cincinnati Law 
Review 1113, at 1115 -1117. 
34 Regulations of Foreign-Related Corporations in the Special Economic Zones of Guangdong Province, adopted at 
the 22°d Session of the Standing Committee of the 6d' People's Congress of Guangdong Province on 28 Sept. 1986. 
See Henry R. Zheng, China's Civil and Commercial Law (Butterworths, Singapore 1988) 340-352. 
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the Company Law in 1993. At present, anti-monopoly merger review is mainly 
governed by the M&A Rules, which interact with and other relevant investment laws 
and regulations, regulations of state-owned enterprises (SOE) and state-owned assets 
(SOA), sectoral regulations, and the Company Law and Securities Law. Analysis of the 
current framework indicates that Chinese merger control may continually focus on 
M&A by foreign investors, although the AML may change the current discriminatory 
framework. The reality is a mixture of facilitating purely domestic transactions due to 
Beijing's ambitions to create national champions and to improve the national economy, 
and of scrutinising transactions involving foreign parties under the protectionist 
pressure. Therefore, the implications are how the current framework will converge 
and/or diverge with the AML in the future. It is thus worthwhile to observe such an 
interaction and the subsequent implications for the markets. 
7.2.1 Company Law and Securities Law 2005 and the Public Takeover Measures 
200635 
Compared to competition law, company and securities law has different objectives and 
primarily focuses on the protection of shareholders' interests. However, the pre-AML 
Chinese merger control law is mainly imbedded in foreign investment and sector- 
specific regulations and the latter are interacting with Chinese company and securities 
law. 
The Company Law has a chapter to regulate corporate mergers and divisions and 
requests modification registration of such structural changes. 36 The Securities Law also 
has a chapter to regulate conduct of listed company acquisitions. 37 Promulgated 
according to the company and securities law, the Measures on the Takeover of Listed 
Companies (the Public Takeover Measures) provide detailed procedural rules and 
33 The Chinese Company Law was adopted 1993, and was amended in 1999,2004, and 2005. The Chinese 
Securities Law was adopted in 1998, and was amended in 2005. Measures on Takeovers of Listed Companies (the 
Public Takeover Measures) were issued by the CSRC in 2002, amended in May 2006, and effective as of September 
2006. 
36 Company Law 2005, ch 9. 
37 Securities Law 2005, ch 4. 
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stipulate that public takeovers involving industry policy, industry entry standards and 
SOA should obtain approval from relevant regulators prior to notify the takeover to the 
China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). Foreign investors are further 
requested to comply with relevant investment regulations. 38 These rules redirect the 
current analysis to investment and sector-specific laws and regulations, from which 
one could have a glimpse on the present Chinese merger control law. 
7.2.2 Anti-Monopoly Review of the M&A Rules 2006 and the Notification 
Guidelines 
The existing Chinese merger control law was introduced in 2003, as part of the Interim 
Provisions on Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign investors 
(the Interim M&A Rules). 39 Further revised legislation, the Provisions on Mergers and 
Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors (the M&A Rules), was 
issued in August 2006 and entered into force in September 2006.40 The M&A Rules 
provide a basic regulatory framework for M&A by foreign investors and have one 
chapter including four articles devoted to `anti-monopoly examination'. 41 
The Guidelines of Anti-Monopoly Notification for Mergers and Acquisitions of 
Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors (the Notification Guidelines) were issued 
by the Anti-Monopoly Investigation Office (the AMIO) of the MOFCOM on 8 March 
2007! 2 Modelled on the EC merger control regime and promulgated for the purpose of 
implementing the M&A Rules' merger control system, the Notification Guidelines 
provide legal certainty on several procedural issues, including important clarifications 
on the timing and content of notification, etc. 
98 Public Takeover Measures 2006, arts 4 and 89. 
39 The Interim M&A Rules 2003 were jointly issued by the MOFTEC, SAT, SAIC and SAFE. 
40 The M&A Rules 2006 were jointly issued by the MOFCOM, SASAC, SAT, SAIC, CSRC and SAFT. English 
version of the M&A Rules is available at, 
<http: /hvww. fdi. gov. cWpub/FDI EN/Laws/law en info. jsp? docid=66925>. 
41 The M&A Rules 2006, ch 5, Articles 51-54. 
42 Official text of the Notification Guidelines (in Chinese) is available at: 
<http: //tfs. mofcom. gov. cn/aarticle/bb/200704/20070404597464. html>. 
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The M&A Rules' anti-monopoly examination provisions and the Notification 
Guidelines represent a pilot project to establish an effective merger control law in the 
PRC prior to the enactment of the AML. 43 The purpose of the M&A Rules is to 
regulate M&A conduct by foreign investors and the merger control provisions and the 
Notification Guidelines are widely expected to be either replaced by or revised 
according to the AML in the near future. 44 However, signals from the second reading 
of the proposed AML may be contrary to such an expectation. The AML finally 
incorporates a provision stating that M&A of domestic undertakings by foreign 
investors should be examined according to relevant rules if the proposed transactions 
are related to national security. 45 
7.2.2.1 Legislative Base and Objectives 
The M&A Rules are promulgated according to Chinese company law, foreign 
investment laws and other relevant regulations. 46 Similar to many normative 
documents in China, the M&A Rules aim to achieve multiple objectives, including 
promoting and regulating foreign investment, ensuring employment, and protecting 
fair competition and the country's economic security. 47 These uncertain and sometimes 
conflicting objectives have caused difficulties concerning interpretation and 
implementation. For example, should the promotion of fair competition be the sole or 
primary objective of the merger control system? In the absence of a primary objective, 
how will competing interests be balanced by the regulators? As observed by 
practitioners, the M&A Rules are based on the principles of necessity and pragmatism; 
43 Compared with the Interim M&A Rules 2003, the M&A Rules 2006 have provided more certainty on the general 
procedures for approval and registration of transactions which do not trigger the anti-monopoly review system and 
have established a new mechanism of M&A through share swap. However, the M&A Rules 2006 inherited the anti- 
monopoly review system set up by the Interim M&A Rules 2003 without any substantive change. 
u Peter J Wang, 'Chinese Merger Control', in Global Competition Review (GCR), The Asia-Pacific Antitrust and 
Trade Review 2006 (Law Business Research, London 2006) 29, and, Jin Bosheng, Woguo waizi binggou zhengce 
zhubu wanshan (Steadily improved Chinese Policies on M&A by Foreign Investors), 
<http: //www. fdi. gov. cn/pub/FD I/wzyj/zcfgyj/t20061013_64882. htm>. 
45 AML, art 29. 
46 M&A Rules 2006, art 1. 
47 Ibid. 
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and legislation related to the Chinese merger control system generally conveys a 
deliberate lack of clarity, with undefined or ill-defined key concepts. Because publicly 
available and legally binding decisions are currently lacking, ample space has therefore 
been left for administrative discretion. 
7.2.2.2 Scope 
The M&A Rules regulate transactions involving foreign parties, apply to equity and 
asset M&A, and cover both onshore transactions and offshore transactions. 48 As a 
framework for foreign investors, the M&A Rules are not applicable to transactions 
between Chinese undertakings or offshore transactions by Chinese undertakings. Such 
discriminatory treatment and its implied over-inclusive scope have attracted trenchant 
criticism within and outside the PRC. 
7.2.2.2.1 Onshore Transactions 
According to the M&A Rules, onshore transactions refer to M&A of domestic 
enterprises by foreign investors. The concept includes two types of transactions, 
namely, `equity mergers and acquisitions' and `asset mergers and acquisitions'. 49 
" Equity Mergers and Acquisitions (Guquan Binggou) 
Equity mergers and acquisitions refer to (1) acquisition of equity interest of a purely 
domestic enterprise by a foreign investor and the subsequent conversion of that 
domestic enterprise into an FIE; or (2) a foreign investor's subscription to the 
increased capital of a purely domestic enterprise and the subsequent conversion of that 
domestic enterprise into an FIE. 
" Asset Mergers and Acquisitions (Zichan Binggou) 
Asset mergers and acquisitions refer to (1) a foreign investor's establishment of an FIE 
to acquire and operate the assets of a domestic enterprise; or (2) a foreign investor's 
48 M&A Rules 2006, art 2. 
49 Ibid. 
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direct acquisition of the assets of domestic enterprise and invest those assets to 
establish and operate an FIE. 
7.2.2.2.2 Offshore Transactions 
The term of `offshore mergers or acquisitions' (offshore transactions) has not been 
defined and has only been referred in the section of anti-monopoly review of the M&A 
Rules 50 How the regulators assess offshore transactions remains uncertain at the time 
of writing. " However, as observed by commentators, this term could catch a large 
number of transactions taking place outside China. 52 
7.2.23 Procedural Issues 
7.2.2.3.1 Enforcement Agencies: MOFCOM and SAIC 
A mechanism of dual approval agencies for anti-monopoly merger review and a single 
approval agency for all M&A by foreign investors (based on Chinese company and 
foreign investment law and regardless of competition concerns) have been established 
since 2003. Such concurrent approval systems have caused certain confusion, in part 
because of the different underlying rationales and norms and the M&A Rules' 
legislative techniques. The institutional arrangement of the M&A Rules has been 
clarified as below: 
" Anti-Monopoly Review Agencies for M&A by Foreign Investors: MOFCOM 
and SAIC 
Under the M&A Rules, both the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) and the State 
Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC) may receive M&A notifications 
and conduct anti-monopoly merger review. 53 No local branches of MOFCOM and 
so M&ARules 2006, art 53. 
31 The official English version of the M&A Rules chose the term of 'overseas mergers. ' This author chooses 
`offshore transaction' for the purpose of consistency since this term was used by the Interim M&A Rules 2003 and 
has been frequently discussed by practitioners and scholars since 2003. 
52 Peter J Wang (n 42) 30. 
33 M&A Rules 2006, art 51. The MOFTEC was one of predecessors of the MOFCOM. The MOFTEC ceased to 
exist in March 2003 with its authorities transformed into the newly established MOFCOM. The MOFCOM also 
incorporated the former State Economy and Trade Commission (SETC) and partly the former State Planning 
Commission (SPC). Other parts of authorities of the SPC were incorporated into the NDRC. 
204 
SAIC have been allocated with merger control tasks. No further details are provided on 
responsibility for and allocation of cases, and given their unclear powers it cannot be 
assumed that both agencies will adopt a consistent approach in conducting merger 
reviews. As things stand, the MOFCOM has six officials and the SAIC has five to be 
allocated with the anti-monopoly merger review task. In practice, counsel have advised 
parties to submit to both agencies, but MOFCOM has been more active since 2003.54 
" General Review Agencies for M&A by Foreign Investors: MOFCOM and its 
Provincial Bureaux (with SAIC and its local Bureaux as the Registration 
Agency) 
Also according to the M&A Rules, the MOFCOM and its provincial bureaux are 
generally responsible for approving transactions covered by the M&A Rules and the 
SAIC and its local bureaux are the registration authority for approved transactions. " 
Which level of approval agencies, MOFCOM or its provincial bureaux, should a 
proposed transaction be reported to depends on the total investment, nature of the 
targeted enterprise or the enterprise's sector. 56 There are no notification threshold has 
been stipulated and it can be assumed that all transactions fall in the scope of the M&A 
Rules should be reported in order to obtain approval. 
" `Special Review' by the MOFCOM 
Another noteworthy point is that the M&A Rules incorporated a new article that has 
been described as a `special review provision' by practitioners 5.7 The article stipulates 
that if a foreign investor acquires `actual control' of enterprises under certain 
circumstances, the proposed transaction must be notified to the MOFCOM. Non- 
compliance with this rule may result in termination of the transaction, divesture the 
54 The information is based on speeches given by Michael Han and Doug Markel at Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer 
Web-based Seminar `Developments in China's Anti-Monopoly Law and M&A Regulations' on 24 January 2007. 
55 M&A Rules 2006, art 10. 
36 M&A Rules 2006, ad 21. 
37 M&ARules 2006, art 12. Doug Markel commented the article as a'special review provision', seen 52, above. 
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business or any other `effective actions' by the MOFCOM to eliminate the 
transaction's effects on `national economic security'. These circumstances include (1) 
the acquired enterprises involving key industries, (2) the transaction may affect 
national economic security, and, (3) the acquired enterprise possesses famous or 
historical Chinese brands. The M&A Rules left the term `actual control' and `national 
economic security' undefined and it is not clear how this `special review provision' 
interacts with the substantive test provided by the anti-monopoly review section of the 
M&A Rules. 58 
7.2.2.3.2 Notification Thresholds 
" Onshore Transaction Notification Thresholds 
The M&A Rules provide four notification thresholds for onshore transactions. 59 They 
are: 
(a) One party in the current year has a business turnover within China exceeding 1.5 
billion RMB; 
(b) One party has acquired more than 10 domestic enterprises in one year in related 
industries; 
(c) One party's market share in China has already reached 20 per cent; or 
(d) One party's post-transaction market share in China will reached 25 per cent. 
It's noteworthy that the M&A Rules request foreign parties' affiliates to be included 
when calculating theses thresholds. 
The M&A Rules further introduce a `discretionary review mechanism' which provides 
that even if the four notification thresholds for onshore transactions are not met, the 
MOFCOM and the SAIC may still request foreign parties to notify under two 
circumstances. They are (1) upon requested by competing domestic enterprises, 
relevant government departments or industry associations, if the MOFCOM and SAIC 
find that the proposed transaction may involve `a very large market share' or, (2) if 
58 See 7.2.2.4, below. 
59 M&A Rules 2006, art 51. 
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existing factors may `seriously affect market competition. 60 No further information 
has been provided on how these instances are to be treated by the regulators. 
The discretionary review mechanism is a modification of the earlier Interim M&A 
Rules, which provided that if existing factors may `seriously affect market competition, 
or the people's livelihood and national economic security', the MOFCOM and SAIC 
may require parties to notify the transaction. 61 An obviously inconsistent approach 
existed in the old wording due to the mixed competition and non-competition 
considerations. However, one cannot presume that the MOFCOM and SAIC, based on 
the revised article, will conduct M&A review purely dependant on competition 
concerns. In fact, the new wording still leaves substantial space for domestic 
competitors and government agencies to lobby a review of M&A by foreign investors 
on non-competition grounds. The case is another reminder that it might be very 
difficult for the current M&A regime and the future AML to be isolated from strong 
political influence. 
" Offshore Transaction Notification Thresholds 
For offshore transactions, The M&A Rules provide five notification thresholds 
including: 
(a) One party possesses assets within China worth more than 3 billion RMB; 
(b) One party in the current year has a business turnover within China exceeding 1.5 
billion RMB; 
(c) One party's market share within China has already reached 20 per cent; 
(d) One party's post-transaction market share within China will reach 25 per cent; or, 
(e) As a result of the transaction, one party will directly or indirectly hold equity 
interest in more than 15 FIE in related industries. 
Similar to the thresholds for on shore transactions, foreign parties' affiliates need to be 
taken into account. Because each of these thresholds (China-wide assets, turnover, 
60 The M&A Rules 2006, art 51. 
61 The Interim M&A Rules 2003, art 19. 
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market shares, or equity holding of more than 15 FIE in related industries) will 
independently trigger mandatory notification for offshore transactions, the M&A Rules 
have the potential to catch a large number of M&A occurring outside the PRC that 
involve parties with a strong presence in China. However, such transactions may not 
necessarily have significant competitive effects in the jurisdiction. 
7.2.2.33 Who should Notify and Timing of Notification 
Conforming to the accepted international practice, the M&A Rules and Notification 
Guidelines oblige the acquiring parties to notify proposed transactions to the 
competent authorities before any public announcement. For offshore mergers and 
acquisitions, an alternative rule is to notify at the same time as the transaction is 
notified to the competent authorities of the jurisdiction in which the transaction will 
occur. 62 
7.2.2.3.4 Documents Requested for Notification 
As regards documents to be submitted as part of the notification process for the anti- 
monopoly review, the M&A Rules provide no clear instructions. Other provisions of 
the M&A Rules require parties to submit a series of documents, but they are for the 
purpose of foreign investment approval and registration. 63 As observed by practitioners, 
these requested documents do not include any separate competition-related 
information. The Notification Guidelines have improved legal certainty to a great 
degree but have also imposed considerable burdens on the parties and regulators alike. 
Under Article 3 of the Notification Guidelines, 19 substantive sections must be 
complied with, necessitating the collection and submission of a substantial quantity of 
documentary evidence. The sections cover, for example: information of the parties' 
names, legal addresses, business scopes and affiliates; a description of the proposed 
transaction, its objectives and economic rationale; definitions of relevant markets; a 
62 See Article 4(2) of the ECMR, Article 6 and 54 of the M&A Rules 2006, and Articles I and 2 of the Notification 
Guidelines. 
63 M&A Rules 2006, arts 21 and 22. The contents of these two articles basically followed relevant articles of the 
Interim M&A Rules 2003. For detailed explanation on documents requested see Maher M Dabbah and Paul Lasok, 
Merger Control Worldwide (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2005) 270-272. 
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description of supply and demand structures; details of the top five competitors in all 
relevant markets; and the competitive conditions of the relevant markets such as entry 
analysis and the parties' vertical and horizontal agreements. Although most required 
information is clearly necessary for the AMIO to conduct its assessment, the need to 
submit certain documents (such as the notification party's notarized registration 
certificates) has been criticized as excessive, unnecessary and unrealistic. Given that 
many transactions that trigger mandatory notification may have a very limited nexus 
with the PRC, the European Commission's Short Form on merger notification and the 
simplified procedure on merger review could provide an alternative practical model for 
China to follow in the near future. 64 The Short Form and the simplified procedure are 
designed for the purpose of reducing the burden both on the competition authority and 
on parties where the notification thresholds are met, but where the parties' businesses 
do not overlap, or overlap in a limited way. Under such scenarios, there is no realistic 
possibility of competition concerns arising. 
Chinese legislators already seem to be alert to these existing flaws, and the First 
Reading Draft of the AML adopted notification thresholds solely based on objective 
turnover criteria and requests much limited notification documents. Nonetheless, the 
current active enforcement of the M&A Rules and the Notification Guidelines serves 
as a useful, practical model on which to build the AML merger control framework. 
One must wait to see how Chinese merger control law further evolves, during the 
process of concluding the AML and the law's early developments. 
7.2.2.3.5 Prior Notification Consultation 
To improve efficiency, transparency and predictability, the Notification Guidelines 
introduce a prior notification consultation mechanism. Parties are encouraged to 
contact the AMIO officials before the formal notification and to discuss the necessity 
" See Annex 1 `Form CO relating to the notification of a concentration pursuant to Council Regulation (EC) No. 
1392004' to the Implementing Regulation (Commission Regulation (EC) No. 802/2004) and the Commission 
Notice on a simplified procedure for treatment of certain concentrations under Council Regulation (EC) No. 
1392004 [2005] OJ C56/32. 
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of notification and issues of market definition. 65 This rule also appears to follow the 
EC but not the US practice. In the EC, undertakings are consistently encouraged pre- 
notification contact with the Commission. While in the USA, the `file and pray' is still 
the predominant approach. 66 
7.2.23.6 Time Limits for Approval and Decision-making Process 
Information on the decision-making process is limited, although the Notification 
Guidelines specify an initial waiting period of 30 working days. 7 Should that deadline 
not be met, the transaction is automatically cleared. If the parties receive a notice of 
extension of review period, the review process will be extended to 90 working days. 68 
Under the M&A Rules, if MOFCOM and SAIC determine that an onshore transaction 
may result in excessive concentration, impede fair competition or damage consumer 
interests, they will jointly or solely convene the relevant departments and enterprises, 
and other interested parties for a public hearing within 90 working days of receiving all 
requested documents. After the hearing, MOFCOM and SAIC will decide whether to 
approve, conditionally approve, or prohibit the proposed transaction. 69 There is no 
hearing procedure provided for offshore transactions however. 
7.2.2.3.7 Non-compliance 
Apart from the punishment for non-compliance with the `Special Review Provision' as 
discussed above, the M&A Rules do not provide a mechanism for penalising non- 
compliance with the anti-monopoly review provisions. 70 
6s The Notification Guidelines, art 5. 
66 See, European Commission, DG Competition Best Practices on the conduct of EC merger control proceedings 
(2004), <http: //ec. europa. eu/comrn/competition/mergers/legislationlproceedings. pdf>, and, Cooley Godward 
Kronish LLP, U. S. and Europe: A study in Contrasts, 
<http: //www. cooley. com/practices/content. aspx? id=US and Europe A_Study_in Contrasts>. 
67 The Notification Guidelines, art 4. (Article 52 of the M&A Rules 2006 provides a 90-day waiting period for 
onshore transactions but no similar time limit is provided for offshore transactions. It is not certain if this 30-day 
waiting period is applicable to both onshore and offshore transactions. ). 
68 The Notification Guidelines, art 4. 
69 M&A Rules 2006, art 52. 
70 See 7.2.2.3.1, above. 
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7.2.2.3.8 Appeals 
The M&A Rules do not provide a mechanism for appeal. However, Chinese 
administrative law provides that parties may seek administrative reconsideration 
and/or bring administrative litigation to the People's Court. Detailed analysis on the 
appeals procedure is provided in Chapter 8 below. 
7.2.2.4 Substantive Tests and Exemptions from the Anti-Monopoly Review 
The substantive tests of the anti-monopoly review are based on whether the proposed 
transaction may `lead to over-concentration, impair fair competition or damage 
consumers' interests'. " Foreign investors are also generally required not to `disturb the 
social economic order, harm the social and pubic interests, or lead to a loss of state- 
owned assets'. 72 Little information is available on how the regulators conduct the 
appraisal process. 
Moreover, the M&A Rules have incorporated a noteworthy special review provision 
that stipulates that if a foreign investor acquires `actual control' of domestic enterprises 
under certain circumstances, the proposed transaction must be reported to MOFCOM. 
Non-compliance with this rule may result in the termination of the transaction, 
divesture of the business or any other `effective actions' by MOFCOM to eliminate the 
transaction's effects on national economic security. These circumstances include: (1) 
where the acquired enterprises involve key industries; (2) where the transaction may 
affect national economic security; and, (3) where the acquired enterprise is responsible 
for famous or historical Chinese brands. 73 The M&A Rules left the term `actual 
control', `key industries' and `national economic security' undefined and it is unclear 
how this special review provision interacts with the substantive appraisal tests. 
Apart from these tests, the regulators scrutinize proposed transactions according to the 
71 M&A Rules 2006, arts 52 and 53. 
72 M&A Rules 2006, art 3. 
73 M&A Rules 2006, art 12. 
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Catalogue Guidance for Foreign Investment Industries (the Investment Catalogue), 
which covers most domestic industry sectors and classifies them into three groups, 
namely, industries which encourage, restrict or prohibit foreign investment. 
74 The 
Investment Catalogue governs foreign investment in the PRC on a sector-by-sector 
basis and provides no competition-based provisions. However, it affects the feasibility 
of M&A by foreign investors and affects the M&A Rules merger control system in a 
remote and indirect way. 
Furthermore, the M&A Rules stipulate that parties may apply for an exemption from 
the anti-monopoly review if the proposed transaction can: (1) improve conditions for 
fair competition; (2) restructure loss-making enterprises and safeguard jobs; (3) 
introduce advanced technologies and management talents and improve the acquired 
enterprise's international competitiveness; or (4) improve the environment. 
75 EC and 
US competition law scholars may recognize the implied efficiency and failing firm 
defences. However, both competition and non-competition values are once again 
implied by the M&A Rules on appraisal tests and exemptions. As no detailed guidance 
has been provided on how these values are balanced, the appraisal process is subject to 
significant administrative discretion. 
7.2.2.5 Comments 
Four years after the emergence of Chinese merger control law, the relevant substantial 
and procedural rules have been improved to a great extent. Chinese officials have 
accepted a significant number of merger notifications and have conducted in-depth 
investigations with increasing sophistication and regulatory capacities. However, given 
that `[m]erger control is based on predictions of what will happen on the post-merger 
market', 76 and the key to an effective merger control law is to identify why and when a 
14 M&A Rules 2006, art 4. The Industries Catalogue was issued by the former State Development and Planning 
Commission (SDPC), the former State Economy and Trade Commission (SETC), and the former Ministry of 
Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC) in March 2002, amended by the State Development and 
Reform Commission (SDRC) and the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) in November 2004, and was effective as 
of January 2005. 
75 M&A Rules 2006, art 54. 
76 Brenda Sufrin, `Competition Law in a Globalised Marketplace: Beyond Jurisdiction' in Patrick Copps and others 
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proposed transaction should be prohibited, 77 the M&A Rules and the Notification 
Guidelines continue to cause concerns due to their discriminatory approach, implied 
protectionism, multilayered notification thresholds and appraisal tests, and overlapping 
enforcement authorities. Major technical issues calling for prompt clarifications also 
include the current non-differentiation between horizontal and non-horizontal mergers, 
the uncertain degree of cross-ownership required for `affiliates', and the lack of 
guidance on how to define the relevant market. 
7.2.3 Special Rules on Acquisition of State-owned Assets (SOA) 
In recent years, as economic reform has been strengthened in China, the pace of 
restructuring SOE and SOA has been accelerated. Such a process has witnessed a 
series of related regulations and rules. As discussed in 7.1.1 above, the Chinese 
government accepted M&A as an important instrument in the country's ongoing 
economic developments and policymakers recognize that M&A enable fragmented 
industries to consolidate and to develop from regional level to national and global level. 
In addition to generally applicable laws and regulations on M&A, a series of special 
rules only apply to foreign and domestic investors intending to acquire SOE and SOA. 
These rules often incorporate competition concerns and, to certain extent, give rise to 
inconsistency and uncertainty. 
7.2.3.1 The SASAC System 
Established in 2003, the SASAC system is the principal regulator of SOE and SOA in 
China. 78 The status of the SASAC system was established by the Interim Regulation 
on Supervision and Administration of State-owned Assets of Enterprises (the SASAC 
Regulation), issued by the State Council in May 2003. According to the SASAC 
Regulation, an important duty of the SASAC system is to maintain and improve the 
controlling power and competitiveness of the SOE and SOA in key sectors of national 
(eds), Asserting Jurisdiction: International and European Legal Perspectives (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2003) 127. 
n Alison Jones and Brenda Sufrin, EC Competition Law (2'1d edn Oxford University Press, Oxford 2004) 848. 
78 The SASAC system was established according to the Circular on the Structure of the State Council approved at 
the 1" Session of the 10i6 NPC in March 2003. 
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economy and national security. The SASAC system is authorized to review and 
approve restructuring plans, M&A, division, and other major issues of SOE and 
SOA. 79 No time limits and substantive appraisal test have been clarified by the SASAC 
Regulation. In 2006, the SASAC issued two documents to further strength its 
regulatory power on restructuring activities of SOE and SOA, especially on M&A. 80 
However, as typical administrative documents in China, the two documents provide no 
detailed provisions on procedural issues and no clarification on the relationship with 
other relevant laws, regulations and rules. 
7.2.3.2 Rules Applicable to Foreign Investors Acquiring SOE and SOA 
The M&A Rules generally require that if foreign investors plan to acquire SOE and 
SOA and to reorganize the target enterprises into FIE, foreign investors must comply 
with relevant laws and regulations. 81 
7.2.3.2.1 Filing Procedures of Listed Companies Transferring State-owned 
Shares to Foreign Investors 2004 
A directly applicable regulation is the 2004 Circular on Key Issues of Filing 
Procedures ofListed Companies Transferring State-owned Shares to Foreign Investors 
and Foreign Invested Enterprises (the Circular). 82 Formulated according to the Interim 
M&A Rules and still effective, the Circular applies to listed non-financial enterprises 
transferring state-owned shares to foreign investors or FIE. The Circular stipulates that 
parties shall obtain approval from the SASAC and its provincial bureaux and 
meanwhile `report to and ask opinions from' the MOFCOM 83 Because of the Circular, 
the SASAC system exercises concurrent jurisdiction with the MOFCOM and SAIC on 
M&A by foreign investors, with MOFCOM and SAIC's authorities originate from the 
79 The SASAC Regulation, arts 2,14,20 and 21. 
80 The Provisional Measures on Supervision of Local SOE Administration (April 2006) and the Provisional 
Measures on Supervision of Central SOE Investment (June 2006). 
81 M&A Rules 2006, arts 4 and 5. 
82 The Circular was jointly issued by the MOFCOM and the SASAC in January 2004. 
83 The Circular, arts I and 2. 
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M&A Rules. Such an arrangement may however result in inter-agency conflicts, a lack 
of accountability and uncertainty. 
7.23.2.2 Strategic Investment of Listed Companies by Foreign Investors 
Another relevant regulation on foreign investors is the 2005 Measures for Strategic 
Investment of Listed Companies by Foreign Investors (the Strategic Investment 
Measures) 84 `Strategic investment by foreign investors' is defined as foreign investors 
acquiring listed companies (A-shares) by means of M&A as a long-and-mid-term 
strategic investment. 85 The Strategic Investment Measures provide that strategic 
investment by foreign investors shall not impede fair competition, cause over- 
concentration, and exclude or restrict competition in relevant domestic product market. 
A dual-approval system is established which requested proposed transactions to obtain 
approval from the MOFCOM and from the CSRC, with SAIC and its local bureaux as 
registration authorities. A 30-day time limit for approval is provided, which is 
significantly shorter than the M&A Rules. 86 As one could reasonably expect, before a 
foreign investor closing an M&A of a listed SOE, the proposed transaction may need 
to notify the MOFCOM, the SASAC, the SAIC, the CSRC for competition-related 
review, and to all these regulators plus the targeted SOE's sectoral regulator for foreign 
investment approval. 
There are other administrative regulations and rules governing M&A of SOE and SOA 
by foreign investors with inconsistent procedure, overlapping regulators and provisions 
concerning competition issues without clarified substantive tests and remedies. 87 The 
situation has led to significant regulatory complexity which is difficult to comprehend 
84 The Strategic Investment Measures were jointly issued by the MOFCOM, CSRC, SAT, SAIC, and SAFE in 
December 2005. 
ss The Strategic Investment Measure, art 2. A-shares in Chinese regulatory context refer to 'Renminbin common 
stocks'. The term 'certain scale' is not defined by the Measures. 
86 The Strategic Investment Measures, articles 4,7,8 and 12. 
87 For example, the 2002 Circular on Issues Related to Transferring State-owned Shares and Institutional Shares of 
Listed Companies to Foreign Investors issued by the CSRC, MOF, former SETC, the 2002 Interim Provisions on 
Introducing Foreign Investment to Reorganize SOE issued by the former SETC, MOF, SAIC, SAFE. The SETC 
was terminated with its powers incorporated in the MOFCOM in March 2003. 
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even for experts in the field. 
7.2.4 Other Relevant Foreign Investment Law 
7.2.4.1 The Law of Sino-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures 200185 
The Law of Sino-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures (the EJV Law) does not define `equity 
joint ventures', which has caused uncertainty in interpreting the relationship between 
the term and the concept of `mergers and acquisitions'. This problem is expected to be 
resolved by the AML which has chosen the concept `concentrations' to cover mergers, 
acquisitions, and `acquiring control' or abilities to exercise `decisive influences' 
through contracts or other methods. Presumably, this will cover certain form of joint 
ventures. 89 The EJV Law and the Implementing Regulations of the Law of Sino- 
Foreign Equity Joint Ventures (the EJV Law Implementing Regulations) empower the 
MOFCOM and other agencies of provincial level authorized by the State Council to 
examine and approve the establishment of Chinese-Foreign EJV with a 3-month time 
limit. 90 No substantive appraisal test is provided but the Implementing Regulation 
prohibits EJV which impede the State's sovereignty, contrary to Chinese laws, disobey 
criteria of national economic development, cause environment pollution, or cause 
obvious unfair situation to jeopardize other party's interests. The EJV Law and its 
Implementing Regulations offer no details on how the agencies assess a proposed 
EJV. 91 
7.2.4.2 The Law of Sino-Foreign Cooperative Joint Ventures 200092 
Similar problems also exist in the Law of Sino-Foreign Cooperative Joint Ventures (the 
CJV Law), such as no definitions for key concepts, uncertain substantive appraisal 
tests and insufficient procedural information. The MOFCOM and other agencies of 
provincial level authorized by the State Council have been empowered to approve CJV, 
8 The EJV Law was adopted in July 1979 and was revised in April 1990 and March 2001. 
ý' See the First Reading Draft, art 16 and discussion at 7.3.1 below. 
90 The EJV Law Implementing Regulations were issued by the State Council in July 2001. 
91 The EJV Law, art 3 and the EJV Implementing Regulations, arts 4 and 6. 
92 The CJV Law was adopted in April 1988, was amended in and is effective as of October 2000. 
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however, with a 45-day time limit 93 What remains to be seen is how future legislative 
and non-legislative measures will deal with the relationship between the concept of 
`joint ventures' and of `concentrations'. The EC competition law on `full function joint 
ventures' may offer valuable experience to this question. 
7.2.5 Sectoral Regulations: Examples in the Financial and Civil Aviation Sectors 
Many sector-specific rules regulate M&A that incorporate competition considerations 
or interact with the above-discussed laws and regulations from either substantive or 
procedural perspective. A further question which arises is how these sectoral rules will 
interact with the merger control rules of the AML after 1 August 2008. 
For instance, the Commercial Bank Law, the Insurance Law and the Regulations on 
Administration of Financial Institutions with Foreign Investments stipulate that M&A 
and foreign-invested joint ventures in the banking and insurance sectors are subject to 
examination and approval of the CBRC and the CIRC 94 A very different rule appeared 
in the Regulations on the Administration of Insurance Companies with Foreign 
Investments, according to which mergers of insurance companies involving foreign 
investments should be reported to CIRC within 10 days of implementing the 
transaction. 95 This is the only rule that set out a non prior-notification mechanism. At 
the time of writing, other relevant articles on M&A in China have either prior- 
notification or uncertain notification mechanism. 
Another interesting example is M&A rules of the civil aviation sector provided by the 
Administration Provisions on Mergers and Restructures of Civil Aviation Enterprises 
and Airports (the Civil Aviation Restructuring Rules). 96 Promoting fair and orderly 
" The CJV Law, art S. 
" The Commercial Bank Law was adopted in 1995 and was amended in 2003. The Insurance Law was adopted in 
1995 and was amended in 2002. The Regulations on Administration of Financial Institutions with Foreign 
Investments were issued by the People's Banks of China (PBoC) in 2001. 
93 Issued by the CIRC in 2001. See Article 22(7) of the Regulations. 
% Issued by the CAAC in July 2005, effective as of August 2005. 
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competition and preventing monopoly and `malicious competition' are among the 
objectives of the rules 97 The rules also request M&A and other restructuring activities 
in the civil aviation sector to comply with relevant sectoral regulations, foreign 
investment law and anti-monopoly law. Restructuring activities should obtain 
approvals from the CAAC or its local bureaux. Approval procedures and a 20 
working-days time limit have been provided. There is a 10 working-day extension if a 
decision cannot be made within the 20 working-day time limit and upon approval of 
the chief official of the notified agency. This set of time limits is among the shortest in 
all Chinese laws and regulations on M&A. No substantive appraisal test has been 
clarified by the Civil Aviation Restructuring Rules. 98 
For the relationship between economy-wide competition law and sector-specific 
competition regimes, experience from the recent and future developments in Hong 
Kong SAR may be relevant to the Mainland. According to a recommendation in 2006 
by the Competition Policy Review Committee (CPRC), the government of the Hong 
Kong SAR plans to adopt a general competition law. The existing competition rules of 
the telecommunications and broadcasting sectors are likely to operate alongside the 
proposed law. Nevertheless, the public consultation has showed that respondents prefer 
a unified regulatory body in the long term. 99 
7.2.6 Comments 
On the whole, the current legal and regulatory framework mainly consists of 
subsidiary legislation promulgated by various ministries and sectoral regulators. This 
97 The term `malicious competition' (E zing Jingzheng) has been frequently referred by Chinese officials and 
commentators during the past decades. The term has never been exactly defined. Based on the context the term 
often been employed, 'malicious competition' can be understood as an opposite of `competition on the merits', or as 
`abusive coippetition' compared to `normal competition'. However, malicious competition has developed as an 
implicit rhetoric term and has been used, whenever it is possible, to criticize foreign take-over of Chinese 
enterprises. 
98 The Civil Aviation Restructuring Rules, arts 1,2,4,5,7-9, and 11-13. 
99 Connie Camabuci and Margaret Wang, 'The Beginning of a New Era: A General Competition Law for Hong 
Kong', in GCR: The Asia-PacijIcAnhtrust Review 2007 (Law Business Research, London 2007) 45-46. 
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situation has impacted adversely on Chinese M&A regulation and merger control law 
because the current framework's implied inter-agency conflicts that cause often 
contradictory substantive rules and over-decentralized enforcement authorities. 
Secondly, obvious problems exist in legislative techniques. The current framework has 
many undefined or ill-defined terms and concepts that have caused a certain degree of 
confusion. Excessive discretionary or contradictory substantive appraisal tests result in 
non-enforceability and costly compliance. Competing agencies are claiming 
jurisdictions over transactions with inconsistent time limits and other procedural 
uncertainty. All these problems have created a bureaucratic and inefficient regulatory 
environment and high burdens for business. 
Thirdly, conflicts among competition law and other laws and regulations are more 
obviously reflected by the merger control rules. Harmonization and simplification is 
therefore required. 
Finally, the context of privatizing SOE and SOA is noteworthy with the rise of a 
powerful regulator, the SASAC and its local bureaux. Adjusting the current regulatory 
framework of SOE and SOA according to the AML, or compromise the latter 
according to the former, is an inevitable task for Beijing. However, a one-stop merger 
control regime may be politically unacceptable and thus seems too challenging to be 
achieved in short time. 
7.3 Merger Control under the Anti-Monopoly Law 2007100 
7.3.1 Concentrations of Undertakings (Jingyingzhe Jizhong) 
Similar to previous drafts, the final version of the AML addresses merger control in 
Chapter IV, under the title `Concentrations of Undertakings' (Jingyingze Jizhong). The 
ioo For analysis of historical developments of the previous draft AMI. (the 1999,2001 and 2004 drafts) on merger 
control, see Williams (n 14) 181-82,194, and 207-08; and, American Bar Association (ABA), Joint Comments on 
the Proposed Anti-Monopoly Law of the People's Republic of China, at, <http: //www. abanet. org/antitrust/at- 
con ments/2005/07-05/abaprcat2005-2final. pdf>, May 2005, and, <httpi/www. abanet. org/antitrust/at- 
commentsl2003/07-03/jointsubmission. pda, July 2003. 
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wording of the merger control rules of the AML, however, indicates important policy 
changes since the 1999 Draft. 
The AML covers a variety of situations of concentrations, including, (1) mergers, (2) 
acquisitions of control of other undertakings through the purchase of shares or assets, 
and (3) acquisition of control (qude kongzhiquan) of other undertakings, or of the 
ability to exercise decisive influence (juedingxing yingxiang) on other undertakings, 
through contract or other means. 101 It's noteworthy that the AML deleted the 
requirement of `adequate extent', which was incorporated prior to the First Reading 
Draft, for acquisitions of control of other undertakings through the purchase of shares 
or assets. 102 
No definitions have been provided for terms of acquisition of control and of decisive 
influence. Nevertheless, some clues exist which may help to understand these terms 
and to predict how they will be interpreted in the future. For example, as regards 
`adequate extent', the April 2005 Draft provided a 20% threshold for acquisitions of 
voting shares. The April 2005 Draft also stipulated a concentration shall be deemed to 
arise when there is an acquisition of `direct or indirect control on business operation or 
personnel issues', which may imply the meaning of `decisive influence'. The reason of 
changes in the final wording of the AML was not clear. However, it seemed Chinese 
lawmakers are following more closely with the EC merger law model with plans to 
leave detailed interpretations to the AML enforcement agencies' future normative 
documents and decisional practice. In European, the ECMR defines a `concentration' 
as a situation where a change of control on a lasting basis results from a merger, an 
acquisition, or a full-function joint venture. The ECMR further defines `control' as 
having `the possibility of exercising decisive influence' with more detailed 
explanations provided by two jurisdictional notices. 
103 
101 AML, art 20. 
lot See, for example, art 16 (2) of the First Reading Draft. 
103 Commission Notice on the concept of concentration under Council Regulation (EEC) NO 4064/89 on the control 
of concentrations between undertakings, [1998] OJ C66/5; Commission Notice on the concept of full-function joint 
ventures under Council Regulation (EEC) No. 4064/89 on the control of concentrations between undertakings [1998] 
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Other Chinese M&A laws and regulations also provide indicators. For example, the 
Public Takeover Measures 2006 state that an `acquisition of control of a listed 
company' means any of the situations, including: (1) the investor is a majority 
shareholder controlling more than 50% shares of the listed company; (2) the investor 
can actually control more than 30% voting shares; (3) the investor has controlling 
powers to appoint half or more of the broad members; or (4) the investor, by virtue of 
the voting rights it actually controls, can exercise major influences on decisions 
adopted at general meetings of shareholders. '°4 
A noteworthy provision may severely challenge and weaken the jurisdiction and 
effectiveness of the AML. Followed its predecessors, the First Reading Draft included 
an article which stipulates that where relevant provisions of other laws or 
administrative regulations regulate monopolistic conduct prohibited by the AML, the 
former should prevail. '05 Although this provision was finally be removed, one could 
still expect that the current regulatory framework of M&A may co-exist with the AML 
for an uncertain and considerable period of time due to the costly harmonization 
process and strong pressure from divergent interest groups. 
7.3.2 Procedural Issues: Chinese Guoqing and European Style 
Different to the AML rules on restrictive agreements and abuse of dominance, the 
AML merger control procedural rules co-exist with the merger control substantive 
rules under a single chapter. 106 Since the First Reading Draft, significant changes on 
merger control, particular those dealing with procedural issues, indicated the 
developments of Chinese merger control law. Although the nature of the enforcer, the 
structure and the notification thresholds appeared based on the ECMR model, 
OJ C66/1. A consolidated Jurisdictional Notice replace the previous four jurisdictional Notices in July 2007, see: 
<http: //ec. europa. eu/conun/competition/mergers/legislation/draft jn. html>. 
104 The Public Takeover Measures 2006, art 84, see n 33, above. 
ºos The First Reading Draft, para 2 of art 2. 
106Ch4AML. 
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provisions on the decision-making procedure appeared to borrow elements also from 
the US Hart-Scott-Rodino Act. Analysis of this section shows that the merger control 
rules under the AML are a creation imbedded in the Chinese Guoqing and designed 
primarily based on the European style. 
7.3.2.1 Enforcement Agency: The AMEA 
The Anti-Monopoly Enforcement Authority (AMEA) has been designed as an 
administrative control system combing investigative and prosecutorial functions with 
adjudicative function. To what extent the AMEA could achieve maximal accuracy at 
minimal administrative costs is a question to be answered. Further analysis of the 
AMEA is provided in Chapter 8 below. 
7.3.2.2 Notification Thresholds 
In comparison with the previous drafts, the First Reading Draft showed improvement 
by choosing turnover thresholds in place of the former multiple notification thresholds 
that combined criteria of turnover, transaction value, and market shares. 
107 However, 
Since the Second Reading Draft, the merger notification thresholds have been deleted 
and the task of future clarification has eventually been left to the SC. The SC is in the 
process to promulgate AML implementing regulations in order to address a series of 
unsettled questions including the merger notification thresholds. The AML 
implementing regulations are expected to be enacted by 1 August 2008.108 Discussion 
in this section has indicated the underlying force which may explain why the AML on 
this aspect has developed in this particular way. 
Based on the ECMR model, the First Reading Draft stipulated that a prior notification 
should be filed with the AMEA by undertakings of the concentration if the worldwide 
turnover and the China-wide turnover thresholds are both met. Without the prior 
107 It has been observed that market share thresholds are subjective and are difficult to apply in practice. See for 
example, ICN, Guiding Principles and Recommended Practices for Merger Notification ('Ihe ICN 
Recommendation), <httpJ/www. internationalcompetitionnetwork. org/guidingprinciples. html>, and, ABA (n 97) 
Joint Comments 2005,22-23. 
108 The Second and the Third Reading Drafts, art 20, and the AML, art 21. 
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notification, the concentration shall not be implemented. 
109 The notification thresholds 
were: (1) the combined aggregate worldwide turnover of all the undertakings 
concerned in the preceding year exceeding RMB 12 billion (approximately EURO 
1.19 billion), and, (2) the aggregate turnover of China's domestic market in the 
preceding year of any one undertaking concerned exceeding RMB 800 million 
(approximately EURO 80 million). 
It had been recommended that the AML should request at least two undertakings as 
opposed only one having China-wide turnover meet these thresholds. 
110 This comment 
is reasonable which aims to exclude notification from concentrations having very 
limited nexus with China or the effects of which are felt remote from China. Revising 
the notification thresholds accordingly will therefore enable the AML conform more 
closely to the accepted international norms of merger control law)" However, from 
the feedback within China towards the First Reading Draft in 2006, it seemed that this 
notification threshold problem was ignored by interested parties since no comments on 
this issue were provided. "2 
The First Reading Draft further provided that the aggregate turnover should include 
those with which the undertaking involved has controlling or affiliation relationships. 
In addition, the SC may stipulate alternative notification thresholds for special sectors 
such as banking and insurance, etc. The AMEA may adjust the thresholds for 
notification of concentrations according to economic development and market 
situations, and report such adjustments to the SC for approval. How to calculate 
turnover and define `affiliation relationship', and what the thresholds for special 
109 The First Reading draft, para 1 of art 17. 
110 ABA (n 97), Joint Comments 2005,22. 
1" For example, notification thresholds of the ECMR look to combined worldwide turnover of the undertaking 
concerned and the Community-wide turnover of at least two of the undertakings involved in the concentration, also 
see ICN (n 103). 
112 This comment is based on two internal confidential documents issued by the SCNPC in late 2006 and early 2007 
(hereinafter referred as the SCNPC Summary'). Sources and official titles of the documents cannot be disclosed for 
the purpose of informants' protection. These two documents summarized comments on the First Reading Draft by 
NPC and local PC members, State Council, local governments of 23 provinces, 5 autonomous regions and 4 
municipalities, industries, academic institutions, non-government organisations, and professional associations. 
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sectors would be are all uncertain. 
Nevertheless, the final version of the AML chooses not to provide specific notification 
thresholds, leaving the task of future clarification to the SC. The official documents 
and archives of the AML First Reading at the 22°d Session of the 10th NPC may 
explain such a choice. 113 During the discussion session on the First Reading Draft, 
many SCNPC members expressed their concerns regarding the turnover thresholds. 
For example, one member, Mr. Wen Shizhen, commented that the proposed law must 
take into account real situations of China and should include notification thresholds of 
both turnover and market share. 114 According to Wen, enterprises of certain sectors (for 
example transformers producers) and domestic enterprises holding key technologies 
normally have lower turnover which might not meet the notification thresholds 
stipulated by the First Reading Draft. M&A of such enterprises by MNC may however 
impact national economic security. He further stated that the AML should provide 
sector-specific turnover thresholds, and the law should prohibit M&A with post-merger 
market share above 1/5 or 1/4. 
Another member, Mr. Ni Yuefeng, also expressed similar opinions by emphasizing the 
necessity to strictly prohibit `malicious M&A' with monopolizing intentions. 
115 Mr. Ni 
mentioned several current hotly-debated transactions in China, including Carlyle's 
attempt to acquire Xugong Group and Caterpillar Group to acquire Xiagong Group. He 
stated that MNC only acquire high-quality assets but leave all burdens and problems to 
the State. China will thus lose controlling powers on industry development and 
technology innovation by selling leading SOE without scrutiny. The comment was a 
very representative one. Therefore, how the merger notification thresholds will evolve 
113 Analysis below is based on NPC, Shijie Renda Changweihui Daibiao Weiyuan Fayan Zhaideng (NPC: Summary 
on SCNPC Members' Discussion on the Proposed Anti-Monopoly Law), 27 June 2006. The summary was 
published by the NPC on 30 June 2006 at: 
<http: //www. npc. gov. cn/zgrdw/common/zw. jsp? label=WXZLK&id=350218&pdmc=1520> (in Chinese). 
114 Wen Shizhen, Vice Chairman of the Financial and Economic Affairs Committee of the 10" NPC and member of 
the 10"SCNPC. 
115 Ni Yuefeng, Vice Chairman of the Environment Protection and Resources Preservation Committee of the 10th 
NPC and member of the 10`" SCNPC. 
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under the proposed AML or by the future secondary legislative instruments remains to 
be seen. 
7.3.2.3 Notification Thresholds for Financial and Other Special Sectors 
Under the First Reading Draft, the SC was delegated with the power to set alternative 
notification thresholds for banking, insurance and other special sectors. This rule was 
in line with the EC and US practice where M&A by institutional investors are under 
different notification thresholds and/or exemptions. 116 Nevertheless, how widely the 
`special sectors' will be interpreted is uncertain. Considering the vigorous debate on 
notification thresholds, the coverage of the `special sectors' deserves a careful 
consideration. 
Since the general merger notification thresholds established by the First Reading Draft 
have been deleted since the Second Reading Draft, the rule of special notification 
thresholds is omitted accordingly. '" Nonetheless, future developments on the AML's 
merger control procedural rules are expected to have special treatment to the financial 
sector. 
7.3.2.4 Notification Exceptions: 'Single Economic Entity' 
There are two exceptions to the notification obligation, where: (1) an undertaking 
concerned already holds more than half of the voting rights or of the assets of all other 
undertakings concerned in the concentration; or (2) an undertaking not involved in the 
concentration holds more than half of the voting rights or assets of all other 
undertakings concerned in the concentration. 118 
Undertakings belonging to the same group and having the status of parent and 
subsidiary may have distinct legal personalities. According to the provision discussed 
116 See Article 5 (3) (a) ECMR and Chapter on USA at Dabbah and Lasok QC (n 61)1293-94. 
117 The Second Reading Draft, art 20. See 7.3.2.2, above. 
uaAMI, art 23. 
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here, such undertakings are treated, for the purpose of the AML merger control rules, 
as a `single economic entity' and therefore are exempted from notification 
obligation. 119 
7.3.2.5 Who Should Notify and Timing of Notification 
Previous provisions on parties who should be obliged for submission of notification 
has been removed from the First Reading Draft, according to which, in case of mergers 
or joint ventures, joint notification is required; and, in case of acquisitions, the 
acquiring parties are required to notify. 120 As regards timing of notification, the AML 
provides that a notifiable concentration should not be implemented without a prior- 
notification. No further information on this issue is available at the time of writing. 121 
Relevant provisions of the M&A Rules and the Notification Guidelines have however 
provided some references on parties and timing of notification. 122 
7.3.2.6 Documents Requested for Notification 
Under the AML, documents requests for initial merger notification include: (1) an 
application; (2) information on competition in the relevant market; (3) the agreement 
of the proposed concentration; (4) the involving parties' audited financial reports of the 
preceding accounting year; and, (5) other documents requested by the AMEA. 123 
According to the First Reading Draft, the `application' requires information about the 
parties, worldwide turnover in the preceding year, total assets and total turnover of the 
preceding year within China, market share in the relevant market, and the total value of 
the proposed transaction and the proposed execution date of the transaction, etc. 124 The 
119 The concept of 'single economic entity' is borrowed from the Article 81 (1) EC jurisprudence by this writer for 
the purpose of characterization. The concept has not yet been introduced by Chinese legislator. It's noteworthy that, 
'the (EC) case law has yet to explain whether the notion of control in the ECMR should be applied to the 'single 
economic entity' doctrine under Article 81(1), or whether the notions of control differ as between those two 
provisions. ' See, Richard Whish, Competition Law (5th edn Butterworths, London 2003) 88-89. 
120 For example, the April 2005 Draft, art 25. 
121 AML, art 21. 
122 See 7.2.2.3.3, above. 
'' AML, art 23. 
124 The First Reading Draft, art 19 and the Second Reading Draft, art 22. 
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First Reading Draft omitted previous requested information on costs, pricing, capacity, 
and the proposed transactions' effect on national economy and social public interest. 
This was a welcomed improvement since the previous rules were criticized for 
imposing unnecessarily burdensome information requirements on parties that do not 
raise competition concerns meriting further investigation. 125 The AML further 
simplifies the documentary burdens according to which, the application only need to 
specify issues including names, addresses, scope of business, proposed date for 
implementing the concentration and other matters as stipulated by the AMEA. '26 
7.3.2.7 The Preliminary Review and the Further Review 
The administrative decision-making process of merger control is briefly outlined below. 
First, concentrations (mergers, acquisitions, and acquisition of control through other 
methods such as contracts) that meet the notification thresholds stipulated by the SC 
must be notified to the AMEA. Such concentrations cannot be implemented before 
notification and need to wait until the preliminary review period expired. With a 
preliminary review of 30 days following the notification, the AMEA may either take a 
decision of opening a further review investigation or a decision that no further 
investigation will be conducted. There is no extension to the 30-day time limit for the 
preliminary review. If the AMEA fails to reach a decision with the time limit, the 
proposed concentration is deemed to be cleared. '27 
The time limit for the further review is 90 days which can be extended by up to 
another 60 days under specified circumstances and with the AMEA's written notice to 
the undertakings involved. These circumstances include (1) the undertakings 
concerned agree to extend the time limit; (2) documents submitted by the undertakings 
concerned are inaccurate that need further verification; or, (3) relevant circumstances 
have significantly changed following the notification. 128 
'25 ABA (n 97) Joint Comments 2005,23. 
126 AMI, art 23. 
ýný art 25. 
129 AML, art 26. 
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Furthermore, during the course of the further review, if the AMEA reaches a 
conclusion that the proposed concentration may eliminate or restrict competition and 
the undertaking concerned cannot meet certain conditions, 129 it shall adopt a decision 
to prohibit the concentration; otherwise the concentration shall be cleared (which may 
subject to conditions imposed by the AMEA). 130 There are no explicit rules on whether 
the AMEA will address the undertakings concerned before the final decision a 
statement of objections, setting out its findings and giving the undertaking opportunity 
to respond in writing and at an oral hearing. 
The AMEA shall publish prohibition decisions or conditional approval decisions in 
time. 13' The transparency and accountability of the AMEA is in doubt as the draft does 
not require the AMEA to publish unconditional approval decisions. The unconditional 
approvals, however, are expected to be majorities and to be helpful guidance to future 
transactions. From this aspect, the proposed AML appeared to follow the US merger 
control model because under the ECMR, the EC Commission is required to issue 
decisions for unconditional and conditional clearance decisions and outright 
prohibition decisions. 132 
7.3.2.8 Non-compliance 
Remedies for non-compliance with the AML merger control rules include orders to 
cease the implementation of the concentration, the disposal of shares or assets, or the 
transfer of business within a given time limit, and orders take all necessary measures to 
restore to the state of prior-concentration. A fine up to RMB 500,000 may also be 
imposed. 133 
129 Conditions which may be accepted by the AMEA include: proof of the proposed concentration will improve the 
conditions of competition and the pro-competition factors will obviously outweigh anti-competition factors, or the 
proposed concentration is in accordance with the public interests (AML, art 28). See discussion at 7.3.3, below. 
"o See 7.3.3.3, below. 
131 AML, art 30. 
132 ECMR, arts 6,8, and 10. 
133 AML, art 48. The amount of the fine is between RMB 1 to 5 million under the First Reading Draft but since the 
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7.3.2.9 Appeals 
The AMEA's decision is binding on the undertakings to whom it is addressed. 
However, for parties who disagree with the AMEA's decisions, they can apply for 
administrative reconsideration. If parties are not satisfied with the decisions of the 
reconsideration, they can refer to administrative litigation, namely, to bring an action 
challenging the decisions by the reviewed organs before a People's Court. 134 
Further analysis on the AML administrative appeal proceedings and judicial 
proceedings is provided by Chapter 8, including the dynamic interface between the 
AML and existing Chinese litigation rules under the 1989 Administrative Litigation 
Law and the 1991 Civil Procedural Law. 
7.3.3 Substantive Appraisal Test 
7.3.3.1 Elimination or Restriction on Competition 
Previous drafts had adopted a dominance test but since 2005, the test has been changed 
to the `elimination or restriction on competition'. According to the AML, a substantial 
appraisal test is based on whether a proposed concentration `has or may have the effect 
of eliminating or restricting competition'. 135 Although it has been proposed that there 
should be a `substantiality' standard before a concentration is prohibited, until now, the 
AML has shown no improvement in this regard. 136 
The AMEA may decide not to prohibit a proposed concentration, however, provided 
that the undertakings concerned can prove that the pro-competition factors of the 
proposed concentration clearly outweigh its anti-competitive factors, or can show that 
Second Reading Draft such an amount has been reduced, and the fine under the AML is capped at RMB 500 
thousand. 
134 AML, Para 2 of art 53. 
135W4art 28. 
136 ABA (n 97) Joint Comments 2005,24. 
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the proposed concentration is in the public interest. 137 
7.3.3.2 National Security Review 
Article 31 of the AML, which provides that mergers and acquisitions of domestic 
enterprises by foreign investors or other form of concentrations involving foreign 
investors must go through both anti-monopoly review and national security reviews `in 
accordance with relevant provisions of the State', has triggered expressions of concern 
from US and EU business groups. 138 As regards the AML merger control rules, 
Western governments and MNC feared that China may use the new law to block non- 
domestic competitors' access to the lucrative Chinese market as well as to justify the 
government heavy market intervention under the name of `national security'. Recent 
overseas investments by Chinese enterprises and sovereign wealth funds have caused 
many to believe that the AML may reflect the fact that an increasingly prosperous 
China no longer needs foreign investment as badly as before and that Beijing is 
therefore using its national security review to discourage foreign investment. 
Nonetheless, it is unclear how such a national security review will be applied and the 
wording of Article 31 AML actually indicates that Chinese policymakers intend to use 
other laws and regulations but not the AML to deal with concerns on national security. 
7.33.3 Factors to be Considered: a Preliminary Framework for Analysis 
Under the AML, the AMEA shall take into account the following factors, including: (1) 
relevant market share and market power of undertakings concerned; (2) concentration 
levels of relevant market; (3) effects on market entry and technology development; (4) 
effects on consumers and other related undertakings; (5) effects on national economic 
developments; and (6) other factors having effects on market competition that the 
AMEA considers shall be taken into consideration. 139 The proposed concentrations' 
effect on public interest, a factor which was required to be considered under the First 
137 
, WL, art 28. 
178 Jamil Anderlini, `Investors fear over China monopolies law' Financial Times (London 30 August 2007). 
139 AML, art 27. 
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Reading Draft, was deleted. 140 
7.33.4 Conditional Approval: Commitments or Remedies? 
If the AMEA decides to approve a concentration, it may attach `restrictive conditions' 
to the implementation of the concentration in order to `reduce the anti-competitive 
conditions arising from the proposed concentration'. 141 What type of conditions, 
structural, behavioural, or both, will be used to modify a proposed concentration is 
uncertain at the time of writing. Also, whether these conditions will be applied in a 
manner similar to the merger commitments and remedies under the EC and US 
competition law has yet to be addressed by the AML's future guidelines or notices. 
7.4 Horizontal Mergers in China: COME to Acquire China Paradise as an 
Example 
In July 2006, the consumer electronics retailers were shocked by a joint announcement 
between GOME Electrical Appliances Holdings Ltd. (GOME) and China Paradise 
Electronics Retail Ltd (China Paradise) regarding an acquisition plan. GOME, the top 
one consumer appliance retailer in China by turnover and profit, believed that 
acquiring China Paradise, the top one consumer appliance retailer in Shanghai and the 
top three consumer appliance retailer in China, could offer the post-acquisition group 
numerous benefits. Mr. Huang Guangyu, Chairman of COME, stated that the 
transaction could enable the group to enjoy a strengthened position and thus to pursue 
further consolidation opportunities. Furthermore, the acquisition could reduce price 
competition and thus enable the post-acquisition group to focus on business 
improvements and customer services. 
In fact, the two companies have had complementary geographic networks. China 
Paradise's leading position in Shanghai and other regions could thus benefit GOME. 
As of 31 March 2006, GOME and China Paradise had a combined 501 stores across 
140 The First Reading Draft, art 23 (6). 
141 AML, art 29. 
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China, among which GOME had a total number of 296, China Paradise 205. In 
Shanghai, Zhengjiang, and Henan, where GOME had no presence, China Paradise had 
52,23, and 20 stores respectively. Commenting on the proposed transaction, Mr Huang 
stated that the acquisition will be an important step in GOME's development and will 
confirm the company's `clear position as the market leader in China. '142 GOME was 
one of the `key and strategic enterprises' chosen by the Ministry of Commerce 
(MOFCOM) in 2004. The post-acquisition GOME/China Paradise was expected to 
have more than 800 retailing stores in the near future, with annual national wide 
turnover above RMB 80 billion. However, Electronics producers commented that the 
proposed acquisition was `terrifying' because the `powerful retailers' have already 
treated them with many unfair transactional conditions and now, the former `Big Four' 
is becoming `Big Three'. 143 In August 2006, GOME and China Paradise retailing 
stores in Shanghai had a large-scale price cut and had warned their suppliers not to 
attend joint advertising campaign, in-store promotion activities, and new store opening 
promotion activities with Suning, the nearest competitor of GOME and China 
Paradise. '44 
In October 2006, the MOFCOM held a public hearing as regards the proposed 
acquisition between GOME and China Paradise. Several consumer electronics 
producers and distributors presented the hearing and were against the acquisition. 
Questionnaires addressed to competitors included a question of `what kind of influence 
will the acquisition bring to competitors' and other questions modeled after the EU 
model. However, the hearing was close-door, parties were not involved and no 
information was available on how the MOFCOM assessed the deal. 145 The deal was 
142 Analysis of this paragraph is based on information from the Joint Announcement: GOME to acquire all the 
issued shares of China Paradise, on 25th July 2006 at Hong Kong Stock Market (SEHK), 
<http: /Avww. hkex. comhk/listedco/listconews/sehkl20060725/LTN20060725195. pdf>. 
143 Chen Junjun, 'Guomei tumou Yongle: kongbu de binggou' (GOME to acquire China Paradise: a terrifying 
takeover) Zhongguo Jingji Shibao (China Economic Times) (20 July 2006). 'Big Four' refers to 'Guomei', 'Suning', 
'China Paradise', and post-acquisition 'Five Star/Bust Buy'. 
"" Chen Hua, 'Guomei Yongle yaoqiu gongyingshang buxu zhichi Suning' (GOME and China Paradise required 
suppliers not to support Suning) DongfangShibao (Orient Times) (8 August 2006). 
143 Telephone interview with counsel to one of GOME's competitors conducted in January 2007. 
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successfully closed in November 2006 and China Paradise became a wholly owned 
subsidiary of GOME. 
7.5 Concluding Remarks 
Regarding the AML merger control rules, many commentators believed that, although 
developed gradually, the major weakness is that the AMEA's powers are still too 
discretionary and this creates uncertainty. Furthermore, people are concerned that there 
are insufficient checks that could lead to excessive government interference into 
marketplace or to corruption or both. 146 
In conclusion, the AML may develop as a modern legislation conforming to the 
accepted international practice to the maximum extent consistent with China's unique 
requirements, a compromised product of conflicting competition policy and industry 
policy, or something else in between. An objective, and pro-competition merger 
control system is difficult to achieve in short time. A de facto discriminatory enforced 
merger control law provided by the M&A Rules may trigger trade remedies and 
blocking statute against China with by no means any certainty for this transitional 
economy. Therefore, without any reservation on the significance of a merger control 
law for China, this writer's pragmatic suggestion is that short and medium term 
implementing objectives of the AML, instead of uncontrolled ex ante deliberation on 
concentrations, could focus on minimizing entry barriers, ex post scrutiny on 
restrictive agreements and abuse of dominance. Market structure is always unstable in 
a dynamic globalising environment, and de-merger remedies can only be used as a last 
resort with great caution. Furthermore, it is better to address the `national (economic) 
security' and `political independence' concerns outside the realm of competition law. 
Having said that, China has overcome a steep learning curve to introduce a struggling 
but fast growing merger control law, in particular, and a system of competition law, in 
general. 
146 See, for example, comments by various interested parties in 2006 SCNPC Summary, see n 108, above. 
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8 
Enforcement 
One of the most significant challenges running through the legislative debate has been 
the design of an appropriate AML procedure. Difficulties of resolving this problem 
have led to a legislative deadlock. Prior to the enactment of the AML, as the only 
major jurisdiction without a comprehensive competition code, China deals with 
competition-related issues through a series of laws, regulations, rules and policies. 
Currently, the State Administration of Industry and Commerce (SAIC), the National 
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and the Ministry of Commerce 
(MOFCOM) play separate but sometimes overlapping roles on regulating competition 
and monopolies. The three agencies' authority originates from the AUCL, the Price 
Law, the Bidding Law, and most recently the M&A Rules. 147 This framework has 
caused inter-agency conflicts, unaccountability and uncertainty but the AML's 
enactment does not improve the situation. Building on the three reading drafts, the 
AML envisages the establishment of an Anti-Monopoly Commission (AMC) and an 
Anti-Monopoly Enforcement Authority (AMEA) designated by the SC. However, the 
law leaves insufficient certainty on commissionership, staffing and authorities of the 
AMC and AMEA, and on the relationship between the two institutions. Furthermore, 
which agency(ies) would be designated as the AMEA is still uncertain at the time of 
writing. 
This chapter demystifies an obscure relationship between the AML procedure on the 
one hand, and Chinese litigation rules and legal-political reality on the other, and thus 
highlights how the AML affects the marketplace and governance in the PRC. 
The chapter begins by tracing the historical development of the AML agency 
arrangement, which has been designed as an administrative control system combing 
147 See discussions on relevant laws and agencies at 3.2,4.2,5.2,6.2,7.2, above. 
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investigative and prosecutorial functions with adjudicative function. The chapter asks 
to what extent the system could achieve maximal accuracy at minimal administrative 
costs. 
The chapter goes on to analyze the AML administrative proceedings of (1) restrictive 
agreements and abuse of dominance, (2) merger control, and (3) abuse of 
administrative powers to restrict competition. It then looks at the AML judicial 
proceedings of administrative and civil litigation that can be relied upon by interested 
parties, and explains why the AML provides these proceedings in a single article 
without further clarification. 
Finally, by examining the 1989 Administrative Litigation Law and the 1991 Civil 
Procedure Law, the chapter evaluates the interface between the AML procedure and 
Chinese litigation rules. It answers whether a judicial check on AML agency's 
decisions is illusory and whether there is space for AML private enforcement. Because 
the AML will enter into force on I August 2008 and Chinese litigation rules are 
currently under revision, the interface is thus a dynamic and evolutionary one. 
8.1 Background 
The last and the most demanding task for Chinese AML legislators is the design of an 
optimal and appropriate enforcement system. Since such system requires the existence 
of relatively independent competition authority under competent check of the judiciary, 
it is difficult to be adopted under the current Chinese context, in which an accountable 
administrative and an impartial judicial system are not fully established. 148 This 
dilemma has led to the AML to a legislative deadlock and there has been a constant 
power-fighting process on institutional arrangement from 1999 to present. 
The ongoing debate focuses on the superiority and feasibility of a single, centralized 
and (quasi-)independent enforcement authority vis-ä-vis a system of multiple 
1411 See ch 2, above. 
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enforcement agencies. '49 This chapter examines principles of the AML enforcement by 
looking closely at the agency arrangement, and the administrative and judicial 
proceedings. It also describes the status quo of the logjam between the AML and 
industry policy in the PRC, the latter manifests mainly as numerous and ever-growing 
sectoral regulations. Finally, the chapter attempts a recently raised question that asks 
whether the adoption of the EC competition law model would be a Trojan horse for the 
PRC. '5° 
8.2 Institutional Structure under the Anti-Monopoly Law 2007 
The 1999 and 2002 Drafts AML once envisaged an Anti-Monopoly Administration 
Body (AMAB) directly under the State Counciltst. The proposed AMAB was later 
substituted by the 2004 Draft with a `competent commercial authority under the 
Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) which shall establish competent Anti-Monopoly 
Agency'. 152 
Enforcement mechanism of the April and July 2005 Drafts went back to the 1999 and 
2002 model and suggested a ministry-level Anti-Monopoly Authority (AMA) and 
equipped the AMA with substantial investigating and decision-making powers. 153 
Nevertheless, this possibility has disappeared again since November 2005. The status 
and competence of the AML enforcement authority is still an unclear point at the time 
149 American Bar Association (ABA), Joint Comments on the Proposed Anti-Monopoly Law of the People's 
Republic of China, at, <http: //www. abanet. orglantitrust/at-comments/2005/07-05/abaprcat2005-2final. pdf>, May 
2005,4-5 and 28-30, and, <http: //www. abanet. org/antitrust/at-comments/2003/07-03/jointsubmissionpdf>, July 
2003,4 and 25-27; Mark Williams, Competition Policy and Law in China, Hong Kong and Taiwan, 185-191,194- 
197, and 440-441. For most recent comments on the AML enforcement see related papers presented at the 2d Asian 
Competition Law and Policy Conference, Hong Kong, December 2006, at, 
<http: //asiancompetitionforum. org/presentation/schedule. htm>. For example, Wang Xiaoye, 'Highlights of Chinese 
Antimonopoly Draft - From a Critical Perspective', in which Professor Wang emphasizes that the 'lack of a unified 
antitrust authority' is a serious problem of the AML. 
150 Mark Williams, 'Adoption of the EC Competition Law Model - Is It a Trojan Horse for China? ', in Cheng 
Weidong (ed) 7hongguo Jrngchengfa Lifa Tanyao (An Exploration of China's Legislation on Competition) (Social 
Science Academic Press, Beijing 2006) 102-149,324-357. (The article was translated into and published in Chinese. 
The original text was attached as part of the appendix of the book. ) In this article, Williams suggests that the 
adoption of an EC model may create unforeseen and unintended consequences to China. See discussion in 8.6, 
below. 
151 See the 1999 Draft and the 2002 Draft. 
152 The 2002 Draft, arts 37 and 38, and the 2004 Draft, arts 6,40-41. 
153 The April 2005 Draft, art 6 and the July 2005 Draft, art 5. 
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of writing. According to the AML, the Anti-Monopoly Commission (AMC) of the 
State Council shall be responsible to organize, coordinate and guide the anti-monopoly 
work, and the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority (AMEA) designated by the 
State Council shall be in charge of anti-monopoly law enforcement. 
'54 
8.2.1 The Anti-Monopoly Commission (AMC): a Consultative and Coordinating 
Organisation 
Under the First Reading Draft, the AMC is composed of heads of relevant departments 
of the SC and certain numbers of experts. The AMC decision-making and procedure 
rules will be stipulated by the SC (presumingly through future administrative 
regulations). '" It is suggested that the AMC should be set up as a standing 
organisation and its commissioners should preferably leave their current jobs in order 
to make the AMC functional. 156 Nonetheless, such an arrangement has been deleted 
since the Second Reading Draft. Under the AML, authorities and responsibilities of the 
AMC include (1) formulating competition policy, (2) investigating and evaluating the 
overall competition condition of the domestic market and generating evaluation reports, 
(3) supervising and coordinating the AML enforcement (by the AMEA) and other 
relevant enforcement work by relevant organs and regulators, (4) harmonizing 
decision-makings of major anti-monopoly cases, and, (5) other responsibilities 
stipulated by the SC. '57 
However, the design of an AMC has been welcomed neither by scholars nor concerned 
parties. It is believed that the AMC will be an unnecessary, ambiguous, troublesome 
and overlapping organ co-existing with the AMEA. 158 In brief, the AMC is a 
consultative and coordinate organisation and its design reflects political difficulties and 
ßs4 AML, arts 9 and 10. 
us The First Reading Draft, art 32. 
156 The 2006 SCNPC Summary, seen 15, below. 
"7 AML, art 9. 
158 See, for example, Wang Changbin, `Redefine the Function of New Chinese Competition Authorities: A View 
beyond Law Enforcement', Paper presented at the 2nd Asian Competition Law and Policy Conference, 2; the 2006 
SCNPC Summary, comments given by the Province of Jilin, seen 15, below. 
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compromise in setting up the AML enforcement mechanism. 
8.2.2 The Anti-Monopoly Enforcement Authority (AMEA) 
8.2.2.1 The AMEA at the Central Level 
As regards the AML enforcement authority, a particular vexed question is how 
responsibilities will be allocated between several agencies that the AMEA might 
incorporate in. '59 
A recent popular view is that the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), the State 
Administration for Industry & Commerce (SAIC) and the National Development and 
Reform Commission (NDRC), will assume the role of AMEA and will have concurrent 
jurisdiction to enforce the AML. The first reason of such an observation is that the 
MOFCOM holds powers to enforce the 2003 M&A Rules (now the revised 2006 M&A 
Rules) and would be responsible for merger control; the NDRC has supervised the 
1997 Price Law and the 2003 Interim Price Monopoly Rules, and would scrutinize 
anticompetitive agreements especially cartels; and the SAIC has enforced the 1993 
AUCL, and thus would investigate abuse of dominance and certain merger review 
(under the M&A Rules). 160 The second reason is that according to wordings of the 
AML, it seemed one or more affiliated agency(ies) will be appointed by the SC by 1 
August 2008. 
This writer argues that whilst such understanding is however incomplete and might 
even contrary to the will of Chinese legislators. In fact, which agency (ies) will be 
appointed as the AMEA and hierarchy of the AMEA are still uncertain at present. This 
argument is in part based on an official NPC document summarizing nationwide 
feedbacks on the First Reading Draft from interested parties (hereinafter referred to as 
the `2006 SCNPC Summary'). 161 
159 Similar concerns have been expressed by scholars and practitioners recently. For example, Wang Changbin (n 12) 
1; Michael Han, 'Development in China's Anti-Monopoly Law and M&A Regulations', speech at Freshfields 
Bruckhaus Deringer Web-based Antitrust Seminar on 24 Jan 2007. 
160 See for example, Wang Changbin (n 12) 1 and S. 
161 An internal confidential document issued by the Legislative Affairs Office of the SCNPC (the Standing 
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According to the 2006 SCNPC Summary, a typical view among Chinese agencies 
currently regulating competition-related issues came from the SERC (State Electricity 
Regulatory Commission). The SERC suggested that the wording of `Anti-Monopoly 
Enforcement Authority designated by the State Council' should be clarified as 
ministries and other agencies of the SC which function as market regulators according 
to laws and administrative regulations. Since among 78 agencies of the SC by early 
2007, at least 29 agencies more or less have certain powers on regulating competition 
and market, this suggestion implied an over-broad enforcement framework. 
Nevertheless, this suggestion reflects the ongoing power-fighting on the AML 
enforcement among Chinese agencies at the highest level. 162 
On the contrary, local governments, academic institutions, professional associations 
and industries criticized the uncertainty and non-independency on the AML 
institutional arrangement. 163 For example, Tibet and provinces of Helongjiang and 
Guangdong questioned the AMEA and suggested that which agency would be 
appointed must be clarified. Jiangsu, one of the most developed provinces of the PRC, 
suggested that the absence of an independent and competent enforcement agency 
indicates that the time is not yet ripe for enacting the AML. This view was also shared 
by scholars of China Academy of Social Science (CASS), the highest Chinese official 
research institution in social science. 
Over the years, the anonymous Chinese attending public discussions has also provided 
Committee of the National People's Congress) in December 2006. Source and official title of the document cannot 
be disclosed for the purpose of informants' protection. This document summarized comments on the June 2006 
Draft AML from NPC and local PC members, State Council, local governments of 23 provinces, 5 autonomous 
regions and 4 municipalities, industries, academic institutions, non-government organisations, and professional 
associations. 
162 See discussions in chs 2 and 3 on power-fighting of AML drafting and enforcer status among Chinese central 
government agencies. The seventy eight SC agencies include 28 ministries and commissions (MOFCOM, SDRC, 
etc. ), 1 special organisation (SASAC), 18 organisations (SAIC, STA, GACA, etc. ), 6 offices (TAO, HMAO, etc. ), 
14 institutions (CIRC, CSRC, SERC, etc. ), and 14 bureaus (STMA, SPB, SAFE, etc. ). See discussions at 2.3.1, 
above. Structural framework and information of SC is available at <http: //english. gov. cn/links/statecouncil. htm>. 
163 Critical opinions came from governments of Shanghai, Tianjin, Chongqing, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Hunan, Guangxi; 
China Academy of Social Science, China Academy of Engineering, Development Research Centre of the SC; Foreign Investment Enterprises Association, Sino-Pec, China Life Insurance Co.; Tsinghua Univ. China Univ. of Politics and Law, Xiamen Univ. etc. 
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their enthusiasm and wisdom towards the anti-monopoly enforcement. 164 One 
comment by a questionnaire respondent reads `it will be much quicker to establish a 
Monopoly-Protection Authority than be struggling to set up an Anti-Monopoly 
Enforcement Authority. All we need is each ministry, commission, and bureau provides 
one official. 065 
`The AML legislation has been the most democratic lawmaking process in the history 
of the PRC', so said Professor Xiaoye Wang, a top Chinese competition law scholar. 166 
Signals from the 2006 SCNPC Summary and the ongoing public discussions are that 
the demand and desire for a relatively independent or at least centralized AML 
enforcement agency parallel the power-fighting process. Over the years, such a 
demand and desire is becoming more powerful and persuasive, although it is 
unrealistic to predict whether it would win by 1 August 2008. It may be even stronger 
in the long run and thus may predict the future trend of the AML. While transitional 
China is ushering in a more plural society slowly but inevitably, the evolution of AML 
and its enforcement mechanism continue to prove a proposition that competition law 
and policy change as interest group demands change. 167 
8.2.2.2 The AMEA Local Branches 
Another major concern is the necessity of establishing AMEA local branches across 
the PRC taking into account the size of the country and the possible heavy workload to 
a one-stop AML enforcement mechanism. However, if the answer is yes, the following 
question is how the system should be designed in order to minimum enforcement 
inconsistency between central and local enforcers and to avoid regulation capture by 
local business. 
164 At the time of writing, most major national presses and websites have had on-off or continued open discussions 
on the AML legislation 
165 Source: questionnaire respondents to the current writer's field research in China in summer 2005. See Appendix 
2 for data explanation. 
1" See 3.1.5, above. 
167 ML Greenhurt & Bruce Benson, American Antitrust Laws in Theory and in Practice (Avebury, Aldershot 1989) 
179-80. 
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To assure nationwide consistency, the previous drafts AML did envisage a network of 
local branches at the provincial level which would be under the unified leadership and 
administration of the AML authority under the SC. 168 However, the AML finally 
provides that the AMEA can authorize `the corresponding organs of the people's 
government at provincial level' to be in charge of the AML enforcement 
responsibilities. 169 Considering the widespread problem of regional blockade in the 
PRC, this design of decentralized enforcement branches implies a danger of local 
influences and conflict of interests that may compromise the consistency and 
transparency of the AML to an immeasurable content. 170 
8.2.3 The People's Court System 
The people's court system is a four-level, complex but still vulnerable one in the 
hierarchy of the PRC power system. 171 The AML empowers the people's courts to 
review the legality of acts of the AMEA and to adjudicate anti-monopoly 
compensation claims brought by injured parties. Analyses of AML judicial proceedings 
of administrative and civil litigation are provided at 8.4 below. However, at present, it 
would be unrealistic to predict the degree of judicial function of the people's court 
system on the AML. 
8.3 The Anti-Monopoly Administrative Proceedings 
The AML provides three packages of different administrative proceedings, with 
relevant rules of which spread in Chapters I, IV, VI, and VII. These three packages are 
proceedings: (1) on restrictive agreements and abuse of dominant market positions; (2) 
on merger control; and, (3) on abuse of administrative powers to eliminate or restrict 
168 For example, art 37 of the April 2005 Draft and art 33 of the July 2005 Draft AML. 
169 AMI, pars 2 of art 10. 
170 See discussions on local protectionism /regional blockades in 4.5.2, above. Also see ABA (n 3), comments on art 37 of the April 2005 Draft, at, Joint Comments 2005,29. 
171 See 2.4, above. The four levels are: (1) the Supreme People's Court at the national level, (2) the Higher People's 
Courts at the provincial level, (3) the Intermediate People's Courts at the municipal level, (4) the Basic People's 
Courts at county or district level. 
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competition. The first two packages cover infringements defined as `monopolistic 
conduct', the principal subject matter of the AML. The third package covers 
enforcement rules on a type of conduct, widely known and referred as `administrative 
monopoly', which is not defined as `monopolistic conduct' but is declared unlawful by 
the AML. The current AML framework empowers the AMEA jurisdiction on 
monopolistic conduct and delegates other competent administrative organs jurisdiction 
on abuse of administrative powers to restrict competition. 
This section starts analyses from power of the AMEA on the three packages of AML 
administrative proceedings. It further examines administrative review, a mechanism 
provided by existing Chinese law, which functions as internal checks within the 
administrative system of the PRC. 
8.3.1 Power of the AMEA: The Integration of Investigation, Prosecution and 
Adjudication 
The AML enforcement mechanism has been based on an EC model of competition 
procedure since 1999. As analyzed already, the PRC made such a choice for a variety 
of reasons. 172 The principle features of such mechanism are administrative control and 
the combination of investigative and prosecutorial function with adjudicative function 
to a specialized administrative agency. 
The concept of `administrative control system of competition law' means a mechanism 
in which: (1) administrative decision making is central, but subject to judicial checks 
by courts; (2) basic objectives often intertwine with or aim to implement governmental 
policies; (3) government administrators and specialized procedures play the central 
roles; (4) implementation, more or less discretionary, relies on a variety of compliance 
tools, including competition advocacy and informal guidance to undertakings, etc. 173 
172 See chs 5,6, and 7, above. 
173 See David J Gerber, Law and Competition in Twentieth Century Europe: Protecting Prometheus (1" paperback 
edn Oxford University Press, Oxford 2001) 128 and 173. The contents of this paragraph are also based on Gerber's 
presentation at a book launch seminar (held for the Chinese edition of Law and Competition in Twentieth Century Europe) in Beijing on 31 October 2004. 
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Under the AML, similar to the European Commission, the AMEA combines the 
investigative and prosecutorial function with the adjudicative function. According to 
the Chapter VI Investigation of Suspected Monopolistic Conduct and Chapter IV 
Concentrations of Undertakings, the AMEA has some substantive but roughly-outlined 
powers to investigate and assess possible monopolistic conduct. These powers include 
investigating and evaluating sector-specific market competition conditions, inspection 
of business premises, interviews, request and collection for information and evidence, 
inquiring and freezing bank accounts, interim measures, accepting commitments and 
reopen proceedings, finding infringements, imposing fines and adopting decisions, etc. 
Wils, an EC competition law commentator suggests that, for comparing different 
competition enforcement system, accuracy and administrative costs can be two 
premier factors. Wils claims that these two factors can be relied on when choosing 
between function-separate and function-integrated options of competition enforcement 
mechanisms. He recognizes that a wide range of factors may have influence on 
capacity of an enforcement system, for example, `the level of expertise' and `the 
availability of sufficient resources'. However, he further observes that these factors 
should be assumed with equal footing in any given competition law enforcement 
system, and focus should be given to whether the system `achieves maximal accuracy 
at minimal administrative cost'. The reason is that accuracy and administrative cost 
can be significantly different, for example, in the function-separate US antitrust 
enforcement system and the function-integrated EC system. 174 
The question `whether the AML enforcement mechanism could achieve maximum 
accuracy at minimum administrative cost' is highly relevant that is worthy to be 
assessed by commentators and is necessary to keep vigilant by Chinese policymaker 
and enforcer. 
174 Wils, Principles of ECAntitrust Enforcement, (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2005) 161-62. 
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8.3.2 Rules on Restrictive Agreements and Abuse of Dominance 
Enforcement rules on the prohibition of restrictive agreements and abuse of dominant 
market position are provides by the AML in Chapter VI Investigation of Suspected 
Monopolistic Conduct and Chapter VII Legal Liabilities. 175 
The AML administrative proceeding on restrictive agreements and abusive behaviour 
by dominant undertakings is outlined below. Firstly, an AML investigation can be 
opened under the AMEA's initiatives or after receiving complaints. The undertaking 
involved has rights to state its case and to defend itself. Secondly, if the undertaking 
concerned offer commitments to eliminate effects of the alleged monopolistic conducts 
within certain time limit, the AMEA may suspend the investigation. How long will the 
time limit extend has not yet been provided by the AML. The AMEA shall supervise 
the performance of the commitments. It may decide to terminate the investigation 
(without given a formal decision) and may decide to reduce or relieve the penalties 
upon satisfied performance of the commitments. However, the AMEA may reopen the 
proceeding when some conditions are satisfied. These conditions are (1) failure to 
perform the commitments by the undertakings involved; (2) substantial changes 
occurred to the facts upon which the decision of suspending the investigation was 
made; or (3) such decision was made upon incomplete or misrepresented information 
by the undertakings involved. 
After investigation and verifying evidence, if the AMEA determines that the alleged 
behaviour constitutes monopolistic conducts stipulated by the AML, it can adopt a 
decision finding an infringement of the AML, ordering the undertaking concerned to 
terminate the behaviour, and/or imposing fines (between 1-10% of previous annual 
turnover) and confiscating the illegal gains. As regards non-implemented restrictive 
agreements, a fine less than RMB 500 thousands may be imposed. Furthermore, for 
parties of restrictive agreements reporting relevant information and provide important 
evidence, the AMEA may adopt a decision of reduced or exempted punishment. This 
°S This framework has been followed since the 1999 Draft. See relevant articles of AML, including chs VI & VII, 
AML, esp. arts 38-47,49-50, and 52. 
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rule can be seen as a rudimentary form of a Chinese leniency mechanism towards 
cartels. 176 When deciding amounts of fines, the AMEA shall take into account factors 
such as nature, extent and duration of the alleged behaviour. The AMEA may publish 
its decisions to the public. 
8.3.3 Rules on Merger Control 
Different with the enforcement rules on prohibiting restrictive agreements and abuse of 
dominance, enforcement rules concerning merger control are mainly provided in the 
Chapter IV Concentrations of Undertakings and therefore co-exist with the substantive 
rules on merger review. This arrangement is also based on the ECMR model. Only one 
article regarding merger control is provided in the Chapter VII Legal Liabilities which 
stipulates that implementing an unauthorized concentration may incur a fine up to 
RMB 500 thousands and other measure in order to restore to the conditions of pre- 
concentration. 177 
The administrative proceeding of merger control is briefly outlined below. First of all, 
concentrations (mergers, acquisitions, and acquisition of control through other means 
such as contracts) that meet the notification thresholds stipulated by the AML must be 
notified to the AMEA. Such concentrations cannot be implemented either before 
notifications or until clearances by the AMEA. With a preliminary review of 30 days 
following the notification, the AMEA must make a decision that if a further review 
will be opened. There is no extension to the 30-day time limit for the preliminary 
review. If the AMEA fails to reach a decision with the 30-day time limit, the proposed 
concentration is deemed to be cleared. Secondly, the time limit for the further review is 
90 days which can be extended by up to another 60 days under specified circumstances 
and with the AMEA's written notice to the undertakings involved. These circumstances 
include (1) the undertakings concerned agree to extend the time limit; (2) documents 
submitted by the undertakings concerned are inaccurate that need further verification; 
176 See 5.3.1.2 and 5.3.3.2, above. 
177 AML, arts 23-26,30,48. 
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or, (3) relevant circumstances have significantly changed following the notification. 
Furthermore, during the course of the further review, if the AMEA reaches a 
conclusion that the proposed concentration may eliminate or restrict competition and 
the undertaking concerned cannot meet certain conditions, 178 it shall adopt a decision 
to prohibit the concentration; otherwise the concentration shall be cleared (which may 
subject to conditions imposed by the AMEA). There are no explicit rules on whether 
the AMEA will address to the undertakings involved before the final decision a 
statement of objections, setting out its findings and giving the undertaking opportunity 
to respond in writing and at an oral hearing. 
Many commentators and critics of the current enforcement rules believed that, 
although developed step by step, central weakness of the AML merger control rules is 
still too many uncertainties and too much discretionary authority to the AMEA. They 
feared that there are insufficient checks which could lead to excessive government 
interference into marketplace or to corruption of the officials or both. 179 
8.3.4 Rules on Abuse of Administrative Power to Eliminate or Restrict 
Competition 
As regards administrative monopoly, the AML provides that conduct of administrative 
and/or public organizations which abuse administrative powers to restrict competition 
shall be ordered to revoke andmodify such conduct by relevant governmental agencies 
at higher level. The AML further provides that where other laws and administrative 
regulations stipulating abuse of administrative powers to eliminate or restrict 
competition, those provisions shall apply. 180 
Previously, it was the AML authority which shall order the alleged agencies to revoke 
17" See 7.3.3, above. Conditions which may be accepted by the AMEA include: proof of the proposed 
concentration's pro-competition factors will obviously outweigh anti-competition factors, or the proposed 
concentration is in accordance with the public interests. See AML, art 28. 
119 Huang Yong, Wang Xiaoye, see n 3, above, and comments by various interested parties in the 2006 SCNPC 
Summary, seen 1S, above. 
'go AML, art 51. 
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the administrative abusive behaviour. Currently deleted enforcement rules also include 
powers of the AMEA to refer the alleged abusive administrative behaviour to criminal 
procedure when the behaviour may constitute a criminal offence. And the AMEA's 
power to request the alleged agencies rectifying or revoking promulgated rules that 
eliminate or restrict competition. 181 Therefore, one may reasonably predicate a major 
dilemma implied by the current rules that although the AML still attempts to regulate 
abuse of administrative power to restrict competition, this type of behaviour however 
falls outside the jurisdiction of the AMEA but falls within the jurisdiction of `other 
competent administrative organs', a category which include uncertain numbers of 
agencies in the PRC. 182 
8.3.5 Administrative Reconsideration (Xingzheng Fuyi): The Internal Check 
Mechanism193 
Administrative reconsideration, according to the Administrative Reconsideration Law 
(ARL), the Administrative Litigation Law (ALL), and relevant judicial interpretations, 
refers to citizens, legal persons, and other organisations applying to administrative 
organs for reconsidering the legality and/or appropriateness of specific administrative 
actions. 184 Administrative reconsideration is therefore an internal administrative 
remedy available to grieved parties of administrative decisions and behaviour. 
Analysis of AML administrative reconsideration has been ignored by commentators. 
Until present, not much relevant literature has provided insights on this topic. While 
Huang, a Chinese scholar recently examined the insufficient design of the AML 
remedies, argued the AML would be `a toothless monster', and briefly asked who 
would be parties to the AML administrative reconsideration, but he suggested no 
answers. 185 
"' For example, the April 2005 Draft, art 49. 
162 Wang Xiaoye (n 3) 11. 
183 'X then ing g fuyi' sometimes is translated as 'administrative review'. 
ýu ARL, arts 1 and 2. 
135 Huang Yong, 'Zhongguo Fanlongduanfa xia de Jiuji Cuoshi' (Remedies of Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law), Paper 
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However, taking into account the status quo of a strong administrative system versus a 
relevantly weak judiciary in the PRC, the AML administrative reconsideration 
proceeding is important and may play a significant role in the AML's future 
enforcement after 1 August 2008. Furthermore, existing framework of Chinese law has 
indeed provided basic, although not optimal answers, both to the AML administrative 
reconsideration and to the AML administrative litigation. A step by step inquiry is 
therefore offered below which explores key concepts and major aspects of the AML 
administrative internal check mechanism through a dialogue between the 1999 
Administrative Reconsideration Law (ARL), the 1989 Administrative Litigation Law 
(ALL), and the AML. 
8.3.5.1 The Context: The Administrative Reconsideration Law 1999 (ARL) 
and the Administrative Litigation Law 1989 (ALL) 
The AMEA's decision is binding on the undertakings to whom it is addressed. AML 
interested parties can refer to administrative reconsideration as the first venue to 
challenge the AMEA's decisions on concentrations between undertakings. If the parties 
are not satisfied with the decisions of the reconsideration, they can refer to 
administrative litigation, namely, to bring an action challenge the decision by the 
reviewed organs before a People's Court. 186 For the AMEA decisions on restrictive 
agreements and abuse of market dominant position, parties can choose to apply for 
administrative reconsideration or directly bring an action to challenge the decision. 
187 
Administrative litigation is analyzed in the next section of judicial proceedings. 
However, two existing and closely linked Chinese laws, the ARL and the ALL need to 
be introduced here since they provide key concepts and a context for any further 
delivered at the 2"d Asian Competition Law & Policy Conference, 1 and 7, see n 3, above. 
186 AML, art 53. See, also, art 25 of the 1989 Administrative Litigation law, which reads: When citizens, legal 
persons or other organisations directly bring actions before the People's Court, administrative organs which took the 
specific administrative actions are the defendants. For reviewed specific administrative actions, if reviewing organs 
withhold the specific administrative actions, the original administrative organs are the defendants; otherwise the 
reviewing organs are the defendants. 
187 AML, art 53. 
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investigations on the AML administrative and judicial proceedings. Furthermore, the 
AML does not provide any explanations on administrative reconsideration and 
administrative litigation, which implies that reference to the ARL and the ALL is 
imperative in order to fully understand the relevant AML enforcement rules. Therefore, 
a preliminary analysis of administrative reconsideration and administrative litigation in 
China and their implications to the AML is provided here and in the following section. 
Nevertheless, the interaction between the ARL, the ALL and the AML enforcement has 
inevitably ushered in a broader legal landscape in which Chinese constitutional law, 
administrative law, criminal and civil laws and relevant litigation rules need to be 
taken into account. Therefore, more detailed investigation will not be conducted in this 
thesis; the topic however merits another timely and more in-depth academic endeavour. 
8.3.5.2 Key Concepts: Specific Administrative Actions (Juti Xingzheng Xingwei) 
and Abstract Administrative Actions (Chouxiang Xingzheng Xingwei) 
Currently, `specific administrative actions' are the principle subject of both 
administrative reconsideration and administrative litigation in the PRC. Thus, this term 
and its opposite, namely, `abstract administrative actions', need to be clarified first. 
Specific administrative actions, according to the ARL, the ALL and relevant People's 
Supreme Court judicial interpretations, refers to unilateral actions undertaken by 
administrative organs and/or their personnel, organisations exercising administrative 
functions, or other organisations or individuals entrusted with administrative powers 
by administrative organs, which target specific citizens, legal persons or other 
organisations and produce legal effects such as to affect their interests, rights and 
obligations. In the AML context, interim measures taken and/or decisions imposed by 
the AMEA and its local branches are `specific administrative actions' and thus may be 
subject to administrative reconsideration and litigation. 
On the contrary, according to Article 12 of the ALL, abstract administrative actions 
refer to administrative regulations, ministerial rules, decisions and orders, and other 
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normative documents with general binding force adopted by administrative organs. 
Although under trenchant criticism and possible reform has been demanded over the 
years, at present, abstract administrative actions are basically administratively and 
judicially non-reviewable. 188 The AML prohibits administrative organs and public 
organization abusing administrative power to set rules with contents that eliminate or 
restrict competition. However, these rules will be categorized as `abstractive 
administrative actions' and therefore is out of control by administrative reconsideration 
and litigation. 189 
8.3.5.3 The Anti-Monopoly Administrative Reconsideration Authority(ies) 
Currently, the legal basis for identifying AML administrative reconsideration 
authority(ies) is Article 14 of the ARL. This article provides that interested parties can 
apply for administrative reconsideration to organs of the State Council against specific 
administrative actions adopted by the same organs. Article 14 also allows interested 
parties apply for administrative review directly to the State Council against specific 
administrative actions adopted by organs of the State Council. However, according to 
the ARL, decisions by the State Council's administrative review will be final and 
interested parties will lose their rights of referring to administrative litigation. 
Therefore, direct applications to the State Council for administrative review rarely 
happen in practice. 
In sum, under the ARL and the current AML framework, the administrative 
reconsideration authority(ies) against decisions adopted by the AMEA should be either 
the AMEA or the State Council. 
As regards decisions adopted by the AMEA local branches, which are currently 
specified as `the corresponding organs of the people's government at provincial level', 
interested parties shall have rights to choose either apply to the AMEA or to the 
188 ARL, art 7. 
189 AML, art 37. 
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people's government at provincial level for AML administrative reconsideration. The 
legal basis of is Article 15 of the ARL. 
8.3.5.4 A Proposal 
Considering the complex nature of competition cases which require detailed fact- 
finding and rigorous legal, economic, and empirical analysis, also considering the fact 
of local blockade and protectionism in the PRC, it is hereby submitted that future AML 
revision and/or (non-)legislation may specifically establish a special panel under the 
AMEA and delegate the panel status of the AML administrative reconsideration 
authority. On this aspect, the recent EC Commission experience on Chief Economist 
and the Peer Review Panel, which reflects an emphasis on procedural informal 
safeguards, may have particular relevance to Mainland China. Considering the scope 
of this thesis, this point will not be further discussed here. 
8.3.5.5 Limitation Periods for Anti-Monopoly Administrative Reconsideration 
Article 9 of the ARL laid down a 60-working-day general limitation period (unless 
extended by other laws) for all applications for administrative reconsideration. 
Limitation periods for adopting decisions of administrative reconsideration are 
provided by Article 31, which includes a 60-working-day general period (unless 
deduced by other laws). This limitation period can be extended by up to another 30- 
working-day when decisions cannot be made in 60-working-day because of 
complexity of the cases concerned and when approvals are granted from head of the 
administrative reconsideration authority. In brief, unless the AML further specifies 
limitation periods of the AML administrative reconsideration, the ARL rules shall 
apply. 
8.4 The Anti-Monopoly Judicial Proceedings 
Administrative litigation has been provided by the AML as a statutory remedy for 
parties who challenge decisions by the AMEA or its local branches in front of the 
People's Court system. Civil litigation is available for injured parties to seek 
compensation. Since the current literature has provided insufficient analyses on the 
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implications of administrative and civil litigation to the AML, this section aims to 
identify uncertainties and to submit possible answers. 
8.4.1 Administrative Litigation 
8.4.1.1 Is Administrative Reconsideration a Prerequisite for Administrative 
Litigation? 
A hotly-debated issue of the 2006 SCNPC Summary focuses on whether the AML 
administrative reconsideration is a prerequisite procedure prior to challenging the 
AMEA's decisions before a court. Furthermore, it has been suggested that interested 
parties should be provided with rights of choice on either (a) administrative 
reconsideration followed by administrative litigation, or (b) direct administrative 
litigation without administrative reconsideration. 
190 The AML finally chooses both 
approaches although according to the authentic wording prior to the First Reading 
Draft, it seems that an administrative reconsideration does be required before the 
opening of a judicial procedure. 
8.4.1.2 The AML Administrative Litigation Plaintiff(s) and Defendant(s) 
The first question to be answer is who can sue whom. According to relevant articles of 
the ALL and the AML, as a general rule, all decisions imposed by the AMEA and its 
local branches (AML decisions) producing legal effects to interested parties may be 
subject to judicial check through administrative litigation to a people's court. It is 
therefore a straightforward answer that parties who are addressed by AML decisions 
are plaintiffs ofAML administrative litigation. 
However, who would be the defendant(s) is worth a two-step analysis. First of all, if 
the AML allows interested parties to challenge the AML decisions before a court 
without first seeking administrative reconsideration, and if the decisions were imposed 
by the AMEA, the AMEA will be the defendant. On the contrary, if the decisions were 
190 According to the 2006 SCNPC Summary, see n 15, above, the Supreme People's Court of PRC and provinces of 
Shandong and Jilin suggested that the AMI, should clarify whether administrative review is a prerequisite of 
administrative litigation. Policy Research Office of the SC, National Development Bank, China People's University, 
etc. suggested that AML parties should have rights to choose proper venues to challenge the AMEA s decisions. 
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imposed by the AMEA local branches, whether the local branches will be the eligible 
defendants calls for further legislative and/or judicial interpretations. The reason is 
that according to Article 25 of the ALL, if administrative decisions are imposed by 
delegated organisations, the authorizing administrative organs are the defendants. 
Under the current AML context, the AMEA local branches are `corresponding organs 
of the people's government at provincial level' authorized by the AMEA. Therefore, 
the AMEA should be the defendant of an AML administrative litigation, no matter the 
challenged AML decisions are imposed by central or local AML authority(ies). 191 
Secondly, if the AML requires AML administrative reconsideration as a prerequisite 
for AML administrative litigation, or if the concerned parties do choose firstly refer to 
administrative reconsideration but then not satisfied by the outcome, according to 
Article 25 of the ALL, who will be the defendants will depend on whether the AML 
administrative reconsideration authority(ies) change the original AMEA decisions. 
That means if the AML administrative reconsideration authority supports the original 
AMEA decision, the AMEA will be the defendant. Otherwise, if the original AMEA 
decision is changed by the AML administrative reconsideration authority, the 
reconsideration authority will be the defendant. In this case and under the current 
AML framework, AMEA, the State Council, and the people's government at provincial 
level are all possible defendants of AML administrative litigation. 
Judging by these analyses, obvious tensions exist on legal certainty, litigation costs, 
administrative burdens, accuracy and connecting factors behind the status quo as 
regards identifying defendants in AML administrative litigation. One may thus 
reasonably conclude that these problems do need to be addressed by legislators, the 
Supreme Court (by way of judicial interpretation), and scholars in the near future. 
8.4.1.3 Legal basis for the AML Administrative Litigation 
Article 53 of the AML allows dissatisfied parties referring to administrative litigation 
191 AML, art 10. 
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to challenge AMEA decision. However the AML does not provide specific legal basis 
on which the interested parties can rely on. Once again the question has to be answered 
by looking at the ALL. 
According to Article 11 of the ALL, eight types of specific administrative actions are 
judicially reviewable through administrative litigation. Among them the first three 
categories are relevant to the AML enforcement, they are: (1) administrative sanctions, 
including detention, fines, revocation of business licenses or permits, orders to suspend 
production or business, confiscation of property, etc; (2) coercive administrative 
measures, including restrictions of personal freedom, seizing or freezing property 
and/or bank accounts, etc; (3) interfering with business' autonomous rights. 
Furthermore, Article 54 of the ALL specifically provides that seven types of 
inappropriate conduct by administrative organs may cause a specific administrative 
actions being revoked, partially revoked, or modified by the people's courts. The 
courts may also order the defendant administrative organs (the defendants) to perform 
a new specific administrative action or perform its legal responsibilities. These seven 
categories are all relevant to the AML enforcement, including: 
192 (1) The alleged 
specific administrative actions are based on insufficient principal evidence; (2) The 
alleged specific administrative actions are imposed through an incorrect application of 
laws or rules; (3) The defendant administrative organs violated legally prescribed 
procedures; (4) The defendant exceeded its legal authority, (5) The defendant abused 
its power; (6) The disputed administrative penalties are clearly unjust; (7) The 
defendant's failure to act or delayed to act of its legal responsibilities within reasonable 
time. 
Under the AML context, a plaintiff can therefore rely on administrative litigation 
against an AML decision before a people's court on both factual and legal grounds. 
The court may annul, partially revoke, or change the coercive measures, the fine and/or 
192 The wording below is based on art 54 of the ALL and Minxin Pei, `Citizens v Mandarins: Administrative 
Litigation in China' (1997) 152 The China Quarterly 855-56. 
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other penalty imposed by the AMEA or its local branches. 
8.4.1.4 Jurisdiction 
The next logical question is which court(s) will have jurisdiction on cases brought 
against the AMEA and its local agencies. Although this question can only be fully 
answered after identifying defendants of the AML administrative litigation, a 
preliminary answer based on all available legal information is provided as below. 
According to Articles 15 and 17 of the ALL, the courts of first instance for AML 
administrative litigation can be the intermediate people's courts of Beijing and other 
intermediate people's courts at municipal level. The appellate courts can be the higher 
people's courts of Beijing and other higher people's courts at provincial level. 
Although the court of first instance can also be one of the higher people's courts if the 
case is `important and complex', it is however hardly happen in practice according to 
official statistical terms. 193 Currently, civil and administrative litigation in the PRC is 
subject to one appeal only. 
Under the AML context, considering the fact of total 389 intermediate people's courts 
and 30 higher people's courts (one for each region at provincial level) in the PRC, 
194 
two major concerns are: (1) Would the current ALL jurisdiction rules be realistic for 
the future AML administrative litigation? (2) Would the PRC have resources to train 
sufficient judges of all these courts in order to apply the AML competently? 
The answers might be negative. The present writer therefore proposed that future AML 
revision and/or other (non-)legislation efforts should further address jurisdiction 
problem of the AML administrative litigation. 
13 According to Zhongguo Falu Nianjian & Zhongguo Sifa Xingrheng Nianjian (Yearbook of Chinese Legal System 
& Yearbook of Chinese Judicial Administration), various years between 1989-2006, no first trial of administrative 
litigation has been found to start from a higher people's court. 
"' See discussion of court system of the PRC in ch2, above. Also see official information of the trail system at: 
<http: //www. china. org. cn/english/Judiciary/31280. htm>. 
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Similar concerns have expressed by some commentators but they have not provided 
reasons for their argument. For example, Mr Wang Da, a judge of the Supreme 
People's Court has recently suggested that the AML can specifically stipulate that the 
court of first instance for AML administrative litigation is the Higher People's Court of 
Beijing, and the appellant court is the Supreme People's Court of PRC. 195 Whether Mr 
Wang's suggestion will be adopted is uncertain. The 2006 SCNPC Summary has 
showed no comments on courts' competence and jurisdiction problems. 
8.4.1.5 Limitation Periods 
According to Article 57 and 60 of the ALL, the limitation period for first instance 
courts to deliver judgments of administrative litigation is three month, and the period 
for appellant courts to deliver final judgments is two month. These periods can be 
extended unlimitedly upon approvals from the Supreme People's Court. According to 
competition enforcement experience of the EC and the USA, for example, `the normal 
CFI procedure takes around thirty months', 196 the three-month and two-month 
limitation periods would be too unrealistic to deliver AML judgments although they 
can be extended, the unlimited extension implies however insufficient protection of 
legitimate expectations. 
8.4.2 Civil Litigation: Is There Space for Private Enforcement? 
According to the AML, undertakings shall be responsible for civil liabilities if their 
monopolistic conduct cause damages to others. 197 Clarification is needed such as 
procedures available for seeking AML compensation, the scope of the vague term 
`others', the level of compensation, and whether AMEA decisions are prerequisites for 
seeking AML compensations, etc. The 2005 ABA Joint Comments presume that since 
no AML damage claim may be commenced until the AMEA has imposed a decision 
193 Wang Da, 'Gong Ribende Fanlongduan Zhidu Tan Zhongguo de Fanlongduan Lifa' (Analysis on Chinese Anti- 
Monopoly Legislation in the light of Japanese Anti-Monopoly System) in Cheng (ed), An Exploration of China's 
Legislation of Competition 173-74, see n 4, above. 
196 L. 0. Blanco &KJ. Jorgens, 'Antitrust Rules (Articles 81 & 82 EC)' in L. 0. Blanco (ed), European 
Community Competition Procedure (2nd edn Oxford University Press, Oxford 2006) 60. 
'97 AML, art 50 
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and confirmed a finding of monopolistic conduct, an injured party must complain to 
the AMEA first. 198 However, another commentator argues that private enforcement can 
be a powerful tool to facilitate AML compliance. Furthermore, designing punitive 
damage calculations could provide incentives to injured parties to take action, 
especially where they cannot persuade the AMEA to act. Such action could also be a 
deterrent to offenders. '99 
In practice, prior to the enactment of the AML, Chinese undertakings are actively 
seeking legal basis from the existing framework, for example, by relying on the 1993 
AUCL and the 1999 Contract Law, to challenge competitors' alleged monopolistic 
conduct. High-profile cases include Sichuan Dexian v Shanghai Sony Guangdian 
Electronics on leverage effect and bundling of consumables in aftermarket and 
Dongjin v Intel on bundling and interoperability/IP rights disputes 20° At the same time, 
Chinese judges have written decisions that are consistent with the AML legislation 
based on broad principles in older statutes. 20' 
Therefore, whether there is any space for AML private enforcement, whether private 
enforcement should be encouraged to play a larger role in the AML enforcement, and 
if yes, whether Chinese courts could be competent to handle AML damage disputes 
which are not based on the AMEA's public enforcement are worth to be further 
addressed. 
8.5 Anti-Monopoly Enforcement v Sectoral Regulations Implementation 
The relationship between competition law and industry policy constitute a highly 
complex problem. Under the AML context, prior to the November 2005 Draft, the 
proposed law stipulate that it applies to market competition of regulated industry, even 
198 ABA (n 3) Joint Comments 2005,32-33. 
1" Williams (n 3) 189. 
200 See 6.4, above. 
201 Comments given by a UK trade and competition lawyer active in China. 
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where sector-specific laws and/or regulations exist. 202 Nevertheless, recently drafts 
(until the Second Reading Draft) all compromised to national industry policy and 
provided that if other regulatory structure exists, it takes priority. 203 However, many 
commentators criticized this approach and expressed their concerns on the possibility 
of regulatory failure of sector-specific approach, especially `regulatory capture' which 
means `the regulator is captured by the very industries being regulated. '204 
The 1993 AUCL has similar arrangement that stipulated that `where laws or 
administrative rules and regulations provide that other departments shall exercise the 
supervision and inspection, those provisions shall apply' . 
205 Lessons from the AUCL 
were clear that numerous sectoral regulators and sectoral regulations have 
substantively challenged the hierarchy and effectiveness of the AUCL. 206 
The fact is, in part because of the backlash of the protectionism and the ever-growing 
sentiment of nationalism, industry policy supporters seemed much stronger than the 
enthusiastic AML advocates. For example, in the 2006 SCNPC Summary, the SASAC 
commented that whether natural monopolies and state-owned or controlled industries 
such as energy, telecommunication, petroleum, and railway, etc. should subject to the 
proposed AML need to be reconsidered. Some powerful regulators and SOE such as 
the STMB (State Tobacco Monopoly Bureau), SGCC (State Grid Corporation of 
China), CNPC (China Natural Gas & Petroleum Corporation), and several local 
governments claimed that industries of public utilities, tobaccos, banking and 
insurance, etc. should either subject to sectoral regulations or be granted anti- 
monopoly exceptions for the reasons of public interests and national security. On the 
contrary, the MOJ (Ministry of Justice), and many local governments expressed 
202 See for example, the July 2005 Draft, an 43. 
203 See for example, the First Reading Draft, pare 2 of art 2. 
204 See, for example, Wang Xiaaye (n 3) 6-7; Williams (n3)426; Paul Craig, Administrative Law (Sweet & Maxwell, 
London 2003) 360. 
207 AUCL 1993, art 3. 
206 See discussion in ch 3, above. 
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concerns on public grievance towards abusive behaviour of regulated industries and 
these sectors' tendency and ability to bypass the proposed law. 
When examining the relationship between competition policy and regulation, Kirchner 
proposes that initial introduction of sectoral specific regulation may `easily result in a 
regulatory deadlock' during the transformation process of state monopolies to 
competitive market. From the case of the PRC, this observation can be proved valid. 
Kirchner suggests that such regulatory deadlock `can only be prevented or ended if 
prudent regulatory devices are combined with the early introduction of competition 
policy in downstream market'. 207 This suggestion however, may or may not be 
workable for the case at hand and which side could win in the competition between 
competition law and industry policy in the PRC still need to be seen. 
8.6 Concluding Remarks: an Answer to the Possibility of the EC Competition 
Law Model as a Trojan Horse to China 
Williams recently asks whether introducing an EC competition law model could be a 
Trojan horse for China since an anti-monopoly law may `contain hidden dangers that 
might cause unforeseen consequences for the Chinese economy? ' The writer does not 
define what these hidden dangers could be and what kind of consequences would they 
bring to China. 20' 
Previously, Williams suggested that it may be possible that additional powers granted 
to the state authorities in order to promote competition could however be used to 
protect failing domestic industries from effective competition, a condition brought by 
new entrants to the domestic Chinese market. 209 Western governments and 
multinational companies have showed similar concerns as they fear that China may use 
the AML to check and block non-domestic competitors' access to the lucrative Chinese 
207 Christian Kirchner, 'Competition policy vs. regulation: administration vs. judiciary' in Manfred Neumann & 
Jurgen Weigand (eds. ), The International Handbook of Competition (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham 2004) 306-318. 
201 Mark Williams, (n 4)'Adoption of the EC Competition Law Model', 324-357. 
209 Williams (n 4) 354. 
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market as well as to justify the government's heavy market intervention. 
Williams' use of the `Trojan horse' metaphor may imply the `transformative power of 
legal transplants', a question which has been focused on by scholars of comparative 
law. 210 For example, Grossfeld observes that comparative law may function as an 
'early warning system', which is alerting countries to impending social changes and 
how other systems are coping with those changes. 211 Scholars who have focused on the 
adoption of Western law in twentieth century Africa were also interested in the 
unintended cultural changes that accompany the reception of foreign law in a 
developing country. Hiller writes: 
... while any developing country can probably adopt and adapt any law or 
body of laws from another culture, ..., such 
laws or body of laws carry with 
them so much imperceptible and incommensurable cultural "baggage" that the 
receiving country will inevitably experience far more internal cultural change 
than it either realized, intended or would have intended? 12 
Bearing these warnings in mind, this writer has two comments regarding Willams' 
Trojan horse metaphor. First, although the AML could be abused by protectionists and 
nationalists, but the AML will be a vexed instrument and Chinese officials already 
realize that they have much `effective' policy tools, for example, flexible sector- 
specific industry policies, to protect and promote domestic industries instead of 
referring to the AML. A vivid example is Carlyle's attempt to acquire Xugong. The 
proposed transaction was notified to MOFCOM according to 2003 M&A Rules in 
October 2005, the proposed acquiring shares have been deduced from 85% to 45%, but 
210 Spencer Weber Waller, `Neo-Realism and the International Harmonization of Law: Lessons from Antitrust' (1994)42 Kansas Law Review 557-604,567. In this article, Waller provides critical analysis on the transferability of 
national law and suggests 'a new focus on the harmonization of values and norms in place of a wasteful search for a 
common global text of competition law' (Waller, 581). 
211 Bernhard Grossfeld, The Strength and Weakness of Comparative Law (Tony Weir trans, 1990), 112. Cited by Waller (n 64) 567. 
212 Jack A Hiller, 'Language, Law, Sports and Culture: The Transferability or Non-Transferability of Words. Lifestyles, and Attitudes Through Law' (1978)12 Valparaiso University Law Review 434. Cited by Wailer (n 64) 
586. 
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the deal is still waiting to be cleared. The influence of 2003 M&A Rules (now the 2006 
M&A Rules) is much marginalized by the MOFCOM, the SASAC and the NDRC. 
Instead, claims such as `national economic security' can be relied on whenever it is 
convenient. 
Secondly, the deeper reason for prevailing protectionism and nationalism might be 
found beyond market and competition. For example, one commentator observed that 
the Chinese ruling elites have become `increasingly reliant on the facile notion that 
state-sponsored patriotism and nationalism can hold China's disparate groups 
together'. 213 
Therefore, this writer's answer to the possible `Trojan horse' question is that, in the 
short run, since the PRC up to now shows very pragmatic and instrumental approach 
toward competition law and policy, an AML on its own cannot destroy the regime like 
the wooden horse to Trojans. Nevertheless, in the long run, the `Trojan horse' 
metaphor may well predict the socio-cultural changes that will result from the ongoing 
and forthcoming tensions between the AML and its indigenous context. 
213 Willy Wo-lap Lam, 'Unmark the man with wooden face', at: <http: //www. project- 
syndicate. org/convnentaryAam I/English>. 
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9 
The Way Ahead 
It is evidence of a history - the history of power and antitrust law... But we can 
already glimpse a future that is certainly unknown, but for this very reason 
open to the options and the dilemmas of yesterday and today. 
- Giuliano Amato, Antitrust and the Bounds of Power' 
Chinese competition law and policy is still in its infancy. Since competition law and 
policy indicates economic, political and social development stages of a specific 
jurisdiction, its focus is different across time and place. The emphasis of competition 
regulation in a transitional China, as noted by commentators, should be to facilitate 
the establishment of a competitive market. Such a goal is significantly different from 
the aim of maintaining an existing competitive environment in established market 
economies. Furthermore, the predicaments, challenges and implications of getting the 
PRC, a former monopolist operator of the whole economy, to develop a workable 
competition law and policy, cannot be underestimated. 
When examining multinational enterprises and the law, Muchlinski observes `the 
interaction of MNEs with the political communities in which they operate', and 
identified `ideological themes' that have influenced the development of MNE 
regulation. 3 From the preceding discussions, one may also see the strong influence of 
European experience as well as Nationalism, the `regulated market perspective' and 
the `Marxist' perspective. As already discussed, the tension between a transitional 
'Giuliano Amato, Antitrust and Bound of Power (Hart Publishing, Oxford 1997) 129. 
2 Bing Song, 'Competition Policy in a Transition Economy: The Case of China' (1995) 31 Stanford Journal of International Law 387,394. 
3 Muchlinski identified a number of ideological 'Building Blocks' including perspectives of the 'Neo-Classical Market', the 'Regulated Market' and the 'Marxist' and the influence of Nationalism. See, Peter Muchlinski, Multinational Enterprises and the Law (2d edn Oxford University Press, Oxford 2007) 81, and 90-96. 
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economy and a still highly concentrated political regime is more obviously reflected by 
the AML than any other existing law of the PRC. For example, to prohibit the abuse of 
administrative power to restrict competition, a system of legal, economic and political 
instruments is required. Neither legal nor non-legal approaches alone are sufficient. 
Without being sustained by an independent judiciary and a competent quasi judiciary 
competition authority, using administrative power to check administrative power may 
be unfeasible. Moreover, in order to establish a transparent and administrable 
competition regime, administrative guidelines and notices are required to clarify a 
series of uncertain points under the AML. For example, block exemption regulations 
may be urgently needed to enable the AML monopoly agreement exemption rules 
workable in practice. 
As regards merger control rules, western governments and MNCs feared that China 
may use the AML to block non-domestic competitors' access to the lucrative Chinese 
market as well as to justify the government heavy market intervention under the name 
of `national security'. Recent overseas investments by Chinese enterprises and 
sovereign wealth funds have caused many to believe that the AML may reflect the fact 
that an increasingly prosperous China no longer needs foreign investment as badly as 
before and that Beijing is therefore using its national security review to discourage 
foreign investment. Nonetheless, it is unclear how such a national security review will 
be applied and the wording of Article 31 AML actually indicates that Chinese 
policymakers intend to use other laws and regulations but not the AML to deal with 
concerns on national security. 
Moreover, the AML enforcement mechanism and various concerns towards this 
mechanism are located at the crossroads of economic and political power in the PRC. 
It is still difficult to tell how the AMC and the AMEA will be organized by 1 August 
2008, when the AML will come into force. Understandably, there are real fears that the 
insufficient checks on and excessive discretion under the AML could lead to 
unnecessary government interference into the marketplace or heavy business burdens 
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or both. One may predict that concerns on transparency, predictability, consistency, 
procedural equity, and compliance will continue to be focuses of Chinese competition 
law and policy discourse. 
Having said all that, the substantial and positive impact of the AML and of broader 
competition policy to the PRC should not be underestimated. For example, complaints 
have led to a number of recent price fixing cases coming to light, and the public 
enthusiasm towards the AML is particularly high. As commented by Professor Xiaoye 
Wang, an adviser to the AML legislative panel, `the enactment of an anti-monopoly 
law is a beginning but not a finishing touch to Chinese competition legislation. ' 4 
Future competition law developments in the decades to come may prove to be heavily 
influenced by the newly-enacted AML, along with other legal and regulatory reforms 
by the PRC. 
Markets are messy, complicated, and inevitably imperfect. S On the other hand, 
governments often fail to act ideally. The first priority of the transition in the PRC, in 
theory, has been the optimum use of scarce resources and the extent to which it can 
best be achieved in markets within an appropriate framework of law and institutions or, 
where markets cannot work, in other approaches. Because in the real world the 
alternative to the market is the government, and both are imperfect, the choice between 
them unavoidably turns on judgement of the comparative consequences of market 
failure and government failure. Some hold that government failure is likely to be more 
serious than market failure - in which case government ought to keep its hands off the 
economy even in cases of market failure. Gary Becker states the position as follows: 
I am inclined to believe that monopoly and other imperfections are at 
least as important, and perhaps substantially more so, in the political 
4 Wang Xiaoye, `Fanlongduanfa: Zhongguo jingji tizhi gaige de lichengbei' (The Anti-Monopoly Law: a landmark 
of China's economic reform) Fah! Ribao (Legal Daily) (Beijing 1 September 2007). 
5 Bruce Doern and Stephen Wilks (eds), Comparative Competition Policy (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1996) 13. 
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sectors as in the market place... does the existence of market 
imperfections justify government intervention? The answer would be 
`no' if the imperfections in government behaviour were greater than 
those in the market 6 
Reminders of the existence of government failure are important since such failures are 
prevail in the contemporary PRC. Governments may well gear policies to special 
interests or other political considerations, rather than to the public welfare. Peter 
Muchliski, on the contrary, argues that the whole society should 
... 
be vigilant against the hypocritical, self-serving, ideology of some 
senior executives who cry out against `regulation' in the name of 
`entrepreneurship' when they are in fact advocating a return to the `state 
of nature' in which anything goes, nothing of much use, other than 
paper money, is produced, and people are cheated. 
A pragmatic recognition of the possibility of both market and government failure, 
besides suggesting efforts to improve markets and governance, would dictate careful 
and open-minded examination of competition law and policy issue to determine the 
best way to proceed. As observed by Gerber, `[c]ompetition law presents special 
epistemic problems, because it involves a variety of interrelated goals, values, and 
perspectives, and because economic causation issues that are central to its application 
are often complex and uncertain. 's 
Furthermore, domestic and regional competition law is shaped by and shapes the law's 
ecological environment. Similar to other social phenomena, competition law is 
6 Gary Becker, The Economics Approach to Human Behavior (The University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1976) 37. 
7 Peter Muchlinski, 'Enron and Beyond: Multinational Corporate Groups and the International Governance and 
Disclosure Regimes' (2004-2005) 37 Connecticut Law Review 725,763. 
$ David Gerber, Law and Competition in Twentieth Century Europe: Protecting Prometheus (1" Paperback edn 
Oxford University Press, Oxford 2001) xvii. 
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evolutionary and dynamic. Its influence can be both marginal and substantive across 
different jurisdictions and time. 9 In a broader context, when examining international 
harmonization of competition law, Waller observes that `the failure to achieve 
uniformity is not just the result of bad faith, lack of clarity or misunderstanding of the 
common text. It is the product of a more fundamental disagreement about what it 
means to "value" something. ' Waller observes the tensions between the USA and Japan 
regarding the Sharman Act as a suitable model for Japan to transplant new competition 
provisions at the end of the World War H. Waller used such tensions as an example of 
the problems and assumptions underlying attempts at harmonizing competition law. He 
noted that Japan lacks `an indigenous tradition of competition as a value to enforce 
through legal mechanism' and much of the frustration of the USA `stems from the 
assumption - at least implicit - that competition law in Japan should work in a similar 
fashion as in the United States'. Waller further comments that `whether nations are 
actually discussing the same topic, or whether they are discussing very different topics 
but using overlapping vocabularies' should be determined. Waller thus suggests that `a 
candid discussion of norms and values, rather than the enactment of specific legal 
rules'... would help avoid the fate of failures of the `five great attempts' that have been 
made to achieve a true international harmonization of competition law in the twentieth 
century. 10 For example, during the negotiation process of the UNCTAD Set of 
Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles for the Control of Restrictive Business 
Practices (RBP Code)' of 1980, the USA and many other developed countries `were 
talking about antitrust, or something close to it. The unaligned nations were using the 
rhetoric of antitrust to talk about development needs and the transfer of technology. It 
was unclear that, if anything, the socialist bloc thought it was discussing, other than a 
9 For example, despite the textual similarities between the US Sherman Act and the Japanese Antimonopoly Act and 
the significant role of the USA in the promulgation of the Japanese Antimonopoly Act, the Act has been enforced 
much less frequently than the comparable US laws. Moreover, the Act has been often perceived more as an instrument of industrial development and a barrier to market access than a true antitrust system. See analysis in Spencer Weber Waller, `Neo-Realism and the International Harmonization of Law: Lessons from Antitrust' (1994) 
42 Kansas Law Review 592-93. 
10 The 'five great attempts' referred by Waller included efforts on harmonization of competition law made by the 
League of Nations, the proposed International Trade Organization (ITO), the Economic and Social Council of the 
United Nations, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development. See, Waller (n 11) 578-79, and fns 2-6. 
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set or principles that might disadvantage the West. 'tl 
Regarding transplanting competition law in the PRC, after three decades opening-up 
and market economy reform, the conception and development of the AML is still 
sending multi-angle signals similar to what has been observed by Waller. The PRC is 
in the process of shaping its competition law and policy to meet indigenous societal 
needs. The mere task of drafting the AML took thirteen years. One may thus predict 
that the full establishment and optimal enforcement of Chinese competition law and 
policy may request much longer time to achieve. Such process requires sufficient 
political support. There are full bargains and pressures in the course of legislature, and 
the future of China's competition law, could be flooded with infinite struggles and 
conflicts. Therefore, whether such process may eliminate the core of a competition law 
system is calling for close observations and is open to further explanations. 
Nevertheless, as manifested by this thesis, competition law and policy affects 
marketplace and governance of the PRC, although it is impossible to assess the extent 
of the effect at this very early stage. The cautious concluding remarks of this thesis is 
that the evolution of the Chinese competition law and policy is the outcome of a 
collision and fusion between indigenous conditions and Western experience, which 
occurs in connection with changes in the Chinese market, society and governance. 
Promulgating an AML was a small step - however fundamental - in the process of 
elaborating modern market economy, rule of law, and good governance in the PRC. 
11 Waller(nll)619. 
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Appendix 2: Data Explanation for a Field 
Research during May and June 2005716 
1. Introduction 
During May and June 2005. the present author conducted a field research in mainland 
China to assess the country's ongoing anti-monopoly legislation for the purpose of 
supporting the author' PhD thesis. The main objective of this research was identical to 
the author's thesis, that is, to explore the interaction between a system of competition 
law and the law's ecological environment"' in a transitional socialist China . 
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716 1 am honoured and grateful for the generous funding from the University of London Central Research Fund 
(2004/2005. Ref. AR/CRF/C), without which the project would be unfeasible. 717 The concept of 'ecology of competition law' is explored in chs I and 2 of the thesis. 
"" 'Transitional socialist China' refers to a regime in which the preconditions for a market economy and 
representative political institutions are not fully established. The regime is fundamentally different from 
`established democracies', for instance, the UK and the USA. Although it is in transition, the regime is categorized 
by political scientists as a 'non-democracy' and therefore contrasts with 'democratizing regimes'. for instance, 
post-communist Central and Eastern European Countries such as Hungary. 
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The body of the research comprised a series of extensive discussions, interviews with 
thought leaders of law and economics, government officials, business professionals, 
and the general public, with the research effort focus on four cities in Mainland China 
where the market competition features are both representative and nuances: Beijing, 
Shanghai, Xi'an, and Zhengzhou. 719 The research also comprised substantive review 
and analysis of relevant literature, data, and document. Below is the explanation of 
data that have been referred to in this author's thesis. 
2. Interviews and Questionnaire Surveys: 
In summary, the researcher conducted: 
"4 focused interviews (including 2 telephone interviews), each lasting about 40-65 
minutes, respondents are all based in Beijing (two law scholars and two 
economics scholars); 
" 32 shorter interviews (including 20 telephone interviews), each lasting about 10- 
25 minutes; (Respondents are lawyers/in-house counsels and judges based in 
four cities: Beijing 10, Xi'an 4, Zhengzhou 12, Shanghai 6) 
" Questionnaire surveys: totally 279 respondents (See below for detailed 
classification) 
Both the layout of the questionnaires and working language of the interviews were in 
Mandarin. 
719 See Figure 1 for geographic position of the four cities. 
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Classification and definition of participants 
Respondents who participated in the research can be classified as legal professionals, 
law researchers/lectures and college students (mainly majored in law or economics), 
business/other professionals, government officials, and the general public. See Figure 
2.1-2.5 for the distribution of questionnaires. 
Figure 2.1 Distribution of respondents by cities 
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Xi, i 
17° 
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Figure 2.2 Distribution of respondents by Occupations 
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Figure 2.3 Distribution of respondents by undertakings/organisations ownership 
or type 
Total Respondents: 279 
281 
60% 
50% 
40% 
30% 27% 
20% 
10% 6% 
0% 
II 
state awned private 
enterprises enterprises 
27% 6% 
6% 
foreign - schools and 
invested research public smct, Is other 
enterprises institutes 
I% 56% 4% 6% 
Figure 2.4 Distribution of respondents by educational background 
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Figure 2.5 Distribution of respondents by ages 
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postgraduate undergraduate college and no inswcr 
below 
41-60 
19% 
25-40 
38% 
18-25 
39"16 
  18-25   between 25-40 between 41-60 60+   no answer 
Respondents' Institutions/Undertakings/other Organisations720 
Totally 315 respondents participated in this research who are affiliated with more than 
55 organisations. A random sample of organisations is provided below: 
BASF China 
Capital University of Economics and Business (CUEB, Beijing) 
China University of Politics and Law (Beijing) 
China Telecom 
Huiyou Hostel, Beijing 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China. Zhengzhou Branch 
7'0 (I) The views expressed in this research reflect those of the respondents and do not necessarily reflect those of 
the institutions/organisations with which they arc affiliated. 
(2) The researcher cannot offer a list of governmental authorities, judicial courts, and Iaw firms with which some 
respondents are affiliated, considering the political sensitiveness of this research. Respondents from these three 
categories were deemed strictly anonymous. It is worth noting that Chinese law firms are not totally autonomous 
as they are regulated by the Ministry ofJusticc, and are required to follow the CCP's ideological trend. 
283 
bO- no ýinswcr 
3% 1% 
MacDonald's, China 
Mars China, Beijing 
Peking University 
Shanghai University 
The 5" Construction Company of Henan Province 
The Institute of Law of the Chinese Academy of Social Science (CASS. Beijing) 
Tsinghua University 
Unilever China 
Worldwide Travel, Xi'an, China 
Xi'an Foreign Language University 
Xi'an Machinery Company of Highway (Subsidiary of The Highway and Bridge Construction Group, 
China) 
Xi'an Minsheng Department Store 
Zhengzhou University 
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Appendix 3: Anti-Monopoly Law of the People's 
Republic of China' 
(Adopted by the 29th Session of the Standing. Committee of the 10th National 
People's Congress on August 30,2007) 
Table of Contents 
Chapter One General Provisions 
Chapter Two Monopoly Agreements 
Chapter Three Abuse of Dominant Market Position 
Chapter Four Concentration of Undertakings 
Chapter Five Abuse of Administrative Power to Eliminate or Restrict Competition 
Chapter Six Investigation of Suspected Monopolistic Conduct 
Chapter Seven Legal Liabilities 
Chapter Eight Supplementary Provisions 
1 Unofficial translation for reference purposes only. Source: Nathan Bush, `The PRC Antimonopoly Law: 
Unanswered Questions and Challenges Ahead' October 2007 The Antitrust Source, <www. antitrustsource. com>. 
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Chapter One General Provisions 
Article 1 This law is enacted for the purposes of preventing and prohibiting 
Monopolistic Conduct, protecting fair market competition, promoting efficiency of economic 
operation, safeguarding the interests of consumers and the public interests, and promoting the 
healthy development of the socialist market economy. 
Article 2 This law is applicable to Monopolistic Conduct in economic activities 
within the territory of the People's Republic of China. This law is applicable to Monopolistic 
Conduct outside the territory of the People's Republic of China that has eliminative or 
restrictive effects on competition in the domestic market of the People's Republic of China. 
Article 3 "Monopolistic Conduct" referred to herein includes: 
(1) conclusion of monopoly agreements by undertakings; 
(2) abuse of dominant market positions by undertakings; 
(3) concentrations of undertakings that have or are likely to have the effect of 
eliminating or restricting competition. 
Article 4 The State shall formulate and implement competition rules suitable for 
the socialist market economy to improve control of the macro-economy and to strengthen a 
unified, open, competitive, and orderly market system. 
Article 5 Undertakings may implement concentrations in accordance with the 
law through fair competition and voluntary combination to expand their business scale and to 
improve their market competitiveness. 
Article 6 Undertakings with dominant market positions shall not abuse their 
dominant market positions to eliminate or restrict competition., 
Article 7 With respect to industries that are controlled by the state-owned 
economy and that are critical to the wellbeing of the national economy and national security, 
as well as industries in which exclusive operation and exclusive sales are the norm of 
business in accordance with the law, the State shall protect the lawful business activities of 
the undertakings in such industries. The State shall regulate and supervise the business 
activities of such undertakings and regulate the prices of commodities and services provided 
by such undertakings in accordance with the law so as to protect the interests of the 
consumers and to promote technological progress. 
Undertakings in the industries referred to in the preceding paragraph shall conduct 
their business in accordance with the law, shall be honest and reputable in their business 
dealings, and shall maintain strict self-discipline and accept public supervision. They shall 
not harm the interests of consumers by utilizing their controlling positions or their status as 
the exclusive provider of certain services or products. 
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Article 8 Administrative agencies and organizations empowered by laws and 
regulations to have the function of administrating public affairs shall not abuse their 
administrative power to eliminate or restrict competition. 
Article 9 The State Council shall establish the Anti-Monopoly Commission 
which shall be responsible for organizing, coordinating, and guiding the anti-monopoly work. 
The Anti-Monopoly Commission shall perform the following duties: 
(1) to research and formulate competition policies; 
(2) to organize investigations, assess the overall market competition conditions, 
and publish the assessment reports; 
(3) to formulate and promulgate anti-monopoly guidelines; 
(4) to coordinate the anti-monopoly administrative enforcement work; 
(5) to undertake other duties as designated by the State Council. 
The State Council shall stipulate the composition of and the working rules of the Anti- 
Monopoly Commission. 
Article 10 The authority appointed by the State Council to perform the function 
of anti-monopoly law enforcement (the "Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority under 
the State Council") shall be responsible for the anti-monopoly law enforcement work in 
accordance with the provisions of this law. 
The Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority under the State Council may, if 
there is a practical need to do so, delegate to the corresponding agencies of the People's 
Governments at the levels of province, autonomous region and municipality directly under 
the central government responsibilities of the anti-monopoly law enforcement work in 
accordance with the provisions of this law, if necessary. 
Article 11 The trade associations shall strengthen the self-discipline of industries 
to lead undertakings within their respective industries to carry out lawful competition and to 
maintain the order of market competition. 
Article 12 "Undertakings" referred to herein mean natural persons, legal persons 
and other organizations that are engaged in manufacturing or otherwise dealing with 
commodities, or providing services. 
"Relevant Market" referred to herein means the scope of commodities and the scope 
of territory within which the undertakings compete with each other during a specific period of 
time with respect to specific commodities or services (collectively "commodities"). 
287 
Chapter Two Monopoly Agreements 
Article 13 The following Monopoly Agreements among undertakings with 
competing relationship shall be prohibited: 
(1) fixing or changing the price of commodities; 
(2) limiting the outputs or sales volume of commodities; 
(3) allocating the sales markets or the raw material purchasing markets; 
(4) restricting the purchase of new technology or new equipment or restricting the 
development of new products; 
(5) jointly boycotting transactions; or 
(6) other Monopoly Agreements determined by the Anti-Monopoly Law 
Enforcement Authority under the State Council. 
"Monopoly Agreements" referred to herein mean agreements, decisions or other 
concerted conducts that eliminate or restrict competition. 
Article 14 Undertakings are prohibited from entering into Monopoly Agreements 
with their counter-parties that: 
(1) fix the resale price of commodities sold to third parties; 
(2) limit the minimum resale price of commodities sold to third parties; or 
(3) other Monopoly Agreements determined by the Anti-Monopoly Law 
Enforcement Authority under the State Council. 
Article 15 The provisions of Articles 13 and 14 shall not apply to agreements 
among undertakings if the undertakings can prove that such agreements fall under any of the 
following: 
(1) for the purpose of improving technology, researching and developing new 
products; 
(2) for the purpose of improving the product quality, reducing costs, enhancing 
efficiency, unifying specifications and standards of products, or implementing division of 
labor based on specialization; 
(3) for the purpose of improving operational efficiency of small and medium- 
sized undertakings and enhancing their competitiveness; 
(4) for the purpose of achieving public interests, including, but not limited to, 
energy saving, environmental protection, and disaster relief; 
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(5) for the purpose of alleviating serious decreases in sales volume or distinctive 
production surpluses due to economic depression; 
(6) for the purpose of safeguarding legitimate interests in foreign trade and 
foreign economic cooperation; 
(7) other circumstances as stipulated by laws and by the State Council. 
If any Monopoly Agreements fall into the circumstances set forth in sub-clauses (1) to 
(5) above so that the provisions of Articles 13 and 14 are not applicable , the relevant 
undertakings must also prove that the agreement so concluded will not materially restrict 
competition in the Relevant Market and that the agreement can allow consumers to share the 
benefits generated therefrom. 
Article 16 The trade associations shall not organize undertakings within their 
industries to engage in Monopolistic Conduct prohibited under this Chapter. 
Chapter Three Abuse of Dominant Market Position 
Article 17 Undertakings with dominant market positions are prohibited from 
abusing their dominant market positions by engaging in the following activities: 
prices; 
(1) selling commodities at unfair high prices or buying commodities at unfair low 
(2) selling commodities at prices below cost without any justification; 
(3) refusing to transact with counter-parties with respect to a transaction without 
any justification; 
(4) restricting, without any justification, their counter-parties to transact with such 
undertakings exclusively or to transact with other parties designated by such undertakings 
exclusively; 
(5) engaging in tie-in sales of commodities or imposing other unreasonable 
conditions with respect to transactions without any justification; 
(6) applying differential treatments to counter-parties to transactions who have the 
same qualifications with respect to transaction price and other transaction terms, without any 
justification; 
(7) other activities that are deemed by the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement 
Authority of the State Council as abusing dominant market positions. 
"Dominant Market Positions" referred to herein mean the market positions held by 
undertakings who are able to control the price or quantity of commodities, or other 
transaction terms in the Relevant Market or to block or affect the entry of other undertakings 
into the Relevant Market. 
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Article 18 A finding that certain undertaking has a Dominant Market Position 
shall be based on the following factors: 
(1) the market share of the undertaking in the Relevant Market, and the 
competition conditions in the Relevant Market; 
(2) the ability of the undertaking to control the sales market or the raw material 
purchasing market; 
(3) the financial resources and the technical capacities of the undertaking; 
(4) the extent to which other undertakings depend on the subject undertaking with 
respect to relevant transactions; 
(5) the level of difficulty for other undertakings to enter the Relevant Market; 
(6) other factors relating to the determination whether the subject undertaking has 
a Dominant Market Position. I 
Article 19 Undertakings may be presumed to have a Dominant Market Position if 
they satisfy any of the following conditions: 
(1) the market share of one undertaking in the Relevant Market accounts for 1/2; 
2/3; or 
for 3/4. 
(2) the joint market share of two undertakings in the Relevant Market accounts for 
(iii) the joint market share of three undertakings in the Relevant Market accounts 
In case of circumstances set forth in the sub-clauses (2) and (3) above, if any of such 
undertakings has a market share less than 1/10, it shall not be presumed to have a Dominant 
Market Position. 
If an undertaking which is presumed to have a Dominant Market Position presents 
evidences showing otherwise, it shall not be deemed to have a Dominant Market Position. 
Chapter Four Concentration of Undertakings 
Article 20 Concentration of undertakings means the following circumstances: 
(1) a merger of undertakings; 
(2) an acquisition by an undertaking of the control of other undertakings through 
acquiring equity or assets; 
(3) an undertaking, by contracts or other means, acquiring control of other 
undertakings or the capability to exercise decisive influence on other undertakings. 
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Article 21 If a concentration of undertakings meets the thresholds for notification 
as stipulated by the State Council, the relevant undertakings shall file a notification with the 
Anti-monopoly Law Enforcement Authority under the State Council in advance. Without 
filing such a notification, the undertakings shall be prohibited from implementing the 
concentration. 
Article 22 Undertakings are permitted not to file any notification with the Anti- 
Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority under the State Council if their concentration meets 
any of the following conditions: 
(1) one undertaking participating in the concentration owns more than 50% of the 
voting shares or assets of each of the other participating undertakings; 
(2) more than 50% of the voting shares or assets of every undertaking 
participating in the concentration are owned by a single undertaking that does not participate 
in the concentration. 
Article 23 When undertakings file a notification of concentration with the Anti- 
Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority under the State Council, they shall submit the 
following documents and materials: 
(1) the notification; 
(2) an statement explaining the impact of the concentration upon the competition 
conditions of the Relevant Market; 
(3) the concentration agreement; 
(4) the financial and accounting reports of the undertakings participating in the 
concentration in the preceding fiscal year, which are audited by accountant firms; 
(5) other documents and materials required by the Anti-Monopoly Law 
Enforcement Authority under the State Council. 
The notification shall indicate clearly the name, address and business scope of the 
undertakings participating in the concentration, the proposed date for implementing the 
concentration and other matters as stipulated by the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement 
Authority under the State Council. 
Article 24 If the documents and materials submitted by undertakings are not 
complete, undertakings shall file supplementary documents and materials within the time 
limit specified by the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority under the State Council. 
If the undertakings make no supplementary filing within the specified time limit, it shall be 
deemed that no notification is filed. 
Article 25 The Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority under the State 
Council shall conduct a preliminary review of the reporting undertakings, decide on whether 
to initiate further review, and notify the undertakings in writing of its decision within 30 days 
from the date of receipt of the documents and materials submitted by the undertakings in 
accordance with Article 23 hereof. The undertakings shall not implement the concentration 
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before the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority under the State Council makes its 
decision. 
The undertakings may implement the concentration if the Anti-monopoly Law 
Enforcement Authority under the State Council decides not to initiate further review or 
makes no decision within the time limit. 
Article 26 If the Anti-monopoly Law Enforcement Authority under the State 
Council decides to initiate further review, it shall complete the review within 90 days from 
the date of the decision, decide whether to prohibit the concentration of the undertakings and 
notify the undertakings in writing thereof; in case of a decision to prohibit the concentration 
of undertakings, it shall explain its reasons. Undertakings shall not implement the 
concentration during the review period. 
Under any of the following circumstances, the Anti-monopoly Law Enforcement 
Authority under the State Council may extend the time limit for the review set forth in the 
above paragraph by giving a written notice to the undertakings, provided that the extension 
shall not exceed 60 days at the maximum: 
(1) the undertakings agree to extend the time limit for the review; 
(2) the documents or materials submitted by the undertakings are inaccurate and 
need further verification; or 
(3) material changes have occurred with respect to relevant circumstances since 
the undertakings filed the notification. 
If the Anti-monopoly Law Enforcement Authority under the State Council makes no 
decision within the time limit, the undertakings may implement the concentration. 
Article 27 The following factors shall be taken into consideration in the review of 
the concentration by undertakings: 
(1) the market shares of undertakings participating in the concentration in the 
Relevant Market and their ability to control of the market; 
(2) the degree of concentration in the Relevant Market; 
(3) the effect that the concentration of undertakings may have on market access 
and technological progress; 
(4) the effect that the concentration of undertakings may have on consumers and 
other relevant undertakings; 
(5) the effect that the concentration of undertakings may have on the development 
of the national economy; 
(6) other factors affecting the market competition that the Anti-Monopoly Law 
Enforcement Authority under the State Council deems relevant shall be taken into 
consideration. 
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Article 28 The Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority under the State 
Council shall make a decision to prohibit a concentration of undertakings if such 
concentration has or may have the effect of eliminating or restricting competition. However, 
the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority under the State Council may decide not to 
prohibit a concentration if the undertakings can prove that the positive effects of such 
concentration on the competition obviously overweigh its negative effects or that the 
concentration is in the public interest. 
Article 29 If the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority under the State 
Council does not prohibit the concentration of undertakings, it may decide to impose 
restrictive conditions to reduce the adverse effects the concentration may have on 
competition. 
Article 30 The Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority under the State 
Council shall publicize in a timely manner its decisions to prohibit the concentration of 
undertakings or to impose restrictive conditions on the concentration of undertakings. 
Article 31 If the merger with or acquisition of domestic enterprises by foreign 
investors or other forms of concentration involving foreign investors concerns national 
security, in addition to the review of concentration of undertakings in accordance with the 
provisions of this Law, it shall be examined for national security review in accordance with 
relevant regulations of the State. 
Chapter Five Abuse of Administrative Power to Eliminate or Restrict Competition 
Article 32 Administrative agencies and organizations empowered by laws and 
regulations to have the function of administrating public affairs shall not abuse their 
administrative powers to require or require in a disguised form organizations or individuals to 
deal in, purchase or use the commodities supplied by the undertakings designated by them. 
Article 33 Administrative agencies and organizations empowered by laws and 
regulations to have the function of administrating public affairs shall not abuse their 
administrative powers and take any of the following actions to hinder the free flow of 
commodities among different regions: 
(1) to charge discriminatory fees under separate fee categories or at different rates, 
or fix discriminatory prices for commodities originated from other regions; 
(2) to impose on commodities originated from other regions technical 
requirements or inspection standards different from those applied to similar local 
commodities, or cause commodities originated from other regions to be subject to 
discriminatory technical measures such as duplicate inspection or certification, so as to 
restrict the entry of commodities originated from other regions into the local markets; 
(3) to implement special administrative licensing measures applicable only to 
commodities originated from other regions, so as to restrict the entry of commodities 
originated from other regions into the local markets; 
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(4) to set up checkpoints or take other measures to block the entry of commodities 
originated from other regions or the flow of local commodities out of the region; 
(5) other actions that may impede the free flow of commodities among different 
regions. 
Article 34 Administrative agencies and organizations empowered by laws and 
regulations to have the function of administrating public affairs shall not abuse their 
administrative powers to exclude or restrict the participation of undertakings from other 
regions in local bidding activities by means such as prescribing discriminatory qualification 
requirements or standards or by not publishing information according to law. 
Article 35 Administrative agencies and organizations empowered by laws and 
regulations to have the function of administrating public affairs shall not abuse their 
administrative powers to exclude or restrict investment in their region or establishment of 
branches or subsidiaries in their region by undertakings from other regions, by applying 
means such as treatment not equal to what local undertakings are entitled to. 
Article 36 Administrative agencies and organizations empowered by laws and 
regulations to have the function of administrating public affairs shall not abuse their 
administrative powers to compel undertakings to engage in any Monopolistic Conduct set 
forth hereunder. 
Article 37 Administrative agencies shall not abuse their administrative powers to 
make regulations that contain provisions eliminating or restricting competition. 
Chapter Six Investigation of Suspected Monopolistic Conduct 
Article 38 The Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority shall investigate 
suspected Monopolistic Conducts in accordance with the law. 
Any organization or individual shall have the right to report any suspected 
Monopolistic Conduct to the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority. The Anti- 
Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority shall maintain the confidentiality for the reporting 
organization or individual. 
The Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority shall conduct necessary 
investigation if the report is in writing and includes relevant facts and evidence. 
Article 39 When conducting investigations of the suspected Monopolistic 
Conduct, the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority may take the following measures: 
(1) entering into business premises of the undertaking being investigated or other 
relevant places for inspection; 
(2) questioning the undertakings being investigated, interested parties, and other 
relevant organizations or individuals, requesting them to clarify the relevant facts and 
circumstances; 
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(3) examining or copying relevant documents, agreements, accounting books, 
business correspondence, electronic data and other materials of the undertakings being 
investigated, interested parties, and other relevant organizations or individuals; 
(4) sealing or seizing relevant evidence; 
(5) making inquiries about the bank accounts of the undertakings. 
Measures as stipulated in the foregoing paragraph may be implemented only after a 
written report has been submitted to the principal responsible persons of the Anti-Monopoly 
Law Enforcement Authority and the relevant approval has been obtained. 
Article 40 Investigations of suspected Monopolistic Conduct by the Anti- 
Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority shall be carried out by at least two enforcement 
officers and such officers shall present law enforcement certificates. 
The enforcement officers shall maintain written records of their inquiries and 
investigations. Such written records shall be signed by the persons questioned or 
investigated. 
Article 41 The Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority and its staff shall 
keep confidential commercial secrets obtained during the course of law enforcement. 
Article 42 The undertakings being investigated, interested parties, or other 
relevant organizations or individuals shall cooperate with the Anti-Monopoly Law 
Enforcement Authority with respect to the performance of its functions in accordance with 
the Law and shall not refuse or hinder the investigation by the Anti-Monopoly Law 
Enforcement Authority. 
Article 43 The undertakings being investigated and interested parties shall have 
the right to state their opinions. The Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority shall verify 
the facts, justifications and evidence presented by the undertakings being investigated and 
interested parties. 
Article 44 After investigating and verifying the suspected Monopolistic Conduct, 
if the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority determines that such conduct constitutes 
Monopolistic Conduct, it shall make a decision in accordance with the law and may publicize 
the decision to the public. 
Article 45 With respect to a suspected Monopolistic Conduct being investigated 
by the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority, if the undertakings being investigated 
commit themselves to take specific measures within the time limit approved by the Anti- 
Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority to eliminate the effects of such Monopolistic 
Conduct, the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority may decide to suspend the 
investigation. The decision to suspend the investigation shall expressly state the specific 
commitment made by the undertakings being investigated. 
If the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority decides to suspend the 
investigation, it shall monitor the undertakings' performance of their commitments. If the 
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undertakings have fulfilled their commitments, the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement 
Authority may decide to terminate the investigation. 
The Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority shall resume the investigation if one 
of the following circumstances occurs: 
(1) the undertakings fails to fulfil their commitments; 
(2) material changes have occurred with respect to the facts based on which the 
decision to suspend the investigation was made; 
(3) the decision to suspend the investigation was made based on incomplete or 
untrue information provided by the undertakings. 
Chapter Seven Legal Liabilities 
Article 46 If the undertakings conclude and implement Monopoly Agreements in 
violation of relevant provisions of this Law, the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority 
shall order the undertakings to stop such illegal act, confiscate their illegal gains and impose 
fines of more than I% and less than 10% of their sales in the preceding year; if the Monopoly 
Agreement has not been implemented, fines of less than RMB500,000 may be imposed. 
If the undertakings, on their own initiative, report to the Anti-Monopoly Law 
Enforcement Authority information concerning the conclusion of Monopoly Agreements and 
provide important evidence, the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority may reduce the 
penalty imposed or grant exemption from penalty after weighing the relevant circumstances. 
If trade associations organize undertakings within their respective industries to 
conclude Monopoly Agreements in violation of this 
, 
Law, the Anti-Monopoly Law 
Enforcement Authority may impose a fine of no more than RMB500,000; if the 
circumstances are serious, the authority in charge of registration and administration of social 
organizations may revoke the registration of the trade organizations in accordance with the 
law. 
Article 47 If the undertakings abuse their Dominant Market Positions in violation 
of relevant provisions of this Law, the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority shall 
order the undertakings to stop such illegal act, confiscate their illegal gains and impose a fine 
of more than I% and no less than 10% of their sales in the preceding year. 
Article 48 If the undertakings implement the concentration in violation of 
relevant provisions of this Law, the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority under the 
State Council shall order the undertakings to stop implementing the concentration, dispose of 
equity or asset within a specified time limit, transfer their business within a specified time 
limit or take other necessary measures to revert to the condition of the undertakings before 
the concentration and may impose a fine of no more than RMB500,000. 
Article 49 The Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority shall take into 
consideration the nature, extent and duration of the illegal act and other factors in 
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determining the specific amount of the fines set forth in the Articles 46,47 and 48 of this 
Law. 
Article 50 Undertakings that cause loss to others as a result of their Monopolistic 
Conduct shall be liable for civil liabilities in accordance with the laws. 
Article 51 If administrative agencies and organizations empowered by laws and 
regulations to have the function of administrating public affairs abuse their administrative 
power and engage in activities eliminating or restricting competition, their superior authority 
shall order them to make correction; the chief officer directly responsible and other persons 
who are directly responsible shall be subject to disciplinary sanctions in accordance with the 
law. The Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority may propose to the relevant superior 
authority as to how to address the issue in accordance with the laws. 
If there are other provisions in laws and administrative regulations concerning the 
regulation of actions eliminating or restricting competition that are taken by administrative 
agencies and organizations empowered by laws and regulations to have the function of 
administrating public affairs that abuse their administrative powers, such other provisions 
shall prevail. 
Article 52 If any individual or organization refuses to provide relevant materials 
or information, or provide false materials or information, or conceal, destroy or remove 
evidence, or take other action to refuse or hinder the investigation conducted by the Anti- 
Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority in accordance with the law, the Anti-Monopoly Law 
Enforcement Authority shall order such individual or organization to make correction. the 
Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority may impose a fine of less than RMB20,000 on 
individuals or a fine of no more than RMB200,000 on organizations; if the circumstances are 
serious, a fine of more than RMB20,000 and less than RMB 100,000 may be imposed on 
individuals and a fine of more than RMB200,000 and less than RMB 1,000,000 on 
organizations; if any conduct constitutes a criminal offence, the relevant individual or 
organization shall be prosecuted for criminal liability in accordance with the law. 
Article 53 If any individual or organization objects to the decision made by the 
Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority in accordance with Articles 28 and 29 hereof, 
they may first apply for administrative review in accordance with the law; if they object to 
the decision of the administrative review, they may file an administrative lawsuit in 
accordance with the law. 
If any individual or organization objects to decisions made by the Anti-Monopoly 
Law Enforcement Authority other than those specified in the preceding paragraph, they may 
apply for administrative review or file an administrative lawsuit in accordance with the law. 
Article 54 Any staff of the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority who 
abuse their powers, fail to fulfil their duties, conduct irregularities for personal gains, or 
disclose commercial secrets obtained in the course of law enforcement shall be prosecuted for 
criminal liabilities in accordance with the law if their conducts constitute criminal offences, 
or shall be subject to disciplinary sanctions in accordance with the law if their conducts do 
not constitute criminal offences. 
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Chapter Eight Supplementary Provisions 
Article 55 This law shall not apply to Undertakings' conducts that are exercising 
their intellectual property rights in accordance with the provisions of laws and administrative 
regulations relating to intellectual property rights. However, this law shall apply to 
Undertakings' conducts that eliminate or restrict competition by abusing their intellectual 
property rights. 
Article 56 This law shall not apply to the alliance among or concerted actions by 
farmers and the farmers' economic organizations in connection with the production, 
processing, sales, transportation, and storage of agricultural products and other business 
activities related to agricultural products. 
Article 57 This law shall become effective as of August 1,2008. 
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